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Abstract: 
This thesis employs a discursive methodology to analyse the policy problem of 
cultural non-participation. In so doing it seeks to answer the questions of what 
the problem is, why a problem exists, and what the existence of the problem 
does ‘in the real’ (Bacchi, 2009). The study draws on primary data generated in 
the form of policy texts, speeches and 42 in-depth qualitative interviews with 
individuals working in or for publicly funded cultural organisations in Scotland. 
Employing the methodological approach of problematisation (Foucault, 2003a 
[1981]), the study offers a close analysis of the discursive logics upon which the 
construction of the problem relies. In so doing it is asserted that the problem 
construction functions as an articulatory practice (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) that 
not only constitutes and organizes social relations but also supports asymmetric 
relations of power and allows inequality in society to be represented as both 
inevitable and sensible (Rancière, 2004). 
Beginning with a discussion of how cultural participation has been constructed 
as an object of enquiry, the thesis moves on to consider how cultural non-
participation is constructed as a problem across the discursive planes of politics 
and professional practice. Having made visible the discursive logics of the 
problem construction, the discussion then examines the contingent historical 
conditions under which the existence of certain subjects, objects, and the 
intelligible relations between them became possible. Arguing that the Arts 
should be understood as a discursive institution, it is proposed that the subject 
identity of the non-participant is not only a necessary part of the discursive logic 
of this institution, but also provided the ideal boundary object (Star and 
Griesemer, 1989) around which the legitimacy of the relationship between the 
Arts and the state could, in part, be based. 
Drawing on the work of Jacques Rancière (1991; 2004; 2004), it is argued that 
the manner in which those labelled as non-participants are subjectified 
obscures their agency and in so doing suppresses their capacity to speak within 
the field of cultural policy. As such, the field of cultural policy remains 
characterized by asymmetric relations of power and dominated by those who 
lay claim to the discursive identity of cultural professionals. The result is state 
subsidised practices that while doing little to influence individual patterns of 
behavior, through performing inclusion and equality contribute to the 
maintenance of a status-quo in which state support will only be provided to 
individuals who accept the values of those who exercise the most power in the 
field.  
Keywords: cultural policy; problematisation; Foucault; Rancière; cultural 
participation; non-participation; barriers, boundary objects; the Arts; discourse 
analysis; social inclusion    
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Introduction  
i The origin of a puzzle  
The Scottish Government wishes to increase cultural participation and 
engagement, and in so doing implicitly suggest that a portion of the populace is 
currently culturally disengaged1. This is the portion of the population that is 
referred to within the field of cultural policy as the non-participant. Yet who, 
exactly, is a cultural non-participant? This was the puzzle from which this 
research began. It was a puzzle because the researcher had never met one. They 
shared John Holden’s belief that the entire population takes part in some sort of 
cultural activity, because “pretty much everyone listens, reads, watches, dances 
or sings” (2010, p.64). Nowhere in their life had a cultural non-participant 
presented themselves to the researcher, the very notion seemed nonsensical 
against the palpable evidence of experience, and yet there were evidently 
enough of them to warrant the Scottish Government to seek them out and take 
action to ensure their cultural participation.  
The researcher found themselves faced with this puzzle upon hearing that 
“increasing cultural engagement”2 was to become one of the Scottish 
Government’s fifty national indicators and thus one of the key measures of 
progress towards Scotland becoming “a better place to live and a more 
prosperous and successful country” (Scottish Government, 2012, n.p.). Indeed 
despite there being no definitive statement of government cultural policy in 
Scotland, what has been made explicit is that their aim is to “encourage 
participation in a diverse cultural life” and that as such it is “vital that everyone 
has the opportunity to participate” (Scottish Government, 2015a). For this 
reason, the Scottish Government is: 
                                                          
1 A variety of phrases were employed in relation to the policy aim of increasing cultural 
engagement, all of which can be assumed to be a synonym for the culturally disengaged. 
Throughout the research there were regular references to ‘non-participants’, ‘potential 
participants’, the ‘hard-to-reach’, ‘non-attenders’, ‘non-users’ or ‘non-visitors’ (See Widdop & 
Cutts 2011 for an example of a policy relevant document in which all of these terms are used). 
Given the prevalence with which it was used, it is the label of the non-participant that the 
current research will adopt in discussing this discursive identity.  
2 Primary data has been italicised throughout.  
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“fully committed to widening engagement with culture for all communities 
and individuals” [and that they desire] “for access to, and participation in, 
cultural activities to be as wide as possible” (Scottish Government, 2010a) 
 
As a national indicator, a yearly statistic was to be published pointing to the 
percentage of the population who were participating in culture, and thus, by 
default, highlighting the percentage of those who were not. Those who were not 
– around 9-11 % of the Scottish population depending on the year - are 
variously referred to as ‘non-participants’, ‘hard-to-reach’, ‘non-attenders’, ‘non-
users’ or ‘non-visitors’ in the policy documents and associated research (See 
Widdop & Cutts 2011 for an example of a text in which all of these terms are 
used). It was also apparent that the supposed lack of cultural participation on 
behalf of these individuals was something that local authorities and 
organisations receiving public subsidy were strongly encouraged by the Scottish 
Government to try and address:  
All those involved in the provision of culture are encouraged specifically to 
target non-attenders, and to consult them, when planning, developing, 
appraising and marketing their cultural ‘product’, whether it be an 
exhibition in a museum or gallery, a music or theatre event, or a library 
service” (Scottish Government, 2008, emphasis added) 
Indeed the commitment to encouraging participation and promoting 
appreciation of arts and culture were included in the list of Creative Scotland’s 
six statutory functions when it was established in 2009 through an act of 
parliament (Scottish Parliament, 2009c, 2009a). In particular there was a 
requirement to increase the “diversity of people who access and participate in the 
arts and culture” (Scottish Parliament, 2009a). Yet cultural organisations have 
been seeking to address the problem of access and participation for some time 
(Belfiore and Bennett, 2010; Kawashima, 2006). And so through attempting to 
make sense of one puzzle, a further, larger puzzle began to demand the 
attention of the researcher: why does cultural non-participation remain a 
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problem despite decades of policy interventions intended to address it, and 
perhaps more importantly, why is it a problem for the state in the first place?  
The problem of cultural non-participation and the state’s role in addressing it is 
not a recent phenomenon. Galloway & Jones argue that there has long been a 
drive to increase participation and engagement in the arts (2010) and the belief 
that civil society has a role to play in supporting the cultural lives of their 
citizens is one with a genealogy that has been argued to stretch at least as far 
back as Greek and Roman civilisation (Belfiore and Bennett, 2010; Sinclair, 
1995). Yet despite this long history of encouraging participation, the problem of 
non-participation appears to persist and therefore continues to be something 
requiring  state intervention not only in Scotland but across the UK and beyond 
(Stevenson et al., 2015; Stevenson, 2013b; Balling and Kann-Christensen, 2013; 
Tomka, 2013). In England, the Department for Culture Media and Sport (DCMS) 
has spoken of the importance of understanding non-participation because “a 
large proportion of adults do not meet the targets for participation” (Charlton et 
al., 2010, p.8, emphasis added). Perhaps even more alarmingly, the European 
Commission proclaimed that Europe was becoming a “less cultural continent” 
(2013a), a conclusion they had reached on the basis of the latest cross national 
cultural participation survey in which they found the number of cultural non-
participants was rising.  
This problem is one that Europe shares, apparently irrespective of the specific 
findings of any survey or the various policies that are in place. For example, 
despite Denmark enjoying the highest levels of active participation in Europe, 
their cultural policy continues to suggest that they have a problem of ‘non-users’ 
(Balling and Kann-Christensen, 2013). In Scotland, the same surveys that are 
used to highlight areas of ‘under-participation’ also indicate that 90% of adults 
are ‘culturally engaged’ (Scottish Government, 2009). A 90% rate of cultural 
engagement could easily be interpreted as an indication that no problem exists, 
especially when considering that this engagement is measured only in relation 
to a select number of the potential activities that could be understood as 
cultural participation. However the Scottish Government continues to state that 
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there remains a “split between those participating in culture and those who do 
not” (2008). Likewise, the Warwick Commission on Cultural Value identified 
widening participation and engagement in the culture and creative industries as 
a priority for policy making while simultaneously celebrating the UK as a 
culturally rich and diverse society (2015). Indeed, the problem of cultural non-
participation exists in a society where cultural participation appears to be 
increasingly accessible and ubiquitous in people’s lives. We live in a society in 
which there is an abundance of objects and activities with which to participate, 
available in ever-increasing formats and accessible via a diversity of platforms. 
For example, over 100,000 people went to see two concerts over one weekend 
(ITV News, 2015) and a Korean singer has been listened to over 2 billion times 
on YouTube (McIntyre, 2014).     
Even more curious is that despite a decade of measurement and related policies 
in the UK, combined with an explosion in digital opportunities for participation, 
the headline rate of cultural participation is little changed (Martin et al., 2010). 
This has led some, such as theatre director Danny Moar, to argue that cultural 
policy has primarily exhibited a “remorseless and obsessive preoccupation” 
about subsidised organisations “chasing after new audiences who, for perfectly 
legitimate reasons, are just not interested [in what those organisations do]” 
(Culture Media and Sports Committee, 2011, p.19). In addition, it is unclear as to 
what the primary motivation is that lies behind the drive for greater cultural 
participation. Where some might argue that it is in order to ensure people are 
getting the best from their public services, others could equally point to the 
persistence of a belief in the capacity of culture to do things to society, be it 
civilising the population at the turn of the last century, or reintegrating the 
socially excluded at the turn of this. 
While others (Oakley and Bell, 2014; Holden, 2010) have asked in relation to 
cultural participation - what’s the problem? – the answers they offer tend to 
critique the definition of the problem rather than questioning its ontological 
status, considering why it exists, and reflecting on what its existence does to 
social relations. This is indicative of the extent to which an objective problem ‘in 
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the real’ (Bacchi, 2009) is assumed to exist, albeit one about which definitional 
disputes can be conducted. What has not been considered is the potential that 
the problem cultural participation surveys are designed to measure, and 
cultural engagement policies are intended to address, is a discursive 
construction.  If one seeks to analyse it from this perspective, then cultural 
participation policies can be understood as discursive practice that sustains the 
problem construction and perpetuates the subjectification of certain individuals 
through the acceptance of the uncontested categories that the discourse creates 
and sustains (Bacchi 2009). It is from this perspective that the current study has 
been undertaken and upon which its original contribution to knowledge is in 
part based.  
ii Research question  
As shall be outlined in Chapter 1, methodologically this research falls under the 
broad umbrella of Interpretive Policy Analysis (IPA) and Schwarz-Shea and 
Yanow offer the following description of how research of this kind should 
develop:  
 [It] begins with a puzzle, a surprise or a tension, and then seeks to 
explicate it by identifying the conditions that would make that puzzle 
less perplexing and more of a ‘normal’ or ‘natural’ event […] In this 
puzzling out process, the researcher tacks continually, constantly, back 
and forth in an iterative-recursive fashion between what is puzzling and 
possible explanations for it, whether in other field situations […] or in 
research–relevant literature. (2012, p.27) 
While this researcher might adapt the description to suggest that what is of 
interest is more specifically the factors that make that which the researcher 
finds puzzling apparently normal or natural to others, what the quote is 
intended to highlight is the manner in which both the starting point and 
research journey are understood in research of this kind. Although it should not 
be understood as an example of Grounded Theory (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), 
IPA does share a similarly non-linear approach to the process of research. Most 
modes of Interpretative Policy Analysis begin not with a rigid hypothesis, for 
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which evidence will be gathered to either support or refute its validity, but 
rather with a broader topic, chosen because of an apparent policy puzzle 
(Mason 1996) that requires further exploration and for which existing logical 
positivist analysis appears inadequate. Equally, although it is not the case that 
grand theory has nothing to offer in addressing the area of inquiry – indeed such 
theories are an important heuristic aid in the sense-making process that the 
researcher is conducting - they are not the starting point of the work. What is of 
utmost importance is that there must be a balance, an “ongoing dialogue 
between theory and the empirical world” (Wagenaar, 2011, p.10).  
As such, interpretative approaches to policy analysis are often informed by a 
belief that undertaking a rigidly systematic enquiry can risk the researcher 
applying a priori assumptions about what will be of importance to the study. 
This in turn leads to an inflexible process of data generation and analysis 
combined with an absence of reflexivity that either overlooks potentially 
valuable sources of information or is less than transparent about the degree to 
which unacknowledged sources may have influenced the conclusions presented. 
Schwartz-Shea & Yanow (2012) argue that although having a structured 
research design does not preclude the generation of the type of critically 
oriented enquiry that an interpretative analysis is intended to produce, they 
encourage researchers designing studies to free themselves of some of the more 
constraining structural features of scientific research that all too often are 
adopted in name alone in an attempt to speak the language of supposedly 
objective evidence. This is because many of the methodologies that can be 
subsumed under the IPA heading are based on ontological and epistemological 
assumptions that make the linear practices and normative language associated 
with what is normally understood as good research design, at best irrelevant 
and at worst contradictory to the conclusions reached. Therefore flexibility 
towards the evolution of the research design is central to interpretative 
research because the “abductive and hermeneutic reasoning that undergird the 
interpretive research processes are both built on successive phases of learning 
[…] the investigation builds on itself in a reiterative, recursive fashion” 
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(Schwartz-Shea & Yanow 2012, p.79). Unlike in positivist informed research, 
changes to the research design should be expected and indeed welcomed. They 
are an indication that the researcher is responsive to their surroundings and is 
responding to their experiences as they attempt to make sense of their area of 
enquiry, a process in which they become methodological negotiators (Denzin 
and Lincoln, 2013).  
With regards to the present research, as part of this process of negotiation, over 
time and informed by an on-going reflective dialogue between theory and the 
empirical evidence, the initial puzzle was refined into more distinct lines of 
enquiry that allowed the researcher to be able to judge what material was 
relevant and to provide the fulcrum through which otherwise disparate 
observations could become linked and understood. Within interpretative 
research this type of emergent understanding is “allowed – and indeed expected 
– to develop over the course of the research project, [it is] an iterative process of 
researcher sense-making which cannot be fully specified a priori because of its 
unfolding, processual character” (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow 2012, p.78). It relies 
upon the sort of feedback loop (Silverman, 2010) in which the on-going 
experiences of the researcher continue to shape both their area of interest and 
the methods employed, through encouraging a “generative confrontation of 
[the] initial ideas and preconceptions about the project with the body of 
empirical material [that is being generated]” (Wagenaar, 2011, p.231).  
However, eventually both the research question and the approach adopted in 
answering it become more fixed, and with regards to the current research it 
became apparent that the object of study was not the non-participant, but 
rather their discursive representation within the field of cultural policy as a 
problem that could and should be solved. It became evident that the core 
question the researcher sought to answer was:  
Why is there a problem of cultural non-participation? 
Focusing on problems is not unusual for policy analysis, however interpretative 
policy scholars have focused on the failure of mainstream policy analysis to take 
account of the “inherently normative and interpretive character of policy 
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problems” (Fischer, 2003, p.11). Such scholars suggest that governing has 
become about “the identification [or representation] of situations as problems, 
the recognition of expertise in relation to these problems and the discovery of 
‘technologies’ of governing which are seen as an appropriate response” 
(Colebatch, 2006, p.313). Wagemans proposes that this means governments 
“have limited interest in the reality of what is going on in society because 
problems, opportunities, and solutions are only relevant as far as they can be 
handled within the existing institutional system. Accordingly, problems and 
their definitions are adapted to instruments instead of vice versa” (2002, p.64). 
He argues that this then leads to entrenched social structures that are 
asymmetrically aligned and difficult to alter. 
Citing Bennett’s oft referenced discussion about the torn halves of cultural 
policy (2004), Bell and Oakley (2015) suggest that cultural policy researchers 
are in general caught between critical and applied approaches. The subsidised 
cultural sector, both in the UK and abroad has faced increasing calls to legitimise 
the public money it receives (Larsen, 2014;Holden, 2006). As such, much 
cultural policy research is often accused of being loosely disguised special 
pleading (Craik, 2007) as it has become caught up with what Fischer describes 
as the politics of advocacy (2003). Arguably this is because a significant amount 
of research is conducted by those close to the sector and sympathetic to their 
need for greater evidence to support continued subsidy. As Craik (2007) 
suggests, it is likely that the majority of cultural policy researchers have an a 
priori belief in the value of the sector they research and their aim is thus to 
evidence this value through the legitimate channels of what is understood as 
objective academic research.   
 
As such, this study has chosen to take an interpretative approach so as to allow 
for a more critical reflection and discussion about the problem of cultural non-
participation. With a desire to avoid an accusation of uncritical, naïve and 
idealistic advocacy, both the research focus and methodology have been 
selected so as to offer an opportunity not only to ask the sort of difficult 
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questions that Belfiore (2012) has argued cultural policy research too often fails 
to address, but also to seek to answer them in a difficult way that does not 
succumb to a necessity to offer explicit and detailed technical solutions and 
pseudo-action (Adorno, 1978). For critique need not simultaneously suggest 
definitive action as “it is rather the task of thought to analyse the reasons behind 
the situation and to draw the consequences from these reasons” (Adorno, 1978, 
p.200). 
iii Overview of the thesis 
In an attempt to offer the reader an opportunity to understand the broad 
structure of the analysis and arguments with which they are to be presented, 
this introduction will now conclude with a brief overview of the chapters that 
follow.  
Chapter 1 – Outlining the research approach 
For reasons that will be explained in due course, rather than offering a literature 
review Chapter 1 outlines the research approach that has been taken to conduct 
this research. In so doing it seeks to both situate the work within a discipline 
and to provide an explanation of how the chosen methodology has affected both 
its relation to the existing body of knowledge and the manner in which data has 
been generated and analysed. It begins with a short discussion about the nature 
of policy studies and the extent to which a broad variety of approaches have 
emerged since Harold Laswell first conceived of a policy science that was 
intended to contribute towards a policy making process primarily understood 
in terms of authoritative rational choice (Parsons, 1995; see also Colebatch, 
1998 for discussion about the nature of policy as an object of study). A summary 
of the primary critiques of rational policy analysis leads to Interpretative Policy 
Analysis (IPA) being identified as a broad approach to policy research that takes 
into account the role that language plays in constructing a social reality. 
However, it is a specifically discursive perspective that has been adopted for the 
present study and as such there is an extended discussion about the extent to 
which the discursive logics evident in the language employed to talk about 
policy problems constructs and represents certain social actions and agents as 
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problematic and thus legitimate objects of state intervention, a process that 
Foucault has described as discursive problematisation (1977, 1972).  
As shall be explained, in order for the researcher to analyse cultural 
participation as a problematisation they began with Carol Bacchi’s Foucauldian 
inspired framework for analysing problem representations (2009) but 
expanded it in order to better encompass the dispositive (Jager and Maier, 
2009; Foucault, 2002 [1966]) of which the problem representation in policy 
texts is but one part. In practice, this widens the discursive sites at which data 
can be generated, and as such the researcher was not only interested in written 
texts but also in speech acts, practices, and objects that share a system of 
meaning with those texts. Throughout the analysis, the aim has been to reflect 
on the assumptions and critical logics (Howarth, 2010) that underlie the 
problem construction and in doing so consider what is left unproblematic or 
silenced (Bacchi, 2009). The aim of such an approach is to problematise the 
problematisations3 (Bacchi, 2009; Howarth, 2009) in order to foreground the 
normative assumptions upon which a stated policy problem has been based. As 
Foucault has argued, employing problematisation as a research methodology is 
first and foremost “an endeavour to know how and to what extent it might be 
possible to think differently, instead of what is already known” (1985, p.9). 
Chapter 2 – Social and Political Logics: Constructing cultural participation 
as an object of enquiry 
This chapter offers what would traditionally be understood as the literature 
review. However, as outlined in Chapter 1, to see the existing research as 
occupying a neutral space outside of discourse is antithetical to the 
methodology that has been adopted. As such, what Chapter 2 provides is a 
discussion about the different ways in which cultural participation - and in 
particular the problem of cultural non-participation - has been constructed, 
understood and represented in the existing research as an object about which 
truths can be claimed. In doing so it highlights the dominant social and political 
                                                          
3  Foucault used the term problematisation to refer both to the construction of a practice as a 
problem, and to the methodology by which the problem construction could be analysed. For the 
purpose of clarity, this thesis will use the term to refer to the methodology alone.   
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logics upon which the problem construction relies. Beginning with a discussion 
of how culture has been defined as a distinct field of human activity, it then 
progresses to a discussion about the ways in which participation with culture 
has been constructed as valuable for both the individual and society. Part three 
of this chapter focuses on the explanations that are given for the contingent 
social relations that are highlighted by cultural participation surveys. In 
particular the notion of barriers is discussed and the extent to which the idea of 
intra-personal psychological barriers relies heavily on the arguments of 
Bourdieu (1986 [1979]), in particular his theory of cultural capital and the role 
this plays in social stratification. The chapter concludes by contrasting this 
dominant logic with alternative explanations that do not represent the 
observable differences in what people do as a social problem requiring state 
intervention. Drawing in particular on literature from economics and marketing, 
alternative discursive strands are highlighted that represent differing patterns 
of participation in terms of individual identity, market conditions and personal 
motivations.  
Chapter 3 – The dominant discourses of cultural participation in the field of 
cultural policy 
This chapter moves on to analyse policy texts and qualitative interviews, 
arguing that in order to understand why the problem construction of cultural 
non-participation is sustained one must consider how it is reproduced. In 
analysing policy texts and qualitative interviews, the researcher found that they 
were faced with two distinct and apparently contradictory discursive strands of 
cultural participation. In one - the strand of abundant participation - there was 
an abundance of opportunities to participate with culture and the creative 
industries, so much so that rates of cultural participation were significant 
enough to be seen as a primary driver of economic growth. In the other - the 
strand of inadequate participation - there was a deficit of opportunities for 
cultural participation and culture was a more rarefied range of activities and 
objects around which distinctions and hierarchies continued to exist.  
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However it is only in the strand of inadequate participation that the problem of 
cultural non-participation becomes possible. The problem is constructed in 
terms of there being a certain type of experience that some people are having a 
suboptimal degree of exposure to because of various barriers that are 
preventing them from doing particular types of things. The state is therefore 
represented as addressing this market failure through the provision of 
opportunities to participate with state subsidised organisations and activities. 
However, there are distinct limits about what can be understood as an 
appropriate intervention by the state and what would be considered as 
unnecessary or inappropriate. In particular, participation with for-profit 
organisations and activities is seen as something distinct, with the associated 
implication that such participation is of lesser value to society than that which 
occurs with state subsidised organisations.   
Chapter 4 – The genealogy of the problem construction  
Chapter 4 sees the thesis move on to propose that the possibility of cultural 
non-participation was first constructed as part of the discursive constitution of 
the Arts as an institution. As such, non-participation and the related identity of 
the non-participant has always been a necessary part of this institution’s 
discourses, discourses that required adaptation when the Arts sought public 
subsidy from the state and was brought into direct relationship with the 
discourses of government. The figure of the non-participant became the ideal 
boundary object around which the discourses of these two institutions could 
combine. The Arts was already discursively associated with a unique and 
transformative experience and there were those in society that the discourses of 
government had deemed in need of transformation. The fact that those 
represented by the state as being in need of transformation were not currently 
participating with the Arts could in turn be pointed to as evidence that the 
transformative claims of the Arts were true and thus justification for their 
continued support. As such, not only was the possibility of non-participation 
fundamental to the institutional discourses of the Arts, the subject identity of 
the non-participant now provided this institution with an oubject upon which it 
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could claim to positively act in the interests of society, and thus justify its public 
subsidy.  
However there is a problem that the Arts continues to face in maintaining the 
legitimacy of these claims. For despite all the activity that has been undertaken 
under the rationale of increasing cultural participation, it remains the case that 
the majority of what receives public subsidy attracts the participation and 
interest of a minority of the population. So even if claims about the 
transformative powers of participation with the Arts are true, the majority of 
the public that are paying for them appear not to be exposed to their benefits. As 
such, the continued non-participation of the majority in that which receives 
public subsidy must be explained, but explained in such a manner as to continue 
to justify the existence of state subsidies for the Arts. As Chapter Five will argue, 
this is achieved through the manner in which those that can employ the greatest 
power within the field construct the subject of the non-participant as an object 
in the discourse, and about which taken for granted claims can be made.   
Chapter 5 – Fantasmic logic: Designing desirable models of agency  
Chapter 5 offers a close analysis of the fantasmic logics in the problem 
construction that problematise the agency of those who show no interest in the 
Arts. Beginning with a discussion about how non-participants are represented 
as socially deprived and hard to reach, the chapter moves on to highlight how 
non-participants are also presumed to lack knowledge and understanding about 
what they are failing to participate with. As such it is implied in the logics of the 
problem construction that once this is addressed with the right sort of 
intervention the non-participants’ patterns of participation should align with 
the patterns of participation exhibited by those who are understood to be 
participating ‘normally’.  This is indicative of the distinction between the 
discursive identity of the cultural participant who, when they have reached a 
conclusion that something is not for them are seen as having made a legitimate 
choice, and the discursive identity of the non-participant who, when they have 
reached the same conclusion are seen to have made a flawed judgment as the 
result of structural determinants. While the choices of the cultural participant 
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are represented as the legitimate expression of personal preference informed 
by an enlightened education consisting of the right knowledge and experience, 
the choices of the non-participant are associated with ideas of class distinction, 
false consciousness and structural exclusion.  
Such a perspective forever obscures the agency of the non-participant and 
denies any potential for them to be acknowledged as a conscientious non-
participant of the Arts and therefore inequitably served by state spending. It 
renders any choice to reject certain organisations and practices as a deviance 
from the norm, a technical problem that is solvable via appropriate policy 
interventions primarily delivered by manifestations of the very institution that 
the supposed non-participant has chosen to reject, an institution whose 
discourses make the very existence of the non-participant possible. The 
potential to see non-participation as political, the rejection of dominant 
discourses about the very nature and value of the unique artistic experience is 
thus effectively obscured.  
Chapter 6 – Asymmetric relations of power   
As Chapter 5 will outline, labelling someone as a non-participant discursively 
associates them with a lack of aspiration, drive and openness. This discursive 
identity ensures that those labelled as non-participants cannot be heard in the 
field of cultural policy, although their voice can be invoked. As such, Chapter 6 
argues that the field remains dominated by a cultural elite whose participation 
preferences enjoy significantly more direct state support than others. This final 
chapter outlines the extent to which the potential for these cultural elite was 
also the product of the discursive constitution of the Arts. Their claim to 
specialist knowledge has allowed those that adopt this identity to exert greater 
influence on the field of cultural policy through their ability to manage the 
dominant discourses through which it functions. It is proposed that this elite is a 
network of cultural professionals who function as a community of discourse or a 
discursive coalition (Howarth, 2010) in the sense that they adhere to the 
discursive logics of the Arts in order to identify, discuss and value certain 
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practices and in so doing affirm their own elevated status within the field of 
which the institution is a part.  
Chapter 6 goes on to argue that it is the dominance of the cultural professional 
over the field of cultural policy that means despite the rhetoric around 
supporting cultural participation, in actuality this is a performative practice that 
is about affirming the value of the Arts and the legitimacy of its existing 
relationship with the state.  Acknowledging that there are those who feel such a 
situation is at worst benign, this research argues this is not the case because 
choice is an individual act that becomes political when one person’s choices are 
granted greater status by the state than another’s, and that in turn this then 
affirms the status of the individual who made that choice. This is important 
because the impact of such discursive subjectification and the inequality that it 
affirms is not limited to the field of cultural policy. Because of the extent to 
which the discourses of the Arts and government are bound together, the 
problematisation of cultural participation supports the dominant logics of social 
mobility and the assumed justice of a meritocracy. Logics that have seen 
concerns about empowerment and inclusion supersede questions of material 
entitlement and structural inequality (McGuigan, 2004) and which performative 
participation policies only serve to affirm. 
Conclusion  
The thesis concludes by arguing that the problem construction of cultural non-
participation is integral to the discursive legitimacy of the relationship between 
the Arts and the state. It is constructed as being a problem for those labelled as 
non-participants, and the construction of non-participants as a subject provides 
a discursive object upon which the Arts can legitimately claim to act in return 
for public subsidy. As such, the legacy of this discursive logic is a cultural policy 
that continues to be “about creating the bureaucracies that deal with the 
problems that the very institution of the policies create” (Miller and Yudice, 
2002, p.25). The crisis of legitimacy faced by the Arts with regards to state 
subsidy is forever neutralised by negating the validity of the value judgements 
made by those that do not participate with its manifestations. This 
22 
 
neutralisation is achieved through managing the subject identity of the non-
participant, and undertaking the performative practice of ‘reaching out’ that 
allows the Arts to be represented as being for, and of, everyone. In turn, and in 
alignment with the dominant discourses of the modern episteme, the greatest 
change is represented as being required on the part of those most inequitably 
served by the societal status quo, not by the institution that affirms their 
inequality as something inevitable. It is the choices of those labelled as a non-
participant that are represented as neither being diverse enough nor open to 
being challenged. The absence of diversity with regards to what gets funded and 
who makes those decisions is forever obscured by the invitation to take part 
after the value judgements have been made.    
Despite the critical methodology that has been employed, the researcher is 
mindful of a pragmatic necessity to offer reflections on how this argument might 
affect cultural policy making. As such, it is suggested that to finally upset this 
institutionalised inequality would require a shift in how decisions are made. A 
shift away from a model in which certain people are shut out of decisions about 
supporting cultural participation on the basis of their ignorance about how best 
to enrich their own life. This political change cannot be achieved through solely 
technical means, for a dialogue would need to occur in which no one was 
labelled as a non-participant so that everyone’s values could be heard and 
acknowledged as equal within the field. The purpose of such dialogue should 
not be understood as ensuring an expanded number of activities are valued as 
cultural participation, because as it stands being valued as cultural participation 
means being valued within the discursive logics of the Arts. It is the dominance 
of this institution that needs to be disrupted if an emancipatory cultural policy is 
ever to be achieved. For culture is not the sole preserve of the Arts, and the field 
of cultural policy should not be constrained by the dominant discourses of a 
single institution no matter how pervasive. Progressive cultural policy making 
and the research needed to engender it requires thinking outside of the Arts, 
however its discursive constitution makes it very difficult to do so. This thesis 
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hopes to initiate that process through providing a possible theoretical 
framework through which such thinking could be developed.  
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Chapter 1 – Outlining the research approach   
The chapter below aims to not only detail the methodology adopted, but also to 
outline how this methodology has shaped the entire approach that has been 
taken in producing this research. Situating cultural policy analysis within the 
wider discipline of policy studies, the discussion first highlights the extent to 
which an increasing number of diverse accounts about the nature of policy and 
policy-making have led to equally diverse approaches to conducting the study of 
policy. However, as shall be detailed in due course it is an interpretative 
approach to policy analysis that has been employed for the current study, 
specifically one informed by a Foucauldian concern with discourse and the 
discursive construction of problems within which subjects, objects and the 
potential relationships between them are established.  
1.1 Cultural policy studies  
Cultural policy studies is an expanding field of study and one that has explored a 
diversity of policy areas both large and small, from the global to the local. Whilst 
by no means extensive, an indicative list might include: the creative industries 
(see, for example: Oakley 2009; Miller 2009; Galloway & Dunlop 2007a; 
Garnham 2005; Hesmondhalgh & Pratt 2005); creative cities (Bonet et al., 2011; 
Pratt, 2010; McGuigan, 2009); the public provision of museums and libraries  
(Bennett, 1998; Bennett, 1995;), free entry to museums ( Martin, 2002; Bailey 
and Falconer, 1998); the role of popular culture (Looseley, 2011); local cultural 
policymaking (O’Brien and Miles, 2010; Gilmore, 2004);  cultural diplomacy 
(Nisbett, 2012; Mark, 2010); the cultural Olympiad (Low and Hall, 2012; 
Gilmore, 2012); cultural regeneration (Pratt, 2009; García, 2004; Montgomery, 
2003); and indeed, cultural participation (Jancovich, 2015, Stevenson, 2013b; 
Balling and Kann-Christensen, 2013; Gilmore, 2013). It is important, however, 
to note that there are differences between these studies in relation to their 
ontological understanding of what cultural policy is and how to analyse it, with 
the object of study variously being understood as discourse, text, process, and 
practice (Bell and Oakley, 2014). It is for this reason that although Schuster 
acknowledges there has been increasing interest in cultural policy research, he 
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finds it far harder to clearly delimit what such research can be understood to be 
about (2002a).  
 
Evolving from the work of various disciplines, in various locations, the subject 
area has to some extent consolidated to the point that there are now a number 
of conferences and journals dedicated to the discussion and dissemination of 
research undertaken in this area, and a significant number of degree level 
programs orientated to the field (Bell and Oakley, 2015). While the locus of 
activity was, for some time, an interface between researchers in the UK, United 
States and Australia, more recent developments have been stimulated by 
Nordic, South East Asian and South American scholars (Flew, 2012). Reviewing 
the development of the discipline, Scullion and Garcia (2005, p.11) propose that 
a specific tripartite research agenda has developed that investigates:  
 the history and historiography of cultural policy;  
 the principles and strategies of cultural policy, and; 
 the relationship between cultural policy and cultural theory/cultural 
studies 
Although highlighting the distinctions that exist between them, they 
acknowledge that these three broad categories of history, practice and theory 
are strongly interconnected and that their interconnection is a common feature 
of much research in this emergent discipline.  
 
Research relevant to the field of cultural policy studies is conducted by a varied 
range of individuals with a diverse range of research interests and motivations 
(for a discussion, see: Scullion and García, 2005; Schuster, 2002). As such, the 
discipline of cultural policy studies is understood to be both multidisciplinary 
and interdisciplinary in practice and absorbs research from more established 
disciplines into its canon4 (such as political science and cultural studies). The 
fluidity of the terrain means that reflecting on what, in the context of their 
                                                          
4 These multidisciplinary approaches can result in tension that both Bennett (2004) and Gray 
(2010) have reflected on in relation to the development of the subject area. 
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research, they understand cultural policy to be becomes the first job of any 
researcher whose work is orientated towards it. This process brings into being 
the object of their study, which although not an objective reality might be 
considered as such within the parameters of their work.  
 
Given the diverse backgrounds of those contributing knowledge to this field, it is 
not then surprising to find a multiplicity of views on what cultural policy is, 
although most commonly it is understood as a form of public policy practice 
that is orientated towards a distinct groups of social agents and actions that 
might commonly include the arts and creative industries (Bell and Oakley, 
2015). Such a definition has also been expanded to include all the actions taken 
by a state that affect the cultural life of its citizens (Gray, 2010). Ahearne (2009) 
and DiMaggio (1983) categorize these positions as perceiving two differing but 
related objects of study and label them as either implicit and explicit (Ahearne, 
2009) or indirect and direct (DiMaggio, 1983) cultural policies.  However these 
debates tend to focus on what can be understood as cultural policy, and as such 
questions remain around what cultural policies are, what they exist for, how 
and why they are created, practiced and assessed and what there is to learn 
from analysing them (Gray, 2010).  
 
The discipline of cultural policy studies is also understood as being concerned 
with values to a more explicit degree than any other policy area. DiMaggio 
argues that cultural policy is most likely to be found where there is a dissensus 
over the meaning, value, nature or distribution of the good in question and as 
such “cultural policies […] are those that regulate what has been called the 
marketplace of ideas” (1983, p.242). As such, exercising an influence over what 
types of human practice gain a public presence and the manner in which this 
public presence both emerges and is framed, inherently exerts a structural 
pressure on the production and circulation of meanings within society, with 
concomitant influences on social relations. Therefore, there are those who argue 
that cultural policy studies is the missing agenda of cultural studies (McRobbie, 
cited in Miller and Yudice, 2002). These perspectives suggests it is a utilitarian 
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application of a critical engagement with cultural artifacts that responds to the 
claims of irrelevance outside the academy that had beset the discipline in the 
nineteen eighties (also see Bell & Oakley 2015 for a discussion of the influence 
of cultural studies on cultural policy studies).  
 
However, the discipline of cultural policy studies appears to have inherited 
what Barker (2005) describes as the primary sin of cultural studies, namely a 
tendency for researchers to offer only a brief and somewhat vague discussion of 
the methodology upon which their argument is based5. This is especially 
problematic given that, as has already been noted, research in this field draws 
from many disciplines, not only cultural studies but also philosophy, art history, 
sociology, politics, science and technology studies, and economics. All of these 
are disciplines that bring their own methodological complexities, yet are often 
combined in the pursuit of multidisciplinary work with too little detail about 
how their different methodological perspectives have been integrated (Gray, 
2010). This means that at a disciplinary level cultural policy studies can often 
lack clear parameters and boundaries and some of the research conducted can 
be open to accusations of exhibiting a lack of methodological rigor that evades 
robust critique ( Scullion and García, 2005; Schuster, 2002). With regards to the 
present study, the detail offered below hopes to assuage the potential for such 
accusations to some degree, while also offering a framework in which others 
may choose to work in future.    
 
1.2 Policy Analysis  
The analysis of, and engagement with, policy and policy-related issues is 
something that is increasingly prevalent across disciplines. No longer confined 
to political science, it is a prominent feature in the fields of cultural studies, 
management studies, environmental studies, international relations, health and 
education. This is perhaps because there are few, if any areas of life that remain 
outside of the logics, rationales and regimes of policy. Those researchers 
                                                          
5 With regards to cultural studies, the methodological texts of Alasuutari (1995), McGuigan 
(1997) and Gray (2003) are notable exceptions.   
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working within the applied strand of policy analysis generally understand the 
object of their study as a linear and rationale process of structured interaction 
in which the role of the analyst is to provide objective expertise to the rational 
authoritative decision maker (Parsons, 1995). From this perspective the policy 
process is understood “as an exercise in informed problem-solving6: a problem 
is identified, data is collected, the problem is analyzed and advice is given to the 
policy maker who makes a [rational] decision which is then implemented” 
(Colebatch, 2006, p.311). In this model, research is conducted for policy and its 
purpose is twofold. Firstly it is to provide an understanding of the behavior of 
policy relevant agents and the nature of the world they inhabit. Secondly it is to 
analyze the policy process itself to ensure it is working effectively. In both cases 
the collection of what are understood as facts is paramount. The aim is to find 
technical solutions to what are represented as technical problems so as to 
inform decisions about the best way in which government might intervene so as 
to ensure the delivery of an outcome deemed to be in the best interests of 
society. 
 
However this approach to policy analysis has come under sustained critique 
almost since its inception. Not least because the scientific rationality that it 
relies upon depicts “a model of society which [leaves] no room either for politics 
and the practice of the political art, or for a distinctively political theory” 
(Turnbull, 2007, p.145). Fischer (2003) argues that this approach adopts a neo-
positivist framework that supports a technocratic form of governance primarily 
concerned with control. From this perspective, policy analysis of the type 
                                                          
6 The idea that government could solve problems through the implementation of policy emerged 
in the early twentieth century (Parsons, 1995, p.17). However it was in the United States, and in 
particular through the work of four scholars, Harold Lasswell, Hebert Simon, Charles Lindbloom 
and David Easton, that the relationship between science and policy was formally codified. Of 
particular influence was the publication of The Policy of Orientation. Edited in 1951 by Laswell 
and Lerner this text set out the fundamental assertion that it is the problem orientation that 
should animate the policy analyst and that made the work distinct from other forms of 
scholarship (1951). While Laswell’s policy sciences relied on scientific rationality they were not 
wholly positivist nor slavishly bound to logical empiricism (Turnbull, 2007). Laswell 
acknowledged the problem of values but bracketed them off from the supposedly objective 
science of problem solving as something that was done in advance in order to identify the 
problem and preferred outcome. However this disaggregation of the act of problem setting from 
the process of problem solving would become the site of much critique of his model. 
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outlined above exists to legitimate a supposed objective process of decision-
making as a particular model of rationality. Although evidence-based policy 
making was supposed to have replaced the influence of ideology, it may only 
have obscured it through excluding any consideration of the presence of values, 
power and politics in policy. For research has shown that the manner in which 
supposedly objective analysis and evidence is used is unlikely to be either 
objective or oriented toward solving the problem (for some examples see: 
Belfiore, 2009; Belfiore and Bennett, 2007a; Belfiore, 2002; Weiss, 1991).  
 
While earlier critiques (Rein and White 1977; Lindbloom 1959) of a purely 
rational conception of policy had focused on structural factors of process, the 
argumentative turn (Gottweis, 2006; Fischer and Forester, 1993) focused the 
analysis on the extent to which policy making relied upon a univocal 
understanding of vocabulary in which words “have or can be made to have only 
one meaning, and that meaning can be established without respect to time and 
place” (Yanow, 1996, p.132). This built on the ideas of Victor Turner (1974) 
who argued for research to adopt a position of multi-vocality so as to explore 
both the instability of meaning and its consequences for policy. The belief is that 
“language does not simply mirror the world, [but rather] profoundly shapes our 
view of the world” (Buchstein & Jorke, 2012, p.271). As Turnbull notes, 
Laswell’s (1951) classic approach “excludes questions over the normative 
formulation of problems and the political rhetoric necessary to justify policy in 
the event of differences of opinion” (2007, p.13). Furthermore, in Laswell’s 
understanding of how problems were identified, the public were at worst 
invisible and at best understood as clients or spectators who required their 
problems to be shown to them by networks of unrepresentative expertise 
(Miller and Yudice, 2002). Frank Fischer (Fischer, 2003; Fischer and Forester, 
1993) has traced the increasing importance that expertise is understood to have 
gained in influencing and legitimating government policy and has been 
influential in encouraging research that considers the role and deployment of 
power in policy formation, execution and evaluation. In particular he highlights 
the place of argumentation in policy, the result of which is what Turnbull (2007) 
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has described as a politicising of the problem orientation through 
foregrounding the interests and interpretations of those that can exert the 
greatest power over its identification and construction.  
 
Various researchers have undertaken such work (see, for example Yanow and 
Schwartz-Shea, 2006; Gottweis, 2006, 2007; Hajer and Wagenaar, 2003; Fischer, 
2003; Yanow, 1996) and although informed by a diversity of theoretical 
perspectives, from French post-structuralism to American pragmatism, they all 
share the belief that “policies, in general, are not only instrumental-rational acts, 
but are also expressive of human meaning” (Yanow, 2014, p.37). They can be 
understood as embodying and expressing the stories each polity tells itself and 
other publics, about its identity and values. This focus on meanings means that 
unlike policy research in the positivist tradition, for those adopting an 
interpretative approach to policy analysis no objective reality is understood to 
exist that the researcher is able to document, replicate or measure. Meanings 
are made and remade at both an individual and collective level, driven by 
encounters with - and exposure to - other agents, institutions and discourses. As 
Yanow states: “interpretive policy analysis asks not only what a policy means 
[…] but also how a policy means” (2014, p.143). The focus is therefore on 
identifying the ways in which truths about specific types of social activity and 
actors are made, sustained and transmitted (Yanow, 1996; Torgerson, 1986). In 
this sense, interpretative analysis of policy is as interested in mapping the 
architecture (Pal, 1995) of the policy arguments (see Epstein 2008; Swaffield 
1998; Linder 1995 for examples) as seeking to directly contribute to the 
production of policy.  
 
While Interpretive Policy Analysis (IPA) can be used as a general title for this 
kind of work, in practice this title subsumes a broad spectrum of research 
activity that includes, for example: Critical Policy Analysis; Deliberative Policy 
Analysis; Argumentative Analysis; Critical Discourse Analysis; and Frame 
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Analysis7. Although all are shaped by a commitment to the social constructionist 
movement that developed in France and the UK (Fischer, 2003), there are 
differences in their understanding of how this socially constructed reality might 
be understood. As such, IPA cannot be called a single research methodology or 
method, but rather a loose affiliation of methodologies that are as much defined 
by what they are not (rational positivist policy science) as what they share in 
common: 
 
Interpretivism is not only about phenomenological hermeneutics. For 
instance, because it’s also the “application” of such methodological (i.e., 
ontological and epistemological) presuppositions to political issues, we 
can’t ignore the kinds of issues that critical theorists have addressed. For 
me Foucauldian analysis or any theorist dealing with issues of power and 
structure and agency has a place here. Interpretive Policy Analysis is not 
of a single piece. It includes a very strong, normative theoretical 
dimension around issues of democracy, citizenship, participation and so 
on. But then there’s also a methodological orientation that’s agnostic 
with respect to that normative dimension, whose exponents try to 
do research in order to figure out what’s going on in a given setting or 
case without framing the analysis in terms of democracy or citizenship or 
some other liberal concern (Yanow, in Valenzuela 2012, p.120) 
 
While the researcher would not dispute this assertion, methodological 
differences do remain between these various approaches and it is important 
that any researcher undertaking any form of IPA is clear about the particular 
methodology that has been adopted and how this has informed their 
understanding of the knowledge that they are producing. As such, it is to the 
specifics of the methodology that has shaped the present research that the 
discussion now turns. 
                                                          
7 See Yanow and Schwartz-Shea (2013) for a list of the various analytical methods that can be 
understood to take an interpretative approach to policy analysis.  
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1.3 Policy as Discourse 
As will be outlined in more detail below, it is a discursive approach that has 
been employed in the present study, more specifically one based upon the 
Foucauldian notions of genealogy, governmentality, problematisation, and 
states of domination (Foucault, 1972, 1977, 1980, 1991, 2002 [1966]). 
Discourse is a term that is widely employed across a broad range of disciplines 
including critical theory, sociology, linguistics, philosophy, social psychology 
and many more (Mills, 1997). Howarth (2000) summarizes that its proliferation 
in the social sciences is in response to the growing dissatisfaction with the 
dominance of logical positivist approaches to understanding the social world. 
However, he asserts that its increasing employment has resulted in a 
proliferation of meanings, interpretations and connotations in which the 
specific concept of discourse employed varies depending on the research 
discipline and for what purposes it is engaged. This variety has led to a 
significant discourse about discourse (Howarth, 2000) in which each 
understanding has developed an increasingly technical and theoretical 
sophistication relevant to the discipline specific understanding of the world and 
the process of gaining knowledge about it. While Bove (1990) and Bacchi 
(2000) both argue that by its very nature it is inconsistent to search for a 
correct definition of discourse, it remains important that any research 
employing  it as an analytical term offers some explanation as to how discourse 
and its relationship to policy has been understood.  
 
Cameron and Panovic (2014) offer three definitional themes that are helpful in 
drawing out the distinctions with regards to how the term can be employed in 
research.  
 
• Discourse is language above the sentence;  
• Discourse is language ‘in use’;  
• Discourse is a form of social practice in which language plays a 
central role  
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The first dimension is most closely related to how it is understood in linguistics 
where the aim is to describe the form of language and explain how it works as a 
system. The second is broader and considers the use of language far more. Here, 
concerns expand to include not only the linguistic form but also other questions 
including who is using the language, to whom they are communicating, what the 
content of the language is, what sort of rules it adheres to, and for what purpose 
has it been employed. This focus on the social is expanded further in the third 
definition where discourse is not only about representations and systems of 
meaning, but is also understood as a structuring social practice through which 
realities are constructed and structured, or made and remade through the use of 
discourses (now plural). From this final perspective “discourse is a richer 
ontological category, which captures something about the complex character of 
all social relations and practices, as well as the ways subjects identify and are 
captured by certain meaningful practices” (Howarth, 2010, p.311). Agents are 
not understood as simply subscribing to a shared way of understanding the 
world, because as Laclau and Mouffe argue “a discursive structure is not a 
merely ‘cognitive’ or ‘contemplative’ entity; it is an articulatory practice which 
constitutes and organizes social relations” (1985, p.96).  
 
This perspective encompasses a varied range of positions and approaches. 
Howarth (2000) suggests that while positivists and empiricists most often 
perceive discourses as frames - instrumental devices that foster common 
perceptions and understandings of the world - realists conceive of them as 
specific objects for study with their own inherent properties and causal powers. 
Against these conceptions in which an objective world offers a reality against 
which the character and veracity of a discourse can be understood, stand 
structuralist, marxist and post-structuralist approaches. Critical Discourse 
Analysis (often associated with Norman Fairclough and his followers) 
understands discourse as the semiotic dimension of social practice. It places a 
greater emphasis on hermeneutical understanding and insists on a “mutually 
constituting relationship between discourse and the social systems in which 
they function” (Howarth, 2000, p.67). This type of research often seeks to 
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explore the manner in which meaning and language become an instrument of 
the powerful employed to intentionally oppress those they seek to control.  
 
However there are those that argue discourses are not the creation of any one 
individual, but rather that “they have taken their shape with the passage of time, 
they reflect the whole history of the societal form, and they have effects that no 
one has consciously intended” (Talja, 1999, p.469). Therefore, “the expressive8 
dimensions of policy are rarely explicitly and intentionally crafted” (Yanow, 
2014, p.139) and to presume as such leads to one of the common mistakes that 
Gray (2010) argues discursive analysis of policy often makes. In divorcing the 
discourses from the specific agents and practices to which they constitutively 
relate, the cart is put before the horse and consequences are mistaken for 
causes. “[T]he creation of compliant, managed individuals becomes the reason 
for cultural polices rather than the outcome of them, which is, apart from being 
teleological, as Bennett (2004, p.238) notes, a ‘somewhat paranoid formulation’” 
(Gray, 2010, p.222).  
1.3.1 Foucault  
In seeking to avoid this, the present research understands discourse in a 
different manner, one that is perhaps most akin to that which Howarth (2000) 
has labelled as discursive theory and that he associates with the work of authors 
such as Derrida, Foucault and Laclau & Mouffe. Although this perspective does 
not conceive of discourse as the direct product of a few key agents, by virtue of 
their location within the discourse some agents are understood to have greater 
influence over its reproduction. Therefore, discourses are not understood as 
“transhistorical structures operating [entirely] outside of human intervention” 
(Bacchi, 2000, p.52). For while there may be less focus on the conscious 
manipulation of meaning by those who can exercise the most power, there 
remains a concern with the manner in which discourses sustain taken for 
granted asymmetric power relationships. For “every discursive structure is 
uneven and hierarchical” (Howarth, 2010, p.313) and thus legitimises and 
                                                          
8 By “expressive” Yanow is pointing to the meanings that policy creates and affirms.  
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secures structures of social dominance (Jager and Maier, 2009) that would 
otherwise be under threat.  
 
Specifically it is Michel Foucault’s notion of discourse that is of most pertinence 
to the current research9, in particular his later concern with genealogy 
(Foucault, 1980), governmentality (Foucault, 1977) and problematisations 
(Foucault, 1977). Each of these concepts can be seen as developments or re-
articulations of his earlier quasi-structuralist perspectives that had focused on 
the archaeology of knowledge (Foucault, 1972) but in which the question of 
power had remained implicit (Howarth, 2010; O’Farrel, 2005). Foucault did not 
understand discourse as subsequent to the structuring of society – a perspective 
that grants the action or object ontological primacy - but rather as an integral 
part of the whole practice of structuring, organizing and managing. From this 
perspective discourse contributes to the construction of the social world, given 
that, as Foucault states, discourse (and the discourses that constitute them) are 
“practices which systematically form the objects of which they speak” (1972, 
p.49). Collectively they form what Foucault conceived of as an order of things 
(2002 [1966]) and which “organises everything, makes some things possible 
and others impossible, permits us to say some things but makes others 
unthinkable” (Danaher et al., 2000, p.xiv). 
 
To summarise briefly, this perspective is predicated upon an understanding that 
all objects and actions are discursive in the sense that their meanings depend on 
a socially constructed set of rules and conventions specific to the context, or 
more specifically, the discursive field (Foucault, 2002 [1966]) in which the 
object or action is contemplated (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). It is these systems 
of meaning that manifest themselves in normative assumptions, discursive 
                                                          
9 While the research presented here has been informed by both Foucault’s and Bacchi’s thinking, 
it should not be seen as a direct application of an unproblematic system of conducting discourse 
analysis. Instead, their work has offered a methodological framework that has proven valuable 
for the researcher in addressing their research question. While it may regularly evoke the 
language of Foucault, it is the researcher’s interpretation of this language that has been 
employed and inevitably these interpretations are open to challenge and critique.  
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keywords, subjectified identities, discourse strands, and discursive practice. 
According to this perspective, “people don’t ‘think or speak ideas’ or make 
meanings. On the contrary, structures ‘think and speak through people’” 
(Danaher et al., 2000, p.8) As Robert Young (cited in McGuigan, 2004, p.35) 
remarked, the effect of such discourses is to make it virtually impossible to 
think outside of them, because these various discourses, in tandem with the 
fields of knowledge of which they are a constituent part, provide the structures 
of knowledge via which individuals identify, engage and respond to the objects 
and actions they encounter within the physical world in a socially meaningful 
way. 
1.3.2 The dispositive  
Such systems of meaning mean that “discourses do not exist independently; 
they are elements of dispositives […] a constantly evolving synthesis of 
knowledge that is built into language, action and materialisations” (Jager and 
Maier, 2009, p.109) of which there are three transit points:  
 Discourse (language and thought) 
 Discursive practice (actions) 
 Materialisations (which are created through discursive practice)    
Foucault described the dispositive as an apparatus, “a resolutely heterogeneous 
grouping composing discourses, institutions, architectural arrangements, policy 
decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophic, 
moral and philanthropic propositions; in sum, the said and the not-said, these 
are the elements of the apparatus. The apparatus itself is the network that can 
be established between these elements” (Foucault, 1981. in Rabinow and Rose, 
2003, p.xvi). Foucault appeared to understand the dispositive as a domain of 
things about which truths could be claimed to be known (Foucault, 2002 
[1966]). While understanding the system of meaning that binds these 
components together in a dispositive is central to this type of research, it is not 
in the sense of uncovering the true meaning that had been obscured by those 
assumed to hold power, as a more Marxist position might take. Nor is it in the 
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sense of recovering the supposedly authentic meanings that agents give to their 
actions. For while Foucault appears to acknowledge that the establishment of a 
dispositive may have been a specific strategic response to a specific historical 
problem, it “can gradually have a more general rationality extracted from it, and 
hence be turned into a technology of power applicable to other situations” 
(Rabinow and Rose, 2003, p.56). 
 
However the task of analysing the dispositive is very complex since by its very 
nature it requires analysis of the meaning that exists between that which the 
researcher can encounter - it must be analysed through foregrounding the 
system of knowledge that exists amongst the elements of the apparatus 
(Foucault, 1977). As such, the scope of work undertaken by those conducting 
discourse analysis has expanded far beyond a focus on only the written text to 
include the analysis of a wide variety of linguistic and non-linguistic material 
including: talk; speeches; historical events; ideas; images; research; 
organisations; and institutions. All of which can be employed as researchers 
seek to gain a better understanding of the particular dispositive of which they 
are a part10. The aim of research such as this is therefore to analyse and 
reconstruct (through the language of discussion) the knowledges that both 
make these practices and materializations knowable and delimit the intelligible 
with regards to the possible relationships between them.   
1.3.3 Relations of power 
Foucault advises those wishing to employ his approach to “substitute the logic 
of strategies for the logic of the unconscious” (Foucault, n.d. in Rabinow and 
                                                          
10 Although the approaches of Bacchi and Scheurich both make attempts to link the discourses 
they identify in written texts to specific social objects (such as schools, community centers, job 
roles etc.) or actions (policy interventions and their associated practices) there remains an 
unspoken distinction between them. This is evident in Bacchi’s six questions, only one of which 
– question six - considers the discursive practices of the problematisation, and given the focus 
on written texts it is unclear how she foresees that this might be approached. As such, the 
present research sought to develop Bacchi’s approach so as to address this limitation through 
moving beyond a sole focus on written texts when generating data to include a broader range of 
text analogues (Ricouer 1971; Taylor 1971; Yanow & Schwartz-Shea 2006;  Schwartz-Shea & 
Yanow 2012; Yanow 2000) so as to offer a greater understanding of how the discourses in 
question are socially produced, reproduced, disseminated, defended and negotiated. 
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Rose, 2003, p.xv). For although the aim is to denaturalize the discourse, analysis 
is not conducted so as to reduce it to an indicator of something else but rather 
that it might be understood in its own right, to “maintain it in its consistency, to 
make it emerge in its own complexity” (Foucault, 1972, p.52). The intention is to 
consider the emergence and perpetuation of historically specific rules and 
conventions that structure the production of meaning in a particular social 
context (Howarth, 2000) and the manner in which those rules and conventions 
are negotiated as part of the will to knowledge (Foucault, 1978) that supports, 
advantages, or valorises a particular social group in some way. For as McGuigan 
notes, although this is similar to the Wittgensteinian dictum that language sets 
the limits to our world, this position goes further in that it requires 
consideration of the “operations of power in the regulation of discourse, 
procedures of exclusion, reason and truth, internal policing and conditions of 
application” (2004, p.35). 
 
This is because there is a direct relationship between truth and relations of 
power – that Foucault highlights in his use of the term Power/Knowledge (1980 
[1976]) - that mean some truths are made truer than others by virtue of existing 
power relationships already constituted in discourse. Those same truths in turn 
reinforce the power relationships that guarantee their dominance and 
normative adoption. Discourses create what Foucault has called states of 
domination in which “relations of power are fixed in such a way that they are 
perpetually asymmetrical and the margin of liberty is extremely limited” 
(Foucault, 1991 [1984], p.12). This does not suggest that people are not free, 
indeed he argues that “if there are relations of power throughout every social 
field it is because there is freedom everywhere” (Foucault, 1991 [1984], p.12) 
and that as such, all systems of domination are always vulnerable to change and 
transformation given that they will constantly encounter resistance that must 
be overcome (Howarth, 2010). Indeed according to Foucault the exercise of 
power presupposes a weakening of the existing structures of dominance, for if 
oppression could be absolute then there would be no need for relations of 
power:  
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…to exercise a relation of power, there must be on both sides at least a 
certain form of liberty. Even though the relation of power may be 
completely unbalanced or when one can truly say that they have ‘all 
power’ over the other, a power can only be exercised over another to the 
extent that the latter still has the possibility of committing suicide, of 
jumping out of the window or of killing the other. That means that in the 
relations of power, there is necessarily the possibility of resistance, for if 
there were no possibility of resistance – of violent resistance, of escape, 
of ruse, of strategies that reverse the situation – there would be no 
relations of power (Foucault, 1991 [1984], p.12) 
 
Understanding policy as discourse therefore means that the researcher 
perceives it as part of the dispositive and as such an example of where such 
relations of power are managed and can be understood. From this perspective, 
governments are not understood as “responding to problems that exist out 
there […] rather problems are created or given shape in the very policy 
responses that are offered” (Bacchi, 2000, p.48), the ‘discovery’ of a problem is 
always preceded by its discursive constitution (Watts, 1993). However, labeling 
some aspect of social practice as a problem requires that alternative 
understandings of the world be repressed.  
1.3.4 Subjugated knowledges  
And so while there may be many competing constructions of any aspect of 
society, those that are constructed as a problem within the discourses of 
government policy become dominant through their inevitable dissemination 
through the complex networks by which the state permeates every aspect of 
their citizens’ lives. In turn, this limits what it is possible to think, say or do 
about this aspect of social practice, and sees conflicting representations become 
silenced, discounted or marginalised, what Foucault has described as 
subjugated knowledges (1980) and about which discursive identities can be 
constructed as both subjects and objects in the discourse. In turn it is these 
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identities that legitimise the actions that the state takes in their name, because 
“the institutional authority to categorise people is frequently inseparable from 
the authority to do things to them” (Cameron, 2013, p.16).  
 
The construction of such subject identities is based on the discursive logics that 
policies contain. Not in the sense of rigid constraints with regards to how one 
should or must act but rather about how actions will be socially understood in 
any given context. They provide the criteria for identifying and evaluating social 
behavior and using such evaluations to explain inequality. Ultimately, norms of 
desirable behaviour are established against which people as political subjects 
are judged and on the basis of which asymmetrical power relationships are 
accepted. Any divergent action or activity can then only be understood in 
relation to the normative ideal, either co-opted as part of the solution or pointed 
to as evidence of the problem requiring corrective action by the state. Although 
one can choose to resist, contravene or adapt the discursive logics implicit in 
policy, this resistance and adaptation can only be understood in relation to the 
dominant logics, their associated discourses and as part of the wider dispositive 
that gives meaning to the discourses and their discursive opposition. As such, 
any grievances, demands and alternative constructions of reality advanced by 
the dominated are discursively channeled and negotiated in ways that result in 
policy solutions which “do not disturb or modify a dominant practice or regime 
in a fundamental way” (Howarth, 2010, p.321). Therefore the purpose of 
analysing policy problems as discourse is to better understand how this occurs 
in order to “re-activate those opinions that were foreclosed […] in order to show 
how present practices rely upon exclusions that reveal the non-necessary 
character of existing social formations, and to explore the consequences and 
potential effects of such repressions (Howarth, 2010, p.328). 
1.3.5 Problematisation  
While scholars such as Fischer (Fischer 2003; Fischer & Forester 1993) and 
Yanow (2000, 1996) have challenged the ways in which a policy problem is 
constructed, interpreted or framed, an observable problem is often still 
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understood to exist and their intent tends to be an attempted reframing of this 
problem or a facilitated dialogue about the multiple ways in which it can be 
understood. In contrast, Carol Bacchi’s work (2000; 2004; 2009; 2010; 2012) 
employs the Foucauldian concepts of archaeology, genealogy and 
problematisation to question the assumption that a problem exists in the real at 
all, through an analytical process that she describes as problematising the 
problematisations (2009). While Bacchi has perhaps done the most to 
systematise this type of approach11, it is not without precedent in the field of 
policy studies ( Howarth and Griggs, 2012; Howarth, 2010). In particular, James 
Scheurich (1994) advanced an approach to policy analysis that was informed by 
a similar philosophical pedigree12.  
 
Bacchi’s approach is perhaps best understood as an attempt to systematise the 
methodology that Foucault called problematisation (1977, 1985). It is an 
approach that Howarth argues can be read as a combined articulation of 
Foucault’s archaeological and genealogical approaches, where “archaeology 
describes the rules of formation that structures discourses [and] genealogy 
examines the historical emergence of a discursive formation with a view to 
exploring possibilities that are excluded by the exercise of power and systems of 
domination” (2000, p.46). In the field of policy studies, “the practice of 
problematisation focuses on the question of problem-definition in a particular 
field or domain, the various problematisations of this problematisation, and the 
efforts of an analyst to problematise these problematisations” (Howarth, 2010, 
                                                          
11 The six questions around which Bacchi’s method revolves are: 
1) What is the ‘problem’ represented to be? 
2) What are the assumptions and presuppositions that underlie this representation of 
the ‘problem’? 
3) How has this representation of the ‘problem’ come about? 
4) What is left unproblematic in this representation of the ‘problem’? Where are the 
silences? Can the ‘problem’ be thought about differently? 
5) What effects are produced by this representation of the ‘problem’? 
6) How is this representation of the problem produced, disseminated and defended? 
How can it be questioned, disrupted and replaced? (2009) 
12 Developed for policy studies in education, but applied more broadly (see for example 
Vandersypen 2012) his approach offered a framework for analysis that was intended to expand 
the capacity of policy analysis to act as a critical problematic. Through approaching policy as the 
site at which social regularities and normative values can be identified he refused the 
acceptance of social problems as natural occurrences.  
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p.325. See also Bacchi 2012 & 2009). The aim is to employ the “logics of critical 
explanation” to “render a problematised phenomenon – a particular policy or 
practice for example – more intelligible” (Howarth, 2010, p.326). This is 
important to undertake given that the social problems governments seek to 
address should not simply be accepted as natural occurrences that have 
emerged from an objective reality, but rather as constructed representations of 
a perceived reality and therefore sites at which social regularities, normative 
values, and expressions of power can be identified (Bacchi, 2012; Cortell 
Vandersypen 2012; Bacchi, 2009; Scheurich, 1994).  
 
In this regard, research employing Foucauldian problematisation as a 
methodology seeks to undertake an immanent, rather than transcendent 
critique of the policy problem under analysis because it is intended “to make 
visible the perspectives and starting points on the basis of which knowledge and 
meanings are produced in a particular historical moment” (Talja, 1999, p.461). 
It is an enquiry that Watts (1993) summarises as exploring the discursive 
constitution of a practice as a problem and  although this is done in order to 
“make it possible to evaluate the practical consequences of different ways of 
approaching a particular phenomenon” (Talja, 1999, p.461), the primary task of 
the researcher is not to adjudicate between these differences. Rather it is 
“rediscover at the root of these diverse solutions the general form of the 
problematisation that has made them possible – even in their very opposition 
[…] what has made possible the transformations of the difficulties and obstacles 
into a general problem for which one proposes diverse practical solutions” 
(Foucault, 2003 [1984], p.24).  
1.3.6 Research questions  
As was outlined in the introduction the core question that this research seeks to 
answer is: Why is there a problem of cultural non-participation? To answer 
this using problematisation the following sub-questions were addressed and 
will be answered in the chapters that follow: 
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1. How has the problem been constructed as an object of knowledge? 
2. What discourses of cultural participation are dominant in the field of 
cultural policy? 
3. What discursive logics are employed to construct non-participation as a 
cultural policy problem? 
4. What is the genealogy of this problem construction? 
5. What subjects are constructed within the problem? 
6. How are these subjects constructed? 
7. How do the constructions of these subjects contribute to the resilience of 
the problem construction? 
8. What effects does constructing non-participation as a problem have on 
social relations in the real? 
1.4 Data Generation  
This chapter now moves on to outline how data was generated and analysed in 
order for the researcher to offer answers to the questions outlined above. To 
analyse a problem construction a researcher must have data that they believe 
will make the logics of the problem construction more transparent and 
amenable to analysis (Jager and Maier, 2009). When conducting any form of 
interpretative research the researcher does not collect data as they might within 
the positivist paradigm, but instead they are understood as accessing the sites at 
which data can be generated in one of three ways: reading, talking and 
observing (Yanow and Schwartz-Shea, 2013; Jager and Maier, 2009). This data 
must be generated in the field, whereby the field is understood not as a 
particular organisation, group of agents, or geographical location but as a field 
of knowledge and practice that is to be primarily explored with regards to its 
discursive structure and the power relationships that it both produces and is a 
product of. As Foucault states: “power and knowledge directly imply one 
another [such] that there is no power relation without the correlative 
constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations” (1977, p.27). 
While the researcher may visit various individuals and physical locations in 
order to generate data, it is as a heuristic act in exploring a discursive space.  
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While Scheurich and Bacchi’s approaches to problematisation do not move 
beyond the content of published policy texts, this fails to take full account of the 
multi-modal nature of the dispositive and the extent to which knowledge is not 
only expressed in language but is also embodied in both actions and 
materialisations (Jager and Maier, 2009). As such, the present research sought 
to generate a broader range of data for analysis with the intention of 
considering a multiplicity of sites of meaning within the dispositive13, and to 
understand the construction and reproduction of the problem across different 
discursive planes (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). In so doing, the research makes a 
valuable contribution to knowledge through providing material evidence of how 
the discursive logics identified are socially reproduced in practice across 
multiple planes. Although written texts and qualitative interviews were 
employed as the two primary sources of empirical data generation, as will be 
discussed in more detail below, adopting problematisation as a methodology 
means that existing research is also considered part of the dispositive and 
therefore discussed as such rather than as an objective body of knowledge 
towards which this research contributes. The sections that follow will now 
outline in more detail how the various data were generated.   
1.4.1 Existing research as data 
In research that seeks to understand a problematisation, the existing research is 
not seen as being outside of the dispositive under analysis but an integral part 
of it. Conducting research is a discursive act that combines texts, language and 
practice to produce claims to knowledge and in so doing perform objectivity. 
From a Foucauldian perspective, research is not a value neutral repository of 
facts to which a thesis such as this is designed to add, but rather the name given 
to the work done by certain individuals who seek to “shape the production and 
interpretation of knowledge” (Denzin and Lincoln, 2013, p.350). As such, 
traditional literature reviews that set out to undertake a process of gap-spotting 
                                                          
13 While this has resulted in the generation of multiple types of data it should not be confused 
with the mixed methods of positivist approaches that are adopted in a bid to achieve 
triangulation. Talja (1999) describes it as contextual triangulation and it can be understood as a 
multimodal approach to research (Muller 2008 cited in Yanow, 2014) that has been described as 
the process of mapping for exposure and intertextuality (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow 2012).  
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(Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011) so as to justify new research as a suitable gap-
filler tend towards affirming the dominant discourses in the field of study and 
sustain the normative practices within the institution of academia. Such an 
approach tends to under-problematise existing literature and in so doing acts to 
reinforce rather than challenge existing theories and the logics and assumptions 
on which they are based (2011).  
 
Given the philosophy of the methodology outlined above, adopting the 
recommended model of literature review → methodology → analysis → 
discussion can be both inimical and disingenuous to the logics of the study. As 
Alvesson and Sandberg (2011) note, established ways of researchers relating 
their question to existing literature rarely attempt to foreground the 
assumptions and discourses that underlie them and as such: 
 
It is common to refer either positively or mildly critically to earlier 
studies in order to “extend this literature” (Westphal & Khanna, 2003, 
p.362), to “address this gap in the literature” (Luscher & Lewis, 2008, p. 
221), to point at themes that others “have not paid particular attention to 
(Thornborrow & Brown, 2009, p.356) or to call for more “empirical 
research” (Ewenstein & Whyte, 2009, p.7). Such “gap-spotting” means 
that the assumptions underlying existing literature for the most part 
remain unchallenged in the formulation of research questions. In other 
words, gap-spotting tends to under-problematise existing literature and, 
thus, reinforces rather than challenges already influential theories. 
(2011, p.247) 
 
As such, rather than a traditional literature review that sits outside of the 
empirical analysis, this research has located the existing literature within the 
dispositive and considered the extent to which it provides a body of knowledge 
and performed objectivity upon which the professional discourses about 
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cultural participation rely14. This has resulted in an analysis of the existing 
literature that foregrounds the different ways in which cultural participation - 
and in particular the problem of cultural non-participation - has been 
constructed, understood and represented in the existing research. In doing so, 
this has allowed the researcher to interrogate and reconsider the familiar and 
taken for granted knowledge about the subject that the researcher may have 
brought with them to their endeavour and which is to be understood as part of 
the dispositive under analysis. 
 
Given the nature of the discipline and the extent to which the primary purpose 
of this approach to existing research is to delineate the field of knowledge, both 
grey and peer-reviewed literature has been considered relevant. In selecting 
sources a two-fold approach was undertaken. Firstly, the bibliographies of 
government policy texts were analysed in order to identify those texts and 
authors that appeared most regularly. This was done on the assumption that 
their prominence meant that they were indicative of the structures of 
knowledge upon which the problem construction of cultural non-participation 
was based. Simultaneously, key disciplinary journals were analysed – for 
example Cultural Trends, International Journal of Arts Management, 
International Journal of Cultural Policy, Journal of Arts Management, Law and 
Society - the bibliographies of relevant articles likewise providing an indication 
of knowledge claims most commonly employed in relation to the problem 
construction under analysis.  
1.4.2 Policy texts as data 
Schwartz-Shea & Yanow argue that following things is a key characteristic of 
much interpretative research and that they believe this should be guided by “the 
                                                          
14 While the researcher accepts that such an approach is risky as it can mean questioning 
existing power relations in a field, it should be remembered that the field of academia is based 
on the belief that all knowledge is uncertain (Alvesson and Sandberg, 2011a), researchers tend 
towards conformism (Kuhn, 1970) and theoretical developments partly come from challenging 
fundamental assumptions (Tsoukas and Knudsen, 2004). As such they believe that such 
alternative and critical approaches should be welcomed. 
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intertextual trail from initial document15 to related ones” (2012, p.97). Because 
the root of the puzzle that had inspired the research was the Scottish 
Government’s inception of a national indicator on cultural engagement, this part 
of the data generation process began with the indicator itself, in particular its 
existence and the statistical analysis that was published as part of the reporting 
for the Scottish Household Survey (SHS). This was complemented with the 
collation and analysis of texts in which the problem of cultural non-participation 
or the value of cultural participation were explicitly referenced. Central and 
local government, Creative Scotland, and the organisations that they fund 
produced the majority of these texts16.  
 
While the study focused on cultural policy in Scotland, devolution remains in its 
relative infancy and thus cultural policy in Scotland is significantly influenced by 
its shared history with that elsewhere in the UK and continued relationship as 
part of the wider UK (Schlesinger, 2009b). As such, the research also looked at 
relevant texts produced elsewhere in the UK as evidence of a common 
understanding of the problem construction born out of a shared discursive 
history17. While the process outlined above ultimately resulted in the analysis of 
many documents, it is a smaller number that have been analyzed in closest 
detail and that have been used to provide the direct quotations employed in the 
discussion chapters that follow (see Table 1 for a list of these documents). 
1.4.3 Qualitative interviews as data 
As discussed earlier, in interpretative research “the reliability and 
generalizability of research findings can be enhanced by combining different 
types of research materials, interviews, and written texts, and by contextual 
triangulation” (Talja, 1999, p.473). Initial sources of data should be extended by 
                                                          
15 Schwartz-Shea and Yanow understand a document as any relevant site, artifact, or discourse 
within the field of study. 
16 New texts were sometimes identified as a result of being referenced within an existing text 
under analysis. Other times it was the result of having been mentioned in an interview. 
17 As such, the findings of this research should not be understood as being specific to Scotland, 
but rather as an indicative case of how the problem of cultural non-participation is constructed 
across Europe (See Stevenson et. al. (2015) for a discussion about the problematisation of 
cultural non-participation in a European context).  
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making explicit comparisons between different settings or contexts in order to 
identify regularities in the logics employed, which can be identified through 
repeatedly occurring descriptions, explanations, arguments and subjects 
(Wetherell and Potter, 1988). In discourse analysis this is also understood as 
allowing the researcher to analyse the different planes on which the discourses 
exits and are maintained (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). As such, the analysis of 
policy texts and existing research was complemented with an additional form of 
data in the form of qualitative interviews. These were primarily conducted with 
individuals working in organisations that receive some degree of state subsidy 
on the basis of their contribution towards supporting cultural participation, 
thus allowing the researcher access to a professional plane of discourse about 
the problem construction under analysis.  
Title  Year  Author  Weblink 
Results from the Scottish 
Household Survey  
2009/ 
2015 
Scottish 
Government  
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/Statistic
s/16002/PublicationCulture  
Culture Delivers  2008  Scottish 
Government  
http://www.gov.scot/Resource/Doc/
255857/0075838.pdf  
Cultural Policy: 
Widening Access to the 
Arts and Culture 
(webpage)  
2010 Scottish 
Government  
http://www.gov.scot/Topics/ArtsCult
ureSport/arts/Archive/CulturalPolicy
/workinggroup  
Past, Present & Future: 
Culture and Heritage in 
an Independent 
Scotland. Culture 
Secretary’s speech on 
culture in Scotland  
2013 Fiona Hyslop / 
Scottish 
Government  
http://www.gov.scot/News/Speeches
/Culture-Heritage05062013  
Public Engagement 
Application Guidelines 
2014  
2014 Creative 
Scotland  
http://www.creativescotland.com/__d
ata/assets/pdf_file/0007/24838/Publ
ic-Engagement-Guidelines-2014-v1-
1.pdf  
Unlocking Potential, 
Embracing Ambition: 
Creative Scotland’s Ten 
Year Plan  
2014 Creative 
Scotland  
http://www.creativescotland.com/wh
at-we-do/the-10-year-plan  
National Indicator on 
Cultural Engagement 
(webpage) 
2015  Scottish 
Government  
http://www.gov.scot/About/Performa
nce/scotPerforms/indicator/culture  
Regular Funding 2015-
18: About the portfolio  
2015 Creative 
Scotland  
http://www.creativescotland.com/fun
ding/funding-programmes/regular-
funding  
Creative Scotland The 
Guide to Open Project 
Funding 2014-15 
2015 Creative 
Scotland  
http://www.creativescotland.com/__d
ata/assets/pdf_file/0003/28695/The-
Guide-to-Open-Project-Funding-2014-
15-v1-1.pdf  
Table 1: List of primary texts analysed for this study 
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Interviews are less commonly employed as a method in discourse analysis of 
this kind (Cameron, 2013) and their inclusion in the current study is part of its 
originality18. However, where they are employed, in addition to offering access 
to an alternative discursive plane, they also offer an opportunity to observe how 
the complex and ostensibly contradictory discourses of the field are negotiated 
to construct what the interviewee believes is the most appropriate 
representation of reality at any particular point. However it is important to note 
that the speaking subject is not understood as the originator of a statement and 
so the aim of employing interviews in a discourse analysis is not to capture the 
interviewees’ supposedly authentic intentions, meanings or experiences (Talja, 
1999), but rather to view the interview as a speech event within the dispositive 
(Cameron, 2013). It is a speech event in which the interviewees both account for 
themselves and their practices in relation to the discursive structures that give 
the interview meaning. Multiple discourses will always be evident in any 
interview as there are multiple ways in which any practice can be understood 
and spoken about. However they are not all equally acceptable in relation to the 
dispositive in which the speech event occurs (Foucault, 1972). For the meaning 
of an answer is not a straightforward matter of external or internal reference, 
but also depends on the local and broader discursive structures in which the 
utterance is embedded at that moment (Wetherell and Potter, 1988). 
Furthermore, in formulating their statements the speaker adopts various 
voices19 dependent on the dispositive in which they are speaking, and their 
discursive position relative to the interviewer within it (Talja, 1999). In so doing 
they allow the researcher to better understand the subjects that the discourse 
brings in to being and how those subjects are defined in opposition to their 
possible alternatives (Foucault, 1972).  
                                                          
18 While cultural policy has been analysed discursively, it does not tend to be the case that 
interviews have been employed as discursive speech events in which the reproduction of 
discursive logics can be witnessed and participated in by the researcher.     
19 Discourse analysis emphasizes that subjects are not as one-dimensional, sovereign, and static 
as is commonly assumed, because in different social contexts and speech situations, the 
individual uses variable linguistic resources and moves between different discourses quite 
naturally and skilfully (Talja, 1999, p.470). 
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1.4.4 Selection of interviewees  
Wherever possible, interpretive research rejects the normative language of 
scientific research as it fails to fit the realities of its methods. As such, when 
seeking to carry out interviews it was the principle of exposure (Schwartz-Shea 
& Yanow 2012) that was paramount, as opposed to any pretense about the 
selection of a sample over which the researcher had unproblematic control. The 
selection of interviewees is part of the credibility and trustworthiness of the 
thesis - its internal validity (Silverman, 2010) -  and as such potential 
interviewees were selected on the belief that they had “appropriate experience, 
those people who have been through the critical events, career paths, or social 
routines and rituals” (Lindlof and Taylor, 2011, p.179) relevant to the field of 
knowledge under analysis. In particular they were selected on the assumption 
that they would feel able and proficient to talk about the problem of cultural 
non-participation. As such, the majority of individuals approached were 
working in or for organisations receiving public subsidy. In addition, some 
interviews were also conducted with central and local government employees; 
those with responsibility for distributing pubic subsidy to support cultural 
participation; and artists employed to conduct projects intended to increase 
cultural participation20. What these individuals shared was their experiential 
relevance (Rudestam and Newton, 2015) to the current study, as to a greater or 
lesser degree all of them were required as part of their professional practice to 
work towards increasing participation in culture and thus their role and the 
activities they carry out are part of the same dispositive in which the problem is 
constructed.  
 
As the roles and practices of these individuals have been understood as part of 
the dispositive under analysis, the interviewees were simultaneously 
                                                          
20 While practicalities meant that preference was given to individuals within a closer vicinity to 
the researcher, no limits were placed on where interviewees could be located. All interviews 
were conducted at a location chosen by the interviewee. Ethical conduct throughout the study 
adhered to the basic precepts of consent, confidentiality and trust. Ethical approval was secured 
from Queen Margaret University’s Research committee and all interviewees were provided with 
a spoken description of the project - see Appendix 2.01 - and provided their oral consent. In 
order to encourage interviewees to speak more freely, confidentiality was assured from the 
outset of the interview.  
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understood by the researcher as being both constructed in and users of the 
discourses under analysis21. On the one hand, they were constructed in 
discourse as individuals who would be able, through their actions, to support 
the objective of increasing cultural participation – hence why they were chosen 
for these interviews22. While on the other, as users of discourse they were able 
to provide evidence of how the problem of cultural non-participation is 
constructed, what discursive logics are employed, and how they observe and 
interpret their own identity and practice as subject and object about which 
truths can be known. 
 
It should be noted that the researcher had originally intended to also include 
non-participants in their sample. As such, two individuals who, in the SHS, 
would statistically be labelled as non-participants were interviewed during the 
early stages of data generation. However this line of inquiry was not pursued 
due to an early realisation by the researcher that the act of seeking out 
individuals and applying the label of the non-participant to them was replicating 
part of the discursive practice of the dispositive. In seeking them out for 
interview, the researcher was writing a discursive identity onto these 
individuals that they had not chosen to adopt and yet were being asked to speak 
as a representative of.  Furthermore, as the focus of the research increasingly 
coalesced, it became clear that the object of study was the discursive 
construction of both the problem of non-participation and the identity of the 
non-participant. As shall be discussed in the analysis, these discursive 
constructions are maintained and reproduced by the professionals that 
dominate the field of cultural policy. Those individuals that the researcher was 
labelling as non-participants were not users of these discourses and as such 
their interviews did not exhibit the discursive logics that the researcher was 
seeking to analyse and understand.  While it is acknowledged that there would 
be merit in exploring the discourses that such individuals do use in relation to 
                                                          
21 Throughout the discussion and analysis that follows, their responses will be utilised as such. 
22 In this regard, the very action of selecting them for interview becomes a discursive act that 
affirms the position of these individuals within the dispositive under analysis.   
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their own cultural practice, it was felt that there was not the scope within this 
thesis to do so satisfactorily and that given the conclusions of this study any 
such interviews should not impose the identity of the non-participant onto any 
interviewees.        
1.4.5 The sample   
When conducting research such as this, it is easy to become fixated on securing 
the ‘right amount’ of interviews. However, to do so is to privilege the 
quantitative over the qualitative with no automatic improvement in the quality 
of what is then available for analysis. Even what seems like a small amount of 
qualitative data can prove to be a rich source, indeed Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 
(2012) argue that ten in-depth interviews can provide more than enough data 
for a credible study of this type. For the current research it was ultimately the 
practicalities of being a lone researcher that influenced how many interviewees 
were spoken to. Altogether 42 in-depth interviews of between sixty and ninety 
minutes were conducted, generating over 55 hours of recorded conversations.  
 
The participants are listed alphabetically below (Table 2) and although their 
names and organisations are offered here to add to the credibility of the 
research, in the discussion and analysis they are referred to numerically23 for 
two important reasons. Firstly, this is in order to ensure that quotes cannot be 
apportioned to a specific interviewee, for when oral consent was requested 
interviewees were told that confidentiality would be ensured in the use of direct 
quotations. This commitment to confidentiality was offered so as to allow 
interviewees to feel relaxed in the interviews, encourage them to speak freely, 
and to avoid them feeling any need to self-censor their responses.  Secondly, 
although confidentiality could have been maintained while still acknowledging 
the ‘type’24 of interviewee that the quote had come from, it was felt that to do so 
would lead the analysis towards presenting any differences between what each 
interviewee said as examples of alternative discourses, rather than situated 
                                                          
23 The number does not relate to the order in which interviewees are listed in the table.  
24 For example if it was a funder, manager of a national organisation, manager of a local 
organisation etc.  
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variations of the same discourses, sharing the same discursive logics with 
regards to the problem of non-participation. This is important, because as shall 
become clear throughout the analysis, irrespective of any interviewee’s 
particular circumstances and the answers that they gave, they all employed a 
common discursive logic based on second order assumptions about the identity 
of the non-participant, the problem of non-participation, and the practices by 
which it should be addressed. As such, and as shall be made clear in Chapter 6, 
what was of greatest importance was their shared identity as a cultural 
professional, irrespective of the particular job role in which this identity was 
practiced.  
1.4.6 Interview conduct  
While the majority of interviews were recorded, as part of the researcher 
seeking oral consent25 interviewees were always informed that this was an 
option and some declined to have a permanent record of the conversation 
made26. Initial interviews were semi-structured, making use of an interview 
guide (Lindlof and Taylor, 2011) that consisted of a loose listing of topics and 
questions that the researcher felt would open up the discursive construction of 
the problem and that were based on the ongoing analysis of the research and 
written policy texts. Examples of the typical form that such questions took 
include: 
 What can you tell me about the national indicator on cultural 
engagement? 
 What does the government mean when it states that it wants to increase 
participation with culture? 
 How would you describe your own cultural participation?  
 How do you identify non-participants with whom to work? 
 Why is it important that people participate in culture? 
 What sort of things does your organisation do to support increasing 
cultural participation? 
 
 
                                                          
25 See Appendix 2.01 for a copy of the information leaflet given to Interviewees in order to seek 
their informed consent to contribute to the study.  
26 In these instances the researcher was able to make notes throughout the interview.  
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Name Organisation Name Organisation 
Ali Hill Bongo Club Jon Morgan FST 
Ali Rae National Museums 
Scotland 
Kate Wimpress North Edinburgh Arts 
Alison Reeves WHALE Laura Bennison National Museums 
Scotland 
Alistair Evans Creative Scotland Lindsay Robinson Edinburgh Council 
Beth Dynowski Freelance Artist Lucy Forde Scottish Chamber 
Orchestra 
Brian McMaster EIF/Science Festival Lucy Vaughan Lyceum 
Caitlin Page Fruitmarket Gallery Mark O’Neil Glasgow Life 
Caroline Docherty Creative Scotland Michael Clarke National Galleries of 
Scotland 
Catherine Cassidy Scottish Ballet Mike Griffiths Scottish Government 
Cllr Richard Lewis City of Edinburgh 
Council 
Rami Ousta BEMIS 
Diane Campion Scottish Government Rod White Filmhouse 
Emma Black Surgeons Hall Ros Lamont The Audience Business 
Fiona Bradley Fruitmarket Gallery Sally Hobson Edinburgh International 
Festival 
Gary Roden Playhouse Sambrooke Scott Creative Scotland 
Gavin Crichton Active Inquiry Theatre 
Company 
Sarah Price Edinburgh Printmakers 
Geraldine Heaney Participatory Artist Sarah Saunders National Galleries of 
Scotland 
Gillian Harrison Voluntary Arts 
Scotland 
Sarah Yearsley ENGAGE Scotland 
Ginnie Atkinson Stills/Film Festival Simon Bateson Take One Action Film 
Festival 
Graeme Busfield Non Participant Simon Sharkey National Theatre 
Scotland 
James Allenby Dancebase Steve Bruce Non Participant 
Joanna Baker Edinburgh 
International Festival 
Suzi Morrice Dundee Rep 
Table 2: List of interviewees spoken to for this study 
Questions were intended to be generative (Rubin and Rubin, 2005) so were 
constructed as stimulations intended to encourage an extended response from 
the interviewees. This approach would generally then lead to additional 
discussion and probing in order to further explore the discursive logic that the 
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interviewee’s initial responses were employing. As the interviews progressed, 
the discussion was allowed to become increasingly conversational and more 
akin to the “river and channel approach” (Rubin and Rubin, 2005, p.145) of 
interviewing. This flexible approach meant that while interviewees were free to 
define the scope of their answers, the interviewer was able to ensure that their 
interaction generated extended dialogue about the key areas of interest, thus 
providing richer data for analysis from which greater understanding about the 
discursive structures might be gained. Furthermore, while the utterances 
produced on the basis of established discourses are normally received simply as 
‘grammatical’ that is, as logical and believable descriptions of how things are 
(Foucault, 1972), this approach allowed the interviewer to foreground the 
discourses being employed through probing interviewees on the taken for 
granted facts that they would employ to in order to legitimise the logics upon 
which the discourses they were using relied (Talja, 1999).   
1.5 Data Analysis  
The thesis offered here is the textual representation of what Howarth (2010) 
describes as the practice of articulation. This is a process of analysis that links 
specific theoretical and empirical elements together so as to account for a 
problematised phenomenon and to problematise its continued acceptance. As 
has been outlined above, interpretive research is an “iterative, intertwining 
processes of access, generation and analysis” (Yanow & Schwartz-Shea 2013, 
p.204) each of which is in constant relationship with another. While Yanow 
describes this as abduction, Howarth (2010) describes it as a retroductive form 
of analysis that is conducted through a back and forth relationship with the 
available empirical data until the researcher is persuaded that the putative 
explans clears away the confusion and fits the phenomenon that they are 
researching (see also Braun and Clarke, 2006). The section that follows offers a 
brief summary of how this process has been undertaken in the present research.  
1.5.1 Logics of critical explanation 
As has been discussed above, the data generated are understood as discursive 
work concerning the topic in question (Talja, 1999) and as such part of the 
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dispositive under analysis.  Therefore, the primary value of the data lies not in 
what they directly present but in the potential they afford the researcher to 
access and analyse what Howarth (2010) describes as the logics of critical 
explanation. Discursive logics provide answers to questions about the nature 
and function of various social practices because they capture “both the rules 
that govern a meaningful practice, as well as the conditions that make the 
operation of such rules possible, whilst at the same time rendering them 
vulnerable to change” (Howarth, 2010, p.325). Three types of discursive logic 
exist, the social, the political and the fantasmatic (Howarth, 2010). Respectively 
these logics allow social practice to be characterised, contingent social relations 
to be justified and different social subjects to be attached to specific identities. 
Together they function to naturalise the relations of domination that exist in 
society, for as Wittgenstein (1971) has argued: in normal language each 
expression not only states, but also evaluates. The purpose of analysis is to 
foreground those logics, highlight the implicit evaluations they contain and to 
consider what alternative values they silence.  
 
Adapting advice offered by Potter and Wetherell (1987), the researcher’s 
attempt to understand the logics of critical explanation upon which the problem 
of cultural non-participation relies began with three phases of analysis, the first 
of which consisted of three steps. The first step involved the analysis of 
inconsistencies and internal contradictions within a single piece of core data – 
namely the SHS and its associated report on cultural participation. The second 
step consisted of looking for repeatedly occurring descriptions, explanations, 
and arguments within the data, while the third consists of identifying the basic 
assumptions and presuppositions upon which these arguments were based. 
Practically these steps were achieved through a close reading and critical 
questioning of the texts informed by questions 1, 2 and 4 of Bacchi’s (2009) 
WPR method27.  
                                                          
27 What is the problem represented to be? What are the assumptions and presuppositions that 
underlie this representation of the problem? What is left unproblematic in this representation of 
the problem? Where are the silences?  
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The culmination of this stage of the research involved the researcher stepping 
back from the data in order to formalise their thinking about the problem 
representation evident in the texts. This was done through presenting and 
publishing their work thus far (see Stevenson, 2013b) as not only did this offer 
an opportunity for critical reflection on the perspective they were reaching but 
also an opportunity to test their nascent theories amongst a “tribunal of critical 
scholars, practitioners and policymakers” (Howarth, 2010, p.325) in order to 
seek their evaluation of the researcher’s critiques. Although any acceptance 
gained does not guarantee the validity of a proto-explanation, within the 
discursive field of academia, such discursive practices are central to the 
researcher’s final conclusions being accepted as credible explanations. 
 
Having formed some preliminary theories about the discursive logics of the 
problem construction, the research then progressed to explore these further 
through looking for their use and variation across other discursive planes in 
which the problem construction was also present. As such, the researcher began 
to conduct qualitative interviews and in doing so was able to reflect on what 
kinds of logics the interviewees’ various statements were based on, how these 
logics produced different kinds of truths, and what these truths might 
accomplish when employed by agents in a field (Wetherell and Potter, 1988). 
For when asked to speak about the social world and their practices within it, 
individuals cannot invent new words to express their understanding every time 
they speak and as such have to use the same expressions that have been used 
countless times before (Volosinov, 1986). Therefore, “historically formed 
discourses are repositories of starting points, definitions and themes that 
position the speakers as they give meanings to phenomena” (Talja, 1999, p.470). 
This meant that although the interviews were far more complex and rich sites of 
discourse than the texts, a shared vocabulary of discursive logic could still be 
identified between them. 
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While the written texts could be analyzed as found, interviews required further 
preparation and as such the first 24 interviews were transcribed in detail, 
generating over 200,000 words for analysis. As the kind of fine detail necessary 
for an approach such as Conversation Analysis was not required, what was 
produced were thorough orthographic accounts that included all verbal 
utterances and those non-verbal utterances or pauses that it was believed at the 
time to be pertinent to the analysis. However, as the project progressed, and 
based upon the recommendations of Silverman (2010, p.35) and Gillham (2005, 
p.119) transcriptions were conducted more selectively, focusing only on those 
interviews or parts thereof that it was felt were of particular relevance to 
advancing the researcher’s developing analysis of the problem construction. 
This sort of selective transcription is appropriate for lone researchers as it 
allows a greater proportion of their time to be spent conducting additional 
interviews and is based on the assertion that it is from initial sources that the 
majority of understanding is reached. This means that “subsequent interviews 
add content but little in the way of new categories. [As such] there comes a 
point where it is more economical to listen for new or exemplar statements” 
(Gillham, 2005, p.122) than to slavishly copy out all that has been said. 
Therefore, in the latter stages of the research, active listening was employed to 
seek further evidence of the discursive logics already identified as important or 
to identify if there were any discursive logics that had not previously been 
identified elsewhere.  
 
Interviews and transcriptions were completed in small batches of four or five, 
and periods of analysis took place after each batch of interviews had been 
completed.  The analysis involved the researcher conducting numerous close 
readings of the transcriptions, manually marking up the transcripts with notes 
about the critical logics that they identified. Once again, it was questions 1, 2 
and 4 of Bacchi’s (2009) method that provided the broad framework under 
which this close reading was conducted. In practice, what this initially resulted 
in was a list of the various subjects, objects, and keywords that were most 
common in the interviewee’s responses. This list was populated with quotations 
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from the interviews in which the various discursive components had been 
employed. In turn, this initial analysis then informed the questioning employed 
in latter interviews where the researcher sought to better understand the 
critical logics (Howarth, 2010) through which these discursive components 
were related. As such, latter stages of analysis focused on how the various 
components could be described, what relationships between them were 
possible, and what arguments and explanations were offered with regards to 
these relationships. Once again, a process of close reading and note taking 
culminated in the production of a distilled list of quotations felt by the 
researcher to be indicative of the critical logics that were being repeatedly 
employed in the data.   
 
The endpoint of such a process of analysis is the systematic linking of the 
subjects, objects, descriptions, accounts, and arguments to the particular 
discursive structure of which the researcher believes them all to be a part (Talja, 
1999, p.466). Practically, this was conducted through manually mapping all of 
the discursive components identified and the possible relationships between 
them. Finally, having made visible the critical logics of the problem construction 
within the field of cultural policy, the researcher returned to consider the 
remaining questions that Bacchi (2009) poses. Namely, what are the effects that 
the existence of the problem produces, and how might these effects might be 
disrupted?  
1.5.2 Credibility  
The criteria of validity and reliability are very different in interpretative 
research. Data has been analysed as discursive components, not as facts about 
how the world really is. No research data can therefore, in themselves, offer a 
more authentic, unbiased, or accurate description of reality. Likewise no 
researcher’s interpretation of the data can be argued to be any truer than 
another’s. As such, the conclusions of this research “are not generalizable as 
descriptions of how things are, but as how a phenomenon can be seen or 
interpreted [since] there is no logical reason to doubt that the particular model 
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of argumentation it offers could not be used by any competent member of 
society” (Talja, 1999, p.472).  
 
This might lead some to argue the process outlined above results in conclusions 
that are no more than opinion. While the researcher would acknowledge that 
what is presented is their interpretation, their way of making sense of what they 
set out to consider, they would equally contend that it is not simply their 
opinion. Instead they would argue it is insight that is the product of an extensive 
period of intentional and focused thought about a topic. It is the product of a 
degree of immersive and sustained thinking that one cannot normally afford to 
such a narrow subject. And it is the product of self-conscious thought in which 
ongoing reflection has allowed the researcher to develop a heightened 
awareness of the processes of analysis that led to the conclusions reached. It is 
on these bases that the current study is presented as a valid, valuable and 
credible contribution to knowledge and in doing so the author stresses the role 
of judgement as a situated ability in which a researching subject “acquires and 
enacts the capacity to connect to an object, or ‘apply’ a logic to a series of social 
processes, within a contingent and contestable theoretical framework” 
(Howarth, 2010, p.327)28.  
1.5.3 Critical reflexivity 
What a critical approach to interpretative research such as this does require is 
that the researcher acknowledges their authorial power and as such their 
productive function within the fields that they study, contribute to and exist 
within. Understanding is always partial and “there is no vantage point external 
to the debate from which a disinterested observer can make their observations” 
(Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 2012, p.79). No researcher has the capacity to 
                                                          
28 Howarth offers an extended explanation of this concept, a brief summary of which will be 
offered here. His argument is that having “immersed oneself in a given discursive field 
consisting of texts, documents, interviews and social practices, the researcher draws on his or 
her theoretical expertise to make particular judgments […] and must then decide upon its 
overall import for the problem investigated […]”. An integral part of judging whether a 
particular empirical phenomenon is relevant to the discussion “consists in deciding what [its] 
precise relevance and importance is in constructing a narrative that explains a phenomenon” 
(Howarth, 2010). 
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analyze the world through a filter that allows it to be seen as it really is when no 
one is looking (Geertz, 1973) and neither can they stand outside of discourse 
(Bacchi, 2000). While it might be hoped that the methodological approach taken 
will mean that, to some extent, the researcher “transcends their acculturation” 
(Rorty, 1991, p.13) and in so doing has assimilated a multiplicity of world-
views, attitudes, beliefs, and values, the epistemological basis of any interpretive 
research demands an acknowledgment of the researcher’s status as a positioned 
and active agent within the debate and the degree to which this may also have 
shaped both the data generated and the conclusions reached.  
 
Practically, this means it has been important for the researcher to remain alert 
to their ideological imperatives, epistemological presuppositions, and 
subjective, inter-subjective and normative beliefs about the area under 
investigation (Denzin and Lincoln, 2013). Critical reflexivity is understood as a 
significant marker of quality in interpretive research because it makes both the 
research process and the assertions that arise from it more transparent and 
credible “thereby maximising the trustworthiness of the researcher’s claims to 
knowledge as voiced in a research manuscript” (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow, 
2012, p.104). There are those who choose to explicitly address this through 
adoption of the authorial ‘I’ so as to make their own presence clear at every 
point in the analysis. However, this is an unsatisfactory solution to a wicked 
problem given that ‘I’ is “not a unified subject, a fixed identity, or that solid mass 
covered with layers of superficialities one has gradually to peel off before one 
can see its true face. ‘I’ is, itself, infinite layers” (Trinh, 1989, cited in 
Conquergood, 1991, p.184). To claim a stable identity in order to describe and 
deconstruct a constructed reality is as flawed as the notion of the researcher as 
objective intermediary. Thus, the language used in this thesis primarily adopts 
the traditional, modernist, impersonal and seemingly objective narrative of 
positivist research. However it does so with the clear acknowledgement that the 
written output must only be understood as one voice, one interpretation and 
one way of understanding the matters discussed. 
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Summary  
Chapter 1 has outlined the methodology adopted and discussed how this 
methodology has shaped the entire approach that has been taken in producing 
this research. Situating cultural policy analysis within the wider discipline of 
policy studies, the chapter began by highlighting the extent to which a diverse 
number of accounts about the nature of policy and policy-making have led to 
numerous approaches to conducting the study of policy. After briefly explaining 
the interpretative (or argumentative) turn in policy analysis, the discussion then 
moved on to detail how, for the present study, policy has been understood as 
discourse. In particular, the discussion has focused on how the approach taken 
has been informed by the Foucauldian concepts of problematisation, the 
dispositive, relations of knowledge/power, and the discursive construction of 
subject identities within a discourse. After clarifying the research questions, the 
chapter then provided detail about both data generation and analysis, with 
existing research, policy texts, and qualitative interviews all having been 
analyzed in an attempt to understand the logics of critical explanation upon 
which the problem of non-participation has been constructed. 
Chapter 2 will now move on to offer an analysis of the existing research into 
cultural participation. Specifically, it will consider how cultural participation has 
been constructed as a distinct object of knowledge about which truths can be 
claimed. It will specifically consider the claims that have been made about the 
value of cultural participation as a distinct type of human practice, and the 
explanations that have been offered about why there are observable differences 
in the extent to which various people undertake this practice.  
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Chapter 2 – Social and political logics: Constructing cultural participation 
as an object of enquiry 
As Brook notes: “the factors that influence whether individuals attend the arts29 
have been the subject of a considerable amount of research in the UK, 
particularly during the last decade [with a focus on] how individual 
demographic and socio-economic characteristics influence engagement in 
cultural activities” (2013, p.145). Economists, sociologists and psychologists 
have all offered frameworks and models that make assertions about what 
cultural participation is and offer explanations of the observable differences 
between the cultural participation choices of various individuals. This work has 
been both built on and contributed to by those working in the field of arts 
management - and in particular arts marketing – resulting in a diversity of 
observations, assertions and theories about the different patterns of human 
practice that the quantitative figures regularly show. 
 
As has been outlined in Chapter 1, this study has not approached the existing 
research about cultural participation as a value neutral repository of knowledge 
to which the present study seeks to contribute. Research is thought, and as 
Foucault argues thought is an act that establishes an object and a subject as well 
as the possible relationships between them. Yet it is also the “motion by which 
one detaches oneself from [the object…] and reflects on it as a problem” 
(Foucault, 2003 [1984], p.23). However there can be no absolute detachment 
from discursive structures and therefore no position exists outside of them from 
which they can be understood. For in order for any research about cultural 
participation to have any meaning, it must either be viewed as an explicit 
product of its discourses or understood in relation to them.  
 
                                                          
29 The apparent synonymy between the arts and culture will be discussed in this chapter and 
Chapter 4 
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And so research is an integral part of how problems are constructed, as it 
provides structure, objectivity and credibility to the discursive logics upon 
which the problem construction relies. It generates analysis that is employed as 
evidence the problem exists, frames the ways in which it can be understood, and 
suggests the type of responses that are accepted as appropriate. As such, this 
chapter now offers an overview of research that both produces and reproduces 
discourses of cultural participation, in particular that which contributes to the 
discursive logic that constructs non-participation as a problem. In doing so it 
will specifically address research question 1 – How has the problem been 
constructed as an object of knowledge?  
 
There is a broad range of publications that have been both produced by and 
taken into the discourses that construct the problem under analysis. While a 
wide range of this research will be discussed below, it is inevitably a partial 
selection from all that might be considered relevant. As such, the selection is 
based upon that that the researcher believes to be most indicative of, and 
influential to, the problem construction. Such researcher led selection is not 
unusual in a study of this kind, as problematisation research tends to involve 
focusing on that which allows the researcher to identify and challenge the 
dominant assumptions underlying the research into their topic (Alvesson and 
Sandberg, 2011). 
 
Focusing on two of Howarth’s (2010) three logics of critical explanation, it will 
first be argued that existing research is generative of social logic in defining 
culture as a distinct field of human activity, and participation with culture as a 
uniquely valuable practice. Secondly it is proposed that existing research is also 
generative of political logic through offering explanations and justifications for 
the contingent relations between the various subjects and objects that are 
understood as being possible in relation to this practice. Central to this 
discussion will be a consideration of the ways in which such differences can be 
constructed as a problem, in particular as a problem requiring the intervention 
of the state. 
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2.1 Defining culture as a distinct field of human practice  
Gray (2010) has argued that the contested nature of the central word in cultural 
policy means that it assumes an importance far greater than it has in other 
policy areas such as defense, taxation, and education. Schuster (2002a) points 
towards these definitional difficulties30 as a problem for cultural policy makers, 
indeed there is a whole strand of research that has considered the contested 
nature of many of the terms involved in producing and talking about cultural 
policy and the related confusion that this can bring (Ashley, 2013; McCall, 2009; 
Gray, 2009; Roodhouse, 2008; Galloway and Dunlop, 2007; Levitas, 2004). 
While some of this work has been prompted by the growth of the term creative 
and cultural industries (Miller, 2009; Garnham, 2005), others have focused on 
attempting to understand what cultural policy can be said to encompass (Bell 
and Oakley, 2105; Ahearne, 2009; Throsby, 2009; Craik, 2007). Despite this, it is 
often highlighted how little care is exercised by governments, academics and 
commentators to explicitly identify which meaning of culture is being employed 
(Gray, 2009; McGuigan, 2004).  
This type of discursive contestation is to be expected within any field of 
knowledge. As Foucault has argued, freedom within a discursive field is the 
freedom to take part in “the games of truth which make up the history of our 
relation to ourselves” what he describes as “the technologies: the intellectual 
and practical instruments and devices enjoined upon human beings to shape 
and guide their way of ‘being human’” (cited in Rabinow and Rose, 2003, p.xxi; 
see also Foucault, 2003b [1982]). This is acknowledged by Burton et. al. (2006) 
who have spoken of a need to surface the various assumptions underlying 
policy interventions, and as will be discussed in more detail below, the 
assumptions around the definition, benefits, impacts and value of cultural 
participation have already been challenged, not least through a critical analysis 
of the evidence upon which claims are made (Gilmore, 2013; Belfiore and 
Bennett, 2007a; Belfiore, 2002; Oakley, 2004). However, what has not been 
                                                          
30 What is participation? What is culture? Can definitions be reached at a national let alone 
international level? 
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considered to the same degree are the construction of second order 
assumptions and presuppositions31 that are fundamental in maintaining the 
existence of cultural non-participation as a problem in its own right, the taken 
for granted ‘truths’ that make the construction of the problem possible. The first 
of these is the representation of culture as a distinct field of human practice, and 
it is this that the first part of the chapter will discuss.     
2.1.1 Making culture visible as object about which truths can be known    
Connor argues that culture “became visible as a problem” (1992, p.233) in the 
nineteenth century. Almost immediately, different discourses of culture began 
to crystalize. Since then substantial research has been published exploring what 
culture can, should, and is understood to be. Indeed differing disciplines have 
established distinct theories of culture and in so doing have established various 
frameworks within which the concept can be known, discussed and employed32.  
There is not the scope here to capture this discussion in full, nor to fully draw 
out the distinctiveness of each stance through comparison between them, 
however it is important that some of the core theoretical and disciplinary 
understandings of culture are summarised, not least because of the extent to 
which they have, and are likely to continue to shape the discourses with which 
the problem under analysis is constructed.  
 
At one end of the spectrum, culture is an aesthetic artifact, a material object that 
is the product of a certain type of labor but imbued with some symbolic 
meaning. At the opposite end, there is a conception of culture that refers to a 
continuous process of rule and meaning negotiation in which culture is “not a 
thing but a political process of contestation over the power to define key 
concepts, including that of culture itself” (Wright, 1998, p.14, see also Holden, 
2012). Somewhere between the two, culture is understood a way of life shared 
                                                          
31 The author acknowledges that this will always be an impossible task to achieve in full, 
however as Kendall and Wickham argue, it is the “process of attempting to escape the grip of 
second order judgements which is central to the Foucauldian approach” (1999, p.13). There 
need not necessarily be complete success but a genuine attempt must be shown.   
32 Eagleton (2000) offers a review of these idea from a humanities perspective while Griswold 
(2013) presents a consideration of the term from within the social sciences. 
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amongst a group of social agents who classify and represent their experiences in 
a common manner or worldview (Williams, 1981). However, irrespective of 
which position is adopted, each is a way of dividing up human practice in a 
manner that makes it uncertain and unfamiliar. In so doing culture is 
“problematised as an object to be known” (Foucault, 2003a [1984], p.23) and 
thus becomes an object about which games of truths can be played to the 
advantage of some individuals over others. What follows is a summary of the 
knowledge claims about culture that are integral to the manner in which 
cultural non-participation has been constructed as a problem.  
2.1.2 Culture as a process of refinement and growth  
In particular, and as shall be explored in more depth in Chapter 4, it is a late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century European understanding of culture 
that most significantly influences the dominant discourses about cultural 
participation today (Bell and Oakley, 2015). Within this discourse, cultural 
participation is presented as a process of refinement and growth through which 
an individual reaches the apogee of human development, a progression towards 
the platonic ideal. In relation to this discourse, any discussion of cultural policy 
must acknowledge the importance of Matthew Arnold and his seminal work of 
1869: Culture and Anarchy (Arnold  2009 [1869]). As Peterson (1963) notes, in 
this work Arnold sets out to discover what culture is, what good it can do for 
society, and if it is really necessary. He finds culture to be the study of 
perfection, which he contrasts with the anarchy that he ascribes to the mood of 
unrest and uncertainty that prevailed at the time, a mood that was associated 
with the encroaching civilisation of the industrial revolution.  
 
Arnold’s definition of culture as the best that has been thought and said in the 
world encapsulates the common rhetoric of nineteenth century intellectuals, 
which portrays culture as a repository of human values that must be protected 
against the mechanised modernity that threatens the fabric of civilised society 
(Griswold, 2013; Bennett, 2001). While Arnold’s understanding of the social 
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quality of being civilized was not the same as the quality of kultiviert33 
associated with German Romanticism (Elias, 1994) they do share a common 
logic in their belief in an opposition between culture and society, and in which 
culture gains its own agency. This is a Romantic distinction in which culture is 
the humanising and harmonising agent of modern society – it is through culture, 
and not scientific knowledge, that individuals find meaning - a view shared by 
influential sociologist Max Weber (Griswold, 2013) and that is still promoted 
today by those such as critic and cultural commentator Roger Scruton (2011). 
Despite Weber’s concurrence with this position, this discourse is primarily 
associated with the discipline of the humanities and the practice of defending 
the best of culture as represented in an accepted canon of works (F.R. Leavis 
being significantly influential with regard to this practice). However it must be 
acknowledged that contemporary humanities scholars take a more critical 
perspective than that of their forebears. Thus while they doubtless promote a 
canon of sorts, few would endorse the same narrow hierarchy that Arnold and 
Leavis would have recognised, for fear of the elitist connotations that 
accompany it within the post-modern, post-colonial, multicultural and liberal 
society in which these discussions now take place. Yet, as Griswold (2013) and 
Bell and Oakley (2015) both note, despite these connotations this notion of 
culture does persist and in common usage may arguably be the most widely 
employed. 
 
Barker (2006) acknowledges that the label of ‘art’ is also regularly employed to 
describe culture in the sense outlined above. However as a term, art is only 
moderately less problematic than culture and there is an equally extensive 
history of philosophical thought having been applied to its definition. Theories 
on the nature of art include aestheticism, formalism, functionalism, historicism, 
                                                          
33 “The word kultiviert (cultivated) is very close to the Western concept of civilization. To some 
extent, it represents the highest form of being civilized. Even people and families who have 
accomplished nothing kulturell can be kultiviert. Like the term ‘civilized’, kultiviert refers 
primarily to the form of people’s conduct or behavior. It describes a social quality of people, 
their housing, their manners, their speech, their clothing, unlike kulturell, which does not refer 
directly to people themselves, but exclusively to particular human accomplishments” (Elias, 
2000, p. 6).  
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proceduralism and institutionalism (see Gordon, 2000 for a review of this 
topic). Likewise, within the humanities the term ‘art history’ has increasingly 
been superseded by ‘art histories’ as scholars have sought to acknowledge that 
the classical western canon is one of many possible histories about the 
production of such objects, albeit one that has been extensively naturalised 
through the social institution that it both informs and is informed by (Edwards, 
1999). However as is the case with the concept of culture, all of the various 
narratives about art share a common belief, namely that there is such a thing as 
art, produced through a specific from of practice, and that the objects to which 
the label refers provide opportunities for a unique type of social interaction that 
leads to human34 refinement, growth and development.    
2.1.3 Discursive binaries  
Within the logics of this discourse - in which culture exists as a distinct field of 
human activity – cultural participation becomes a practice that is undertaken 
through specific types of interactions with specific types of objects. 
Furthermore, a hierarchy is generally employed in which some objects and 
interactions are seen as being closer to perfection and thus more capable of 
cultivating the human spirit (Arnold, 2009 [1869]). This form of culture is also 
fragile, constantly under threat from an encroaching commercial utilitarianism 
(Adorno and Horkheimer, 2005 [1944]) in which the sheer quantity of 
industrialised mass culture (Leavis and Thompson, 1933) results in the atrophy 
of authentic individual cultural practice (Simmel, 1968 [1911]). Such a 
conception of culture thus assumes a need for some degree of preservation and 
protection by the state. In this sense, the objects and activities with which one 
might participate have traditionally been understood as a rarefied form of ‘high 
culture’ portrayed in binary opposition to other forms, most commonly:   
 folk culture – particularly associated with Leavis (1933) who employed 
this to describe what he believed was the authentic common culture of 
pre-industrialised communities;  
                                                          
34  Both individually and at a societal level. 
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 mass culture – particularly associated with both Leavis (1933) and 
Adorno and Horkheimer (2005 [1944]) who employed it to refer to an 
industrialised culture produced solely as a commodity for economic 
exchange and as such inauthentic, unsatisfying and manipulative. It is a 
definition primarily used by those whose discussion focuses on the 
production of culture; 
 popular culture - used in different ways by different writers (see Storey, 
1993 and Danesi, 2015 for an overview) but mainly with regards to: 
practice that is distinct from, but equivalent to, high culture (for example 
Gans, 1999 [1974]); as a synonym for mass culture; or as the site at 
which cultural hegemony is secured or challenged (for example Hall, 
1977; Fiske, 1989). It is a definition primarily used by those whose 
discussion focuses on the consumption of culture. 
2.1.4 Culture as part of political processes 
Such binary relationships are also evidence of alternative discourses about 
culture that exist alongside that in which it is understood as a process of 
refinement. Within these discourses culture is not represented as an 
autonomous civilizing force, but as part of societal systems of stratification in 
which domination and resistance is variously understood to be taking place. 
Culture is understood as part of a political process in which different groups 
seek to exert control over the role, meaning and definition of cultural artifacts. 
On one hand, dominant societal factions are understood to employ such control 
as an instrument through which to manage the lives of those they seek to 
dominate. Alternatively, culture is seen as the manner in which those that the 
dominant faction seek to dominate resist such oppression and challenge 
hegemony through being active makers of meaning.     
 
One of the most significant of these discourses is that based upon the work of 
Adorno and Horkheimer, in particular their essay The Culture Industry – 
Enlightenment as mass deception (2005 [1944]). Similarly to Leavis, they saw 
mass culture (the products of what they would later define as the Culture 
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Industry) as conformist, inauthentic and standardized. Their Marxist pedigree 
meant that they argued such culture was not only contaminated aesthetically 
but also politically. In offering commodities that purported to be democratic, 
diversified and consumed by all parts of society, class divisions were concealed 
behind a mass of artificially differentiated commodities that reified social 
relations. As such, it is important to note that although the Culture Industry is 
commonly taken to be synonymous with specific forms of production such as 
Hollywood movies and pop music, Adorno and Horkheimer’s critique is not 
specifically about the content but its form, intent and production. Their critique 
argues that realist and representational cultural artifacts are too easily 
consumed and focus their analysis on the base structures of production and 
social relations that bring such products and practices into being. As clarified by 
Adorno in later works (1977; 1978; 1979), this means that manifestations of 
‘high culture’ such as classical music and opera could just as easily be 
understood as part of the Culture Industry on occasion where their production, 
form and distribution were intended to promote mass consumption and reify 
contingent social relations35. As such, Adorno and Horkheimer adhere to a belief 
in the existence of authentic forms of cultural practice, one that they share with 
scholars as different as Leavis (1933) and Simmel (1968 [1911]).   
 
A second strand of this discourse was formed through the establishment of the 
Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham. The 
broad aim of the extensive intellectual tradition that developed from here was 
to attempt to understand cultural objects in all their complex forms and in 
relation to the political and social context in which they are manifest. While 
there are numerous influential and much cited authors who were central to the 
development of this field (Lefebvre, 1947; Hoggart, 1957; Mills, 1959; Hebdige, 
                                                          
35 Given the brevity of this overview it is not possible to address the full complexity of their 
argument or the criticisms that have been leveled against it. It is, however, important to 
highlight the assumption in Adorno and Horkheimer’s argument that audiences accepted, in an 
unproblematic fashion, the meaning of work that had been imbued during its production. This 
was refuted by later cultural studies work in the active audience paradigm (Barker, 1996) in 
which the audience were understood as active makers of meaning and thus representing 
popular culture as the site at which cultural hegemony is resisted rather than affirmed (see 
Chambers, 1990; Fiske 1989; Willis, 1990 for examples of such work).   
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1979; DeCerteau, 1984), it is the works of Raymond Williams - in particular 
Culture is Ordinary (2014 [1958]) and Culture in Society (1983a) – that are 
perhaps most significant for the extent to which he sought to critique the 
manner that cultural practice had been disaggregated. In his work, while he 
contrasts the idea of culture as art [humanities] and culture as a whole way of 
life [anthropology] he stresses that any attempt to understand culture must 
seek to understand how these two meanings coexist36. In this regard, such work 
sought to critique the taken for granted status of everyday life through 
analysing all forms of signification as part of what he described as the structures 
of feeling (Williams, 1977) or shared values of a particular culture.  
 
While Williams’ work is notable for the extent to which it sought to collapse the 
division that existed between different discourses of culture, in practice both his 
analysis and that which has been informed by his perspectives has mostly 
focused on artistic and intellectual symbolic goods, albeit seeking to have what 
was understood as the popular culture of the majority valued to the same 
degree that the high culture of art was (Barker, 2006). The result being that 
Williams’ desire for analytical and definitional convergence has arguably never 
occurred (Connor, 1992) and however ‘ordinary’ culture might be understood 
to be in this tradition, it remains a distinct field of human activity, albeit one that 
has vastly expanded. For in such research it most commonly remained the case 
that culture was assumed to be the product of distinct and specifically symbolic 
practices that were representative of particular subcultures (Thornton, 1997; 
Hebdige, 1979). As such, the potential for non-participation in popular culture is 
as possible as it is within the discourse that represents culture as a process of 
refinement and growth. However as shall be discussed in Chapter 3, what is 
notable is the extent to which non-participation with practices labelled as 
popular culture is not a component part of the problem construction under 
analysis.    
                                                          
36 He further expands on his work in later publications including Keywords36 (1983b) in which 
he offered an analysis of the formation and subsequent alteration of the meaning of the central 
terms by which we think about western culture and society. 
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2.2 Constructing cultural participation as a uniquely valuable human 
practice  
Culture and art are not the only terms that are contested within this field. Both 
participation and engagement are equally disputed and have been constructed, 
understood and modelled in various ways across a broad variety of disciplines. 
While there is equally not the scope to consider the full spectrum of this work in 
detail, it is important to note that while sometimes used synonymously they are 
also employed as distinct terms. However within the discourse of cultural 
participation, both terms are employed to refer to a particular type of 
interaction between a subject and an object that is understood to be uniquely 
valuable for both the individual and society. The assumptions and knowledge 
claims made about this unique interaction are the focus of the second part of 
this chapter.  
2.2.1 Defining participation and engagement  
Engagement is perhaps the most problematic of these synonyms given that in 
terms of cultural policy it “is frequently an unexamined term that might embed 
assumptions and ignore power relationships” (Ashley, 2013, p.261). However, 
Brown and Novak-Leonard take a less critical perspective and have suggested 
that “[e]ngagement is often used within the field to describe enrichment or 
educational activities intended to enhance or deepen audience experiences” 
(2011a, p.6).  In contrast, they define participation as being either receptive 
(primarily some sort of attendance) or participative. Specifically with regards to 
cultural participation surveys, this researcher has argued elsewhere (Stevenson, 
2013b) that participation is seen as one of two indicators of engagement. An 
individual is classified as engaged if they have either attended an event as a 
consumer, or have participated in an activity in which they had a more active 
role such as reading, singing or painting. 
 
Yet this division is blurred given the increasing adoption by organisations and 
artists of what they refer to as co-creative practice, an activity that has been 
noted and empirically considered by Walmsley (2013b) in relation to what is 
described as audience development: a process in which cultural organisations 
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attempt to widen the demographics of their audience through particular types 
of activities. In explaining this practice, Rudman focuses on the relationship 
between the individual and an organisation, describing co-creation as “a new 
form of “organisational porosity” – a mindset that allows for a free exchange of 
creative energy between an arts organisation and its public” (cited in Brown et 
al., 2011b, p.18)37. Likewise, Brown and Novak Leonard have placed co-creation 
on their model of audience involvement (2011a) that identifies five stages in 
order to “illustrate a progression of involvement from spectating – in which the 
audience member plays only a minor role in the artistic outcome, mostly 
providing meaning to the artefact – to the point at which there is no 
conventional audience at all because every person is involved in creating, doing 
or making” (2011a, p.3). While their model propose co-creation as one point on 
a spectrum, it is clear that others would associate it with various other points on 
the spectrum, if not the spectrum in its entirety. Once more, one is faced with 
the definitional fluidity of the field; for it is evident that co-creation is used in 
reference to various types of activity. This is perhaps why, in reviewing some of 
the literature on participation and co-creation, Walmsley proposes that despite 
their differences the definitions of these two terms both coalesce around the 
ideas of “collaboration, interaction, invention, participation, experience, value 
and exchange” (2013b, p.110) between two subjects. Where one subject is 
understood as part of an audience and the other is an organisation or artist 
producing cultural objects. Whatever term is employed, engagement, 
participation or co-creation is understood as a particular type of interaction that 
is about generating value for those involved. 
2.2.2 Definitions of cultural value  
Underlying all of the various discourses on cultural participation is the notion of 
a form of value creation unique to this specific type of human practice. For 
example, this could be the role the audience has in creating value through giving 
                                                          
37 However as Leadbetter (2009) has noted when explicating his concept of ‘the art of with’, an 
interest in a more active audience is not new to those producing art. Likewise, Bishop has 
argued that the arts has a long tradition of viewer participation and “activated spectatorship” 
(2006, p.78) in which participation is intrinsic to the meaning of the work that is produced. 
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meaning to the artefacts with which they are presented (Boorsma, 2006) or the 
values that are created for all the social agents involved in the exchange by 
virtue of their interaction38 (Grönroos 2011; Grönroos & Voima 2013). Just as 
was the case in defining culture and cultural participation as an object of 
knowledge, there is a significant body of work that has sought to understand 
what is variously described as the value, impact or benefit of cultural 
participation39. Although the majority of research appears to concur that any 
value is not an inherent feature of the object but rather something attributed in 
the interaction, beyond this there is once again significant contestation about 
the terminology employed or the practicality of undertaking any kind of 
experimental approach to measuring and evaluating it (Galloway, 2009; Belfiore 
and Bennett, 2007b; Matarasso, 1997).  
 
Although ‘value’ ‘impact’ and ‘benefit’ are closely related terms they are not 
wholly synonymous despite the extent to which they are employed as such 
(Carnwaith and Brown, 2014). Benefit is generally used to refer to a wide range 
of positive outcomes (both tangible and intangible) that are associated with 
cultural activity and can be employed in relation to both individuals and 
communities (Knell and Taylor, 2011; Radbourne et al., 2010; Brown, 2006; 
Mccarthy et al., 2005; Ruiz, 2004). Unlike benefits, impacts can be both positive 
and negative and generally focus on a specific change that occurs through virtue 
of an interaction with an activity or organisation (Leadbetter and O’Connor, 
2013; DCMS, 2010; Brown, 2006; Matarasso, 1997). While Matarasso (1997) 
identified 50 potential social impacts of participative arts programmes in his 
extensive mixed method multiple case study, Ruiz (2004) distils the existing 
evidence into five categories of impact: personal development; social cohesion; 
community image/regeneration; health and wellbeing; and education and 
                                                          
38 Referencing its use within the service-dominant logic of contemporary marketing theory, 
Grönroos distinguishes co-creation as an interaction dependent model of value creation from 
co-production in which the consumer is actively involed in the production of the product or 
experience (2011). 
39 At the point at which this thesis was submitted, the AHRC published the final report of its 
three year, Cultural Value Project (Crossick and Kaszynska 2016). As such, the conclusions of 
this project are not included in this thesis.  
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learning. Specifically with regards to the impact on individuals, the literature 
also suggests that there is a progression of impact stages defined by an 
individual’s temporal proximity to the activity in question and experienced in a 
variety of impact patterns (Carnwaith and Brown, 2014). While there is no 
framework that explicitly considers the relationship of one to the other it is 
often implicit that impact leads to benefits for individuals or that benefit for 
individuals lead to impact for society. Whatever the relationship, given the 
degree to which research has attempted to measure them, it can be assumed 
that they are both seen as a potential proxy for what is commonly referred to as 
cultural value (see Connor, 1992 for a significant discussion of the manner in 
which different intellectual disciplines have concieved of cultural value, in 
addition to Holden and Balta, 2012; Holden, 2004, 2006Throsby, 2001). 
 
The term cultural value is used in cultural economics to refer specifically to the 
non-economic value created by cultural goods and experiences (Throsby, 2001). 
However elsewhere it is understood to refer to the process through which 
cultural organisations produce benefits and impacts for the individual, 
institution and society (Holden, 2004, 2006). Despite those that question if it is 
either possible or useful to do so (Bourgeon-Renault, 2000), much discussion 
has also been expended around the division of cultural value into its constituent 
components. Distinctions are primarily drawn between instrumental and 
intrinsic value, (Brown and Novak-Leonard, 2013; Belfiore, 2012; Mccarthy et 
al., 2005; Knell and Taylor, 2011; Radbourne et al., 2010; Orr, 2008; Holden, 
2006) where the former is primarily employed in relation to external outcomes 
associated with broader policy aims, and the latter is seen to refer to that which 
will accrue to the individual, is specific to cultural participation and is 
understood as an end in itself.  
 
Despite the prevalence with which this binary is employed, there is much 
disquiet over the degree to which its use has primarily resulted in what some 
see as two complementary components of cultural value being presented in 
conflict or opposition ( Joss, 2008; Knell, 2005; Matarasso, 2003; Merli, 2002; 
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Matarasso, 1997). The result of which has been seen as an increasingly circular 
and repetitious debate (O’Brien, 2014) in which the intrinsic value of cultural 
participation is pitted against cultural participation as an instrument to achieve 
some other purpose40. As such, there are those who have sought to move 
beyond the either/or in proposing models that offer a greater number of value 
categories while stressing the interdependence of them all. John Holden, for 
example, has distinguished both between instrumental, intrinsic, and 
institutional value and use and non-use value (2004, 2006). Likewise, Carnwaith 
and Brown (2014) offer three senses of value (the value to individuals, the value 
represented in cultural organisations and the value to society of a thriving 
cultural sector). Alternatively, Brown (2006) identifies five clusters of benefits 
while McCarthy et al (2005) plot instrumental and intrinsic benefits in relation 
to a second axis of private and public benefits. What is common amongst all of 
this work is that they each make truth claims about what cultural value is and 
the value that cultural participation offers. None seek to disprove the 
assumption that cultural participation is a unique type of practice, generative of 
a unique type of value.   
2.2.3 Assertions about the value of cultural participation to individuals 
and society  
Given the amount of research that has been done into cultural value, a number 
of literature reviews have been conducted that attempt to collate their various 
findings. On behalf of Arts Council England (ACE), Reeves undertook a review of 
the literature related to measuring the economic and social impact of the arts 
(2002). The empirical research into the impact of culture and the arts has also 
been reviewed by Coalter (2001), Guetskow (2002), McCarthy et. al (2001) and 
Galloway (2008). In 2010 the DCMS published the findings of its analysis of the 
                                                          
40 O’Brien (2010) also stresses that any attempt to understand cultural value cannot simply add 
up the benefits experienced by individuals as this will result in a partial picture of the value 
produced through overlooking value that is inherently social and will be produced irrespective 
of whether it was planned to do so or not. 
78 
 
CASE database41 (2010), while four years later ACE published two pieces of 
work, both of which sought to bring together the existing evidence around the 
value of culture to individuals and society (ACE, 2014; Carnwaith and Brown, 
2014). The latter of these two studies explicitly focusing on how individuals 
benefit from attending and participating in cultural programmes and activities, 
something that Galloway had also undertaken previously (2006). In addition 
there are numerous other reviews from the last decade that have, to a greater or 
lesser degree, attempted a similar task ( Spencer-Oatey et. al., 2013; Holden and 
Balta, 2012; O’Brien, 2010; Ruiz, 2004; Keaney, 2006), with a number focusing 
on particular sites of cultural participation such as museums (Wavell et al., 
2002) or specific areas of impact or value, such as: criminal justice (Hughes, 
2005); regeneration (Evans and Shaw, 2004); health ( Daykin et al., 2008; 
Staricoff, 2004; Angus, 2002); education (Newman et al., 2010; Standley, 2008); 
satisfaction and wellbeing (Leadbetter and O’Connor, 2013) and inclusion 
(Jermyn, 2001). 
 
These reviews have all been undertaken for specific reasons, audiences, and 
purposes. While the majority are extensive and thorough there are few that 
have adopted a comprehensive, systematic and consistent analysis of the 
existing research. To do so would be difficult, not least because the object of 
study in the vast majority of this research is not always clearly defined, not least 
because a variety of methodologies have been employed and the ontological and 
epistemological decisions that have informed them are often opaque. As Gray 
notes, given the range of disciplines from which cultural policy research draws, 
the difference between them “in terms of how they understand what it is that 
they are investigating, as well as the differences between them in terms of their 
preferred methodologies, mean that there are some serious ontological and 
epistemological concerns with making use of the findings from one discipline in 
the context of another” (2010, p.226). While it is once again outside the purpose 
                                                          
41 The Culture and Sport Evidence (CASE) program was set up by the Department for Culture, 
Media and Sport (DCMS) in 2008, in collaboration with Arts Council England, English Heritage, 
the Museums, Libraries and Archives Council and Sport England.  
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or scope of the current discussion to consider the content of these reviews in 
close detail, given the extent to which the claims they summarise are 
reproduced on the other discursive planes where the problem construction is in 
evidence, it is worthwhile to summarise some of the common assertions that 
are made in such research, to point to some of the empirical research that 
relates to these claims, and to consider the critiques that have been made about 
them.  
 
One of the dominant discourses of value is economic in nature, and arguments 
around the economic impact of culture are well rehearsed and often promoted 
as one of the most rigorous methods by which the arts and culture can ‘make its 
case’ (Bakhshi et al., 2009). Most commonly it is asserted that the cultural sector 
is a significant contributor to GDP42 and that public money spent on culture 
returns a host of direct and indirect economic benefits. Such arguments are 
most often associated with the work of John Myerscough (1988) and his use of 
multipliers in producing an economic impact assessment, however other 
methods including contingent valuation (Stevenson, 2013a; Jura Consultants, 
2005;) and social return on investment (BOP Consulting, 2011) have also been 
employed. More specifically, cultural organisations, activities and events have 
been argued to have direct and indirect economic impacts both locally and 
nationally (Saayman and Saayman, 2006; Herrero, 2006), and to specifically 
stimulate economic development (Richards, 2000). Furthermore, cultural 
‘districts’, ‘sectors’ or ‘quarters’ have also been argued to boost property values, 
incomes, employment, and turnover  (Noonan, 2013; Stern and Seifert, 2010; 
Florida, 2002). Irrespective of the claims made, the figures reached almost 
always rely, either directly or indirectly, upon the cultural participation of 
individuals in order to generate the economic return43. 
 
                                                          
42 Gross Domestic Product 
43 With regards to economic impacts it is often the case that the participation of tourists is as, or 
even more important than that of locals. 
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With regards to social impacts (see Belfiore and Bennett, 2010 for a historical 
discussion of the claims made about the social impacts of the arts) a broad 
spectrum of claims have been made about the benefits of cultural participation. 
These include: 
 positive associations with higher wellbeing to a degree equivalent to a 
£1,084 annual pay rise (Fujiwara et al., 2014a);  
 positive associations with health, education, employment and economic 
productivity and civic participation (Fujiwara et al., 2014b, 2015);  
 supporting the development of new knowledge (Smithrim and Upitis, 
2005);  
 supporting the development of new skills (Ludke et al., 2014; University 
of Leicester, 2002;); 
 improved employability (Goodlad et al., 2002); 
 offering a new perspective on the world (Walmsley, 2013a); 
 increasing self-confidence ( Goodlad et al., 2002; Matarasso, 1997) 
 increasing empathy (Bal and Veltkamp, 2013); 
 engendering an enhanced sense of pride in one’s own identity (Bailey, 
2005) or even the adoption of a new identity (Lawson, 2009); 
 creating or strengthen social networks (Matarasso, 1997); 
 improving community development through regeneration (Kay, 2000); 
 increasing empowerment and pride (Sjollema and Hanley, 2014); 
 assisting in social cohesion (Lee, 2013) through a positive impact on civil 
society (Leroux and Bernadska, 2014);  
 contributing  towards the integration of ethnic minority communities 
(Field and Harrow, 2001); 
 reducing mortality rates by displacing other behaviours and activities 
that are damaging to health (Vaananen et al., 2009).  
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Specifically in relation to young people and education, cultural participation is 
proposed to:  
 improve wellbeing ( Connolly et al., 2011; Hampshire and Matthijsse, 
2010); 
 reduce the likelihood of truancy and bad behaviour (Lobo and Winsler, 
2006); 
 improve educational performance ( Kendall et al., 2008; Fleming et al., 
2004); 
 improve IQ ( Goulding, 2013a; Schellenberg, 2004); 
 increase confidence, self-esteem and self-efficacy (Martin et al., 2013; 
Catterall and Peppler, 2007; Costa-Giomi, 2004); 
 provide a greater understanding of diversity (Benediktsson, 2012); 
 support the development of transferable skills for negotiating the 
contemporary social (Catterall, 2007) and economic landscape (Lobo and 
Winsler, 2006; Hughes and Wilson, 2004)44. 
For other potentially vulnerable groups such as the elderly, disabled, or long 
term sick, cultural participation is argued to result in a number of positive 
outcomes including  
 reducing  dependency on clinicians (Crone et al., 2012); 
 reducing isolation and enhancing quality of life (Goulding, 2013b); 
 improving wellbeing (Reynolds, 2009); 
Finally, for those who have been involved in crime, cultural participation is 
argued to reduce reoffending rates, while also being shown to have a positive 
impact upon the propensity of those likely to be drawn into criminal behaviour 
(Miles, 2004; The Unit for the Arts and Offenders, 2003). Again, all of the 
assertions above require an individual to be participating in culture in order to 
gain the proposed benefit as a direct result of what is implicitly suggested to be 
a unique form of practice.  
                                                          
44 Many of these impacts being considered are in particular relation to ‘at risk’ young people 
(Respress and Lutfi, 2006; Wright et al., 2006).  
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The findings of ACE’s arts debate suggest that with regards to the public 
perception of the value of the cultural participation, it is aligned with much of 
what has been asserted above. They identified three core strands of value that 
cultural participation was believed to afford: 
 
 Part of a fundamental capacity for life – helping people to understand, 
interpret and adapt to the world around them. Part of the construction of 
one’s own identity and the manner in which it is conveyed. Offers a 
perspective on others identities and ways of living which in turns 
broadens horizons and challenges assumptions.   
 Enrichment of the experience of life – bringing colour, beauty, passion 
and intensity to life. An important source of pleasure, entertainment and 
relaxation that can lift someone out of the everyday tedium of working 
life. 
 Potential for powerful applications - what has otherwise been deemed 
as instrumental effects.  Contribution to economic and social 
improvement across various areas for both individuals and communities 
(Bunting, 2007, p.14) 
 
While for some of the participants in this research there was clearly a 
fundamental connection between each of these areas of value, different groups 
did tend to emphasise specific areas. Those who felt they had little involvement 
with the arts acknowledged that the experience was clearly valuable for others, 
while those with some degree of involvement tended to stress enjoyment, 
enrichment and escape. Arts professionals tended to focus on its value as a 
fundamental capacity for life (which the public came to agree with through 
deliberation) and its capacity for application in other areas, particularly 
education and community development. This was not the only point at which 
there was distinction between the value structure of the public and the value 
structure of what was described as the arts community. While all agreed that 
quality was a critical factor, differences were evident with regards to how 
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quality was understood45 and how such questions of quality related to the value 
of the participation that occurred.  
2.2.4 Contesting the knowledge claims about the value of cultural 
participation  
The evidence upon which the impact and value of cultural participation is based 
has been contested.  In regards economic impact, Griffiths (1993) has 
questioned the extent to which culture affects decisions made by business 
leaders, while both Booth and Boyle (1993) and McGuigan (1996) have 
critiqued the assertions made about the economic impact of cultural 
participation policies. In particular there has been a focus on the methodologies 
employed for the impact studies on which these claims depend. Only one year 
after Myerscough’s seminal study, economist Gordon Hughes challenged his 
results (Belfiore, 2002), while the suggestion that a multiplier effect (central to 
many economic impact claims) can be confidently identified and tracked has 
also been refuted (Baily, Miles and Stark, 2004; Griffiths, 1993).  
 
In terms of social impact, although Eleonora Belfiore (Belfiore and Bennett, 
2010; Belfiore, 2009; Belfiore and Bennett, 2007a; Belfiore, 2002) has been one 
of the most prolific in this regard, there are a number of others who have also 
challenged the claims made (Oakley, 2004; Merli, 2002; Winner and Cooper, 
2000; Van Puffelen, 1996; Hansen, 1995; Hughes, 1989). Galloway (2009) 
summarises these critiques as being about the failure to provide 
generalizability, explanatory failings that overstate the scale of impact or fail to 
explain how the proposed impact occurs, and a failure to take account of the 
complexity of the contexts in which cultural activities take place46. Likewise, 
DiMaggio (2002) suggests (although has not empirically explored) that the 
discourses surrounding the value of cultural participation rely upon generalised 
assumptions of a homogenous and predictable cause and effect. He identifies 
                                                          
45 For the public, quality of experience was of most importance, for arts professionals it was 
quality of product, while for wider stakeholders it was quality of project. 
46 The importance of context as a determinant of impact has been considered by Hargreaves et 
al (2005) and Brown & Novak-Leonard (2007) who describe it as readiness to receive.  
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three fallacies that he claims are embedded in the discourses about the benign 
impacts of cultural participation, and which are often overlooked for the sake of 
a more advocacy friendly claim: 
 
 The fallacy of homogeneity of ‘treatment’ – cultural participation is 
spoken about as though the activities are indivisible and that as such 
exposure to any suitable object counts as a single ‘treatment’. In reality 
there is a heterogeneous range of potential activities and there is no 
reason to assume they will afford similar impacts. The danger is that in 
statistically pooling these various creative or artistic inputs the real 
effects will be diluted. 
 The fallacy of homogeneity of ‘effects’ – even when clearly defined, 
cultural participation is spoken about as though it has undifferentiated 
effects (whatever that may be) on those participating. This fails to 
consider that the effects are due to a multiplicity of individual 
interactions and may very well be path dependent for each individual.  
 The fallacy of linearity of ‘effects’ - the presumption that any ‘effects’ of 
cultural participation are invariant to scale and the relationship to 
outcome is linear in form. Adding more of the same inputs may not result 
in a proportionately commensurate increase in the outcomes (DiMaggio, 
2002, cited in Mccarthy et al. 2005) 
 
Indeed many of the studies that claim to evidence the value of cultural 
participation, along with the literature reviews that seek to summarise their 
findings, have themselves acknowledged their limitations. They will often state 
that at best the research has identified links, associations and correlations 
rather than any sort of direct causality. For example, in their recent statistical 
analysis of the Scottish Household Survey data, the researchers state that while 
“overall participation in culture and sport, and participation in certain 
individual cultural activities, is associated with good self-assessed health and 
high life satisfaction [the study] cannot determine causal relationships” 
(Leadbetter and O’Connor, 2013, p.32). Furthermore, it is acknowledged that 
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should causality be present, its direction of travel is uncertain (Renton et al., 
2012). In addition, even the most statistically robust research is still only a 
cross-sectional study given that, there is little to no substantial longitudinal 
evidence upon which to draw and minimal understanding of how cultural 
participation leads to the impacts with which they are associated (Allin, 2015; 
Galloway, 2009; Miles, 2004) 47. Yet even where such limitations are 
acknowledged, it is not uncommon for definite and firm assertions to be made 
about cultural value irrespective of their existence. For example, a recent review 
of cultural participation research and policy across Europe stated that “despite 
the underlying difficulty in determining the exact remit of the term ‘culture’, 
there is no denying that it has an inclusive role” (EDUCULT, 2015, p. 89, 
emphasis added). 
 
There is also little analysis done that considers the independent associations 
identified with regards to the level of specific cultural practice in order to 
consider if the correlation is stronger in some cases than in others. This means, 
for example, that in the study by Renton et.al. (2012) attendance at a nightclub 
is included as a cultural participation activity. Therefore, on the basis of their 
conclusions, attendance at a nightclub is likely to associate with positive health 
choices, despite the potential that staying up late listening to very loud music 
might be considered by some as a poor health choice when the activity is 
understood from within an alternative discourse. Furthermore, and as is 
acknowledged by Ruiz (2004), there has been little consideration or 
measurement of the relative impact of cultural participation comparative to 
other types of activity. For example there has been no study that has considered 
if participation in culture has a greater or different impact on the social 
networks in a community than participation in sports or if cultural participation 
is more likely to increase a young person’s confidence than learning how to 
cook or volunteering. While Belfiore and Bennett (2007a) question if, given the 
                                                          
47 As Galloway (2009) points out however, it is not only the evidence base for the arts that 
suffers from these accusations and she offers a brief literature review of the critiques that have 
been levelled at the evidence base for other areas of policy.  
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complexity of the experience, it is possible to develop any sort of methodology 
that might offer the potential for meaningful generalisations, Galloway (2009) 
suggests that a theory-based process of evaluation may prove beneficial, albeit 
that it would be reliant upon an on-going process of culmination in which single 
mechanisms were tested in a range of contexts. To fully implement such an 
approach would require control groups to be simultaneously considered 
(White, 2009), something that research into to the impacts of cultural 
participation has thus far failed to employ.   
 
In addition to the critiques of the evidence base, Belfiore and Bennett (2010) 
also identify the intellectual narrative that considers the negative value that art 
may have as one that has been supressed in the contemporary cultural policy 
discourses about cultural participation. In this regard, it is interesting to note 
that in her review of the evidence base for culture, the arts and sports, Ruiz 
(2004) notes that in relation to sports there can be negative as well as beneficial 
social costs. She cites noise pollution, overcrowding, underused facilities and 
reductions in local authority funding for other public services as being potential 
negative impacts (see also Matheson and Finkel, 2013 for a discussion about 
mega events in sport and sex trafficing). Yet the same is not noted for cultural 
participation, indeed no research that considers any negative impacts of culture 
and the arts are considered in the literature reviews that have been produced to 
inform policy making and comparatively little contemporary research work 
appears to have been done (see Tepper, 2011 for a study into protests over art 
and culture in America; Toronyi-Lalic, 2012 for a critique of Public Art in the 
UK; and Baker, 2014 for a critique of the Sistema music programme). This 
asymmetry in the research contributes towards the dominant discourses about 
cultural participation being wholly positive, something that historically has not 
always been the case (Belfiore and Bennett, 2010). 
2.3 Measuring cultural participation  
Despite all of the definitional difficulties outlined above, cultural participation is 
accepted as something that can, and should, be measured and monitored at a 
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local, national and international level. Comparing who participates with what, 
when, and how often, has been the primary aim of a significant body of work, 
the findings of which are central to construction of the problem under analysis. 
As such, the next section of this chapter considers the research that has been 
done to monitor and measure cultural participation, and in so doing affirms the 
existence of a problem as an object of knowledge about which truths can be 
claimed.   
2.3.1 Cultural participation surveys  
The majority of research into patterns of cultural participation is empirical, 
descriptive and survey driven. There are three primary sources from which this 
sort of data is generated: national and regional representative sample surveys; 
arts organisations (either through commissioning studies to inform them about 
their market and audience or administrative data that is increasingly collected 
about attendees and members; and academic studies (although these are often 
secondary analysis of existing data or attempts at aggregation). However, the 
largest body of quantitative data comes from the extensive number of national 
and/or regional level studies that have been undertaken by various countries, 
some of which now provide a time series of data stretching back over a number 
of decades. As Schuster has noted:  
 
…the National Endowment for the Arts in the United States has now 
overseen five Surveys of Public Participation in the Arts (SPPA) 
(conducted in 1982, 1985, 1992, 1997, and 2002); the research division 
of the French Ministry of Culture has overseen four on the Pratiques 
Culturelles des Francais (1973, 1981, 1989, and 1997) and INSEE, the 
French national statistics office has added one (2003); the Canadian 
province of Quebec has conducted at least six (1979, 1984, 1989, 1994, 
1999, and 2004) and Spain at least five (1980, 1985, 1991, 1998, 2003); 
Denmark has conducted nine (1964, 1975, 1987, 1993, 1998, and 2004 
for adults, and 1987, 1993, and 1998 for children); and Italy and the 
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Netherlands, among others, have similar traditions of participation 
studies conducted on a regular basis (Schuster, 2007, p.35).  
 
Since the 1980’s, in the UK, the Target Group Index (TGI) has (amongst many 
other things) collected information on attendance at certain types of activity. 
However both the range of activities captured and accompanying demographic 
data is limited. In order to address these shortcoming, since 2005 in England, 
the Department for Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS) in partnership with Arts 
Council England (ACE), Sport England and English Heritage has undertaken the 
yearly Taking Part survey (see Keaney, 2008 for a discussion of Taking Part and 
its relative merits), a survey that has been argued to be the best in the UK for 
clarity and analysis (Davies, 2007). Likewise in Scotland, participation with 
culture had been studied through the Taking Part in Scotland survey that was 
conducted in 2004, 2006 and 2008. This built upon prior surveys that the 
Scottish Arts Council (SAC) had undertaken in 1991, 1994, 1998 and 2001. 
Although this survey is no longer conducted, cultural participation is still 
measured through the Scottish Household Survey with an additional “Culture 
and Sport Module” having been undertaken in 2007/08 in order to provide a 
broader range of data that would be compatible with the English Taking Part 
survey (see McCall & Playford 2012 for a discussion of the SHS and its relative 
merits). In addition, other quantitative data sets do exist. They include those 
conducted since 1993 by the Arts Council of Wales as part of the broader 
Omnibus Survey; a portion of the Northern Ireland Executive’s Continuous 
household survey; and the Arts Council of Northern Ireland’s General 
Population Survey that has reported on rates of participation with art and 
culture, biennially since 2004.  
2.3.2 Patterns of cultural participation  
Many studies have also attempted to go beyond the simply descriptive statistic 
in order to investigate patterns of cultural participation through consideration 
of inferential relationships, the work by Baumol and Bowen (1966) and Throsby 
and Withers (1979) might be seen as seminal in this regard. Research of this 
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type has been conducted both through original primary research and secondary 
analysis of the type of data sets outlined above. While various methodologies 
could be employed, the existing research would suggest that some form of 
multivariate statistical analysis, and in particular binary regression, are seen to 
be the most appropriate and informative. Examples of these types of analyses 
have been undertaken in a number of countries e.g. Switzerland (Abbe-
Decarroux and Grin, 1992), France (Levy-Garboua and Montmarquette, 1996), 
Japan (Katsuura, 2008), USA (O’Hagan, 1996; Gray, 1998), Spain (Prieto-
Rodríguez and Fernández-Blanco, 2000), Scotland (Leadbetter and O’Connor, 
2013), and England (Grisolía et al., 2010; Chan and Goldthorpe, 2005, 2007)48. 
While it is not within the scope of this chapter to undertake a detailed 
comparison of the results of these various studies, it is worth noting that their 
findings have tended to exhibit clear similarities: 
 Broadly, a significant majority in every survey are classified as 
participating with art and/or culture;  
 In general, people are more likely to attend an event or activity than 
participate in a more active manner, although this can vary quite widely 
depending on how activities have been classified in the survey;  
 With regards to attendance, films; heritage sites; museums; plays 
(especially musicals); and live music concerts (especially rock and pop) 
are the most commonly cited;  
 Aside from television, radio and reading49; textile crafts; playing a 
musical instrument; and painting or drawing are the most common types 
of activity that individuals appear to undertake;  
 Participation with culture via the Internet is seeing a significant upward 
trajectory;  
 Women tend to show a slightly higher likelihood of both attendance and 
active participation than men;  
                                                          
48 For a general survey of this field of study see Seaman (2006).  
49 These are some of the most often contentious activities with regards to how they are 
classified and in the case of television and radio, if they are included at all. 
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 Participation rates tend to be highest amongst the youngest (16-24) and 
lowest amongst those aged seventy-five and over;  
 Being married is a negative indicator for all attendance other than 
comedy, while although having children under five is likely to mean 
individuals participate at a lower than average rate, once the children are 
over twelve they are an indicator of higher attendance patterns, 
especially at the movies;  
 Respondents identifying themselves as white exhibit higher rates of 
participation than those identifying themselves as part of a BME group;  
 The higher the income, the more likely someone is to both participate 
and attend; likewise for their level of education; 
 Those living with a disability or long-term illness were less likely to 
participate in any way, likewise for those living in areas that have been 
identified as being deprived50. 
 Respondents would generally like to do more, however lack of time is 
consistently cited as a factor in this regard51.  
However there are studies that have shown if you broaden what is understood 
as cultural participation, or allow respondents to self-define the term, then 
people are shown to be participating in culture at much higher rates across all 
demographics (Public Perspectives & Middlesex University, 2015; Direction, 
2014; Walker and Scott-Melnyk, 2002). Yet despite this, and as shall be 
discussed in more detail below, findings such as those outlined above are taken 
as evidence that a problem of non-participation exists. The apparent 
assumption is that patterns of cultural participation should be far more 
standardized than they currently appear to be and that the reason for such 
differences needs to be explained and addressed.   
                                                          
50 See Parkinson et al., 2014 and O'Brien and Oakley , 2015 for a full a review of the literature 
regarding equality and diversity in the arts. 
51 The findings summarised above are typical of what is presented as part of high-level executive 
summaries in the research literature that exists in relation to this topic (for some examples see: 
Scottish Government, 2009; DCMS, 2010; Charlton et al., 2010; Leadbetter and O’Connor, 2013; 
Parkinson et al., 2014).  
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2.3.3 Critiques of the measurement tool  
Studies such as those outlined above are not without their critics and the quality 
and value of the statistics gathered has been questioned (Selwood, 
2002;Madden, 2004, 2005b, 2005a). Schuster (2007) in particular has offered 
an extensive and detailed discussion as to the methodological difficulties of 
measuring cultural participation. He specifically highlights the challenges faced 
in attempting to compare cultural participation across international borders – 
something he argues that governments in many countries now find hard to 
resist despite the studies they are using having never been designed to allow for 
meaningful comparison. While acknowledging that a majority of studies share 
as their dependant variable an individual’s participation rate over a 
retrospective period of time, he suggests that the “certain crispness and 
precision” with which the studies are presented “belies the difficulties and 
compromises entailed in their creation” (2007, p.121) and brings into question 
their status as objective evidence. He highlights a range of other challenges 
including: difficulties related to the population surveyed (age range and sample 
size may vary extensively), and issues related to the frequency of survey (the 
time of year and period over which participation is measured all affect the 
participation rates identified).  
 
While critiques such as Schuster’s primarily question the validity and reliability 
of the data produced, others have highlighted their shortcomings for policy 
makers (Keaney, 2008; Brown, 2006; Selwood, 2002). In particular it is 
highlighted that there is very little detail provided that would allow a 
satisfactory disaggregation to be conducted that would highlight the level of 
cultural participation reliant on government subsidy and the degree to which 
policy interventions make any tangible difference to overall cultural 
participation patterns over and above that which one would expect to find in 
any market52. However what all of these critiques appear to share is an 
                                                          
52 Likewise Brook (2013) argues that for arts organisations seeking to understand their 
audiences that aggregated box office data is of far greater value than national studies such as 
these. 
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assumption that whilst the tool may be flawed, cultural participation is 
something that can and needs to be measured and which the representatives of 
the state have a legitimate right to be monitoring.   
2.4 Constructing explanations of contingent social relations  
For all that there may be significant contestation about how best to define it and 
the value that it offers to those who are doing it, all of the research discussed 
above contributes towards the construction of cultural participation as a 
specific mode of human practice that affords the potential for both the 
participant and society to accrue unique value. In so doing it also brings into 
being the possibility of two distinct identities – those who do participate and 
those that don’t – and the need to explain the patterns of cultural participation 
associated with each of them. This chapter now moves on to consider the 
different assertions that have been made about these contingent social 
relations, what Howarth (2010) describes as the political logic of the discourse. 
It begins by considering the dominant logics employed in the construction of 
non-participation as a problem, namely the presence of barriers, and in 
particular the presence of psychological barriers that are understood as an 
indicator of social stratification and inequality.  
2.4.1 Explaining differences in cultural participation in terms of barriers  
As shall become clear in the chapters that follow, one of the keywords in the 
construction of non-participation as a problem is that of ‘barriers’53 and in the 
discourses of cultural policy it is employed as the dominant explanation of why 
such variable patterns of cultural participation exist. It is a logic that has been 
constructed on the plane of research, where barriers have been both defined as 
an object with agency and recommendations provided on how their agency 
might be overcome. Such research has primarily employed quantitative surveys 
in which the closed response answers have tended to focus on personal 
circumstances, the external environment and to some extent intra-personal 
                                                          
53 The concept of barriers is not unique to cultural participation research and as such is also 
reproduced in other disciplines (see, for example, Hendry & Polson 2007; Flanagan & Hancock 
2010; Boag-Munroe & Evangelou 2012). 
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factors (Department for Culture Media and Sport, 2015a; Public Perspectives & 
Middlesex University, 2015; Creative Scotland, 2014a; Scottish Government, 
2009). However some limited qualitative research has also been conducted that 
tends to adopt semi-structured interviews or focus groups to probe more 
deeply into the intra and inter-personal factors that may act as barriers ( Public 
Perspectives & Middlesex University, 2015; Kraaykamp et al., 2008; Creative 
Research, 2007; Morris Hargreaves McIntyre, 2005; Baker and Maitland, 2002). 
Nevertheless, in both quantitative and qualitative approaches, the findings are 
all based on what the respondents state barriers to be rather than any observed 
evidence of how such choices are made in practice. This leads to the possibility 
that in their responses, respondents are simply employing the logic of the 
discourse that makes it possible to ask about barriers in the first place, and that 
as such it should be understood as a self-reproducing truth.  
 
Charlton et. al. (2010) have conducted a summary of the quantitative research 
and found the most common barriers that are regularly cited in this type of 
research to be54: 
 
High costs Health/Disability Lack of time 
Disability Transport problems No nearby venue 
Poor state or accessibility 
of venues 
Fear of going out alone Too boring 
Too difficult Never occurred to me It’s not for me 
Never occurred to me Not interested No need 
Table 3: Barriers to participation: Summary of the findings of Charlton et. al. (2010) 
This broadly aligns with the more condensed taxonomy identified in the survey 
work of Biggins et. al. (2012) who identify the existence of eight possible 
categories of barriers: 
 Emotional barriers 
 Isolation due to geography and finances 
 Health problems 
 No perceived barriers 
 No motivation or interest 
                                                          
54 Charlton et. al. were reviewing the literature in relation to both participation with culture and 
sport. The barriers they identified specifically related to sport have been left out of this table. 
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 Uniformed 
 Time conscious 
 Miscellaneous reasons   
 
Lack of money and/or time are the two most commonly cited factors that 
individuals state act as a barrier to cultural participation (Department for 
Culture Media and Sport, 2015a; ResearchBods, 2014; Biggins et al., 2012; 
Scottish Government, 2009). However, citing the evidence from The Arts Debate 
(Creative Research, 2007; Bunting, 2007) Keaney (2008) highlights that while it 
may be time and money that are often initially pointed to, upon further 
discussion it appears that the primary factor is lack of motivation or interest. 
The study of Biggins et. al. (2012) into individuals’ interests for specific types of 
cultural activities also supports this position in finding that, at the upper end, 
around 50% of respondents stated they had an interest in theatre and film, 
while at the lower end only 10% of respondents stated an interest in 
contemporary dance and electronic arts. These findings point to the possibility 
that in almost all cases, when considered at the level of specific genres of 
activity, the majority have no interest in participating with them. 
 
However, Keaney (2008) goes on to propose that this lack of interest is itself a 
result of complex psychological barriers that are a combination of inter and 
intra personal factors. This assertion is shared by the recent study into the 
cultural participation of young Londoners that found the stated barriers of their 
respondents to be like an iceberg, where initial rationale responses were seen to 
mask underlying emotions and questions of identity (Acacia Avenue, 2013). It is 
an argument that is also employed by Bunting et. al. (2008) who draws a 
distinction between practical and psychological barriers, arguing that it is the 
latter that is of greatest consequence in affecting someone’s patterns of cultural 
participation. The phrase ‘not for the likes of me’ is often pointed to in the 
research as evidence of the existence of such psychological barriers55, and as 
                                                          
55 ACE ran an audience development research program in 2003 called Not for the Likes of You 
(Morton Smyth Limited, 2004) while the SHS specifically asked if respondents believed that 
“Culture and the Arts were not for people like me” (Scottish Government, 2015e). 
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shall now be discussed this is indicative of the degree to which the theories of 
Bourdieu - although rarely cited directly in the primarily grey literature about 
barriers to participation – are a core component of the discursive logics of the 
problem construction. As shall be outlined, these logics represent differing 
patterns of cultural participation as an indicator of social stratification and 
structural inequality.  
2.4.2 Explaining differences in cultural participation in terms of social 
stratification  
In summarising the sociological literature on cultural participation, Chan and 
Goldthorpe (2007, 2005) identify the homology argument as one of dominant 
ways in which differing patterns of cultural participation are understood. They 
associate this argument with those theories that see social stratification 
(structures of inequality) and cultural stratification as being closely mapped 
(See Bennett & Savage 2004; Bennett & Silva 2006 and the articles of the special 
editions that these papers introduce for a discussion of this connection). The 
early work of DiMaggio (1987) is a relevant example in this case, although he 
does acknowledge that stereotypes of cultural participation are more rigidly 
demarcated than the actual patterns of participation in contemporary society. 
This line of argument focuses on the claim that those in higher socio-economic 
strata predominantly consume what is labelled as highbrow culture while those 
individuals lower down the socio-economic hierarchy prefer practice that is 
described as popular or mass culture.  
 
Bourdieu’s work (1986 [1979]) is one of the most prominent examples of the 
homology argument, proposing that processes of distinction and aesthetic 
distancing are actively employed by the dominant classes in order to 
demonstrate, confirm and sustain their superiority. Bourdieu’s work directly 
linked differing patterns of cultural participation with issues of class. Where 
class had, up to that point, primarily been considered in terms of economic 
standing or Weberian notions of status, Bourdieu’s work brought other factors 
to bear including taste, social networks and patterns of symbolic performativity. 
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This led to his influential assertion that there were multiple forms of capital that 
could be employed for social advantage - economic, social, symbolic, and 
cultural – not solely economic capital as had been the dominant argument 
previously.  
 
For Bourdieu56, cultural capital broadly referred to the education, taste and 
learning that was instilled in someone from an early age – part of their habitus. 
Specifically, he proposes three subtypes of cultural capital: 
 
 Embodied – the properties of oneself that are either consciously 
acquired or inherited over time through socialisation and which 
shape an individual’s taste, values and way of thinking;  
 Objectified – physical objects that are owned and which (by virtue 
of symbolic capital) convey the cultural capital of the individual that 
owns them;  
 Institutionalised – recognition by an institution of learning or 
knowledge expressed through some form of measurement (e.g. a 
degree award). It eases the transference of cultural capital to 
economic capital through creating a proxy for cultural capital that 
can be compared with others and more readily exchanged in a 
market. 
     
However it is important to consider all three types of cultural capital in tandem 
with symbolic capital – a concept that he expanded on in later work (Bourdieu, 
1998). Symbolic capital was understood as the result of a process by which 
certain agents within a particular field are able to locate certain manifestations 
                                                          
56 Cultural capital has also been understood in more strictly economic terms, for example 
Throsby (1999) has also posited an understanding of cultural capital in which it is defined as an 
asset that in addition to any economic value it may possess, also embodies, stores or gives rise 
to cultural value. Furthermore, Florida in his creative class thesis, employed the term creative 
capital in relation to an individual’s accumulated capacity to innovate and create meaningful 
new forms in a manner that contributes towards economic growth for the area in which they 
reside (2002, 2003). Although the extent to which creative capital can be said to differ from 
human capital has been questioned (Glaeser, 2005; Fritsch and Stuetzer, 2009). 
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of cultural capital within wider social classificatory structures thus bestowing 
them with a greater or lesser degree of exchange value. As May describes, 
symbolic capital is:  
 
The power to confer meanings upon social reality whilst providing 
for a social recognition of one’s place within social relations […] 
Within a capitalist society, the very accumulation of symbolic 
capital may actually depend upon its ‘distance’ from economic 
necessity (1996, p.126)       
 
The choice to undertake certain activities is, in this understanding, partially 
driven by a desire (conscious or otherwise) to accrue symbolic capital and 
maintain - or alter - one’s place within the stratification of society that is marked 
out by a web of symbolic boundaries. Symbolic boundaries are understood as 
creating groups of people or things to which a system of rules can be applied 
and a structural hierarchy established with regards to the relation of each group 
to another. They therefore have the potential to produce and sustain inequality 
through their capacity to function as a “medium through which individuals 
acquire status, monopolise resources, ward off threats, or legitimate their social 
advantages, often in reference to a superior lifestyle, habits, character, or 
competencies” (Lamont, 1992, pp.11–12).  
 
While it had traditionally been argued that such symbolic boundaries 
maintained an elite-to-mass hierarchy with regards to differing types of cultural 
participation and the cultural capital that an affinity with it would afford, 
Richard Peterson’s work on omnivorousness in relation to the consumption of 
music (Peterson and Kern, 1996; Peterson and Simkus, 1992; Peterson, 1992) 
has led to an argument that this has been replaced with an omnivore-to-univore 
hierarchy that Peterson visualised as an inverted pyramid. Peterson observed 
that individuals with higher social status were not adverse to popular culture 
and were in fact adding an increasing diversity of cultural forms to their 
repertoire at an increasing rate (Peterson, 1992).  
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This strand of the sociological research into cultural participation has become 
increasingly influential and has seen a growing amount of work produced over 
the past decade in which it has been both critiqued and employed (see Peterson 
2005 for an overview of the literature in addition to: Friedman 2012; Savage & 
Gayo 2011; Warde & Gayo-Cal 2009; Sullivan & Katz-Gerro 2007; Warde et al. 
2007; Vander Stichele & Laermans 2006). While there are those that have seen 
the emergence of the omnivore as a representative expression of a more liberal 
and democratic society (Peterson and Kern, 1996; Bryson, 1996), there are 
others that propose more instrumental reasons. Van Eijck, for example, argues 
that qualities associated with omnivorousness are “important resources in a 
society that requires social and geographic mobility, ‘employability’ and social 
networking from its highly skilled worked” (van Eijck 2002 cited in Ollivier, 
2008, p.125). Furthermore, as it has been increasingly adopted as a concept, its 
meaning has become concomitantly less distinct, although two primary 
understandings appear to be in use: the volume and compositional definitions 
(Warde et al., 2007). While the former has been suggested to have become the 
most common operational definition (Warde et al., 2007; Peterson, 2005) it is 
the latter that was of central concern to the original concept.  
 
Peterson’s original argument was that the aesthetics of elite status was “being 
redefined as the appreciation of all distinctive leisure activities and creative 
forms along with the appreciation of the classic fine arts” (Peterson and Simkus, 
1992, p.252). While a rejection of snobbishness and an inclusive tolerance were 
central components of this concept, it was not intended to imply an absolute 
indifference to distinctions. Instead it was conceived as a new form of 
distinction among the privileged “where wide knowledge and capacity for the 
appreciation of many practices and products was itself accorded symbolic 
honour, and that a section of the most privileged part of the population found in 
it a new source of reputation and status” (Warde et al., 2007, p.146).  
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However the work of Warde et. al. (2007) also challenges the notion of a unitary 
and singularly distinctive form of omnivorous engagement. Combining 
quantitative and qualitative research they identify four types of omnivore: the 
professional; the dissident; the apprentice; and the unassuming57. Given that 
there appears to be multiple varieties of omnivorousness (and thus is arguably a 
rather culturally undistinguished practice) questions arise as to the extent to 
“whether each type confers practical or symbolic advantage in equal measure” 
(Warde et al., 2007, p.161). Ollivier (2008) attempts to answer this to some 
degree by focusing on the different ways in which openness to diversity of 
cultural practice is expressed by different types of cultural omnivore. 
Identifying four modes of openness - humanist, populist, practical and 
indifferent – she argues that each expresses a specific form of agency and that it 
is these distinct forms of individual agency that are hierarchized within society, 
replacing previous class based structures. She argues that while modern society 
may bestow the potential for agency to all, there remain competing conceptions 
of how best this agency should be employed:   
 
What is most highly regarded, at least by many intellectuals and scholars, 
is willingness and ability to choose, expressed in relation to valued 
cultural domains. As argued by Snibbe and Markus (2006) and Skeggs 
(2004), this form of agency is both recognised as desirable by, and most 
easily accessible to, individuals who are positioned as central in any 
given field and who possess not only large amounts, but also the right 
kind, of material and symbolic resources (Ollivier, 2008, p.144 original 
emphasis) 
 
                                                          
57 While they are not the first to do this (see, for example Emmison, 2003; Zavisca, 2005), their 
study is of note not only because of the robust methodology employed, but also because of two 
specific points they raise. Not least, they draw a distinction between the particular orientations 
with which the different types of omnivore approach their cultural participation. While the 
professional and dissident approach their cultural activities in a critically aesthetic manner - the 
“disinterested” interaction - neither of the other two types appeared affected by concerns over 
aesthetic qualities. 
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In this regard the societal distinction is not about what one participates in, but 
rather how one approaches it. As Bennett et. al. claim: “arguably it is less the 
selection of cultural content (as with legitimate cultural items) and more the 
orientation towards cultural consumption that delineates class divisions in the 
UK” (2009, p.254). Or as Holden (2010) argues, cultural capital no longer 
resides in a cultural canon, but is instead contained within the cultural capacity 
that one exhibits. The resultant outcome being that some individuals (rather 
than classes58) are more highly valued than others based on the degree to which 
their mode of openness points towards a form of agency that is perceived as 
desirable. In particular, Ollivier argues that it is cosmopolitanism as conceived 
by Hannerz (1990) that is most prized “in societies organized around 
knowledge, networking, flexibility and mobility” (2008, p.142).  
2.4.3 Cultural capital as a problem to be addressed: from theory to 
practice      
Based on the political logics outlined above, one of the dominant assertions 
made in the discourses of cultural policy is that non-participation is therefore 
due to the degree to which an individual has internalised and accepted the 
symbolic boundaries that have been established by those with the greatest 
degree of control over the symbolic value of cultural capital. This cultural 
capital, often seen as being manifest in unspoken questions of etiquette, is seen 
to act as invisible barriers for certain individuals to certain organisations and 
activities. As such, it is on this basis that claims are made about the need for 
action to be taken in order to support individuals in acting against such 
symbolic boundaries (Acacia Avenue, 2013; Morton Smyth Limited, 2004; 
Research Center for Museums and Galleries, 2004) as part of a broader 
aspiration to engender a more equal society. 
 
However, in relation to cultural policy in France, Dubois (2011) has argued that 
while Bourdieu’s theory had a predominant impact on the intellectual 
                                                          
58  As Oakley and O’Brien (2015) note, there is significant technical debate in the sociological 
research about cultural consumption. This primarily cleaves between those that focus on 
Weberian notions of status and those that follow Bourdieu to stress the importance of class.  
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framework of cultural policy, it had limited effects on its actual orientations and 
actions – an observation that the work of others in the UK also points towards. 
For example, in her questioning of the proliferation of terms like cultural, social 
and human capital, Ruth Levitas (2004) has highlighted what she sees as the 
slippage by which they are now primarily considered in relation to capitalist 
production rather than for the insight they provide into how class domination is 
sustained. As such, she argues that they have become part of the naturalization 
of capitalism in which all of the attributes and experiences of an individual are 
perceived as the means to an economic end, an “attribute traded for 
advantageous position in an allegedly meritocratic system” (2004, p.54). 
Focusing in particular on cultural capital, she argues that while Bourdieu’s 
concept was intended to address how the rich create a barrier between 
themselves and everyone else - social exclusion at Barry’s upper threshold 
(2002 cited in Levitas, 2004) – it is employed in the discourses of policy in 
relation to the poor and their inability to integrate into mainstream society 
(Barry’s lower threshold) in part because of their deficit of cultural capital. The 
solution is seen to be the provision of opportunities to participate, given that 
“[i]n a meritocracy, inequality is legitimated by equality of opportunity. 
Opportunity is [therefore] a key concept in the exposition of social exclusion 
and its remedies” (Levitas, 2004, p.48).  
 
The deficit model that this perspective gives rise to has been increasingly 
pointed to as the manner in which cultural participation policies have been 
conducted ( Oakley and O;Brien, 2015; Gilmore, 2013; Miles, 2013; Stevenson, 
2013b; Jancovich, 2011). However, as Roberts (2004) notes, the idea that there 
is some degree of inadequate participation in certain social activities amongst a 
portion of the population is not new in policy terms and was particularly 
prominent in education policy throughout the nineteen sixties. Despite it having 
been discredited by the end of that decade he notes the extent to which the 
discourse of inclusion has given it new life. This concurs with the arguments of 
Levitas (2004, 2005) about the degree to which widening participation in higher 
education has been seen as fundamental in overcoming the weak labour market 
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positions that increasing numbers of young people find themselves faced with in 
a service led economy. Cultural capital, in this sense, becomes conflated with 
formal knowledge imparted in the education system and topped up through 
attendance at selected cultural organisations, something akin to the idea of 
cultural literacy advanced by Hirsch (1988). This type of cultural capital is 
understood as residing in the individual rather than amongst a network and as 
such the right injection of cultural capital into the individual is assumed to 
combat inequality through seamless transference to economic capital via the 
labour market59. However Levitas and others have argued that this is a gross 
misreading of Bourdieu’s original theory (Little, 2015; Gilmore, 2013; Pelletier, 
2009; Levitas, 2004). Furthermore, even if cultural capital could be imbued in 
this manner, there are those that reject Bourdieu’s core proposition around the 
intergenerational transmission of capital as the core driver of social 
reproduction (Goldthrope, 2007). Stressing instead that while it may play a role 
it has nowhere near the degree of importance that economic capital ultimately 
plays with regards to material inequality and which a focus on a redistribution 
of cultural capital ultimately obscures (Roberts, 2004). 
 
The dominant understanding of cultural capital and its role in promoting 
equality is further challenged by Roberts who, in addressing leisure pursuits 
more generally, is unconvinced by the suggestions that participation in certain 
activities can lead to the acquisition of “socio-cultural assets that are convertible 
into, or able to expand and transform into economic assets reflected in labour 
market achievements” (2004, p.57). Finding fault in the findings of a number of 
studies, he highlights two rarely considered flaws with the assumptions around 
capital conversion. Firstly, he points to the degrading effect upon their symbolic 
capital of mainstreaming certain activities to the point that they become 
commonplace - “what works for a few becomes ineffective when access is 
widened” (2004, p.68). Secondly he evokes a less discussed component of 
Bourdieu’s observations to highlight the capacity and speed with which 
                                                          
59 There are those that argue that the status of capital can only be applied to that which has this 
potential to be converted into economic capital (Garnham and Williams, 1986). 
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advantaged groups adopt closure strategies to stem invasion from below and 
defend the symbolic and cultural premium attached to the activities they choose 
to take part in. This chimes with the assertion made by DiMaggio and Useem 
(1978) that all attempts at inclusion are bound to fail, by dint of the fact that one 
of the key functions of social practice is for one group to differentiate 
themselves from another. As Kawashima notes: “it is actually one of the 
functions of culture to legitimise and enhance social inequality” (2006, p.66).  
 
Holden’s suggestion that there is a fundamental paradox at the heart of attempts 
to increase cultural capital sums up these concerns. For while it may be the case 
that “the possession of cultural capital enhances an individual’s social mobility 
[…] cultural capital is itself predicated on culture as a marker of social 
difference” (2010, p.37). Roberts also argues that even if the claims made about 
capital conversion were all accurate, in order for the ultimate egalitarian aim to 
be achieved the individuals must gain access to the labour market at a level that 
is impossible given the shape of the occupational basis upon which the economy 
is based. While acknowledging that “the social and cultural dimensions of 
stratification should never be neglected” (2004, p.69) he suggests that 
sociologists should beware becoming complicit in the spin around participation 
that masks the intransigent economic inequalities about which participation 
policies have achieved little to nothing. His striking conclusion is that given the 
amount of time that policies such as these have been adopted and promoted, 
had they been sound there would no longer be a problem of material inequality 
to address.  
 
Such a perspective evokes the arguments of Levitas (2004, 2005) who, in 
relation to social policy more generally, has highlighted the extent to which 
words like inclusion, participation and engagement have become part of a 
neoliberal lexicon that has allowed debates about equality to be moved away 
from a drive towards economic redistribution and equality of outcomes towards 
the promotion of a meritocracy built upon the notion of equality of opportunity. 
This critique has many similarities to Rancière’s critique (2004) of Bourdieu’s 
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model of distinction and the extent to which it is employed to legitimate 
inequality. In this regard it is its performativity rather than its methodology 
with which Rancière takes issue. Reviewing this critique in relation to 
education, Pelletier argues that in Rancière’s terms the role of public education 
is “to justify inequality whilst promising to perpetually reduce it” (2009, p.9). It 
is an institution populated by “those who give themselves the authority of 
reducing the inequality of others with respect to themselves” (2009, p.9). Those 
who are excluded are seen to be so because, by dint of their habitus, they lack 
the knowledge (and cultural capital) to fully participate in society rather than a 
failure of society to hear the knowledge that they have or value their culture as 
capital. Inclusion becomes the act of increasing the number of people who 
accept the dominant democratic order and their place within it based on 
classifications and divisions established by those that can employ the greatest 
power, and the normativity of which is reinforced by the numerous attempts to 
break down barriers to social mobility as part of a progressive democracy. This 
position starts from a perspective in which inequality is assumed inevitable 
rather than, as Rancière proposes, assuming equality from the outset and to 
then to systematically seek its verification and affirmation60 (for a discussion of 
Rancière’s major work and his particular conception of equality see Davis 
2010).  
2.5 Alternative explanations about difference in cultural participation 
patterns 
However, the differing patterns of cultural participation evident in surveys such 
as the SHS have not only been explained in terms of social stratification and 
inequality. As the research summarised in the final section of this chapter shows 
they can have also been explained in terms of individual identity, economic 
factors and personal motivations. From each of these perspectives, variations in 
                                                          
60 Of course, as Pelletier (2009) notes, this raises the question of how one might seek to speak of 
inequality without positioning oneself in relation to those deemed to be at a disadvantage or 
representing one’s own knowledge as the remedy to their situation. 
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cultural participation would be seen as an inevitable phenomenon rather than 
an indicator of a social problem requiring state intervention.   
2.5.1 Explaining differences in cultural participation as an expression of 
individual identity   
In primarily representing symbolic boundaries as wholly negative, much of the 
existing research into psychological barriers to cultural participation tends to 
overlook the extent to which the creation of such symbolic boundaries can also 
be understood as an important aspect of social life: 
Boundary work is … a way of developing a sense of group membership, it 
creates bonds based on shared emotions, similar conceptions of the 
sacred and the profane, and similar reactions towards symbolic violators 
(Lamont, 1992, pp.11–12)  
Given the importance that a lack of interest appears to play in why someone 
might opt not to participate with a particular type of activity, it is interesting to 
note that what has been far less explored qualitatively is the extent to which 
people may be self-excluding form certain practices as a positive option. As 
Holden states, non-participation is not the same thing as exclusion (2010). 
Indeed the analysis of Bunting et. al. (2008) suggested that even if the physical 
and psychological barriers were removed or reduced there would still remain a 
large proportion of the population who would chose not to participate with the 
type of activities that cultural participation surveys tend to measure. If this is 
the case it is therefore unclear for whom their resultant non-participation is a 
problem.  
This is indicative of the extent to which Bourdieu’s work can be criticised for its 
failure to acknowledge the fluid manner in which individuals can understand 
their actions and their capacity to act in a manner outside of the structural 
expectations of their individual habitus. As May notes: “the potential for human 
practices to gain autonomy from the operation of power is conceived to be only 
minimal in [his] formulations” and thus his conception of human behaviour is 
very “one dimensional” (1996, p.131). This counterpoint to Bourdieu’s position 
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can be found within a strand of sociological literature on cultural participation 
that Chan and Goldthorpe (2007; 2005) suggest exhibits a belief in the theory of 
cultural participation as individualisation -  and which is particularly evident in 
the work of Bauman (1988) and Featherstone (1987). This position is 
associated with an argument that in affluent and commercialised societies such 
as the UK, the relationship between cultural taste, consumption and social 
stratification is increasingly losing any clear grounding. Other demographic 
factors (age, gender, sexuality, ethnicity etc.) are seen to have as much if not 
more relationship to the choices that are made around participation with 
cultural activities and it is argued that a capacity to exhibit individual agency 
and move beyond social conditioning is increasingly in evidence. 
 
It is worth considering Sarah Thornton in relation to this theme of 
individualisation, in particular her work on subcultural capital (1995, 1997). 
While her research exploring the club scene of the late eighties and nineties did 
find evidence of an individualisation narrative in which youth exhibit a desire to 
assert a “distinctive character and affirm that they are not anonymous members 
of an undifferentiated mass” (Thornton, 1997, p.201) she argued that they did 
this through the competing subcultural ideologies of closely associated social 
groups, each of which exhibited their own forms of [sub]cultural capital. She 
also noted that subcultures and their systems of power were not the 
progressive gesture of deviance or dissonance from the hegemonic norm that 
previous scholars such as Young and Hebdige had imagined. Rather they were 
micro-systems of discrimination and distinction that obfuscate the dominant 
structure as they compete in order to replace it with their own. They are 
dependent upon suggestions of superiority over other subcultures and an 
assertion of hierarchy within a reimagined social order.  As Thornton notes, 
“[d]istinctions are never just assertions of equal difference, they usually entail 
some claim to authority and presume the inferiority of others” (1997, p.234). 
While still reliant on Bourdieu’s theories, Thornton’s work reminds us that they 
were the product of “[his] own field, within his social world of players with high 
volumes of institutionalised cultural capital [and that] it is possible to observe 
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sub-species of capital operating within other [currently] less privileged [fields 
or] domains” (1997, p.235). It is however interesting to note that despite 
regular invocations of Bourdieu, researchers explicitly considering cultural 
participation appear to have made little use of Thornton’s theories and their 
implication for how patterns of cultural activity are viewed in policy terms. The 
question of supporting sub-cultural participation is not one that is dominant in 
the discourses of cultural policy.    
 
And so, as Ollivier notes, surveys on cultural participation “tend to be built from 
the point of view of legitimate culture61, and thus to include more items 
pertaining to high culture than popular culture” (2008, p.125). In so doing they 
ignore the forms of cultural capital valued by those often labelled as non-
participants and leading a number of researchers to suggest that the greatest 
barrier to cultural participation may be the lack of relevance that much of the 
publically funded cultural activity has for the majority of the population (Public 
Perspectives & Middlesex University, 2015; Warwick Commission, 2015; 
Bunting, 2007). For example, one study found that while those from ethnic 
minorities were less likely to participate in the arts because they found them too 
irrelevant and off-putting, these same individuals were actively involved in a 
range of activity that they did not regard as art but that appeared to afford them 
the same benefits that are associated with what were described as mainstream 
arts activities (Jermyn and Desai, 2000). Another piece of research identified 
that young people in London found the term arts and culture overly narrow and 
many of the activities that it traditionally encompasses irrelevant to them. They 
saw their cultural life as being far more expansive, and found it difficult to find 
one term that encapsulated all it might include, although the term ‘creative 
activities’ came closest (Acacia Avenue, 2013). Likewise, in exploring public 
attitudes to creativity, Creative Scotland found that of those who felt they did 
something creative in their life, three of the top ten responses were activities 
that would not be captured in the SHS (gardening, cooking for enjoyment and 
                                                          
61 Given the extent to which his work is drawn on elsewhere in the article, it is presumed that 
Ollivier is referring to legitimate culture in a Bourdieusian sense here. 
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baking) (2014a). Despite findings like these, recommendations continue to be 
made about how to increase ethnic minority or young audiences for subsidised 
organisations and activities, but far less consideration is given to how the 
activity that these individuals were participating with might be supported and 
further encouraged. This is perhaps because what is not even asked, let alone 
considered in the discussion around barriers to participation, is what 
individuals are doing with their time and money currently and which they 
would be required to change in order to participate in culture – indicative of the 
extent to which economic perspectives about cultural participation also tend to 
be absent from the research that represents cultural non-participation as a 
problem.  
2.5.2 Explaining differences in cultural participation as the result of 
economic factors  
Traditional economic studies assume individuals to be utility maximising 
rational individuals who will select their level and form of participation with 
cultural activities in order to satisfy their needs, subject to any constraints with 
relation to disposable income and price (Heilbrun and Gray, 1993). These 
preferences are presumed to be fixed and dependent upon the type of individual 
characteristics used to identify the sort of correlations outlined above, 
characteristics that are presumed to exist outside of the model. Price is a 
primary factor in economic models, where price refers to the full cost of the 
participation including: admission; transportation; refreshments; and other 
ancillary expense. However the price of participation is not absolute, but is 
relative to other substitute activities that would afford the same or similar 
utility to the individual. Therefore the economic model proposes that the choice 
to participate in any activity would depend on the relationship between these 
two prices (Vogel, 2000; Nardone, 1982; Throsby and Withers, 1979) . Felton 
(1992) has suggested that such opportunity costs – what will be forgone by 
committing time and resource to participating in the selected activity –  tend to 
have a greater impact at moderate and lower income levels and points to this as 
a factor in explaining greater levels of cultural participation amongst the most 
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affluent. Although in certain circumstances they also act to counteract the 
expected rise in participation that one would expect to see with a rise in income. 
This is because as disposable income has increased but time is perceived to be 
increasingly precious, a majority of people are argued to be looking to 
participate in activities of increasingly high quality and for which there is a 
limited risk of them not delivering a ‘perfect moment’. This leads to a preference 
for the familiar62 and rejection of participation with that which someone has 
had no past experience of (Henley Centre, 2000).  
 
This is understood as evidence of the extent to which, in making their choice, an 
individual is believed to consider their personal preference for the activity in 
question in relation to other goods and services that they could purchase or 
spend time on as an alternative. Understanding the relative merits of the 
various choices available is understood to be mediated by the information 
available to an individual. This means that as the range of substitute activities 
about which they are knowledgeable expands, participation with existing 
activities is likely to alter. What is important about this is that within this body 
of research the potential substitutes for cultural participation are not limited to 
those activities that can to a greater or lesser extent be associated with the arts. 
Roberts (2004) stresses the extent to which the division of what the public most 
commonly understand as leisure time activities into various types of practice 
(such as cultural participation) result in artificial conceptual creations that are 
not necessarily what someone experiences in actuality. Removing any 
distinction between cultural participation and leisure time broadens the range 
of alternatives in relation to which a decision to participate in any type of 
activity will be made.  
 
For example, Montgomery and Robinson (2006) found that arts and sports 
events share similar audiences thus sharing the total attendance time that any 
                                                          
62 Although other studies suggest that when it comes to risk in relation to arts attendance, 
people exist on a spectrum from wholly risk adverse to risk seekers for whom uncertainty is 
part of the attraction, however the latter is in the minority (McIntyre, 2006). 
 
110 
 
one person might have. Furthermore, both were in competition from movies as 
an alternative for either. From this perspective, given that the population 
appears to have access to a wide range of leisure time pursuits (Department for 
Culture Media and Sport, 2015b) and presuming that that the proportion of time 
available for leisure does not increase, it could be assumed that to instigate a 
general increase in activity with regards to one leisure time activity would 
presumably necessitate a general decrease in another. Furthermore, with 
regards to any attempt to increase participation with the arts, it is worth noting 
Putnam’s (2000) argument that a perception of reduced leisure time combined 
with ever greater options and varieties of home-centred leisure options means 
that traditional arts activities face increasing competition from multiple fronts – 
especially those arts activities for which constraints intrinsic to the form limit 
the extent to which individuals can be flexible around how and when their 
participation takes place (McCarthy et al., 2001). The logics of this discourse 
therefore place far more emphasis on the need for those seeking participants to 
effectively communicate to them why they should chose to spend their leisure 
time participating with their organisations and activities as opposed to any 
other option that is open to them.  
2.5.3 Explaining differences in cultural participation in relation to 
motivations and needs 
The idea that cultural participation is not a distinct type of leisure time activity 
means that within the economic discourse anyone seeking to alter patterns of 
participation must first understand the utility or benefit that someone seeks, as 
the logics of this discourse suggest that everyone has individual goals or 
motivations that drive behaviour (Bouder and Pailler, 1999). In this regards, a 
report by the Henley Centre (2000) has suggested there are two ways in which 
people segment their leisure time - constructive leisure time and chilling leisure 
time - and that they have different motivations for each. However empirical 
research highlights the extent to which this simplistic dichotomy can be seen to 
be somewhat reductionist and that within each of these categories a number of 
distinct motivations can be argued to exist. Hood, for example, identified six 
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attributes that she placed along a spectrum of motivation, from the rational to 
the emotional:  
 
 Being with people 
 Doing something worthwhile  
 Feeling comfortable and at ease in one’s surroundings  
 Having a challenge of new experiences  
 Having an opportunity to learn  
 Participating actively (1983) 
 
Yet even with an expanded list of motivations, little consideration appears to be 
given to the manner in which they interact. In suggesting that there are four 
categories of leisure time activity, Kelly (1987; 2000) argues that there are 
always two primary interrelated dimensions that go into any choice about what 
someone will do. Firstly, is it entertainment or fulfilment that is sought? 
Secondly, is the potential for social interaction more important than the activity 
itself or is the individual more interested in the opportunity to develop their 
knowledge, understanding, or skill in relation to the activity in question? 
McCarthy et. al. (2001) have attempted to turn these two dimensions into a 
framework of arts participants (Table 4), although their categories have not 
been tested empirically: 
 
What persons seeks 
Participation 
preference 
 Entertainment Fulfilment 
Developing 
proficiency (self-
focused) 
Participation 
through the media  
Hands-on 
participation  
Social Experience  Attendance (casual)  
Attendance 
(aficionado)  
Table 4: Framework of Arts Participants, by McCarthy et. al (2001) 
Marketing and audience development consultants, Morris Hargreaves McIntyre 
(2006) have also done extensive research into the motivations of participants 
(primarily in relation to museums and galleries) offering a model in which the 
relationship between different motivations is considered. However, rather than 
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a matrix, they present a hierarchy of motivations (Table 5) that owes much to 
the work of Maslow.  Their work draws an explicit relationship between the 
type of needs that are being met and the degree of engagement a participant is 
having. It is proposed that the more someone progresses up the hierarchy, the 
more rewarding and fulfilling their participation is. Here there is a suggestion 
that while attendance may be an indicator of engagement, it is of engagement at 
a superficial level and that participants will be most engaged with those 
activities that are fulfilling what are represented as higher order motivations 
such as aesthetic pleasure and contemplation.   
 
Visitor 
need/motivation 
Engagement 
Perception of 
museum/gallery  
Maslow Hierarchy 
Escapism  
Spiritual Church Self-actualisation Contemplation  
Stimulate activity  
Aesthetic pleasure  
Emotional Spa 
Aesthetic 
Awe and wonder 
Moving  
Cognitive and Esteem 
Personal relevance 
Experience the past 
Nostalgia 
Sense of cultural identity  
Academic interest  
Intellectual Archive 
Hobby interest 
Self-improvement  
Stimulate children  
Social interaction  
Social Attraction 
Social 
Entertainment  
To see, to do 
Inclusion, welcome  
Access, comfort, warmth, 
welcome  
Safety Physiology 
Table 5: Hierarchy of participant motivations, by Morris, Hargreaves & McIntyre (2006) 
The focus within the marketing literature on needs fulfilment also leads to a 
rejection of a simple binary between the cultural participant and non-
participant in absolute terms. Instead, anyone’s participation status can only be 
understood in relation to a specific activity or organisation. Models have 
therefore been proposed that divide the participant and non-participant up into 
multiple different types based around various factors including their needs, 
breadth of activity and the degree to which they believe that a specific activity 
or organisation has the potential to be of value to them. For example, a recent 
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qualitative study of young Londoners found that there were four types of 
cultural participant based around a behavioural and attitudinal axis 
representing repertoire and reward (Fig. 1). 
 
 
Likewise, with regards to non-participants, consultants Morris Hargreaves 
McIntyre propose four types63 based on their extensive quantitative studies: 
 
 Intenders – They believe their needs will be met but there may be 
some barriers from allowing them to pursue this;  
 Open to persuasion – They are not hostile to the idea that their 
needs could be met, but are a little doubtful and may require some 
sort of active persuasion and/or mitigation of risk;  
 Resistors – They are highly sceptical that their needs will be met or 
that they have needs that could be met by the type of organisation 
in question. They may have little knowledge of the activity in 
questions or have had a poor experience in their past;  
                                                          
63 Their study was solely based on attendance at organised activities and as such does not 
consider those who do not participate in what the quantitative studies distinguish as self-
directed cultural activities.     
Specialists: interested in a small number of activities 
about which they are deeply passionate. Personal 
motivation to participate  
Embracers: interested in a broad range of activities and 
are deeply passionate about arts and culture in general. 
Personal motivation to participate 
Participators: take part in a broad range of activities 
but primarily with others. Are motivated to take part by 
others and are rewarded by the social interaction first 
and foremost 
Sociables: take part in one or two activities because 
friends do. Motivated by the social aspect and have no 
particular commitment to the activities they do  
Figure 1: Typology of cultural 
participants, by Acacia Avenue (2013) 
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 Rejectors  - They are actively hostile to any suggestion that the 
organisation has anything to offer them and see no relationship 
between their needs and the proposition of the organisation in 
question (McIntyre, 2006, p.34) 
 
However, while taxonomies such as this one may recognise the importance of 
external environmental factors, there is little consideration given to their 
potential impact on the choices made by an individual. The conceptual model of 
cultural participation offered by Walker & Scott-Melynk (2002) (Table 6) 
addresses this in arguing that any cultural participation choices are a result of 
an interplay between motivations, personal resources and paths of engagement. 
Their model is adapted from one of civic voluntarism that was developed to 
explain who participates in politics and why (Verba et. al. 1995 in Walker and 
Scott-Melnyk, 2002, p.14). While interesting to note that needs are not listed as 
one of the driving motivations, it can be assumed from the accompanying text 
that needs fulfilment remains central to this model.  
 
Individual 
factors 
+ Community factors 
= Individual 
participation choices 
Motivations  
 Values 
 Beliefs  
 Interests 
Paths of 
Engagement 
 
 Family and 
social ties 
 Organisatio
nal 
Affiliations 
 Direct 
recruitment 
 Direct 
marketing 
Structures of 
Opportunity  
 
Programs and events 
available in the 
community: 
 Number 
 Diversity 
 Quality 
 Accessibility  
Methods of 
participation  
 Attend 
 Volunteer 
 Donate 
 Perform  Resources  
 Skills  
 Free Time  
 Money  
Types of activity e.g. 
 Concert 
 Play  
 Opera  
 Exhibition  
Venues 
 Conventional: 
museums, 
theatres etc.  
 Community: 
parks, churches, 
schools 
Table 6: Model of cultural participation by Walker and Scott-Melnyk (2002) 
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In proposing a model that stresses the complex and multifaceted manner in 
which individual choices about cultural participation are made, this work links 
demographic factors such as education and income (resources) to individual 
agency (motivations) while highlighting the extent to which environmental 
(community) factors have been considered far less than either of the other two 
components. This absence has also been noted by Gilmore (2013) when arguing 
that cultural policy overlooks the specificities of place, and Brook (2013) who 
notes that the typical models of attendance (developed primarily to support 
marketing activity) have tended to overlook such environmental factors as 
proximity to a venue and access to public transport. In her study of opera 
audiences in London, Brook showed that the two highest predictors of opera 
attendance were accessibility to a venue and level of education. This is similar to 
the findings of Widdop and Cutts (2012) who considered the importance of 
place in relation to attendance at museums and Johnson et. al (2011) who found 
that most travel to arts events is localised and that the greater the diversity and 
range of cultural opportunities in a local area, the higher the number of trips 
being made. While the type of research outlined above highlights a complex 
range of factors influencing the choices made, it tends not to suggest that any of 
the resultant choices should be seen as any more problematic than another.    
Summary 
This chapter has delineated how the problem of cultural non-participation has 
been constructed as an object of enquiry within the plane of research. It has 
done so by offering an overview of research that is both a part of, and directly 
contributes to, the discourses of cultural participation, and the discursive logics 
upon which the problem relies. Using two of Howarth’s (2010) three logics of 
critical explanation, it was first argued that existing research is generative of 
social logic in defining cultural participation as a distinct form of human 
practice about which specific claims have been made in regards its unique value. 
After outlining the ways in which the existence of cultural participation as a 
specific type of practice is affirmed by the numerous ways in which it is 
measured and monitored, the chapter moved on to consider some of the 
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explanations that have been offered about the varying contingent relations 
between the different subjects and objects that the existence of this practice 
brings in to being. Specifically the discussion focused on the political logic that 
sees differing patterns of cultural participation as indicative of social 
stratification and inequality. On this basis a problem is then constructed, the 
logics of which focuses on the existence of barriers that are stopping certain 
individuals from participating in culture, so that the role of government is then 
seen to be minimizing the effect these barriers have. Alternative explanations 
about why patterns of participation vary see such differences as inevitable, and 
are therefore less prominent within the discursive construction of non-
participation as cultural policy problem.  
 
Chapter 3 will now move the analysis onto a different discursive plane. Focusing 
on the data generated through the policy texts and qualitative interviews it will 
identify the two dominant discourses of cultural participation in policy and 
professional practice, and highlight how the problem of non-participation can 
only exist within the discursive logic of one of them.  
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Chapter 3 – The dominant discourses of cultural participation in the field 
of cultural policy  
Chapter two has offered an analysis of how cultural participation has been 
constructed as an object of knowledge on the plane of research. In doing so it 
has highlighted some of the contrasting and complementary social and political 
logics that are employed. However, not all of these explanations inevitably point 
towards the existence of a problem, and where they do, the construction of the 
problem can differ. For it is not until these logics are taken into the field of 
cultural policy that the existence of a problem becomes a necessity. This is 
inevitable, because “policy is by definition instrumental, in that its aim is to 
achieve active change” (Bell and Oakley, 2014, p.34). As this change is intended 
to make society better, the object of its action must be that which is seen to be 
currently less than optimal – a problem that must be addressed. 
 
As such, to understand how cultural non-participation is constructed as a 
societal problem in which the government can and should intervene, one must 
seek to analyse the existence of the problem on a different discursive plane. 
Therefore, Chapter 3 now turns to an analysis and discussion of the data 
generated through policy texts and qualitative interviews. In doing so, the 
discussion will simultaneously explore the construction of the problem across 
two discursive planes, namely those of politics and professional practice, and 
will particularly address research questions 2, and 3:  
2. What discourses of cultural participation are dominant in the field of 
cultural policy? 
3. What discursive logics are employed to construct non-participation as a 
cultural policy problem? 
As will be detailed below, within the data generated there were two dominant 
ways in which cultural participation was spoken about, and both were often 
employed side by side despite their apparent contradictions. Such points of 
incompatibility within the data points towards the presence of differing 
discourses within a discursive field (Talja, 1999). Contestation between these 
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discourses is to be expected and is the basis of the games of truth that the 
presence of discourse makes possible. As such, there is no absolute list of the 
organisations, objects and activities that would count as cultural participation64 
in relation to the problem construction. Sometimes online activity is included, 
sometimes not. Cinema can be, but not always. Singing is a solution to the 
problem of non-participation, as long as it is in a choir and not at a karaoke bar.  
The chapter focuses on outlining the logics of the two dominant discourses of 
cultural participation that were identified. The first - that of abundant 
participation - is a discourse in which not only is there an extensive range and 
availability of accessible cultural activities with which one can participate, but 
also that this number is increasing (and quite significantly so) due to the 
opportunities that are presented by a contemporary society that is 
multicultural, global and increasingly digital. The second - that of inadequate 
participation - is a discourse in which certain individuals and areas are 
represented as being faced with a deficit of accessible cultural opportunities 
with which to participate. As such, these individuals require some sort of state 
intervention in order to boost supply and/or remove the barriers that are 
preventing access. Each of these two discourses is considered through a focus 
on drawing out some of their key discursive logics (Wodak and Meyer, 2009). As 
will be made clear, although both discourses can and are employed within the 
field of cultural policy, it is only within the logics of the second that the idea of 
non-participation, and thus its construction as a problem, becomes possible. 
3.1 The discourse of abundant participation   
The discourse of abundant participation was one with which the interviewees 
appeared comfortable and regularly employed throughout the interviews. 
Within this discourse, cultural participation was represented as being 
something that was natural, essential and ordinary in the sense that it was 
something everyone did. As Interviewee 2 stated when talking about a project 
                                                          
64 Or to arbitrarily advocate for the inclusion or expulsion of any particular organisation, object 
or activity for doing so would simply be to suggest that the researcher had greater access to the 
truth than either the Scottish Government or those with which the researcher spoke. 
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they were working on: “…dance is at the heart of our culture, you know ceilidh 
dancing and all that sort of stuff, it is something that we do naturally”. Or as 
Interviewee 20 said: “ […] there is so much culture out there […] I mean there is 
so much that really…to quantify it is impossible…I think every type of person might 
have some kind of link to some kind of culture65”. It was a discourse that was 
equally evident in the documentary sources analysed. For example, the Scottish 
Government website states that: “Culture, creativity and a rich, dynamic heritage 
sit at the heart of Scotland's communities” (2015b), while Fiona Hyslop66 
asserted that “[o]ur communities are alive with music, with dance, with bands, 
gala days, literature, with theatre and poetry. I want that recognised and 
celebrated” (2013). As the first half of this chapter will show, it is a discourse in 
which absolute value judgments are supposedly rejected and in which the idea 
of non-participation becomes impossible67. 
3.1.1 Culture as a way of life  
There are two discernable strands within the discourse of abundant 
participation. Firstly there is the abundance of participation that comes from 
understanding culture as a way of life, and thus impossible for any individual to 
be divorced from. It is a discursive strand that explicitly rejects any attempt to 
specifically define culture and is evident in the statement by the Scottish 
Parliament that:  
 
...the Government sees no advantage in a statutory definition of “culture” 
[...] even if it were possible to agree a definition of “culture” in the 
Parliament; it seems inevitable that it would very quickly become 
redundant. Ministers therefore consider a statutory definition of the “arts 
and culture” inappropriate and generally undesirable (Scottish 
Parliament, 2008, p.6)  
 
                                                          
65 Throughout the discussion that follows in the following four chapters, quotations from the 
primary source data are shown in italics. All emphasis in bold has been added, unless otherwise 
stated.  
66 Scottish Cabinet Secretary for Culture, Europe and External Affairs. 
67 See Appendix 1.01 for further relevant examples from the data, similar to those included, 
above. 
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Indeed on their website, when outlining the importance of the national indicator 
on cultural engagement, the Scottish Government states that: “Our culture is key 
to our sense of identity as individuals, as communities and as a nation” (2015d). 
This essentially anthropological notion of culture is echoed in a number of the 
other policy documents that have been analysed. For example, in her 2013 
speech on culture in Scotland, the Culture Secretary, Fiona Hyslop, talked about 
her belief that culture (and heritage) was “of us all” given that it was “our heart, 
our soul, our essence”, in so doing representing culture as something ordinary 
and a common aspect of humanity that is shared by everyone.  
 
Interviewees were often equally reticent about offering an explicit definition of 
culture. Like the Scottish Government, most of the interviewees recognised that 
any absolute definition would be problematic given their awareness of the 
differing interpretations of culture that might be employed:  
I find the words culture, engagement and participation to be contested 
terms and quite difficult to define (Interviewee 26)  
 
I think that some people might take quite an offence at that [laughing] 
depending on their interpretation of culture (Interviewee 1)  
 
It’s that question of what is culture again, and it is just a really difficult 
thing to answer (Interviewee 41) 
 
Likewise, many interviewees would employ an anthropological description of 
culture as a way of life similar to that which was identified in the policy 
documents. Here, as there, the definition has the potential to encompass 
everything someone might do and evokes the manner in which culture was 
understood by Raymond Williams68 (1981):  
 
…everything is kind of cultural in its broadest sense [… …] Scotland is a 
place where there is not just one culture, there is many cultures and it is 
something that should be celebrated, celebrated in our place in Britain and 
in Europe and as part of our connection to the wider world (Interviewee 1) 
                                                          
68 Williams’ conception of culture was discussed in Chapter 2. 
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I am aware that culture is anything and not just the arts and the creative 
stuff (Interviewee 12)  
 
I find it really difficult to understand how culture doesn’t touch you, it, it’s 
there, everywhere. (Interviewee 4)  
 
…but it is the air we breathe really, it is all around you. (Interviewee 11) 
 
…… interestingly I can’t maybe see anything outside of culture. 
(Interviewee 26) 
3.1.2 Culture as artefact  
It was however evident in the interviews that as the discussion moved from 
discussing culture in the abstract to discussing the more concrete idea of 
cultural participation it was common that the definition of culture being 
employed changed. Specifically, when the concept of culture was attached to the 
concept of engagement or participation to form a compound noun, the manner 
in which culture was represented was always that of culture as an artefact that 
one might have an observable and specific type of interaction with. This was a 
shift that was also common within the text of the documents analysed. When 
this occurs, the language employed changes and it becomes more common to 
refer to participation or engagement with rather than participation or 
engagement in. As such, cultural participation becomes represented as a specific 
activity within a social system rather than a synonym for the social system itself, 
and it is in this sense that it is most commonly understood within the second 
discursive strand of this discourse.   
 
Specifically it is the abundance of a mixed market economy that is represented 
as offering an expansive and increasing range of opportunities for the particular 
social interactions that are identified as examples of cultural participation. 
Within this discursive strand there appears to be two potential relationships 
that an individual can have with those activities, objects and organisations that 
are deemed to afford such opportunities. These are evident in the SHS that asks 
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two separate questions: one about attendance69 and one about participation70 
but both are taken to be representative of cultural participation and 
engagement71. The first relates to activities in which the individual is more 
passive while the latter refers to those activities in which the individual plays a 
more active part, such as reading, writing or giving a performance. From this 
perspective, opportunities for cultural participation becomes something that 
requires conscious affirmative action by the individual and, as interviewee 14 
stated, can also be “offered” or as the policy documents all suggest, “provided”.  
 
The logics of this discursive strand were evident in the answers given by 
interviewees when asked to describe their own cultural participation.  All of 
those spoken to mentioned either certain activities in which they played an 
explicitly active role, or more commonly, attendance at various types of 
organisations and events that required the affirmative action of “going to”: 
 
I go to the theatre; I read a great deal [… …] my sort of everyday life would 
be full of going to galleries and going to theatres and things like that… 
(Interviewee 11)  
 
…movies, festival, going to stuff with [my son], panto season is coming up, 
boxing day outing … so yes, I am a keen reader, go to the movies…. 
(Interviewee 5)   
 
As a person? … Well obviously theatre, but I would also say sport, cinema, 
TV, newspapers … … learning, like museums and galleries and that type of 
thing. (Interviewee 14) 
 
I like visiting museums and galleries, I like going to the theatre, that kind 
of thing. (Interviewee 1) 
 
I go to things. I go to theatre, ballet, cinema, whatever (Interviewee 38) 
                                                          
69 The question related to attendance is: Did you attend any of the following events during the 
past 12 months.  
70 The question related to participation is: Have you taken part in the following cultural 
activities (in the last 12 months). 
71 The apparent assumption being that if an individual has had either of these two types of social 
interaction over the previous twelve months then they are ‘engaged’ with culture, if not then 
they are ‘not-engaged’ and thus a ‘non-participant’. 
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Well very obviously because it is part of my job, the museums and galleries 
sector, fairly consistent reader… all sorts of literature, literary review 
magazines and things. And I suppose classical music would be my other 
main cultural interest or participation …sort of radio, buying CDs going to 
concerts that sort of thing. (Interviewee 17)72 
 
While representing cultural participation as specific types of interaction with an 
activity, object, or organisation narrows the scope of the abundant participation 
discourse to specific types of practice, there remains a high degree of tolerance 
for what forms this practice could take. While this acknowledgment of the 
diversity of ways in which someone could participate with culture was most 
explicit in the interviews, it could also be identified in the other data analysed, 
for example Fiona Hyslop’s assertion that the cultural life of Scotland:  
 
…cannot be reduced to a single style or image, rather, they are a wealth  of 
what we might describe as “stories” that take many different forms, as 
diverse and the land, peoples and places of this complex country. 
(2013)   
 
Likewise, Creative Scotland’s ten year strategic plan included an aim to ensure 
that “Everyone can access and enjoy artistic and creative experiences” (2014c). 
This use of the label “artistic and creative experiences” has the potential to 
encompass a huge range of activities, especially given that Creative Scotland’s 
own research had shown the public included activities like gardening and 
baking within what they understood as a creative experience (2014a). 
Acknowledging the multiplicity of ways in which it may be manifest means that 
this discursive strand continues to represent cultural participation as something 
ordinary, everyday, and indivisible from the subjective experiences of the 
individual. It therefore offers a point of overlap with the other primary strand73 
that comprises the discourse of abundant participation, and facilitates the near 
simultaneous use of both without causing any significant discursive dissonance.  
                                                          
72 See Appendix 1.02 for further relevant examples from the data. 
73 Culture as a way of life. 
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3.1.3 The rejection of absolute value judgements  
The representation of cultural participation as a diverse range of activities was 
complemented within this discourse by a significant reticence amongst the 
majority of interviewees for making explicit value judgments about the cultural 
participation choices of others. Indeed many were keen to stress equivalence 
between one type of practice and another: 
 
[Asking about the national indicator] Is it, for instance, going to see a rock 
gig…that is…so that has the same sort of…as it were…merit as going to a 
symphonic concert? It’s not that I am making judgments here. 
(Interviewee 10)   
 
… well engagement with all forms of culture so, I don’t know, going to 
concerts? Listening to the radio? Almost anything actually. And I don’t 
just mean classical concerts; I mean popular music, any sort of music or 
concert. (Interviewee 17)  
 
[After discussing the value of ballet] …but I am also really into street 
dancing [laughs], which is hilarious being in a ballet role, but it has kind of 
taken off recently and we did a project with parkour here, so I am really 
kind of into urban artforms. (Interviewee 2) 
 
…and I am not only talking about high end high arts like opera and 
ballet or whatever… (Interviewee 14) 
 
Certainly in general, interviewees were surprised when they were faced with 
some of those activities that were not included as part of the SHS.  
 
[After discovering that listening to music or watching the television 
didn’t count in the SHS] Oh God, well that is typical isn’t it… (Interviewee 
21)  
 
Interviewee 17: But it can include something like LoveFilm, watching 
movies at home? 
Interviewer: No it has to have been a visit to the cinema 
Interviewee 17: Oh, but that’s odd isn’t it!? Because people more and more 
watch on their ever larger screens at home, I mean I am one of them [… …] 
They have, by vocation, defined the consumption or participation in culture 
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haven’t they? That has already come out in what you have been describing, 
which all strikes me as a bit odd. 
 
Although not all expressed this opinion, many felt that the official definition 
used to measure cultural participation should be widened to include listening to 
music, watching the TV, watching comedians, or reading comics; all activities 
that have at various points been placed under the label of popular or mass 
culture and presented in opposition to that which was traditionally understood 
as the high or fine arts: 
 
…but you are culturally engaging, that is obvious, you are clearly, it is 
nonsense really, you are engaging twice over if you are doing those two 
things [listening to the radio and going online]  (Interviewee 35) 
 
I think those people sitting at home watching television and listening 
to radio are, you know, having a great deal of culture just by doing that, 
and going to the pub and talking to their friends who will be, you know, 
who may well have seen the same or other culture. (Interviewee 20)74 
 
3.1.4 Digital participation  
In particular, within this discourse new technology is presented as having 
diversified the ways in which cultural participation can occur and which 
cultural organisations are encouraged to embrace as part of a digital approach 
to increasing access. Indeed many digital projects are pointed to as examples of 
cultural participation projects, projects that Fiona Hyslop alluded to as “great 
examples of improvements to access through digital media” (2013). Indeed it was 
part of the Scottish Government’s Digital Strategy that they would “bring greater 
access to Scotland's excellent heritage and culture, and preserve our cultural 
works by making vast content available to people online at home or at local 
libraries” (2011, p.9). Likewise, in discussion about the contribution that the 
creative industries can make to their corporate plan, Creative Scotland states 
that “digital networks and platforms make participation and engagement with the 
creative industries more universally accessible” (2015a). Furthermore, digital is 
                                                          
74 See Appendix 1.03 for further relevant examples from the data. 
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also one of their “connecting themes” for the next ten years and seen to support 
their aim that everyone has access to “great art and culture” (2014c). Examples 
of such projects include: 
 
 The Scottish Arts Council’s support for the creation of the online arts site 
Central Station as part of a funding stream intended to provide “more, 
wider, better participation in the arts” (SAC, 2009); 
 The National Theatre of Scotland’s development of a strand of work 
entitled Five Minute Theatre in which anyone, anywhere can upload a 
piece of theatre to be streamed on their dedicated Vimeo site (2015);  
 Simulcasting such as the on-going NTLive project which is highlighted as 
something that Creative Scotland would like to see more of (Creative 
Scotland, 2014c); 
 The 2.75 million web visitors digitally engaged with the Cultural 
Programme of the 2014 Commonwealth Games was picked out as part of 
the evidence that the project had been a success (Creative Scotland, 
2015c).    
3.1.5 Hierarchies of practice 
However, within this strand of the discourse of abundant participation, there 
did appear to be two tiers of cultural participation into which activities could be 
organized. Firstly, with regards to certain activities there was no question of 
their status as cultural participation. Despite the researcher offering no 
definition of how cultural participation was being understood in the study, at no 
point did any interviewee exhibit uncertainty about directly referring to 
theaters, museums, the visual arts, orchestras, dance, opera, ballet, arts festivals, 
art-house cinema, and reading; all of which were also readily employed within 
the policy documents as appropriate examples of cultural participation. Neither 
did the interviewees question any of the activities that their own organisations 
did, nor any of the other activities and organisations that received public 
subsidy.  
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However the majority of interviewees equally exhibited a desire to make it clear 
that they did not limit their understanding of cultural participation to these 
sorts of activities alone and as such there were a second tier of activities which, 
although it appeared to be implied that they were a different type of cultural 
participation, could be considered as such none the less: 
 
Then you have a wider conception that would take in sports clubs, bingo, 
going to the pub and playing dominos, all of those things that count as 
cultural activities within communities (Interviewee 25)   
 
Some people on a Saturday go to a football game, some people go to a 
matinee at the theatre and some people go to the cinema and some people 
go shopping, but what is great is that they are all out there engaging 
(Interviewee 38)  
 
…depends if you extend environmental, community garden stuff into… as a 
form of culture, so I don’t know, are we including that? (Interviewee 26)  
 
…various different clubs, out of school groups various things like that em, 
shopping, em, I don’t know, is shopping culture, are we including shopping 
in culture (Interviewee 1) 
 
As shall become clear, within the discourse of inadequate participation, patterns 
of participation with the majority of these second tier activities were not 
understood as part of the problem construction under analysis.   
3.1.6 Creative Industries 
Many of the activities that appeared to be placed within the secondary  tier of 
cultural participation were those that might commonly be pointed to as 
examples of the creative industries, given that they included such things as 
music festivals, comedy performances, live music gigs, radio and television. This 
is indicative of the extent to which, within the discourse of abundant 
participation, there appears to be no restriction on acknowledging that 
“government sponsored culture is not the means of cultural provision that 
captures the attention of most people most of the time” (McGuigan, 2004, p.42). 
This appears a reasonable acknowledgement given that, as Holden has noted, 
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money spent by governments and sponsors on culture is “dwarfed by the 
public’s appetite to pay for its own enjoyment of culture” (2010, p.53). As one 
interviewee75 stated:  
 
…. 90% of people are engaged but are they really engaged in those things 
that are being funded? For a lot of it, it is not, it is things that are provided 
by the market, things like thrillers and the big musical or something, or the 
panto, where we are not in that economy at all, we are not funding 
anything in there 76   
 
This means that the discourse of abundant participation can therefore refer to 
and be supported by the discourses of the creative industries77 (for a discussion 
of the creative industries in relation to cultural policy see Flew 2012; Miller, 
2009; Oakley, 2009; Roodhouse, 2008; Black, 2006; Hesmondhalgh and Pratt, 
2005; Garnham, 2005) in which an ever burgeoning supply of cultural products 
is understood to be accompanied by an insatiable desire amongst the populace 
for ever greater cultural consumption78. Indeed such a perspective might allow 
one to claim that cultural participation is in rude health given that 170 million 
cinema tickets are sold annually in the UK (EAO, 2011), music festivals and 
concerts are in a period of substantial growth (BBC, 2012), and 71% of the 
almost 800 million visits to online video websites were to access music (33%), 
TV (17%), film (11%) and games (10%) (DS, 2011).  
                                                          
75 This interviewee worked in a role in which they made decisions about what types or 
organisations and activities would receive funding.  
76 The ever-booming nature of the creative industries is a discourse that is commonly employed 
on the discursive plane of the media. See, for example, BBC News (2105) Creative Industries are 
booming.  
77 The UK is regularly presented as being a world leader in this sector and the scale of growth is 
constantly argued to be greater than that exhibited by the rest of the economy (the Warwick 
Commission 2015 recently recapped a number of these arguments and news coverage continues 
to report favourable statistics, see BBC News 2015). Scotland does not stand apart from this and 
alongside the arts and screen, the creative industries are one of the three sectors that Creative 
Scotland is charged to support.  
78 This discourse is complemented by the discursive logic of creativity (Osborne, 2003) that is 
equally ubiquitous in this field and which suggests that creativity “is no longer the exclusive 
prerogative of geniuses or great thinkers, but of all of us” (Osborne, 2003). 
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3.1.7 The impossibility of non-participation within the discourse of 
abundant participation  
The discourse of abundant participation and its two primary strands collectively 
align with Raymond Williams’ assertions that “we live in an expanding culture, 
and all the elements in this culture are themselves expanding” (2014 [1958]). 
Empirically this discourse makes use of the claims to knowledge made by 
research such as that of Bennett et al. (2009) and Miles (2013) that presents 
evidence of the rich and diverse nature of people’s everyday lives79. It is thus 
evident that within the logics of this discourse, the idea of non-participation 
does not and arguably could not exist. Firstly, if the culture of cultural 
participation is “of us all” (as it is suggested within the more anthropological 
strand of this discourse) then every social interaction would have the potential 
to be an example of cultural participation, it would not be possible to exist 
outside of it. Secondly, within the strand that represents cultural participation 
as a specific type of social interaction there is such a profusion of opportunities 
with which to participate, combined with such reticence about making value 
judgements about what type of interactions count that it becomes hard to 
imagine how anyone is not doing something that could be understood as 
cultural participation. Indeed when asked explicitly if it was possible to not 
participate in culture, the answer given by interviewees was almost consistently 
that it simply was not80: 
 
Interviewee 2: I think people are naturally inclined to be cultural beings 
[…] I think it is very tricky not to participate in culture [… …] 
Interviewer: So is it possible to not participate in culture? 
Interviewee 2: [Laughing] No, I think it is very tricky not to participate in 
culture, it’s everywhere 
 
                                                          
79 Findings from the Cultural Pathfinder Project (Crighton & Willis, 2008), Creative Scotland 
(Creative Scotland, 2014a) and Miles (2013) suggest that in relation to creativity and cultural 
participation many individuals both considered and were undertaking a much broader range of 
activities than policies concerned with increasing cultural participation currently address. These 
included activities such as shopping, bingo, sport and parks. 
80 It was acknowledged by a number of interviewees that certain factors, in particular physical 
health, might limit someone’s ability to undertake all the cultural activity that they may wish.  
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I mean show us a place where there is no culture; it doesn’t exist 
(Interviewee 11)  
 
…if there really is such a person that doesn’t do anything … and I really 
don’t think there are that many. (Interviewee 4) 
 
…everyone is involved in culture in one way or another… (Interviewee 6)81  
 
Speaking from within the discourse of abundant participation, these conclusions 
appear wholly sensible. However, if there is so much culture, the population is 
so inherently alive with creativity, and the creative industries are so successful, 
then the core research question of this study - Why is there a problem of 
cultural non-participation? -  becomes even more of a puzzle. For given the 
profusion of cultural participation that is represented as occurring, one might 
be forgiven for wondering if, rather than a problem of non-participation, 
individuals could be in danger of a cultural participation surfeit. Foucault was 
perhaps right when he suggested, “the problem with our culture is probably 
that there is too much of it around, not too little. Our problem is overproduction, 
cultural hubris perhaps, nemesis no” (cited in Osborne 2003, p.76). However it 
is not within this discourse that the problem of non-participation exists, instead 
it is within the discourse of inadequate participation that it is constructed and it 
is to a consideration of this discourse that the discussion now turns.   
3.2 The discourse of inadequate participation  
Given that increasing cultural engagement is one of the Scottish Government’s 
fifty national indicators and one of the only specifically stated national cultural 
policy objectives, it is perhaps surprising that the response from interviewees 
was most commonly one of ignorance about the objective combined with a 
general lack of awareness about, and interest in, the specifics of cultural policy 
and policymaking. Indeed other than interviewees 5, 14, 16 and 26 (one of 
whom was involved in its creation), the only individuals who had any specific 
knowledge of the national indicator were those from the Scottish Government, 
                                                          
81 See Appendix 1.04 for further relevant examples from the data. 
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Edinburgh Council or Creative Scotland. Even in these cases there were varying 
degrees of confidence with regards to their ability to explain exactly what the 
indicator measured or state what the current rate of cultural participation in 
Scotland was: 
 
I probably should be aware. I’m sure someone in the office is aware 
[laughing] I hope! (Interviewee 4)   
 
Ha! That’s a good question! I should probably know seeing as I work for 
[multiple publicly funded organisations] […] but policy is a bit hazy to me 
(Interviewee 18) 
 
Do you know I don’t think I did know [about the indicator] [laughs]!  
Perhaps you could describe it to me (Interviewee 17) 
 
I guess it’s obvious I haven’t read the national indicators! (Interviewee 21) 
 
[Asked what they knew about the national indicator] Not a huge amount 
really [Interviewer: Anything?] No [… …] I may be referencing these things 
a lot but I don’t really take an interest in them.  (Interviewee 41)82  
 
Yet despite this apparent lack of both awareness and interest in the specifics of 
the indicator, how it was established, and what it is intended to do, none of the 
interviewees made any spontaneous indication that they felt the suggestion 
there was a problem of cultural non-participation was unreasonable in any way. 
The interviewees did not have to have seen the evidence that the SHS is 
purported to offer in order to accept the knowledge that it represents. For 
despite the majority of interviewees having explicitly stated that it was 
essentially impossible for someone not to participate in culture, all of them 
continued to speak as though non-participation was not only possible but also a 
problem that needed to be addressed.  
 
This is evidence of the extent to which the many component parts of a 
dispositive need not have material contact in order for them to share a similar 
                                                          
82 See Appendix 1.05 for further relevant examples from the data. 
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conception of the truth. Considering that none of the interviewees asked the 
researcher at any point to define or explain what cultural non-participation was 
and yet continued to have an extensive discussion about it using a similar 
discursive logic to that which could also be found in the policy documents, one 
can presume that there was a shared understanding about what, or perhaps 
who, was being discussed. For example, shortly before Interviewee 12 stated 
that it was impossible not to engage in culture, they had also spoken of the 
extent to which “the middle classes were already engaged” (suggesting that 
others were not). Likewise, Interviewee 41 was insistent that everyone was 
culturally active in some way and it was patronizing to assume otherwise, yet 
also stated that not everyone would want to “access culture” (thus suggesting it 
was possible not to access culture). And while Interviewee 19 stated that 
culture was “a universal part of our lives” it was still something that needed 
intervention and therefore “as a society we should encourage cultural 
participation” (suggesting that without encouragement it may not occur). These 
quotes are all indicative of the extent to which a second discourse was also 
dominant, one in which non-participation becomes possible because the 
discursive logics that it employs contains far greater distinctions about what 
types of practice does and doesn’t count as cultural participation. This discourse 
also offers explanations as to factors that can stop someone from participating 
in the manner that is implied they should. So it is within this discourse, that of 
inadequate participation, in which the problem under analysis is constructed 
and which the remainder of this chapter will focus on discussing.  
3.2.1 Cultural deficit 
Despite their contradictions, the discourse of inadequate participation is 
regularly employed in close proximity to that of abundant participation. For 
example, two sentences after Fiona Hyslop was stressing the need to celebrate 
how alive with culture Scotland’s communities are, she had moved on to suggest 
that “[t]hose who are least provided for are often not just materially deprived, 
but lack opportunities to access culture”. This shifts the narrative onto the 
discourse of inadequate participation, a discourse that translates into practice 
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as a deficit model of cultural policy making (Jancovich, 2011; Miles and Sullivan, 
2010) in which some individuals are assumed to face a shortage of culture to 
participate with83. It is this discourse that provides the discursive logic to 
statements such as the commitment of Creative Scotland to ensure all of the 
organisations in the Regular Funding Portfolio “have committed to increasing 
access to artistic and creative work amongst communities across Scotland” 
(2015i emphasis added). The assumption being that access for some 
communities is currently at subpar levels. The notion of a cultural deficit is also 
reinforced by the use of the prefix ‘under’, which is a common feature across the 
data analysed. Certain groups are seen to be “under represented” or “under 
participating” suggesting an insufficiency or inadequacy in the numbers 
undertaking certain activities. However, what ‘adequate’ would be is never 
addressed, it is simply assumed to be more.  
3.2.2 Cultural provision and opportunities to participate  
The structure of this discourse locates the state at the center of addressing this 
lack of access to culture through their financial support of selected 
organisations and activities – a fundamental discursive practice of the 
dispositive of which this discourse is a part. The state and the organisations 
they support are represented as providing something that otherwise would not 
be available to the populace, and as such the concept of provision was a 
common feature of the written texts analysed: 
 
 Our aim is to ensure that the cultural provision we fund is available to a 
diversity of people (Creative Scotland, 2015h)  
Local authorities contribute information about their provision of culture 
(Scottish Government, 2010b)  
 
We can count it as a success that we have increased cultural provision 
(Creative Scotland, 2014c).  
 
                                                          
83 This is the model that Gilmore (2013) has argued was employed by Arts Council England 
when they set out to banish the UK’s ‘cultural cold spots’. 
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Local authorities have a key role to ensure provision of recreation and 
culture for the people in their area (Scottish Government, 2008) 
 
… persistent inequalities in arts and cultural provision…. (Creative 
Scotland, 2015f) 
 
Exactly what is being provided becomes clearer upon consideration of Fiona 
Hyslop’s speech in which she stated that: “I believe it is our duty to ensure that 
everyone has the opportunity to access the arts and cultural experiences (2013). 
What this points to is the extent to which it is access to opportunities for cultural 
participation that is being provided by the state, a sentiment expressed by a 
number of the interviewees:  
 
I think what we are trying to address is to look at people with the very 
small maps, who haven’t had a chance to kind of like, haven’t had that 
many opportunities to experience interesting culture and creativity and 
to try and grow that. (Interviewee 22)  
 
…have they had the opportunity for it to engender excitement in them, or 
speak to them, and if they haven’t then that is something to address… 
(Interviewee 9)  
 
I would hope that they think it is something like building awareness of the 
cultural opportunities that are available to people and sort of connecting 
people with, with what exists and kind of… the opportunities available 
(Interviewee 12)  
 
We need to as a society ensure that there are opportunities for everyone 
who is in this society to at least try before they dismiss it, before we can 
assume that there is an average of forty to sixty percent of people who 
aren’t going to be interested in this so let’s not bother (Interviewee 20)  
 
I guess it’s that thing of making sure that people have had the opportunity 
to try it (Interviewee 41) 
 
It’s about making sure people know what the opportunities are 
(Interviewee 38) 
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My job is to create opportunities for other people to be engaged with 
culture (Interviewee 39) 
 
Given the use of the SHS survey as the tool by which the Scottish Government 
seeks to measure its progress in addressing the problem of cultural non-
participation, the implicit logic appears to be that equality of access to 
opportunities should result in parity of uptake, and that success should be 
measured as such. However, as has been shown by the results of the SHS, there 
are varying rates of participation across the different types of activities that it 
measures and some of the lowest rates of participation are with those activities 
and organisations that receive the greatest public subsidy. This then requires 
further explanation within the logics of the discourse to explain why, when an 
opportunity for cultural participation is provided, the majority of the populace 
fail to take it.  
3.2.3 Barriers and outreach 
The explanation provided for this can be found in the regularity with which the 
concept of providing opportunities is regularly combined with the concept of 
barriers. As interviewee 13 stated: “I suppose that the idea is that they [non-
participants] are less likely to get the opportunity to make the choice because 
there are X amount of barriers in their way”. Likewise, Interviewee 26 
suggested that when setting up an arts space “it was all about getting people in 
because I felt that there were a lot of barriers for certain kinds of people”. As 
such, this discourse represents the practice of increasing cultural participation 
as being about the removal of the obstructions that are seen to be limiting the 
ability of some to participate (see, for example, Creative Scotland 2012b). Policy 
documents make clear that those organisations receiving state funding require 
“a clear approach to identifying the barriers to taking part in the arts” (Creative 
Scotland, 2014b) implying that their practice should then mitigate against them. 
Indeed a number of the interviewees referenced the extent to which the practice 
of their organisations was to some extent about the removal or reduction of 
barriers: 
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… so I think if we were able to provide opportunities for groups of people, 
you know target audiences, to come and engage in a way that perhaps 
takes away some of those intimidating barriers… (Interviewee 16)  
 
….it is part of the annual feedback as to how we have tried to actively 
engage with more people, ways in which we have reduced barriers to 
attendance (Interviewee 8)  
 
The specific activities intended to remove these barriers were commonly 
referred to as “outreach” or “outreach and engagement work” (see, for example, 
Interviewees 2, 12, 25, 36 and 41) and there is a variety of practice that can be 
represented as such. These various practices could be placed on a continuum at 
one end of which would be those that are broad and un-targeted such as free 
access to state museums and galleries or financial support for touring work to 
more geographically remote locations. At the other they would be more 
narrowly focused such as the subsidy of theatre tickets for certain demographic 
groups or time limited outreach and engagement projects with specific 
communities undertaken precisely for this reason. 
 
As has been discussed in Chapter 2, the concept of barriers has been extensively 
researched and such research adds discursive weight to their taken for granted 
existence through providing a logic and language with which they can be 
authoritatively spoken about. Studies such as those outlined previously, have 
generally identified three broad types of barrier: practical (distance, cost, lack of 
awareness, opening times etc.); physical (primarily disability or age related); or 
mental (psychological, lack of understanding, perception of risk) and examples 
of each were evident in the responses of the interviewees: 
 
 I think there might be an assumption that… some things are expensive 
[PRACTICAL BARRIER], that there is a cost attached to it, whether that is 
paying to get into a gallery or paying to see a show. (Interviewee 1) 
 
…some people are not going because they don’t know about it 
[PRACTICAL BARRIER], some people are not going because they perceive 
it is not for them [MENTAL BARRIER] …some people are not going 
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because they don’t live somewhere where it is available [PRACTICAL 
BARRIER] (Interviewee 2)  
 
…you get this kind of situation where people are able to explore stuff that 
they may have been blocked from experiencing. We talk a lot about 
barriers, what are the barriers to participation and is that about, is it very 
physical barriers, like the fact that the place that the art is done is 
elsewhere, or is it about, you know, psychological barriers, not engaging 
because of the perception about what this is, or is it about, you know, just 
social barriers, outside influences, peer pressure, that it is not cool to do 
stuff, so it is about trying to strip away those barriers (Interviewee 22)  
 
I think that there are all sorts of societal barriers which make people think 
they might not enjoy it… [MENTAL BARRIER] (Interviewee 19)84 
 
The notion that individuals face such barriers appears to be a plausible one. 
Society is not equitable and there are differences in the degree to which 
individuals are free to pursue their own interests and desires in their leisure 
time. Relative poverty, lack of time and geographic location are all potentially 
limiting factors upon an individual’s ability to exert their own agency with 
regards to their non-working life. All of these factors are very likely to account 
for some patterns of behaviour in relation to cultural participation, but what the 
problem construction implies is that the individual would, or should, 
understand these patterns as a problem requiring state intervention.  
3.2.4 Market failure  
Discursively representing cultural participation as something that requires 
provision and/or the removal of barriers implies it is a need that individuals are 
unable to fulfil themselves. It therefore represents it as a particular form of 
exchanged based market relationship85. For as Adam Smith (2010 [1904]) in 
The Wealth of Nations argued: if we are to assume that we are unable to fulfil 
                                                          
84 See Appendix 1.06 for further relevant examples from the data. 
85 McGuigan (2004) has argued that understanding culture in this way is part of the dominance 
of a neo-liberal ideology in which it is impossible to think outside of market based relationships. 
However in the context of this study the manner in which cultural participation is understood 
suggests that irrespective of whether it takes place in the market, or through state subsidy the 
practice is understood as some sort of exchange between participant and producer.      
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our own needs then we become merchants, and we cannot deny the market in 
which we must therefore live. As such, if within this discourse the function of 
state funded organisations is predicated on their ability to provide the populace 
with something they cannot provide for themselves then a market has been 
brought into being. This is indicative of the extent to which, in constructing 
culture as an object of knowledge, cultural production and cultural consumption 
were almost immediately understood as two distinct things (Connor, 1992).  
 
However, in the dominant discourses of a free market economy such as is 
adopted in Scotland and the UK, the presumption is that the government will 
avoid intervention in markets other than where an imperfect environment 
means that market forces alone cannot guarantee an optimal efficient outcome. 
This is a situation described in economics as market failure and is a concept that 
is central to the construction of non-participation as a problem. The regularity 
with which market failure is employed as a justification for state intervention in 
the cultural participation of the populace has been noted by both Creigh-Tyte & 
Stiven (2001) and McGuigan (2004).  Market failure is said to occur for a 
number of reasons, most commonly in relation to: 
 
…imperfect competition or monopoly, economies of scale, imperfect 
information (information asymmetry or adverse selection), or where no 
market equilibrium exists (in the case of public goods, merit goods, 
externalities and incomplete markets)  (Creigh-Tyte and and Stiven, 
2001, p.174) 
 
By employing the discourse of market failure, the discourse of inadequate 
participation locates the cultural participation choices of the populace within 
the category of activities that the state not only has a legitimate right but also an 
obligation to intervene in. As Interviewee 19 stated: I believe that cultural 
provision is one of, is one of the…. is a core responsibility of a government and of 
policy, along with health provision and education provision.  
 
139 
 
While the term market failure was only explicitly used once in any of the data 
generated – “I sometimes think of this in terms of market failure. Artists are in 
effect doing something for which they say, in effect, I struggle to break even as an 
individual or an organisation” (Interviewee 25) - the principles of market failure 
are fundamental to the discursive logic upon which the problem construction 
depends. The argument that the state should take an active role in providing 
access to opportunities for cultural participation and mitigating against barriers 
to such opportunities is predicated upon an assumption that there is an 
imperfection in the market. This imperfection is assumed to affect the capacity 
of individuals to interact with something they otherwise would or should if they 
were fully able to pursue the maximisation of their own utility. However, as 
shall now be discussed, exactly what sort of market failure is occurring with 
regards to cultural participation is never made clear. 
 
Firstly, while it may be argued that encouraging cultural participation 
contributes to the public good, there is a difference between the public good and 
a public good. Public goods are those that it is argued the state should seek to 
provide because the nature of the good negatively impacts a private provider’s 
ability to gain adequate reward and thus open market provision would be less 
than socially optimal (Creigh-Tyte and and Stiven, 2001). However, in and of 
themselves the majority of organisations and activities that the government 
does provide subsidy for are not public goods, for they do not adhere to the two 
core principles of non-exclusivity and non-rivalry outlined by Samuelson 
(1954). Many subsidised activities are held in spaces that effectively allow 
individuals to be excluded (theatres, galleries, studios, cinemas etc.) and as 
many who have attempted to see the Mona Lisa might attest, there is a point at 
which the number of people viewing it negatively affects the interaction one has 
with it. While there may be that which is subsidised that could be described as 
quasi or mixed public goods – such as certain public sculptures – they are few 
and far between.  And so there appears to be no reason why the activities and 
organisations that receive public subsidy might not be provided as private 
goods since they hold the potential for an effective market to be established. 
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Indeed it is just such markets that Cowen (1998) argues have developed very 
successfully throughout history: 
 
Music and the arts have been moving away from government funding 
since the Middle Ages. The Renaissance, the Enlightenment, the 
nineteenth century Romantic Movement and twentieth century 
modernism all brought art further into the market sphere. Today, most of 
the important work in film, music, literature, painting and sculpture is 
sold as a commodity. Contemporary art is capitalist art, and the history 
of art has been a history of struggle to establish markets (1998, p.36) 
 
However there are alternative models of market failure that are often evoked 
within the discourse of inadequate participation. For example, merit goods are 
understood to be those activities and organisations with which participation is 
deemed to be intrinsically desirable and that therefore the state should seek to 
equalise participation with on the grounds of social equality and the public good 
(not in this case a public good, but rather for the general good of the public). If 
the public are unable or unwilling to participate with the merit good then they 
must be supported, encouraged or compelled to do so in the form of cultural 
participation policies.  
 
Leaving to one side for the time being the extent to which some suggest that 
merit goods are “simply a means of dressing-up policy-makers’ paternalistic 
value judgements” (Creigh-Tyte and and Stiven, 2001, p.176) it is unclear as to 
what merit is intrinsic to those goods receiving subsidy that an individual 
cannot get elsewhere. As shall be discussed in Chapter 4, while the dominant 
discourses of cultural policy tend to focus on the externalities86 that cultural 
participation may bring - education, social cohesion, wellbeing etc. (claims that 
gain legitimacy through the existence of the type of research discussed in 
Chapter 2) - once again it must be stressed that there is little to no evidence that 
                                                          
86 Externalities are the indirect effects of the activities of an individual or organisation that have 
an effect on other individuals or organisations for which no compensation is paid.   
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the positive externalities identified are in any way specific to those activities 
and organisations receiving state subsidy.  Indeed as Moss (2009) eloquently 
notes in his review of Gifts of the Muse (Mccarthy et al., 2005) almost all of the 
positive externalities that may be generated by an interaction with the type of 
activities and organisations most commonly receiving state subsidy can be 
equally generated by alternative activities that someone is most likely already 
doing:  
 
Captivation? If I’m running a race or performing delicate surgery, am I 
not equally captivated while doing so? Expanded capacity for empathy: 
does this not happen to me when I volunteer at a homeless shelter? 
Cognitive growth: could I not see many of the same effects from taking a 
class in computer programming or statistical analysis? Creation of social 
bonds: you’re telling me that playing on an amateur sports team, 
following World Cup soccer, going to Star Trek conventions don’t all do 
the exact same things? Expression of communal meaning: well, what the 
hell do you call religious services? (Moss 2009, n.p.) 
 
If, as the Scottish Government acknowledges elsewhere, activities such as sport 
share the capacity to offer individuals the opportunity to gain similar positive 
impacts to those that are commonly associated with cultural participation (Ruiz, 
2004), why does it matter if they are indeed a cultural non-participant? 
Furthermore, even if a unique intrinsic merit of cultural participation were to be 
proposed and evidenced, any suggestion that it would be universally provided 
by every opportunity that the state provides falls foul of the fallacy of 
homogeneity with regards to both treatment and effect (DiMaggio, 2002). No 
utility or benefit from an experience can be guaranteed. The experience of each 
individual will differ in relation to numerous circumstantial factors and 
therefore, at best, any activity may afford the potential for utility but it cannot 
be guaranteed, and neither may it result in the utility that was desired. Yet 
despite all of the above arguments against it, the logics of market failure are still 
employed within the discourse of inadequate provision. The opportunities for 
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cultural participation provided by the state are implicitly represented as either 
a public or merit good offering a utility to those doing it that they would not gain 
otherwise or elsewhere.  
 
However the discourse of market failure and the suggestion that there is a need 
for the state to provide access to opportunities for cultural participation is one 
that has no logic within the discourse of abundant participation - discussed in 
the first half of this chapter - where cultural participation is either a universal 
part of life or readily available through a highly successful market. To do so 
leads to the paradox identified by the Warwick Commission when its authors’ 
stated that the participation gap “is not caused by a lack of demand among the 
public for cultural and creative expression” (2014, p.33). However within the 
discourse of inadequate participation the potential sites for cultural 
participation are no longer as numerous, and there are far clearer distinctions 
between the different types of participation that are possible. For despite Fiona 
Hyslop’s claim that Scotland’s cultural life was as diverse as the land, people and 
places of Scotland, the data suggest that the opportunities for cultural 
participation that the state has any interest in providing access to are far less 
expansive.  
 
For example, Fiona Hyslop wants Scotland to be nourished by “wonderful songs, 
poems, stories, drama, dance, painting and sculpture” (2013). Likewise, the 
Scottish Government’s guide for local authorities on the impact of culture 
(2008) explicitly mentions only art, story-telling, music, museums, heritage, 
visual art, performing art, theatre events and libraries. Furthermore, the 
imagery employed in the same document suggests cultural participation is 
either: a performance; a festival; a museum; a historic site; or playing a musical 
instrument. As Hyslop’s 2013 speech exhibits, the market failure and the 
resultant non-participation that it is represented as causing is not considered in 
relation to the same range of potential sites of cultural participation that 
communities are represented as being “alive with” within the discourse of 
abundant participation. Indeed in providing illustrative detail to support her 
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assertion that the “materially deprived” lack access to culture, Hyslop goes on to 
emphasise that “not everyone can get to galleries, theatres, museums and 
performance spaces”. And thus within the discourse of inadequate participation 
the problem of non-participation becomes possible because there are discursive 
limitations to what can be understood as providing an opportunity for cultural 
participation, and therefore about which the government would be concerned if 
someone was not participating.  
3.2.5 Delineating the limits of cultural participation   
In attempting to understand what counts as cultural participation within the 
discourse of inadequate participation, the researcher first looked to the SHS 
given that it is the results of the SHS that are used as part of the evidence that a 
problem exists, in addition to being the tool by which progress is supposedly 
measured. A rudimentary analysis immediately highlights a whole host of 
distinctions about what does and doesn’t count as cultural participation, 
examples of which include: 
 A visit to the records office does count, whereas going to see a comedian 
wouldn’t, unless the comedian was seen as part of a festival; 
 Buying a book is cultural participation, but buying a CD isn’t, irrespective 
of how much music is on that CD;  
 Someone participates in culture when purchasing a painting, but not 
when viewing that same painting at home. Although a painting seen once 
in a public exhibition is cultural participation seeing another painting 
every day in your own home is not; 
 Going to a craft exhibition is, but not going to buy craft at a market, 
unless that craft is for sale within a gallery as a work of art. This is 
despite the fact that buying craft would count as participating with 
creative activity according to Creative Scotland (2015a). It can only be 
assumed therefore that not all forms of creative activity count as a site 
for cultural participation.  
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One is then faced with the difficulty of making sense of these distinctions. It 
would be disingenuous to suggest that it cleaves along the canonical rules of the 
high or fine arts discourse of liberal humanism (Belfiore and Bennett, 2010; 
Jordan and Weedon, 1995) that Griswold (2013) argues remains commonly 
prevalent in society. While the choice of noun and adjective used by Creative 
Scotland to describe the purpose of their Public Engagement Fund – “to widen 
participation and address barriers to engagement in high quality arts” (2015b, 
emphasis added) – might point towards the traditional high versus low binary, 
the actuality of what is included as cultural participation in the SHS (e.g. panto, 
live DJ sets, and country music) belies this oversimplification. In fact the 
rhetoric of the high arts discourse was something that the majority of 
interviewees explicitly rejected, or at least implicitly avoided87. As Interviewee 
19 said: I make no distinction, I genuinely make no distinction between different 
forms of work, you know high art, low art I just think it’s complete nonsense and I 
personally don’t understand the difference”. Indeed a number of interviewees 
spoke about cultural participation projects they had done that made use of 
activities such as tattoo design (Interviewee 12), parkour (Interviewee 14), and 
live DJs (Interviewees 1 & 18), all of which should be dismissed as popular 
culture if the discursive logic of the high arts was being employed.  In this 
regard, both the stated belief and practice of the majority of interviewees 
appears to stand in opposition to Jensen’s (2002) claim that while the high arts 
continue to be seen as a tonic and thus that which the state wants to encourage 
participation with, the popular arts and media continues to be seen as a toxin. 
While this may be the case in some circumstances, within the field of cultural 
policy any division is not so neat.   
However, that does not negate the fact that there were significant implicit 
systems of distinctions and hierarchies that were present in all of the data 
generated88. Firstly, in relation to the SHS these distinctions were particularly 
evident with regards to the manner that the results have been presented. For 
                                                          
87 Although there were some exceptions (primarily those interviewees who had worked in the 
cultural sector for more than 30 years (for example see Interviewees 17 and 27). 
88 See Appendix 1.07 for further relevant examples from the data. 
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example, pantomimes and musicals are labelled as “other” theatre 
performances, discrete from drama and opera. Likewise for rock and pop music, 
both of which are named and measured discretely from the overall figure for 
live music. This distinction occurs despite the fact that 16% of the population 
had attended these types of music making it more than twice as popular as 
classical music and three times as popular as Jazz, both of which were included 
in the core figure for live music participation. This is mirrored in the 2008 
report on the Scottish version of the English Taking Part survey that included 
specific sets of statistics presenting rates of cultural participation after 
excluding from the results:  rock; pop; country music; and going to the cinema 
(Scottish Arts Council, 2008). The same type of distinctions can also be found in 
some of the research that has critiqued the SHS, for although McCall and 
Playford (2012) have questioned the extent to which the activities asked about 
accurately measure cultural participation, their concern appears to be the 
inclusion of activities that they believe many would not consider to be cultural 
participation rather than any omissions that may have occurred or indeed the 
impossibility of the task attempted. 
It is also interesting to note the degree to which cultural participation with the 
creative industries is never referred to as the type of cultural participation that 
is understood as a solution to the problem of non-participation. Indeed a whole 
range of practice that within the discourse of abundant participation can be 
used as legitimate instances of effective cultural policy are never considered as 
having contributed towards reducing cultural non-participation. For example, in 
stressing the value of the creative industries in Scotland, Fiona Hyslop chose to 
highlight the success of Harris Tweed and the £200 million contribution they 
make to the Scottish economy as well as fashion designers Bebarouque and their 
elaborate body-stockings that are worn by the likes of singer Katy Perry. 
Likewise, in their investigation into how the growth of the creative industries 
might best be supported, the Scottish Parliament focused on TV, film and video 
game production (Scottish Parliament, 2014). However in neither case was it 
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suggested that these policy interventions were in any way related to the 
Scottish Government’s desire to increase cultural participation.  
Statistically, both Fiona Hyslop and the Scottish Government are right not to 
suggest otherwise, for neither buying a body-stocking nor wearing it while 
listening to a CD of Katy Perry and playing Grand Theft Auto would make any 
difference to the published rate of cultural participation89. Indeed significant 
portions of what can be understood as the Scottish Government’s cultural policy 
supports practice that is not represented as contributing towards the assumed 
goal of one hundred percent cultural participation. For example, Hyslop’s 
assertion that she has “pressed the UK government for some years for tax break 
for computer games and high end television drama” (2013) would result in no 
measurable change to the national indicator. Neither would the commitment in 
Creative Scotland’s strategic plans to support TV production, fashion, digital 
technology and the games industry (Creative Scotland, 2014c, 2011a). It can 
only be assumed that these are supported for other reasons, given that although 
they can be spoken about within the field of cultural policy they are illegitimate 
solutions to the discursive problem of cultural non-participation.  
3.2.6 The limitations of discursive practice  
Such distinctions are also evident when analysing the policy interventions of the 
Scottish government that are intended to support and increase cultural 
participation. These actions can be understood as manifestations of the 
discursive practice of “cultural provision” that has been outlined above. They are 
indicative of both how the problem is understood and the type of opportunities 
for cultural participation that are seen as a legitimate solution. For example, 
despite “enhancing the population’s quality of life” being a stated aim of cultural 
policy (Scottish Government, 2011a), and cultural participation rather than 
attendance being shown to be a more effective route to this end (Knell and 
                                                          
89 The most commonly employed definition of the Creative Industries in the UK is that created 
by the DCMS that includes advertising; architecture; art and antiques; crafts; design; designer 
fashion; film; interactive leisure software; music; performing arts; publishing; software and 
computer services; and TV and radio; a list that would encompass a spectrum of potential 
activities far greater than that which are measured in the SHS.  
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Taylor, 2011, p.30), there is a preference to subsidise large scale professional 
organisations (Creative Scotland, 2011b; Scottish Government, 2011a), the 
primary output of which is opportunities for attendance and passive 
consumption. Furthermore, amongst the explicitly participative activities that 
are funded, distinctions are once again evident. For example, it is the provision 
of one year’s free music tuition to all school children that receives by far the 
greatest monetary support (Scottish Government, 2011b). In the SHS, craftwork 
and creating computer animation may be classified as cultural participation, but 
the Scottish Government is not investing 8 million pounds a year90 to facilitate 
children to undertake these activities.  
Considering the 2012-13 Scottish Government draft budgets, of the 149.2 
million pounds set aside for culture, 65% was to support the existence of 14 
national bodies91 (Scottish Government, 2011a). Of the remaining 35%, 
distributed through Creative Scotland, the majority primarily funded a network 
of theatre companies, galleries, and venues in Edinburgh and Glasgow (Creative 
Scotland, 2012a). A pattern of distribution that has changed little under the new 
funding models brought in during 2015 (Creative Scotland, 2015i) and which 
mirrors the pattern that can be observed elsewhere in the UK ( Warwick, 2015; 
Stark et al., 2013; Jancovich, 2011; Selwood, 2001). Although each of these 
organisations is required to actively pursue the development of the broadest 
possible audience as part of their funding agreement (Creative Scotland, 
2015h), the majority of the organisations receiving the bulk of public subsidy 
are those that the SHS appears to suggest are the least successful at providing 
access to opportunities for cultural participation. For example, the SHS shows 
that only 19% of people attend a play during the year, 4% attend the ballet, and 
5% attend the opera (Scottish Government, 2009).  There are far less (if any) 
explicit policy interventions to support participation with those potential 
                                                          
90 As the Scottish Government did in the Youth Music Program. 
91 The 14 national bodies are: National Galleries of Scotland, National Library of Scotland, 
National Museums Scotland, Scottish Library and Information Council, Royal Commission on the 
Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland, Scottish Ballet, National Theatre of Scotland, 
Royal Scottish National Orchestra, Scottish Chamber Orchestra, Scottish Opera, Museums 
Galleries Scotland, National Mining Museum of Scotland, Scotland Fisheries Museum, Scottish 
Maritime Museum.  
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opportunities for cultural participation included in the SHS92 that are more 
successful in engendering participation, such as commercial cinema, pop music, 
club nights and line dancing.  
Furthermore, despite Creative Scotland’s stated objective of supporting those 
individuals who for various reasons struggle to access “the arts, screen and 
creative industries” (Creative Scotland, 2014c) there appears to be far less 
targeted work to support participation in the latter two. This is despite the 
common sense assumption that if living in a remote part of Scotland would limit 
someone’s access to the Scottish Chamber Orchestra then it would equally limit 
his or her access to a Taylor Swift or Rolling Stones concert. Likewise, if a lack of 
disposable income would limit someone’s ability to buy a ticket to the ballet, 
then their financial circumstances would have the same limiting factor on a 
whole host of other activities93 considering that they might be equally, if not 
even more expensive94. It would cost approximately £30 to £40 to take a family 
of four to the local multiplex, a cost that those targeted by cultural participation 
projects may certainly struggle to afford, but that may also be an increasing 
luxury for those who cultural participation policies are not intended to 
support95. Just as Behr and Brennan (2014) have argued that with regards to 
cultural policy there are those forms of culture whose value is primarily only 
ever considered economically, there are equally those forms of cultural 
                                                          
92 The researcher is not suggesting that the choices of those in Government and the 
organisations that they support are less valid than the alternatives; indeed the researcher is a 
fan of much that receives public funding and is grateful that his own interests are subsidised to 
such a degree.  Rather the point is to emphasise that preferences and distinctions do exist and 
do so in tension with the discourse of cultural abundance.   
93 There is equally the argument that these types of discussions should not be limited to any 
particular type of leisure time activity. Other forms of leisure time activities have become as, if 
not more unaffordable for many that would want to do them. As Jones notes “between 1990 and 
2008 the average price of football tickets rose by 600%, well over seven times the rate of 
everything else” (2012, p.135), an activity that had previously been understood as a valuable 
social cohesive at a local community level was allowed to be transformed into a hobby for the 
more affluent controlled by the super-wealthy.  
94 For example the Rolling Stones tour in 2012 at which the cheapest ticket was £100 (Anon 
2012).    
95 This is just the type of obscured inequality that Levitas (2005) argues the discourses 
surrounding the concept of inclusion masks.  And this inequity is not only amongst those that 
are labelled as non-participants. Levitas (2004) has highlighted the increasing inequalities 
(economic, social and cultural) amongst those that are labelled as the included, and the same 
might be said about those who are understood as cultural participants. 
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participation whose economic inaccessibility is never considered as part of the 
problem construction of cultural non-participation. This is because what 
remains silent (Bacchi 2009) in the discourse of inadequate participation is the 
extent to which certain individuals may be faced with inequitable access to that 
which they want to participate with and which presumably they would 
therefore be keen to take up any opportunity offered to them.  
It is clear that cultural participation policies are not intended to indiscriminately 
support individuals to overcome the barriers they face in pursuing the cultural 
participation about which they have an interest. Indeed for reasons that will be 
considered in due course, cultural policy interventions rarely start with an 
expression of desire by those that the intervention is supposedly intended to 
support. For example, one of the interviewees who worked in a geographic area 
of Edinburgh labelled as socially deprived, spoke of the extent to which they 
would often be inundated with offers from the major cultural organisations to 
come and work there. They felt it was clear that these major organisations had 
been given funds and charged with visiting specific areas, despite there being 
little demand for them amongst the people that this interviewee worked with. 
What the interviewee didn’t understand was why that money wasn’t given 
directly to the community to arrange the sort of events, organisations and 
opportunities for cultural participation that she found they were expressing a 
demand for.  
3.2.7 For profit or not: A key binary  
For all that some of the interviewees appeared keen not to suggest that 
participation with non-subsidised culture was of a lesser value, it was evident in 
all of the data generated that increasing participation in what was informally 
labelled as commercial culture was not understood as a legitimate solution to 
the problem of cultural non-participation. For this reason, the distinction 
between their own organisations and those that they described as commercial, 
or for-profit organisations, was a common feature of the interviews and a key 
binary (Bacchi, 2009) in the discursive logic of the problem construction.  
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It appeared that a commercial organisation is understood as one that receives 
no public subsidy and in which the maximization of profit is assumed to be the 
primary driver behind its existence. Therefore, it would seem that when it 
comes to providing access to opportunities for cultural participation, the legal 
structure and business model of the organisation matters significantly. The 
question appears not to be: could this organisation be supported or employed to 
increase cultural participation? But rather: is the organisation and its activities a 
legitimate site at which cultural participation can be acknowledged based on its 
primary source of revenue? For all that the metaphor of a cultural 
ecosystem/ecology is being employed elsewhere in cultural policy (see Holden 
2015 for a useful discussion about the development of this term) within the 
discourse of inadequate participation and the related problem construction of 
cultural non-participation there remains a distinct focus on a specific subsidised 
ecosystem to the exclusion of the larger biome of which it is arguably a part96.  
This rejection of for-profit organisations was also evident in the practice of 
interviewees that was detailed in their responses. Although a few spoke of the 
benefits of working in partnership (see for example Interviewees 12 & 41), this 
was only ever in relation to other organisations receiving state subsidy. Only 
one interviewee97 spoke of partnering with or even discussing the audiences of 
commercial organisations, and the example they gave was one of failure blamed 
upon the “solely commercially focused producers” with whom there was “no way 
of working”. The assumption appears to have been that the commercial theatre 
should have been willing to come and work with the subsidised organisation to 
support their activities, because it was the subsidised organisation that was 
legitimately able to deliver projects that would provide opportunities for 
cultural participation. There appeared to be no notion that the subsidised 
organisation could have worked to support the activities of the commercial 
                                                          
96 An ecosystem is an interconnected network of abiotic (non-living) and biotic (living) factors 
while a biome is a collection of ecosystems with similar biotic and abiotic factors, arguably a 
more accurate metaphor for the full spectrum of cultural activities.  
97 Given that the discussion in this section may reveal which organisations are being discussed, 
in order to maintain anonymity throughout the rest of the thesis, the Interviewees in this 
paragraph have not been matched with their number.  
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theatre in order to increase cultural participation at their site. This despite the 
theatre having the most demographically diverse audience in Edinburgh and 
thus arguably their commercially focused aims managing to deliver greater 
audience diversity than the subsidised organisation was able to do with their 
outreach work.  
When the researcher went to speak with the manager of the commercial 
theatre, the manager stated that they didn’t feel theirs was seen as an 
organisation that was contributing towards increasing cultural participation, 
despite the diversity of their audience. No one from the Scottish Government or 
Creative Scotland had ever spoken to them about their audience in this way, and 
they doubted that those bodies were aware of some of the activities the theatre 
arranged outside of their main program in order to provide more opportunities 
for people to interact with the theatre. They also recognised that there was a 
great demand for their main program amongst people that were unable to 
afford the price of a ticket, however when the researcher suggested that 
subsidising these tickets for some would therefore be a highly effective manner 
of supporting cultural participation, the Interviewee laughed and responded 
with “maybe, but they [the government] are never going to give money to a 
commercial organisation”. Given the extent to which all manner of public 
services have been privatised since the 1980’s, it is interesting to note that the 
involvement of private organisations in the provision of cultural participation 
opportunities is seen to be something unimaginable.  
 
So the researcher began to put this question directly to the interviewees. If the 
Scottish Government wants to support people to participate with culture, and 
people are showing a desire to go to the cinema or a commercial pop concert, 
then should this not be supported as a guaranteed way to increase access to 
opportunities for cultural participation? While some appeared to recognise the 
logic of this suggestion, none of the interviewees felt that this would be an 
appropriate way for the state to intervene. Interviewee 41 spoke of it being  “a 
whole different ballgame when you look at the prices and barriers to 
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commercial work, the difficulty is that part of the reason these shows are so 
spectacular is because of the budgets […] so yeah it’s incredibly sad, just a shame 
really [that some cannot afford them]”. Indeed for Interviewee 4, supporting 
someone to participate with a for-profit cultural activity that they had never 
done before would “be closing their opportunities down rather than opening 
them up”.  
3.2.8 The discursive logic of public subsidy  
And so it would appear that within the rules of this particular game of truth, it is 
only those activities and organisations receiving state subsidy that can be 
understood as providing legitimate sites at which the problem of cultural non-
participation can be addressed:  
 
Well what I am thinking they mean is things that they are putting 
money into, so museums, us, you know, taking part in local dance classes, 
local activity (Interviewee 2) 
 
But when we are talking about non-participation I think we are talking 
about the more formalised cultural element, probably stuff that is getting 
public funding because that is what we measure. (Interviewee 6)  
 
Interviewee 12 may have felt that “we should be giving people what they want 
culturally” but only if it could be offered in the context of the organisation in 
which they worked and in relation to the objects that the interviewee wanted to 
exhibit98. Indeed any suggestion that public subsidy should end up going to 
organisations that were already able to make a profit was greeted as a clear 
contravention of the accepted notions of what public subsidy was primarily for 
(which appeared to be supporting that which was not commercially viable). 
This remained the case even if that subsidy would ultimately help to support 
people to participate with something about which they were interested and in 
so doing align with the Scottish Government’s aim of encouraging participation: 
                                                          
98 Likewise, in interviewing the manager of a nightclub that programmed live music and DJs it 
was interesting to note that while they failed to secure public subsidy on the basis that the acts 
they programmed were all commercial artists, one of those same artists was paid with public 
money to play the same set at a ‘lates’ event at a subsidised cultural organisation. 
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[Talking about audiences having more decision making power] There is 
huge validity to saying to people, tell us what you want us to subsidise […] 
It’s really good in principle, that idea of service users, tenants, whatever … 
are allowed to advocate for how they want to spend the money […] it is 
then how you can sustain a really successful arts scene in Scotland if 
you then withdraw significant public funding from organisations to give to 
local authorities, to then open out these funds. The danger is that it is great 
for those that are proactive […] organising to see the work they want to 
see, the hope being that it is in publicly funded buildings and not always 
commercial work, that money would not be going into the arts in 
Scotland, it is going down to the bank accounts of the producers in 
London (Interviewee 41) 
 
[In response to the suggestion that trips to multiplexes could be 
subsidised for those that can’t afford the prices] … I would baulk a little 
bit at paying money to a corporation who are already making a huge 
amount of money… (Interviewee 7)  
 
Yes, but those organisations are already making a profit… 
(Interviewee 22) 
 
 [When asked why people should not be supported to see mainstream 
feature films]…lots and lots of people make lots and lots of money out of 
films, so it’s not an industry that anyone considers needs 
support…because of the numbers who use it (Interviewee 3)  
 
[After stating that it would be fair to support people to go and see the 
things they were interested in but could not afford] Ok, right… so I don’t 
believe that…. That’s a touring show, a big west end touring show, the 
reason it is so expensive is the production budgets are so high […] the very 
nature of that work that is commercial it is non subsidised. If that 
starts getting subsidised then the rest of us are up shit creek, you 
know (Interviewee 41) 
 
The final quote is indicative of a distinct shift in logic that all the quotes exhibit. 
When their right to public subsidy is brought into question, the objective of 
supporting cultural participation becomes secondary to the objective of 
supporting those organisations with which the majority of the population is 
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least likely to participate. It is a distinction about the assumed purpose of public 
subsidy that was also evident in ACE’s Arts Debate (2008). While the public 
stated that relevance and diversity of the offer should be the priority, many 
artists and those working in arts organisations appear to perceive, like the 
interviewees in the current study, that subsidy is first and foremost about 
supporting artistic practice, in particular supporting practice that may struggle 
to be viable in an open market. As Oakley (2014) argues, there are certain 
practices99 that are assumed should always be protected from the ravages of the 
market, primarily on the basis that their value is maintained or increased 
through doing so. As such, the majority of interviewees believed that any access 
agenda those receiving public subsidy are required to support should be about 
trying to diversify the audience that would be interested in the type of work that 
those receiving subsidy want to produce.  
 
These two positions encapsulate the arguably irreconcilable orientations to 
cultural policy – access and artistic excellence. What Lee et.al.  describe as “the 
age old tension at the heart of arts funding” (2011, p.295) and both of which are 
neatly encompassed in Fiona Hyslop’s description of what she believed it was 
government’s job to do in relation to culture in Scotland 
 
It is our job, however, to create the conditions which enable artists to 
flourish and as many people, groups and organisations as possible to 
benefit from and enjoy our culture and heritage (2013) 
 
It was a tension that was also picked up by one of the interviewees involved in 
making funding decisions: “I see us as always serving two constituencies. One is 
the sector, artists and organisations, and the other is public value and how you get 
to that articulation of public value”. However there is an asymmetric power 
relationship between these two constituencies, for although Holden (2010) 
argues that cultural policy (and thus cultural subsidy) is implicitly understood 
to be about product rather than people, this is not strictly true. There are 
                                                          
99 Oakley  (2014) specifically refers to the distinction between popular and high culture.  
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arguably some people to whom the current approach to cultural policy is 
strongly orientated: those individuals who exert significant influence over the 
products that are created and the organisations that the dissemination of these 
products requires. 
 
Such asymmetric power relationships are evident in Creative Scotland’s 
description of their Open Project Fund, described as intended to support “the 
arts, screen and creative industries, with projects that help them explore, realise 
and develop their creative potential, widen access to their work” (Creative 
Scotland, 2015d). The expected pattern of events implicit in this description is 
that certain individuals decide what work they want to do; they then seek 
money from the state to do this; and in return are expected to use this work to 
address the problem of cultural non-participation. As such, decisions about how 
supporting everyone to have a “rich cultural life” (Hyslop, 2013) might best be 
achieved are therefore constrained by a priori decisions about what has been 
funded and what those that receive funding are interested in doing. As 
Interviewee 21 stated: “the national indicators don’t concern me so much, what 
concerns me is how to take what the organisation does and make it available to 
people who wouldn’t normally have access to it”. Likewise, Interviewee 30 felt 
that most of the organisations that they worked with in the sector were not all 
that interested in policy objectives, their primary focus was in making the work 
that they wanted to and that they “did” cultural participation only because it 
was required in order to get money. Supporting cultural participation therefore 
becomes a question of increasing participation with that which receives 
subsidy, leading to an implication that participation with these subsidised 
activities and organisations offers something distinct from that which can be 
gained through participation elsewhere. As Chapter 2 has outlined, there is a 
wealth of research that either explicitly or implicitly supports this assumption.   
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The question of whether cultural policy is primarily about professionals or the 
public is one that has not been satisfactorily considered100 (Gray, 2000) and it 
appears to be assumed that the same policy intervention will always deliver for 
both constituencies. However supporting the production of that which may 
otherwise struggle to be economically viable is not necessarily the best way in 
which to support those whose social and economic deprivation restricts their 
capacity to have the freedom to make choices about how to spend their time in 
the same way that others do. For all the talk of evidence based policy making, 
there appears to be no evidence required to decide on what type of subsidised 
organisations or policy intervention will most effectively increase cultural 
participation, irrespective of where that cultural participation is taking place.  
Summary  
Focusing on the data generated through policy texts and qualitative interviews, 
this chapter has outlined the two dominant discourses of cultural participation 
that are evident in the field of cultural policy. In one there was an abundance of 
culture with which one might participate, increasing levels of interaction with 
the creative industries was lauded as something positive, and digital 
participation was seen to have significantly contributed to the multiplicity of 
ways in which one might be seen to be participating. In the other, there was a 
deficit of opportunities for cultural participation, culture was a more rarefied 
range of activities around which distinctions and hierarchies continued to exist, 
and in which it was acceptable to question or even dismiss certain activities as 
not being valid forms of cultural participation at all. It was within this second 
discourse, that of inadequate participation, that the problem of non-
participation is constructed.  
 
                                                          
100 The tensions between these dual purposes arguably extend back to the inception of the Arts 
Council and the beginning of explicit public subsidy for the arts.  Two of the most prominent 
figures in CEMA had divergent views on what was most important to support. While Dr Thomas 
Jones prioritised the local, amateur and touring of work, John Maynard Keynes felt the focus 
should be supporting the production of excellence at a professional level and then creating 
demand for these outputs.  It was Keynes that won and the legacy of this approach has meant 
that the balance has forever been tipped in favour of supply irrespective of demand (Sinclair, 
1995). 
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The problem is constructed as one of market failure, in that there is a certain 
type of experience that some people are having a suboptimal degree of exposure 
to because of various barriers that are preventing them from doing so. The state 
is therefore represented as addressing this market failure through the provision 
of opportunities to participate that take the shape of state subsidised 
organisations and activities. Those receiving subsidy then undertake a practice 
of removing barriers that is discursively understood as appropriate and 
necessary. An important part of the discursive logic of the problem is that it 
cannot be addressed through removing barriers to participation with for-profit 
cultural organisations and activities, but only through removing barriers to not-
for-profit organisations and activities that rely on some degree of state subsidy. 
Implicit in this logic is that the value of participation with a state subsidised 
organisation or activity is in some way greater than that which could occur 
elsewhere.  
 
While Chapter 2 has outlined the type of research that provides objectivity to 
this problem construction, the existence of non-participation is only affirmed by 
cultural participation surveys like the SHS and the associated research that 
seeks to explain their findings. The idea of cultural non-participation both 
precedes this research and exists independent of it. As such, Chapter 4 will now 
move on to consider the genealogy of the problem construction through 
undertaking a historical analysis of the point at which the possibility of cultural 
non-participation became imaginable and with it the subject identity of the 
cultural non-participant was established.   
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Chapter 4 – The genealogy of the problem construction  
Thus far the discussion has primarily focused on making visible the discursive 
logics of the problem construction. Chapter 2 has detailed the manner in which 
cultural participation has been constructed as an object of enquiry and the 
various explanations that have been offered as to why differing patterns of 
cultural participation exist.  Moving the focus onto the discursive planes of 
politics and professional practice, Chapter 3 has argued that while there are two 
dominant discourses of cultural participation, it is within the discourse of 
inadequate participation that certain patterns of cultural participation are 
represented as a problem requiring state intervention. However, as Foucault 
notes, for a problematisation to have formed, something prior “must have 
happened to make it uncertain, to make it lose its familiarity, or to have 
provoked a certain number of difficulties about it” (2003a [1984], p.24).  
 
It is for this reason that Foucault’s approach to the studying discourse is a 
historical one, and he describes it as undertaking a history of the present (2002 
[1966]). It is not historical in the sense of looking back to compare the present 
to a more or less favourable past, but rather in the sense of identifying the point 
at which a certain practice became problematic and the conditions under which 
this occurred. Foucault calls this approach genealogy and it is centred around an 
analysis of the conditions under which the possibility of certain relations are 
established and maintained (1977). The intention is to gain a greater 
understanding of practices as they exist today by “seeking the conditions that 
have made these practices possible and have established the grounds on which 
they depend for their intelligibility, [through reflecting on] the contingent 
pathways along which the taken for granted possibilities and limits of our 
present have come into existence” (Rabinow and Rose, 2003, p.xiii). It is such a 
task that the following chapter undertakes and in doing so it specifically 
addresses research question 4 - What is the genealogy of this problem 
construction? While also beginning to address research question 5 - What 
subjects are constructed within the problem? 
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4.1 The institution of the Arts  
As has been discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, with regards to the problem of 
cultural non-participation there is a significant synonymy between culture and 
the arts.  As such, to understand the genealogy of cultural non-participation as a 
problem, one must consider in greater detail the point at which the arts were 
constructed as a distinct field of human practice. However, to do so one must 
first replace the common concern with defining what the arts are, with the more 
fundamental question of what the arts is, an answer to which will be proposed 
in the first part of this chapter.   
4.1.1 The discursive relationship between cultural participation and the 
arts  
It is important to remember that although this research is analysing the 
construction of a problem within cultural policy, this is a fairly recent 
description for what would have been understood throughout the majority of 
the twentieth century in the UK as arts policy: 
Whereas the arts traditionally encompassed cultural practices that were 
cosseted by social elites (largely through the practices of direct and 
indirect patronage from private and/or state benefactors), the re-
definition of arts policy as cultural policy in the second half of the 
twentieth century sought to remove the elitist tag from traditional arts 
and include forms of cultural practice that had broad popular appeal 
(Craik, 2007, p.26).101 
                                                          
101 While Craik is specifically considering an Australian perspective, the same shift can be seen 
to have happened in the UK. While the Westminster ministerial post with responsibility for 
policy in this area was, up until 2005, referred to as the Minister for the Arts101 it was changed to 
the Minister for Culture under New Labour at the same time as they established the Department 
for Culture, Media and Sport. Likewise in Scotland, where the language of New Labour was 
primarily adopted with little alteration (Schlesinger, 2009b), the responsible minister gained a 
titular association with culture rather than the arts (other than a brief period between 2001 and 
2002  when both terms were included).  
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For all that cultural policy may rhetorically orientate itself towards a broader 
scope of activities, “the lobbyists for cultural policy have largely come from the 
arts sector and focused on familiar art forms as strategies to enhance cultural 
development” (Craik, 2007, p.29). As Interviewee 13 stated: “there is clearly an 
agenda to show that as many people as possible are participating so they are 
going to keep the definition of culture very, very wide however the rhetoric coming 
out of Creative Scotland is still very much about the arts”. This may explain 
why, despite asking questions about cultural participation, in all of the data 
generated the researcher was consistently faced with an implied synonymy 
between participation with culture and participation with the arts: 
We actively support the case for the public subsidy of the arts. We 
understand that culture and heritage have a value in and of itself” 
(Hyslop, 2013) 
…what I believe in is that art, well culture, is about learning and 
enlightenment, so if we want a twenty first century nation that is 
articulate, and I don’t mean literally, or literary articulacy, is able to, to be 
open and expressive and connected then it is absolutely essential that you 
participate in culture and that this is supported. (Interviewee 14)  
I would like to believe that there are people high up in government who are 
real advocates for the arts and culture… and that they really understand 
it, and know that it enriches all of our lives and if you imagine a world 
without culture, then that would be pretty awful and dull, I mean you get 
it on a basic level…I think people do have that thing about cuts to arts 
funding, it’s like, why should we fund the arts? We should give all the 
money to hospitals and things like that, but actually, you know, I would 
hope that there is someone really high up in government that really 
understands and believes that participation in culture is a really good 
thing, but it is not always the case. I mean when you get down to certain 
councils, I mean the arts aren’t a statutory service and so they are often 
the thing that gets culled, but I think it is a good thing that culture is up 
there… (Interviewee 12)   
We have been fortunate that the arts have remained important [for 
government] because it is that big question about why is culture 
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important, why should people be engaging with culture (Interviewee 
41).102 
References to the arts were prolific across all of the data generated and while it 
was often used as a synonym for culture it was also clear that the arts was 
understood as an entity in its own right. This was clearly evident in the choice of 
pronoun and the manner in which Interviewee 21 refers to the arts as a single 
object that can, amongst other things, be run, loved, committed to and defended: 
 
…the people who run the arts love the arts and they are therefore 
completely committed to it, and it is therefore a lifelong ambition and 
mission to bring everybody into it. 
 
Indeed for all of the interviewees, the term referred to something tangible 
enough that it could readily be employed as the subject of a clause, the object of 
a verb and something to which agency could be apportioned. Indeed a number 
of interviewees saw this object as being specifically that which the government 
wanted to increase the populations’ participation with and thus the difference 
between talking about cultural participation in the abstract and talking about 
cultural participation in terms of policy objectives:  
 
Yeah, yeah that’s another thing, I guess when I am talking about that I am 
talking about the arts in general, you know… (Interviewee 3)  
 
I would imagine that they [The Scottish Government] are talking about 
the arts. (Interviewee 12) 
 
… is what they [The Scottish Government] are asking is what arts things 
do you participate in? (Interviewee 26)  
 
There is huge value in engaging with the arts, it is having that in your life I 
suppose. (Interviewee 38)  
 
Interviewer: If somebody asked you about your cultural participation, what 
would you tell them? 
                                                          
102 See Appendix 1.08 for further relevant examples from the data. 
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Interviewee 16: As in how do I take part in the arts? 
 
Given that in summarising her aspirations for cultural policy in Scotland, Fiona 
Hyslop stated that she wanted “more people to experience more art” (2013) the 
responses of the interviewees appear to share her understanding of what it is 
that the government wants to increase participation with. As Interviewee 27 
said when the researcher pointed out the difficulty of defining cultural 
participation: “there is not the luxury of time to dance on the pinhead that is the 
definition of culture [given that] most understood that what was meant by the 
term was the arts”. It appeared that Jensen was correct when she argued that 
there existed a “shared presumption of something called art with great social 
power” (2002, p.77). For all that culture is consistently lauded as a broad-brush 
panacea for every social ill and economic difficulty103 or celebrated for its 
economic contribution to GDP, when it comes to a question of supporting 
participation with culture via the distribution of public subsidy, culture reverts 
to something called the arts.  
4.1.2 Understanding the Arts as an institution  
There are doubtless those who would argue that cultural participation policies 
cannot only be intended to increase participation with the arts because – as was 
discussed in Chapter 3 - public subsidy supports a range of activities that go 
beyond the canonical taxonomy of opera, ballet, etc. that would be commonly 
associated with this term. Indeed given the discussion that has already been 
offered in the previous chapter, it is reasonable to suggest that when the 
interviewees referred to the arts, they were not referring solely to such a 
narrow range of activities. But this is to misunderstand what the arts is, to think 
that it is reducible to a fixed list of activities by once again focusing on that to 
which the label can be applied rather than considering the label as an object in 
its own right. As such, the necessity for the label is not brought into question 
and any debate tends to focus on asking what are the arts rather than what is 
                                                          
103 As Bennett (2002, cited in Belfiore and Bennett, 2007a p.226) has noted, it is hard to think of 
another area of policy with quite such an extensive assortment of expectations about its positive 
impacts. 
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the arts?  In attempting to answer the question of what art is, Carey suggests 
that “the answer cannot lie in the physical attributes of the object” for any 
attempt to understand art in this way can be “thwarted at every turn and 
indefinitely” (2005, p.29). It is the suggestion of this thesis that a similar 
position should be taken when attempting to understand what ‘the arts’ is. As 
such, the manner in which it has been understood in the context of this research 
will be outlined, below.  
 
The ACE study, entitled The Arts Debate, found some of their participants 
perceived an ontological difference between art and the arts: 
It appears that members of the public have a narrower view of ‘the arts’ 
than of ‘art’. The arts are perceived as a smaller set of clearly defined and 
more traditional activities – theatre, ballet, art galleries. For many people 
‘art’ is part of the fabric of their lives, while ‘the arts’ are something 
institutional, and separate from their day-to-day experience of the world 
(Arts Council England, 2008, p.13) 
It seems that many see the arts as something institutional, and although in the 
case of The Arts Debate this appears to have been interpreted as meaning that 
they see it as something taking place within an organisation, as shall become 
clear this is not the conception of the institution that has been employed in the 
present research. Although the terms cultural organisation and cultural 
institution are often used interchangeably, distinctions can be made between an 
institution and an organisation that are valuable to evoke in the context of the 
current discussion. Broadly speaking, institutions can be understood as 
“conventions that are self-policing” (Phillips et al., 2004, p. 638) or as Turner 
suggests: 
 
A complex of positions, roles, norms and values lodged in particular 
types of social structures and organising relatively stable patterns of 
human activity with respect to fundamental problems in producing life-
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sustaining resources, in reproducing individuals, and in sustaining 
structures within a given environment (1997, p.6). 
 
Institutions are a specific system of values, agents, actions and meanings that set 
limitations on how certain social activity can be understood and spoken about. 
They can be distinguished both from less organised social forms, such as rituals 
and events, and more complex social forms such as a culture, community or 
society (Kangas and Vestheim, 2010). While the former may be a constituent 
element of institutions, institutions can be understood as a constituent element 
of the latter. Institutions can be identified in the “stable, valued and recurring 
patterns of behaviour” (Huntington, 1965, p.394) that they produce, and as such 
individual organisations can be understood as the materialised expression of an 
institution (Kangas and Vestheim, 2010). However no organisation by itself is 
complete or complex enough to be an institution in its own right:  
 
The relationship between an institution and an organisation can be 
summed up as an issue of the opposites between the general, the 
abstract, and the complete on one hand (institution) and the specific and 
the concrete on the other (organisation). In other words: An organisation 
is a social and empirical representation or realization of the concept of 
institution. Typically, quite many organisations can be subsumed under 
one institution. (Kangas and Vestheim, 2010, p.271) 
 
In their paper on institutions and cultural policy Kangas & Vestheim recognise 
the extent to which institutions function as a system of social structuring that 
governs both the behaviour of individuals and how their behaviour is 
understood. In so doing they identify the institutions of cultural policy as 
specific collections of organisations (museums, libraries, theatres etc.) to be 
understood in isolation from each other. Indeed, in his seminal study on 
museums, Bennett has argued that such cultural organisations can be perceived 
as “technologies of behavioural management […] that aim at regulating the 
conduct of individuals and populations” (1995, pp.89–90). While this researcher 
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agrees with that assertion, they would go further in arguing that such 
organisations are part of a single dispositive and as such must be considered as 
component parts of a single institution – the Arts – that in turn is a significant 
constituent part of the manner in which power is exercised, values are 
distributed and asymmetric power relationships are maintained in UK society. 
Just as the Church can be understood as a single institution composed of 
multiple types of organisations of various size and function, so too is the Arts in 
this study104.  
4.1.3 Institutions and discourse  
While much art is understood as a part of the Arts, when speaking of the Arts, 
not only does one invoke many more types of human activity but also a complex 
network of objects, agents, organisations and practices all of which exist in a 
dialectical relationship. While the concept of an art world105 (Becker, 2008 
[1982]; Thornton, 2008) captures the physical components of these 
institutional relationships, it does not satisfactorily capture the interplay 
between these physical networks and the discursive structures into which they 
must be taken if they are to have any meaning. Likewise, while Shiner (2001), 
Bourdieu (1996) and Staniszewski (1995) have all described some variation of 
what Shiner describes as a system of art, this continues to give art an ontological 
primacy that their own argument would appear to refute. For both art worlds 
and art systems are represented as “networks of artists, critics, audiences, and 
others who share a common field of interest along with a commitment to certain 
values, practices and institutions [organisations]” (Shiner, 2001, p.11). This 
                                                          
104 Accepting its limitations as a communicative tool, capitalisation has been employed to make 
clear the distinction that is being made between art and the Arts. While the former is 
understood as referring to an object such as a painting, or sculpture intended to be valued for its 
visual qualities rather than a utilitarian purpose, the latter refers to the discursive institution 
under discussion. 
105 The idea of an art world was fundamental in the research presented in Howard S. Becker’s 
seminal book Art Worlds (2008 [1982]). Becker presents art as a product of collective action in 
which an object is art if people say that it is, albeit that those groups of people who constitute 
the art world wield greater influence in making these pronouncements. However, both Becker 
(2008 [1982]) and Davies (2001) suggest there is no single art world, but rather multiple 
independently operating worlds, “a loose network of overlapping subcultures held together by a 
belief in art” (Thornton, 2008, p.xi). Becker’s recommendation is for research to forgo trying to 
define art absolutely and instead to observe how art worlds make these distinctions themselves. 
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gives too little consideration to both the dispositive of which all art worlds and 
art systems are a part, and the discursive logic that binds the components of the 
dispositive together – analogous to what Thornton calls “the belief in art” 
(2008). For it is this dispositive, its discursive structure, and the concomitant 
games of truth (Foucault, 1985) that it engenders that are all normatively 
accepted as inevitable and necessary.  
 
As such, it is the idea of an institution as it is understood within discourse 
theory that has been employed within the current study, for as Phillips et. al. 
have argued, institutions can be understood as “social constructions constituted 
through discourse” (2004, p.638, see also Parker, 1992; Kress 1995). However 
as the extract below indicates, their conception of discourse overlooks the 
extent to which the action is equally constituted through the discourse with 
which it is institutionalised:   
 
…the tendency among institutional theorists has been to define the 
concept of institution in terms of patterns of action, whereas we believe 
institutions are constituted through discourse and that it is not action 
per se that provides the basis for institutionalization but, rather, the texts 
that describe and communicate those actions. It is primarily through 
texts that information about actions is widely distributed and comes to 
influence the actions of others. Institutions, therefore, can be understood 
as products of the discursive activity that influences actions. (Phillips et 
al., 2004, p.635) 
 
Going further, Fairclough presents institutions as a fully conceived order of 
discourse that is “simultaneously facilitating and constraining the social action 
of its members: it provides them with a frame for action, without which they 
could not act, but it thereby constrains them to act within that frame” (1995, 
p.38). This far more dialectical relationship between regulative normative 
concepts (creation, genius, aesthetic etc.), identities, (artists, actors, critics, 
audience etc.), practices (painting, performing, composing, outreach etc.) 
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organisations (orchestras, festivals, museums, etc.) and discourses 
(participation, excellence, creative industries, etc.) brings the concept of an 
institution far closer to that of the dispositive and it is in this manner that the 
institution has been understood for the purpose of this research106.  
 
To understand the Arts in such a manner is not without precedent. In particular, 
Arthur Danto and George Dickie are credited with formalising the idea of an 
institutional theory of art. Danto was primarily focused on exploring the 
construction of art through what he identifies as artistic theory, arguing that “to 
see something as art requires something the eye cannot descry – an atmosphere 
of artistic theory, a knowledge of the history of art: an artworld” (1964, p.47). 
Dickie, who formulated these ideas more explicitly, specifically focused on the 
social structures in which the theory was made and maintained. In this sense, he 
saw a work of art in the classificatory sense as “1) an artefact 2) upon which 
some person or persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the 
artworld) has conferred the status of candidate for appreciation” (1971, p.101), 
what Danto referred to as the power of conferring ‘arthood’ on an object (1964). 
Dickie’s institutional theory of art does not argue that there are a narrow group 
of people intentionally executing explicit institutionalising power, but rather 
that there is a network of people employing the same body of knowledge and 
system of meaning to imbue certain objects and actions with value (Jelinek, 
2013), what Howarth describes as a discursive coalition (2010). As 
Staniszewski notes: 
When an artist creates a work of Art it has no intrinsic use or value; but 
when this artwork circulates within the systems of Art (galleries, art 
histories, art publications, museums and so on) it acquires a depth of 
meaning, breadth of importance, and increase in value that is greater 
                                                          
106 While institutions may be discursively constituted, not everything that is discursively 
constituted can be understood as an institution. For what they lack are the “self-regulating, 
socially constructed mechanisms that enforce their application” (Jepperson, 1991, cited in 
Phillips et al., 2004). While all discourses make certain thoughts and actions ‘possible’ and 
others less possible or even detrimental, where the “sanctions are sufficiently robust, an 
institution exists” (Phillips et al., 2004, p.638). 
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proportionately than perhaps anything else in the modern world. (1995, 
p.28) 
However what this institutional theory of art does not sufficiently consider is its 
historical emergence as a contingent body of knowledge, and with it the 
construction of specific types of subject to which claims could be made about 
their relationship to art as an object. In so doing it focuses solely on how the 
discourses of the institution write upon the objects that are labelled as art. And 
as such fails to consider the extent to which the same discourses are part of the 
technologies of the self, “the intellectual and practical instruments and devices 
enjoined upon human beings to shape and guide their ways of being human” 
(Foucault, 2003b [1982], p.146). 
4.2 The discursive construction of the Arts  
In order to understand how the Arts acts as a technology of the self and in so 
doing is integral to the way in which power is exercised and asymmetric power 
relationships maintained in the field of cultural policy, it is important to 
consider some of the core components of its institutional discourses. The next 
section of this chapter sets out to do just this. Beginning with a discussion about 
the point at which the institution was constituted, it goes on to focus on the 
specific assertions made about a unique aesthetic experience and the moralising 
capacities that this experience was claimed to afford.  
4.2.1 The constitution of the Arts as an institution   
Institutions are not eternal and transcendent, they are the product of a 
particular time (Phillips et al., 2004) and in order to reflect on when the 
institution of the Arts was initially constituted it is worth returning once again 
to Creative Scotland’s strategic plan that includes a request for the reader to 
indulge their imagination:  
Artists, creative people and organisations change lives and unlock new 
futures. Art and creativity offer meaning to people’s lives in many different 
ways. We only have to imagine a world without books, music, art and 
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design, dance, theatre and films to realise how fundamental creativity is to 
all our lives. (Creative Scotland, 2014c, p.48)107 
 
While creativity is unquestionably required to produce books, music, dance etc. 
it is also required to make soup, cars, flint knives and lava lamps. The 
fundamental nature of creativity to human existence is fairly self-evident. But 
creativity is not offered in isolation here, it is implicitly related to the Arts, 
artists and creative people, with an oblique suggestion that all of them would be 
required to retain a world with books, music and dance. However for all that 
media commentators such as Joyce McMillan of the Scotsman may, in decrying 
the latest funding cut or ‘managerialist blunder’, employ this same imagery of 
what a world without the Arts would be like (Stevenson, 2014), one need only 
travel back a few centuries to find this very point in history. Upon doing so, one 
would find that a world without the Arts is not a world without culture, or 
indeed art. As many authors note (Belfiore and Bennett, 2010; Carey, 2005; 
Murray, 1997; Shiner, 2001) , for the largest part of human history there was no 
notion of the Arts as an independent concept as is now understood:  
 
The word art is derived from the Latin ars and the Greek techne, which 
meant any human skill whether horse breaking, verse writing, shoe 
making, vase painting, or governing. The opposite of art in that older way 
of thinking was not craft but nature (Shiner, 2001, p.5)   
 
Not only did art and creativity exist before public subsidy, but also before the 
Arts. To suggest otherwise is disingenuous. While some could argue that all that 
was absent was a word, there is little evidence that before the eighteenth 
century any society categorised certain practice in a manner that would be 
analogous to the modern category of the Arts ( Shiner, 2001; Dissanayake, 1998; 
Murray, 1997; Kristeller, 1990 [1950]; Nussbaum, 1986; Tatarkiewicz, 1970). In 
                                                          
107 A similar thought experiment was encouraged by Interviewee 12 who suggested that if one 
were to “imagine a world without culture, then that [world] would be pretty awful and dull”. 
Likewise, this argument forms the abstract of a literature review into the value of the arts 
(Spencer-Oatey et al., 2013). 
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fact a time machine is not even required. There remain those individuals and 
communities relatively untouched by the European intellectual tradition, and 
therefore for whom the Arts do not exist.  And yet this does not appear to have 
limited their capacity to live, or to produce cultures that many in Europe are 
keen to explore. In short, the Arts is not essential or immutable and thus neither 
is participation with it. Both rely upon a social system of meaning that is a 
historical inheritance from a specific period in time.  
 
Building on the work of Kristeller (1990) in what he describes as a brief history 
of the idea of art, Shiner (2001) argues that the category of the Arts as it is 
understood today is a modern European invention established in the eighteenth 
century when the “cult of art” and the “inflated, quasi-religious rhetoric that 
goes with it” came into existence (2001, p.137):  
 
 [a]rt as we have generally understood it is a European invention barely 
two hundred years old. It was preceded by a broader, more utilitarian 
system of art that lasted over two thousand years […] Yet like so much 
that emerged from the Enlightenment, the European idea of fine art was 
believed to be universal (Shiner, 2001, p.3)  
 
He proposes that its emergence and consolidation was the result of a 
convergence of social, institutional and intellectual changes that occurred in 
three stages over a period of around one hundred and fifty years: 
 
…an initial one from around 1680 to 1750 during which many elements 
of the modern system of art that had emerged piecemeal since the late 
middle ages began to be more closely integrated; a second and crucial 
one from around 1750 to 1800 that definitively separated art from craft, 
artist from artisan, and the aesthetic from other modes of experience; 
and a final stage of consolidation and elevation, from around 1800 to 
1830, during which the term ‘art’ began to signify an autonomous 
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spiritual domain, the artistic vocation was sanctified, and the concept of 
the aesthetic began to replace taste. (Shiner, 2001, p.75)  
 
It is an argument that has also been made by others including Woodmansee 
(1994), Mortensen (1997) and Carey (2005).  While Shiner focuses on the 
establishment of a distinct category of “the fine arts” and its “conceptual and 
institutional separation from the contexts of use and everyday pleasure” (2001, 
p.140) the systems of meaning that he associates with it are those that still 
provide the intellectual and discursive framework for the Arts today. As he 
acknowledges, by the nineteenth century the adjective ‘fine’, was already 
regularly dropped without any loss of meaning. And so, while the modifier may 
have entirely vanished by virtue of obsolescence, when one speaks of the Arts it 
evokes the discourses upon which the fine arts were established. These 
discourses were then retrospectively applied to understanding the activities of 
previous eras as one of the tactics by which a new system of knowledge is 
ultimately represented as a universal and eternal truth (Danaher et al., 2000).  It 
is to a discussion of the key discursive logics of this institutional discourse that 
this chapter now turns.  
4.2.2 The Arts and the aesthetic experience  
The Arts is discursively constructed as “something that exists beyond particular 
societies and belongs to the subject of, what might be called for want of a better 
phrase, ‘humanity in general’” (Mirza, 2012, pp.28–29). Yet despite this, the 
ability to interact with the Arts so as to gain some benefit is not something that 
humanity in general is assumed to naturally possess. Rather the ability to have 
an interaction with the Arts is presented as a learnt sensibility that must be both 
cultivated and mediated. Central to this is the notion of the aesthetic as a 
specific type of experience (Belfiore and Bennett, 2010; Shiner, 2001) and 
which simultaneously describes a unique kind of pleasure (or in the case of 
Adorno and Horkheimer the intense refusal of pleasure (1986 [1944])). The 
assertion that the Arts afforded such a unique experience, one separate from 
mere utility or entertainment, is one about which “[p]eople in the West have 
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been saying things [..] for two and a half centuries” (Carey, 2005, p.32) but 
which has also been critiqued for the manner in which it “masks and 
perpetuates certain very definite relations of power” (Connor, 1992, p.13).  
 
Alexander Baumgarten originally coined the term ‘aesthetic’ as a description of 
what he believed to be the appropriate response to the ‘sensate discourse’ of 
poetry (Shiner, 2001). He proposed aesthetics as a new philosophical discipline 
that would be a science of sensual recognition or as De Bolla paraphrases “a 
general enquiry into how we come to know the world from the evidence of our 
senses” (2002, p.9 cited in Belfiore and Bennett, 2010). It was a concept that 
developed “in keeping with the idea, spelled out by Kant and Schiller108, 
according to which aesthetic experience is a specific sphere of experience which 
invalidates the ordinary hierarchies incorporated in everyday sensory 
experience” (Rancière, 2005, p.15) and which ultimately became “a self-
legitimating realm […] that submits to no external principle of restraint or 
regulation but is all the more effective for that as a model of the interiorisation 
of authority in bourgeois society” (Connor, 1992, p.34).  
 
The study of the aesthetic developed into an entire discipline and one that there 
is neither the space nor necessity to survey here. However it is important to 
note that there are those who have questioned if such a thing as an aesthetic 
experience exists in the real: 
Firstly it is hard to identify a feature or quality that is characteristic of 
and essential to what we, in common speech, refer to as the artistic 
experience (a quality, in other words, that makes the aesthetic 
experience unique, thus distinguishing it from moral, religious and all 
other possible types of experiences). Secondly the concept of ‘experience’ 
cannot be properly qualified by the connotation of being ‘aesthetic’, on 
account of the fact that an experience is not an object or a physical thing 
                                                          
108 And also developed by the likes of Hegel and Schopenhauer. 
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that can have or possess qualities (Belfiore and Bennett, 2007a, p.228 
citing Mitias, 1998, pp.1-4)  
Of those that believe an aesthetic experience is possible, a number of debates 
are on-going. While some have located the aesthetic at the level of the 
observable attributes of the object, others have understood the distinction in 
cultural or psychological terms (see Belfiore & Bennett 2007a for an overview 
of these debates). Further debate also exists about whether, if there is such an 
experience, it is ever knowable by any other than the individual who has 
experienced it. Drawing extensively on studies in the physical sciences, Carey 
(2005) argues that because any experience is subjective and the judgement 
based on feelings, the answer to that question is no. Belfiore and Bennett are 
more hopeful, and “reject the proposition that the aesthetic experience 
irrevocably belongs to a realm of the unknowable” (2007a, p.262). Although 
given the evidence currently available it appears that it remains knowable in the 
same way that distant planets are knowable - primarily because of the 
distortions they cause in something about which we have a far greater degree of 
knowledge and capacity to observe109.  
However for all the debates that exist about the nature of an aesthetic 
experience and the capacity for it to be known, observed or understood, the 
case remains that the notion of some kind of unique experience is integral to the 
modern conception of the Arts. For example, Brown and Novak-Leonard define 
the aesthetic experience as being “what happens to individuals as they see, hear, 
and feel art110” (2013, p.224) while Belfiore and Bennett (2007a) acknowledge 
the degree to which aesthetic experience and artistic experience can be 
employed synonymously111. The idea that the Arts offers access to a unique 
experience was also evident in the data of this study such as when Interviewee 
                                                          
109 A belief in the existence of the aesthetic experience in the field of cultural policy tends to be 
assumed on the basis of studies that seek to identify its impact in some manner. 
110 Their definition of art being “dance, theatre, music, film and the visual arts” (p.229) which 
has been encountered within particular contexts and delivered by professional organisations 
and practitioners. 
111 Although they acknowledge in their endnotes that in a purist etymological sense everything 
has the potential to be aesthetic. 
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14 tried to express the impact that the sort of work they did could have, by 
arguing that “the thing that joins both of those activities together is the art, the 
experience of the art”. For all that Rancière may argue that the autonomy of the 
aesthetic experience should not be confused with the autonomy of art (2005), 
discursively, the Arts and the aesthetic are bound together so strongly that the 
capacity for someone to lay claim to an aesthetic experience without being 
written upon by the discourses of the Arts is extremely difficult.   
4.2.3 The Arts as an autonomous and self-contained realm of activity 
Fundamental to Kant’s conception of the appropriate response to art was the 
concept of disinterestedness112 and the related distinction between the 
aesthetic experience and the utilitarian experiences of daily life. He described 
the former as a harmonious free play between the imagination (precepts) and 
understanding (concepts) because without the usual utilitarian requirements to 
define or conclude, the two were free to whirl in pleasurable harmony (Kant, 
cited in Shiner, 2001, p.147). He also conceived that those objects most likely to 
stimulate this harmonious dance were those, the form of which exhibited 
purposiveness without a purpose, by which he meant those forms that appear 
to have been purposefully made but with no clear purpose or use. As part of his 
thesis, Kant also took the older understanding of art as any type of human 
production, as opposed to that which was produced by nature, and began to 
divide it up into different forms. First he divided the mechanical arts from the 
liberal arts before dividing the liberal arts themselves into two. On one hand 
there were the agreeable arts aimed at the ordinary pleasures of recreation113 
and on the other there were the fine arts with which disinterested interaction 
would afford the higher pleasures of aesthetic reflection. While it was beauty 
                                                          
112 Challenging a Kantian belief in the necessity for disinterested observation on the part of the 
participant, participatory practice (Bishop, 2006) has been increasingly employed as a strategy 
to increase public engagement (Schrag 2015). This builds on a trend that initially began in the 
late nineteenth century and that Belfiore and Bennett, citing Berleant (1991), describes as the 
rise of the idea of experiential continuity and according to which an active engagement between 
the perceiver and the art object is central to the aesthetic experience (Belfiore and Bennett, 
2007a, p.230). As such, interaction between artist, art and audience (for want of a better word) 
has become an increasingly prevalent feature of the Arts, though it has manifested itself in 
different ways in different manifestations of the Arts. 
113 Kant offers storytelling, a well-furnished table or music at a banquet as example for this. 
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and not fine art114 that was initially the common factor, over time the focus on 
beauty was stretched by the notion of the sublime and eventually both were 
displaced with the idea of an autonomous and self-contained realm of activity 
that would ultimately be known as the Arts. Not only had a distinct category of 
the Arts been constructed and discursively separated from the contexts of use 
and everyday pleasure, but this also resulted in a similar separation of an 
experience with the Arts from other kinds of experience that one might have.   
4.2.4 The moralising capacities of an aesthetic experience  
Yet the exact extent to which the Arts existed as a realm wholly distinct from the 
everyday has always been unclear. While for some it served as an escape from 
the mundane and material realities of the everyday, for others it provides a 
transcendent tool that should be employed to serve society. While debates 
about the instrumentalisation of the Arts have tended to frame this as a more 
recent phenomenon (for an example of work on this topic see: Gilmore, 2012; 
Nisbett, 2012; Belfiore, 2012; Mirza, 2009, 2012; Orr, 2008; Gibson, 2008), in 
actuality, debate about the degree to which the Arts should be explicitly 
involved in the moral improvement of society have been on-going since its 
discursive construction. When art was understood more broadly as a product of 
human creativity, one of its many functions could be the didactic instruction of 
the populace. However by the eighteenth century, writers such as Adam Smith 
and David Hume were arguing that the only purpose of the Arts (as it now was) 
was the pleasure intrinsic to it (Barrell, 1986). This was not to say that the Arts 
could not have a moralising effect on society (Bennett, 1995), only that the 
effect should not have been intended but rather an indirect benefit of having 
had the unique aesthetic experience that an interaction with it offered. For 
example, Schiller conceived of it as a redemptive experience of a higher truth 
that had the capacity to restore the lost unity between the sensual and the 
spiritual that had stripped mankind of its dignity. While this restoration may 
                                                          
114 Initially Kant highlighted oratory and landscape gardening as objects suitable for aesthetic 
contemplation, works of craft could also be considered if their use was forgone in favour of 
simply being looked at, and he was as interested in the aesthetic response to nature as to fine art 
(Shiner, 2001). 
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occur on the spiritual plane, its effects would ultimately be felt on a temporal 
one. This was not all that far removed from the position originally taken by Kant 
for whom an “aesthetic experience of beauty or the sublime does not teach us a 
particular ‘moral lesson’ but makes us aware of our freedom as ‘moral agents’ 
(Kant, cited in Shiner, 2001, p.147).  
However for others it was not simply a symbol of morality but a force for moral 
transformation. As William Gilpin, author of the influential guidebooks on the 
picturesque stated: 
When I sit ravished at an Ontario, or stand astonished before the 
[Raphael] cartoons, or enjoy myself in these happy Walks, I can feel my 
mind expanded … and my Heart better disposed…a Taste for these 
exalted Pleasures contributes towards making me a better man 
(Andrews 1989, p.53, emphasis added). 
He was by no means alone in this regard and part of the grounds on which John 
Stuart Mill (2001 [1863]) had reached his conclusions about the distinction 
between higher and lower pleasures was that the former contributed towards 
the capacity for an individual to develop, grow and ultimately contribute more 
effectively to society. An argument that, as shall be discussed in the final section 
of this chapter, was central to the manner in which the Arts bound its own 
discourses to those of the state. For it was variously argued by those who first 
employed these discourses that certain groups of people such as women, 
‘negroes’, the labouring classes etc. were unable to enjoy the higher pleasures, 
while others could only do so through a process of civilising education (Shiner, 
2001). As John Ruskin said, “nor can any noble thing be wealth except to a noble 
person” (1871, pp.10–11). This is indicative of the extent to which the power of 
discourse produces not only objects and practices but also subjects (Foucault, 
1980b).  As such, simultaneous to the conception of a unique artistic experience 
was the conception of the individual who was not having them for some reason, 
and whose life was all the worse for it – a discursive identity that would be 
developed over time into that of the cultural non-participant. As will now be 
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discussed, it was the existence of this subject identity that would be 
fundamental in the Arts becoming an institution through which the state sought 
to manage and regulate the choices of the individual and the manner in which 
they were understood. 
4.3 The Arts as an institution of the state  
It is the argument of this thesis that the non-participant is a contemporary label 
for a subject identity that was established as part of the discursive constitution 
of the Arts, and as such is fundamental to the discursive logics of this institution 
and must therefore be maintained. The existence of the non-participant subject 
assumes that is possible for someone to be failing or unable to have aesthetic 
experiences. In so doing it gives discursive coherence to the idea that to be able 
to have such an experience requires one to undertake a particular type of 
practice, rather than it being an innate aspect of humanity. But this does not 
explain why there is a constructed problem of cultural non-participation. If the 
discursive logic of the Arts requires the existence of the non-participant subject 
then their non-participation would not be seen as a problem from a position 
within this system of knowledge alone. However the Arts is not the only 
institution writing the identity of the non-participant, for by the end of the 
nineteenth century the Arts was to become an institution of the state and the 
non-participant would act as the primary boundary object (Star and Griesemer, 
1989) around which their different discourses could coalesce and in so doing 
legitimate the presence of the state in the private lives of its citizens. The next 
section of the chapter discusses the discursive legitimation work that has been 
conducted in order to maintain the taken for granted status of this relationship.  
4.3.1 The Arts and the state  
It would be more than a century after the institution of the Arts was established 
that a formal relationship with the state would be developed. Until late in the 
nineteenth century, the dominant feeling remained that “as long as the market 
was seen to be meeting the needs of the public [then here was no real need for 
the state] to become involved with an activity that was perceived to depend 
upon individual taste and fashion” (Gray, 2000, p.38). The type of activities most 
178 
 
commonly associated with the Arts were not deemed by those in government to 
be important in and of themselves (Bennett 1995). Yet over time, and through 
the lobbying of influential figures, there was a significant ideological shift that 
situated the private lives of the populace within the purview of the state more 
so than had ever been the case previously115 (Toleda Silva, 2015). While the 
initial involvements were small, by the end of the Second World War the British 
Government would shift from a strategy of casual patronage to direct 
intervention, when it did “more to commit itself to supporting the arts than it 
had in the previous century and a half” (Minihan, 1977, p.215), a shift that 
resulted in what  Minihan has described as the nationalisation of culture.  
 
However as Gray (2000, p.38) notes, in a laissez-faire free market economy, 
when the state does intervene in society it must be seen to be for a purpose and 
that purpose must either be the protection of the populace or the improvement 
of their lives to some degree. These purposes legitimate the transference of a 
portion of an individual’s personal wealth to the state, but in order to do so, the 
resultant policy interventions, the agents they support, and the outcomes they 
deliver must also be seen to be legitimate themselves. As such, justification for 
public subsidy had to be integrated into the institutional discourses of the Arts 
and as such, adhering to a strict division between the aesthetic and the 
corporeal was problematic to sustain if the Arts was to be granted public 
support on the basis of providing a unique and societally useful transformative 
experience.  
 
And so the introduction of state funding for the Arts necessitated an adaptation 
of the Arts’ institutional discourses. For as soon as anything becomes a tool of 
the state it is inevitably instrumentalised and requires that it is understood as 
something other than what it is (McGuigan, 2004). As Interviewee 21 said, it’s 
“because we get public money we are asked to do that [tackle non-participation], 
                                                          
115 It was the establishment in 1946 of the Arts Council of Great Britain that was the most 
explicit recognition that the Arts had a legitimate claim on the public purse and that the state 
had a legitimate interest in the leisure time of its citizens. 
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if we didn’t get public money we wouldn’t have to do that, but that would be a 
whole different planet, wouldn’t it?” Belfiore and Bennett have made just this 
point when they argued that without government funding, debates and 
arguments such as those that are being considered in this study “would most 
likely have become a recondite affair, conducted – if at all – by cognoscenti far 
away from the noisy area of public policy” (2010, p.10). 
 
During the financial crisis of 2007 and the austerity policies that followed it, the 
legitimacy of state subsidies for the Arts was often in question. The rhetoric 
about public sector accountability meant that all those receiving public money 
were required to show that they were providing a service that was used by the 
public, could not be delivered by the market, and were doing so in a manner that 
offered a measurable return to society. It was an expectation about which the 
majority of interviewees appeared very aware: 
 
…there is an accountability for public investment which needs to be 
measured in some way. (Interviewee 5)  
 
I guess it is like, if it is public money, then you want to know that you are 
serving the public well and you are serving the public’s interests and 
where the public’s interests lie. (Interviewee 26)  
 
…because we operate in a system where there is public funding of a lot of 
culture, they believe there needs to be some … means on monitoring and 
assessing that funding, and that’s why they’ve got the measure in there. 
In other words it’s coming from the wrong end, potentially. (Interviewee 
19)  
 
I think you have to account for the money you spend from taxpayers – 
so some of the criticism around Forest Pitch was around the cost of the 
event and how many people saw it relevant to that cost. (Interviewee 25) 
 
In a 2014 speech, Harriet Harman the then UK Shadow Secretary of State for 
Culture, stated that “[t]here is a democratic imperative for the arts to show why 
the hard-pressed taxpayer – struggling with the cost of living crisis – should 
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fund the arts” (2014). Her ministerial counterpart, Maria Miller, seemed equally 
in need of persuasion. However, in Scotland, Fiona Hyslop claimed that “the case 
[for state subsidy] has been made” (2013). Yet to suggest that the case for any 
public expenditure is not constantly being made, challenged and remade is 
disingenuous, and the legitimacy of state expenditure on the Arts is one that is 
arguably challenged more often than most. For the crisis of legitimacy did not 
start with the financial crisis. Both Holden (2006) and Bennett (1995) had 
written about it before this event even occurred. In fact questions of legitimacy 
have existed ever since the financial relationship between the Arts and the state 
was established, and “[f]rom the start, the question of state subsidies to the arts 
has been enmeshed in the fierce controversy over public education, and in the 
pursuit of such elusive concepts as taste, refinement, civilization and morality” 
(Minihan, 1977, p. 31. See also: Gray 2000; Sinclair 1995). However from the 
perspective of this study, such controversies are instead understood as 
examples of the truth games that are played and in particular the way in which 
such games allow for the gradual adaptation of existing discourses so as to 
maintain the legitimacy of the institutions that rely on them and the societal 
inequality they obscure.   
4.3.2 Discursive legitimation  
As Kangas and Vestheim highlight, “the ‘naturalness’ of institutions gives them 
strength, makes them seem reasonable and puts them beyond discussion” 
(2010, p.270). However this natural or legitimate status depends on 
institutional agents maintaining the discourses upon which both they and the 
institution rely for meaning, status and power. They manage this through the 
on-going production of symbolic communication that leaves traces (Taylor and 
Van Every, 1993). These traces act as a signal to others that the actions of the 
institution are legitimate and which through their pervasiveness, act as a 
barrier to the unmanaged entry into the field of new discourses that present 
alternative realities or legitimate alternate institutions.  
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However, as McGuigan notes: “no discourse is ever closed off entirely from 
other discourses or without internally disruptive elements” and thus the 
discourses of any institution “do not exist in splendid isolation from the leading 
discourses of the day […] they are porous and there is interaction between 
them” (2004, p.35). Different discourses “are intimately tangled with each other 
and together form the giant milling mass of overall societal discourse” (Jager 
and Maier, 2009, p.235). This means that structural and cultural changes in 
society can pose a threat to institutions as they can cause shifting relationships 
between discourses that may threaten their taken for granted status. In 
particular, institutions face difficulties where there is a need to secure 
transference of existing constructions of reality to new communities or 
generations that have their own system of meanings upon which they could 
establish new, and ultimately competing, institutions (Berger & Luckmann, 
1966 cited in Phillips et al., 2004).  
 
Faced with such threats, institutional agents can chose to adapt the behaviour of 
the institution to this societal pressure for change, and/or execute strategies 
that defend the established beliefs and patterns of behaviour on which they 
depend for their existence (Kangas and Vestheim, 2010). With regards to the 
second option, this primarily results in what is understood as discursive 
legitimation work where the institutional agents adapt existing discourses or 
co-opt new ones in order to manage the meaning associated with their actions 
and ultimately construct refreshed “explanations and justifications for the 
fundamental elements of their collective, institutionalised existence” (Boyce, 
1996, p.5).  
 
Phillips et.al.  (2004) offer a set of conditions under which discursive 
legitimation work is most likely to strengthen and protect the coherence and 
status of an institution116. Firstly they suggest that agents who are understood 
                                                          
116 While Phillips et. al are explicitly concerned with the emergence of new institutions, they 
acknowledge that institutionalisation is the process by which institutions are not only created 
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as having the right to speak within the field(s) in which the institution seeks 
legitimacy and influence should undertake it. Likewise, should any texts be 
produced or practice undertaken they should be of a recognisable and 
interpretable genre appropriate to the field(s). Finally, where new and adapted 
discourses build upon existing discourses both within the institution, the 
field(s), and even elsewhere in society, their adoption and success is also more 
likely. This final point is important as it can result in the core discursive 
architecture of the institution being bound to those established or emerging 
discourses that are most prominent in society at the time and in so doing add to 
the normativity of the institution’s existence.  
 
However throughout this process there are also three important conditions that 
any discursive legitimation work must fulfil (Phillips et al., 2004). Firstly, that 
the discourses remain coherent and structured so as to present a unified view of 
some aspect of social reality. Secondly, that the discourses are supported and 
consistent with other, broader discourses, as their self-regulating mechanisms 
will reinforce each other117. Finally that competing discourses offering an 
alternative construction of the same aspect of social reality must be neutralised 
so as to ensure that agents are not presented with alternative institutions of 
ostensibly equal value and therefore lower costs associated with non-adoption 
of the practices of the dominant institution. And so in seeking to maintain the 
legitimacy of the relationship between the Arts and the state, the discourses of 
the Arts have had to be continually aligned with the dominant discourses of the 
state118. Yet this has had to be achieved without risking the coherence of its own 
system of discursive logic.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
but also produced and reproduced. As such, it can be assumed that their model is also applicable 
to a consideration of institutions’ maintenance and resistance to change. 
117 This is similar to the argument made by Michel Pecheux (1981) who has noted that the 
strength of prevailing discourses (and thus also institutions) are secured interdiscursively and 
when most effectively done makes it difficult to notice how institutions and the discourses that 
sustain them “make it virtually impossible to think outside of them” (McGuigan, 2004, p.35). 
118 While there is not the space to discuss it here, accounts of how Keynes advocated for the 
establishment of the Arts Council suggest that he was adept at such discursive legitimation and 
the deployment of different discourses for different audiences (for a discussion of Keynes' 
approach to charing the Arts Council see Pick, 1991; Sinclair, 1995; Pinnock, 2006). 
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The on-going process of discursive legitimation is one that Larsen (2014) 
argues remains valid and necessary work for all those working in, and 
advocating for, the Arts today. For while the subject of the non-participant 
provided the ideal boundary object around which a legitimising system of logic 
could be established, as other societal discourses shifted, further discursive 
legitimation work was required in order to offer alternative discourses about 
the relationship between the Arts and the state. However, as shall be outlined 
below, all of these discourses were reliant upon the existence of the non-
participant subject as an object upon which the Arts and its unique experience 
could act, for as Bjornsen (2012) has noted119, the legitimacy of cultural policy 
actions relies to a great extent on an abstract faith in art and its transformative 
powers on certain individuals.  
4.3.3 The discursive strand of redistribution and democratising culture    
From the outset, in order to be seen as a legitimate site for state intervention, 
the Arts had to be recognised for “their contribution to national prestige, and 
their role in civilising the population” (Gray, 2000, p.37). As such, and up until 
the nineteen seventies, state subsidy for the Arts was discursively justified in 
two primary ways. One strand focused on representing access to the Arts and 
the unique experience that this afforded as an inalienable right and one that had 
been denied to the majority by the ruling bourgeoisie and the aristocracy that 
had preceded them. State subsidies for the Arts were represented as part of an 
egalitarian process of democratizing culture (Mulcahy, 2006; Landry and 
Matarasso, 1999; Evrard, 1997). This was a discourse that itself gained 
legitimacy from the wider post-war European discourses of the redistributive 
welfare state (Stevenson et. al. 2015; McGuigan, 2004; Duelund, 2003), the core 
assumption of which is that the wealth (both tangible and intangible) of a 
society should be evenly distributed amongst its population. Those activities, 
objects and organisations that had already been discursively written upon by 
the Arts as being of unique aesthetic value were now represented as being part 
                                                          
119 While Bjornsen’s study is based in Norway, he argues that such a belief exists across Europe.  
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of the intangible wealth of the nation and should not therefore be the preserve 
of any one group. State intervention could therefore be justified in order to 
facilitate its equal dispersal. As McGuigan has noted, in his 1929 lectures on 
Equality, “R.H. Tawney (1931) set the social democratic agenda for 
appropriating ‘culture’ from the sole possession of a privileged elite and 
extending it to the masses” (2004, p.39). The non-participant is thus vital in this 
discourse as the subject to which such redistribution can occur.  
4.3.4 The discursive strand of transformation  
However the egalitarian sentiment of this discourse was also bound to a more 
pragmatic one that sought to make clear how the provision of the unique 
aesthetic experience that the Arts claimed to be able to provide would have a 
useful impact on society. Its conception can also be traced to the nineteenth 
century and is indicative of the discursive shift to governance that Foucault has 
associated with the modern episteme (1977). For while Utilitarians such as 
Francis Hutchison and Jeremy Bentham had argued the role of the state was to 
seek the greatest happiness for the greatest number, the difficulties with this 
position become apparent quite quickly. What if the activities that make one 
person happy cause pain to someone else? And so in partial response to this 
difficulty, Bentham’s anointed prodigy, John Stuart Mill, rejected a purely 
quantitative understanding of pleasure. He believed that society would not 
prosper if it solely sought to allow individuals to pursue pleasure 
indiscriminately and only for their own benefit. With distinct echoes of Kant, he 
proposed that there existed two tiers of pleasure. Within this binary, the 
pleasure of intellectual and moral actions was of greater value than the 
supposedly simple pleasures gained through acts that required less cognitive 
engagement – push pin was most certainly not equal to poetry120 as Bentham 
had argued. Rather than happiness, the result of simple pleasure was said to be 
better understood as contentment and thus ultimately of lesser value: 
 
                                                          
120 A reference to Bentham’s oft quoted claim that assuming the quantity of pleasure was equal 
“[p]rejudice apart the game of push pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and 
poetry” (Bentham cited in Bronfenbrenner, 1977). 
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 It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognise that some 
kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It 
would be absurd that, while in estimating all other things quality is 
considered as well as quantity, but that the estimation of pleasure should 
be supposed to depend on quantity alone” (Mill, 2001 [1863], n.p.) 
 
Mill believed the pursuit of the higher pleasures was not only of greater intrinsic 
value to the individual, but more importantly for the current discussion, that 
those who pursued such pleasure would be of greater value to society and thus 
ultimately capable of bringing a greater happiness to everyone overall than 
would have been achieved had they forever been tempted to forgo such 
pleasures in favour of more base satisfaction and personal contentment. The 
converse of this logic is that those who do not pursue these higher pleasures are 
likely to be of less value to society and thus most likely to be deprived.  
These ideas were complimented by a new understanding of mankind that had 
been engendered during the Enlightenment. Men and women were no longer 
accepted as immutable facts whose essential nature would remain unchanged 
from the cradle to the grave. Instead they came to be seen as being “both pliable 
and in dire need of repair and/or improvement” (Bauman, 2004, p.63). As such, 
culture became shorthand for the management of human thought and behavior 
(Bauman, 2004), akin to the notions of cultivation and breeding in which the 
primary concern was to arrest deterioration and to encourage improvement 
and refinement. The state was now understood to have a responsibility to 
ensure that effective and productive citizens were grown from the raw material 
that was born. This was to be achieved through targeted interventions in their 
education and social activities, what Bennett has described as the civilizing 
mission of European cultural policy (1995). The assumption was that left to 
their own devices individual humans would not manage this trajectory 
themselves, “they had to be guided by other humans, educated and trained in 
the art of educating and training humans” (Bauman, 2004, p.63).  
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The belief that state intervention in the leisure time activities of citizens “might 
function to re-engineer the[ir] soul become a commonplace assumption of both 
totalitarian and, also, albeit to a much lesser extent, liberal and social-
democratic thought and practice” (McGuigan, 2004, p.36). Both systems are the 
product of the modern episteme and both adhere to its belief in the logic of the 
inevitable progression of civilization (Danaher et al., 2000). It is an argument 
that persists today, for as Interviewee 19 stated when asked why the 
government should be interested in cultural participation they responded that it 
was because people believed it was a “fundamental part of a civilised society”. 
The alliance between the Arts and the state remains possible because “[t]hey 
are both after the same goal”: to make the world different from what it is at the 
moment and/or from what it is likely to turn into if left alone” (Bauman, 2004, 
p.65). While they might be seen to quarrel, “it is not about whether the world 
should be an object of constant intervention or rather left to its own inner 
tendencies - but about the direction which the intervention should take” 
(Bauman, 2004, p.65). 
Given the unique, transformative experience to which the Arts laid claim, 
minimal discursive adaptations were required in order for state subsidies to the 
Arts to be represented as part of the solution to the increasing numbers of 
urban poor brought to the cities by industrialisation and who were seen to be in 
need of just such cultivation and improvement. It simply required a reframing of 
the relationship with those who had previously been dismissed as unable to 
have aesthetic experiences (Shiner, 2001) whereby they were now understood 
as no longer unable but instead having merely lacked the opportunity to gain 
the knowledge and understanding necessary to appreciate them. This adapted 
discourse became central to how the relationship between the Arts, the non-
participant and the state would be represented, as evidence by the statement of 
the first Minister for the Arts, Jennie Lee, when launching the government’s 
White Paper: 
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 …before we arrogantly say that any group of our citizens are not capable 
of appreciating the best in the arts, let us make absolutely certain that we 
have put the best within their reach. (Lee, cited in Black, 2006, p.128) 
 
These claims had discursive strength because of the extent to which they made 
explicit use of the existing dividing practices (Danaher et al., 2000) that were 
used to delineate society. The two identities became mutually self-affirming 
because those most deprived socially were identified as not having been 
exposed to the Arts, their lack of exposure to the Arts in turn seen as a 
contributing factor to their social deprivation. By association, the supposed 
cultural non-participation of these individuals becomes part of the wider 
problematisation of their societal disengagement and in so doing gains 
legitimacy as a site for state intervention. Subsidising the Arts can therefore be 
justified on the basis of providing access to opportunities for these necessary 
interactions to occur, both in order to help more people transform into effective 
and productive citizens and to maintain the contributions of those, who by 
virtue of their existing participation, have already been transformed. The 
government is thus represented as facilitating access to a unique and essential 
experience through the removal of barriers that had previously limited the 
ability of the majority to have them. The measure of success would therefore be 
the socio-economic and demographic representativeness of those interacting 
with that which the government subsidised (EDUCULT, 2015) as it would be 
evidence that no one was failing to be improved by these interventions.   
4.3.5 Contemporary discursive adaptations: enrichment  
Discursive legitimation work such as the type outlined in the first part of this 
chapter produces new discourses and adds further discursive strands to those 
that already existed. However these should not be understood in a historical 
sense where the creation and adoption of one results in the abandonment of 
another. As Talja (1999) notes, there are always several more-or-less conflicting 
discourses existing in a particular field of knowledge or institution because new 
discourses are constructed as corrections or adaptations to prior discourses. 
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However established discourses do not vanish, they exist side by side with new 
ones, “that is why discourses are internally relatively coherent, but mutually 
contradictory and alternative” (Talja, 1999, p.468). Indeed, as stated previously, 
an institution is strengthened by the presence of multiple discourses upon 
which its agents can draw, in particular if these discourses share commonalities 
to which each can refer. As such, the discursive strand of a unique 
transformative experience and the association of the non-participant with those 
identities that the state represents as problematic are both still part of the 
discursive legitimation work being done by the Arts today. The adaptability of 
these discourses has allowed the Arts to intertwine its own logics with the 
discourse of government very effectively ever since. The mutually affirming 
discursive coherence could be readily refreshed through simply altering the 
nature of the transformation on offer so as to best relate to the priorities of the 
current government – a discursive perspective on a process that Gray has 
described as policy attachment (2004) and Belfiore as defensive 
instrumentalism (2012)121.  
 
This process of adaptation means that, although nowhere in the data was there 
any reference to an aesthetic experience, it was still clearly understood that the 
experience of participating with the Arts was one of distinct and unique value as 
evidenced through the regularity with which it was described as “enriching”: 
 
…irrespective of any instrumental uses, instrumental benefits that come out 
of cultural engagement, it is just that intrinsic value of,  of… of having your 
lives enriched by cultural activity (Interviewee 4)  
 
…they may not have realised that the museum could … enrich… their lives 
(Interviewee 1)  
 
                                                          
121 While there is not the space or need to explore at this point all of the transformative claims 
that have been made about participation with the Arts (these have been well rehearsed both in 
Chapter 2 of this study and elsewhere) it is worth acknowledging that various examples of these 
claims were evident in the data generated.  
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…it is about giving people a new experience and if they take to that 
experience and find it enriching, how do you enable that to continue 
(Interviewee 23)   
 
…there is obviously a big economic thing as part of it, but I would also 
hope, you know, that other side, that it is about enriching lives as part of it 
as well (Interviewee 12) 
 
…so yeah it is about…. yeah enrichment, expanding horizons… 
(Interviewee 36)  
 
…what about their enrichment, what keeps them pushing themselves 
forward as individuals? (Interviewee 21)  
 
…government really has those targets because they too believe that access 
and engagement in cultural activity enriches people’s lives [… …] it is our 
job to put on the best work that we possibly can and, you know, and to give 
an enriching quality experience (Interviewee 19) 
 
Given that enriching means to add value, the somewhat tautological assertion 
being made appears to be that participation with the Arts is valuable because it 
adds value to one’s life. Implicit in statements such as these is that the life of a 
non-participant is less rich than the life of someone who participates with the 
Arts, presumably because they lack the enriching higher pleasures that 
participation with the Arts can afford in the shape of the unique aesthetic 
experience. As Interviewee 38 stated: “I mean you don’t want to be too 
evangelical about these things, but I really do believe that people can get more 
out of their lives if the engage with the arts”122. Certain people are represented 
as being unable to lead fully enriched lives (whatever that may be) by solely 
doing the myriad of other activities that the interviewees previously 
acknowledged those who are labelled as cultural non-participants are likely to 
be doing instead of participating with the Arts. It must be assumed that these 
activities are of lesser value, for it is them that the non-participant would be 
required to stop doing in order to participate with the Arts, no matter how 
much they may enjoy them and believe that they add value to their lives.  
                                                          
122 See Appendix 1.09 for further relevant examples from the data. 
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Indeed it was clear that no Interviewee had considered what type of activities 
the supposed non-participant might have to forego in order to participate with 
the Arts. As was discussed in Chapter 2, while the notion of opportunity cost has 
been present in the cultural economics literature (Felton, 1992), discussions 
around the social impact of the arts (Landry et al., 1993) and with regards to 
arts marketing, it is not something that is considered as part of the problem 
construction of cultural non-participation. No interviewee appeared to have 
reflected upon the fact that asking someone to participate in one thing may 
mean them having to give up participating in something else, thus bringing into 
question the relative balance of costs between these two (or more) options.  
 
Leaving to one side for a moment the question of whether any experience is 
inherently more enriching than any other, one must wonder why anyone would 
want to go to somewhere or spend time with someone that judges their life to 
be lacking richness and in doing so “insistently confirms their low status and 
reinforces a sense of inferiority” (Holden, 2010, p.37). The interviewees 
appeared aware of this implied value judgment and it was clearly a cause of 
unease for some given that they appeared keen to recognise the value of other 
activities - I’m not saying you shouldn’t like that stuff, I’m not saying you are 
having a lesser experience (Interviewee 41). And so while it might be assumed 
that certain activities are understood as an impoverishing experience that 
diminish the value of one’s life to some degree, it was not evident that 
interviewees were suggesting that the preference of non-participants were 
impoverishing per se. However the argument that participation with the Arts 
offers a uniquely enriching experience does inevitably require that alternative 
experiences are presumed to exist that at a minimum, offer less enrichment 
than participation with the Arts does and are therefore less valuable for 
someone to have. As Connor (1992) notes, in order to affirm the dominance of a 
particular set of values it is not necessary to explicitly challenge the values of 
others, but it is vital to subtly undermine them through the repetition of 
implicitly unfavourable comparisons and unacknowledged hierarchies. 
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Furthermore, and as Danto has pointed out, “it is precisely because the 
advocates of the arts aim at enriching the lives of ordinary people that it will not 
greatly help them to say that their lives are already enriched through doing 
something other than the arts elsewhere” (1997 cited in Jensen 2002, p.150).  
4.3.6 Contemporary discursive adaptations: growth, expansion and 
cultural health 
As was the case when the state first started to subsidise the Arts, this unique 
enriching experience continues to be represented as resulting in a positive 
change or transformation for those that have it. For example, Creative Scotland 
talks of the extent to which “Artists, creative people and organisations change 
lives and unlock new futures” (Creative Scotland, 2014c, p.48) while in the policy 
document Culture Delivers (Scottish Government, 2008), it is stressed that 
“[t]here is clear quantitative and qualitative evidence of the positive 
transformational impact of cultural and creative activity on individuals”. It was 
also a narrative that some of the interviewees used in reference to their own 
cultural participation. For example Interviewee 12 spoke of the fact that their 
preferences for cultural participation were shaped by those activities with 
which they had previously found “meaningful transformational engagement” 
while Interviewee 38 stated that: “I was lucky enough to get involved with the 
Arts when I was very young and that was a life changing experience for me and 
it has stayed with me […] that’s my motivation, I would just like more people to be 
able to experience it”.   
 
While the state may no longer be faced with the uneducated masses of the 
industrial revolution, in a neo-liberal meritocracy the type of transformation 
presented as necessary is that which supports personal growth and self-
improvement. This valorisation of self-development is part of the discourses of 
social mobility, meritocracy and individual aspiration that are often associated 
with the Thatcher governments and perceived as having been continued by New 
Labour for whom “[a]ccording to [their] lexicon, only self-enrichment counts as 
aspiration” (Jones, 2012, p.90). These in turn gain their legitimacy through their 
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adherence to what Foucault (2002b [1966])  has argued are part of the 
fundamental orders of discourse of the modern episteme that assumes the 
necessity and potential of an “inevitable progression of civilisation [in which] 
there is an ideal, ultimate and complete form of civilisation, and that humanity is 
developing steadily and inevitably towards that point” (Danaher et al., 2000, 
p.21). These ideas of growth and personal improvement were regularly evoked 
in the responses of the interviewees through the imagery of expansion, 
stretching, and freedom from the limits of a restricted perspective:  
 
To expand their mind and to expand their understanding of culture, 
because people might have had access to arts at school, but they might 
have just drawn some still lives or made a clay pot, they wouldn’t 
understand that art could be video instillation, or it could be a folder full of 
rubbish that somebody has collected, you know, we have got expertise in 
contemporary art and providing a kind of expanded understanding of it [… 
…] it is about expanding their horizons and sometimes freeing them 
up… (Interviewee 12) 
 
…there is a role for introducing people to kind of a… introducing people to 
the idea of expanding their cultural horizons… (Interviewee 11)  
 
It gives them an opportunity to experience something different, something 
that they have not experienced before, and about which they can have an 
opinion, it just maybe opens up their world a little bit (Interviewee 38)  
 
And I believe, actually, drawing on some of the work done in cognitive 
psychology or whatever, that people’s ambitions, views of the world 
and whatever, open up (Interviewee 25) 
 
While such claims can be recognised as contemporary adaptations of those 
upon which the relationship between the Arts and state was first based, a new 
addition to such assertions is the connection that is made between cultural 
participation and someone who was healthy, implicitly suggesting that those 
labelled as non-participants are culturally unhealthy in some regard and 
therefore in need of the cultural equivalent of the NHS to make them better: 
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It is much healthier, it is absolutely healthy when you talk about a 
particular range, or a particular art form and you say, I like this, but I don’t 
like that (Interviewee 17) 
 
…to get people to have a very interesting, healthy creative life you have to 
sweat a bit, it is about challenging what you know, and trying new 
experiences and I think that is what our, that sort of engaging with the 
public is about (Interviewee 22)  
 
The healthy expansion and personal growth engendered by cultural 
participation is then presented as contributing to a process that allows those 
currently identified by the state as problematic to transform themselves into 
someone who can integrate and contribute to society in the manner that is 
desired: 
  
I guess that’s what I’ve always thought that, that if more people are 
engaged with, with the culture in which they live, the less likely they are to 
… to behave in a way that didn’t fit … within that society (Interviewee 3)  
 
Sometimes people end up engaging in the arts because of who they are, 
where they are, because the collection of people within which they function 
[…] different hierarchies [social work, health visitors etc.] where people 
are encouraging them to have that involvement with society 
(Interviewee 41) 
 
That’s what we do, it’s for arts organisation to be aware of who those key 
people are in those communities to try and reach out to those people that 
are just entirely disengaged with society (Interviewee 38)  
 
As the final quote makes clear, the subject of the non-participant remains 
closely aligned with a certain type of person, just as it was at the turn of the 
century, and this association will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.  
4.4 A discursive knot  
The milling mass of societal discourse “is growing constantly and exuberantly” 
(Jager and Maier, 2009, p.235) and as such, it is not unusual for an ever-greater 
number of discursive strands to coexist in productive tension. These strands are 
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all variously employed by the agents of an institution in order to best convince 
the indifferent, the unconvinced and the hostile, of the naturalness of their 
continuing position of privilege. As has been outlined above, such discursive 
legitimation is a strategy that has been effectively employed by the agents of the 
Arts from the outset of its relationship with the state. This has led to the 
multiple discourses of cultural participation that present competing and 
contradictory notions of what it means to participate in culture, and the unique 
value of doing so. As Jensen notes, in doing so the Arts has been defined: 
… in ways that explicitly or implicitly respond to various hostilities (the 
arts aren’t elitist, and need not be controversial), to skepticism (the arts 
are an investment, they make money, they stabilize communities), and to 
indifference (the arts aren’t frills or for someone else, they are vital ways 
to make life better for each and every one of us). The arts become 
vaguely defined as a mélange of cultural forms […] while still being 
touted as powerful medicine for whatever ails society (2002, p.148) 
 
Both Jensen (2002) and Shiner (2001) see such discursive work as a highly 
successful act of self-preservation by those who can exert the most power in the 
field. Whereby these individuals strategically incorporate the ideas, activities 
and arguments of those who resist the discourses upon which their status is 
based. However over time this adoption and interweaving of discourses can 
result in a discursive knot (Wodak, 2007) that becomes increasingly complex 
and ostensibly contradictory. A complexity that itself starts to risk the 
discursive coherence of the institution they were employed to defend. Binding 
the eighteenth century discourses of the Arts to modern discourses of social 
democratic redistribution, neo-liberal service provision, and the free market of 
the creative industries has left the Arts somewhat Janus faced. The Arts must be 
seen as unique but ubiquitous, exclusive but inclusive, not for everyone but for 
anyone, in need of state aid but a driver of the economy. It must be seen to 
respect diverse cultural values while simultaneously finding something wrong 
with the cultural values of certain problematic individuals that needs rectified 
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and which only the Arts can do. The final section of this chapter will reflect on 
one aspect of this discursive knot and consider how its threat to the discursive 
coherence of the institution has been managed. 
4.4.1 Risking the discursive integrity of the Arts   
Shiner argues that a point has been reached in which one is now able to “call 
virtually anything art and get away with it” (2001, p.3). This thesis would argue 
that this is because the ongoing process of discursive legitimation has resulted 
in the Arts repeatedly jettisoning its own criteria about what objects and 
activities count as being part of the Arts. As such, one can find themselves in the 
position of celebrating as a great example of the Arts, capable of delivering 
observable social impacts, that which in a previous era had been decried as the 
immoral entertainment of the masses (Belfiore and Bennett, 2010). This is 
important because while the discourse of democratising culture had been based 
on the logics of a knowing elite bringing the best to the most, diffusing the 
understanding of what the best is in order to say that the most are being 
reached means that ironically the “cultural democracy movement led 
unwittingly to the erosion of the social-democratic project from the inside” 
(McGuigan, 2004, p.41). As Mirza (2012) has noted, opening up the definition of 
the Arts in policy, practice and criticism was a threat to its own existence, for 
what is disseminated more widely is bound to change in the dissemination. 
Likewise, given the extent to which the Arts has been complicit in employing 
arguments about the beneficence of the market, there is now a genuine problem 
in justifying the way in which public cultural policy works and in particular the 
subsidies that are distributed (Bennett, 1995).  
 
As Jensen has highlighted, “repositioning the arts as vernacular culture, a tactic 
used in contemporary arts funding, makes the heroic opposition [to popular 
culture] more difficult to sustain” (2002, p.196), for as the definition grows ever 
broader, “the more fragile, incoherent and tension-ridden these policies have 
become” (Craik, 2007, p.26). In particular because for the majority of the 
population their “cultural needs and aspirations are being met, for better or 
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worse, […] by the market as goods and services” (Garnham, cited in McGuigan, 
2004, p.42). For if it is the case that the activities that are legitimate within the 
discourses of the creative industries and abundant participation are adopted as 
legitimate modes of cultural participation offering the same unique type of 
experience as the Arts, then it does not matter that the majority of the public 
have little interest in what is subsidised. In turn, the discourse of inadequate 
participation, the subject identity of a non-participant and the need for state 
sponsored cultural intermediaries to guide them would be increasingly difficult 
to sustain. Pushing the boundaries of what counts as offering an aesthetic 
experience has put the whole concept of the Arts and its relationship with the 
state at risk.  
4.4.2 The persistence of the Arts as a unique field of human practice 
Yet despite being discursively associated with culture, the creative industries, 
and any and all forms of creativity, the idea of the Arts as a separate field of 
human activity continues to persist in cultural policy. It has not been assimilated 
into an anthropological discourse as just another form of social activity and thus 
simply one manifestation of the multiplicity of cultures that exist within society. 
Discursively, the Arts remains apart, distinct and individual123. Looking at the 
Scottish Government’s website, it is littered with references to the Arts and, 
indeed across the majority of the documents analysed are phrases that affirm 
this separation124:  
The fun, fulfilment and creative stimulation of taking part in culture, the 
arts and heritage activity (Scottish Government, 2008) 
 
                                                          
123The researcher does not suggest that the Arts is alone in this regard, other entities are also 
sometimes separated out such as heritage, screen or the creative industries (for example, 
Creative Scotland, 2014c references all of these) but the Arts arguably enjoys far greater 
recognition and application across all areas of society and multiple discursive planes. The 
researcher also accept that some of these might be dismissed as the stylistic decisions of a 
writer seeking to avoid repetition - indeed this has been a difficulty faced by the current author - 
however in order to be able to make that decision the alternatives they employ must continue to 
make sense. 
124 Even within the UN declaration of Human rights, it is felt necessary to distinguish the Arts 
from the cultural life of the community, as Article 27 states:  “Everyone has the right freely to 
participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific 
advancement and its benefits”.  
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Arts and culture can bring real benefits for communities and individuals 
(Scottish Government, 2015c) 
 
We enable people and organisations to work in and experience the arts 
and creative sectors in Scotland (Creative Scotland, 2014c, p.1) 
 
..if we are to make the most of the richness and diversity of arts and 
culture in Scotland (Creative Scotland, 2014c, p.9)125 
 
Discursive boundaries may change but that does not mean that boundaries no 
longer exist. For while it may be true that the range of objects and activities that 
can be understood as the Arts has significantly expanded, it remains the case 
that it is possible for something to be understood as the Arts, to be judged 
according to the rules and logics of something called the Arts, and that upon 
being accepted as a manifestation of the Arts it is granted the potential to offer a 
unique experience for those that participate with it126. When a new activity, 
object or organisation is associated with the Arts this is simply an alteration of 
its place within the dispositive, from one in which it was considered as an 
example of what the Arts is not, to one in which it is representative of just how 
diverse, and thus inclusive, the Arts can be.  
This can be illustrated by returning to the examples given by interviewees of 
participation projects involving tattoos, parkour and DJ’s. For if excellence and 
expertise matter in relation to the quality of the experience, then a publicly 
funded gallery is surely not the obvious site at which these will be found with 
regards to tattooing. One can legitimately ask the question of why, if it is tattoo 
design that someone is most interested in, should they not be supported to 
interact with tattoo designers in a tattoo studio rather than the outreach officers 
of a contemporary art gallery?  Why could one interviewee not get state support 
for a club night, when the same DJ’s were subsidised to play the same music at a 
                                                          
125 See Appendix 1.10 for further relevant examples from the data. 
126 Artists such as Duchamp, Yves Klein, John Cage, Bill Woodrow, Carl Andre, Jean Arp, Tristan 
Zara, and Orlan are all good examples of those whose work has problematised the concept of art 
to the point that the physical attributes of the object were meaningless in attempting to define 
what art is, however all of which continue to be celebrated and recognised as art. 
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museum Lates event? The logic behind these distinctions is evident in the 
response of Interviewee 41 who regularly stated that there would be added 
value in activities that a non-participant might be doing elsewhere being done at 
the Interviewee’s place of work, because it would help to improve the “quality of 
the experience”. By being taken into and written upon by the discourses of the 
Arts the existing social practice of those labelled as non-participants gains the 
status of a unique, enriching experience of greater value to society than that 
which they were doing otherwise. But in order for this to occur, it must involve 
some degree of interaction with state sponsored cultural intermediaries, for 
only they have the right to write the discourses of the Arts upon that which 
otherwise would not be seen as a legitimate manifestation of its practices. 
Cultural participation has become increasingly less about the specifics of what 
one does and more about where the activity is discursively located by those that 
are legitimated to speak within the field of cultural policy. Just as Danto (1964) 
reached the conclusion that while anything could be art, not everything was, so 
too do the dominant discourses of cultural policy imply that while anything can 
be cultural participation, not everything is. To understand Danto’s argument 
requires a reorientation of the focus away from the object itself and towards the 
individuals who were making the judgments. For Danto, their opinion only 
mattered if they were part of the art world. Only they were able to judge 
something to be art as only they had the required knowledge and experience to 
do so.  In short, those who claim to know in advance what a manifestation of the 
Arts is are those who can then speak in the name of the Arts whether as 
doctrine or ethos. Art was art because those that understood what was 
legitimate to be part of the Arts identified it as such, and it is the same rationale 
that is now employed with regards to cultural participation127.  
4.4.3 The importance of managing identities  
And so for all that there may have been an expansion of the type of activities 
that are accepted as legitimate sites of cultural participation, it remains the case 
                                                          
127 This is also the same argument that Osborne (2003) has made about creativity.  
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that in doing so these activities are adopted into an existing system of meaning 
and values in which managing the identities of the subject becomes increasingly 
important. For there will never be a definitive list of the objects with which 
cultural participation can occur. In fact the opposite is true, for debate and 
discussion about what would count has become an increasingly important part 
of the discursive practice of the institution, so long as any debate does not 
question the validity of the institution itself. As Gell has argued, the Arts is: 
…really a secular form of religion, not in that everyone embraces it but in 
so far as it has been sacralized beyond contestation; we can argue with 
each other within the aesthetic sphere but the aesthetic sphere itself is a 
sacred place (1992, p.42)  
 
Instead what is important is the degree to which the validity of that institution 
as a “sacred place” now relies more than ever on the assumption that two types 
of people exist: those that know and those that are unknowing, those whose 
values are coordinated and those that are not (Gell, 1992). Or to put it in the 
contemporary language of the problem construction: those that do not 
participate and those that are allowed to label others with that identity. 
Maintaining the existence of the non-participant negates the need to ever 
definitively explain what is and isn’t cultural participation in practice. Instead, 
discursively affirming the existence of the non-participant in text, speech and 
practice implicitly defines cultural participation as a distinct social activity that 
it is possible not to do. And it is this possibility that is arguably vital in 
protecting the institution of the Arts from the oblivion of meaninglessness that 
the ongoing discursive legitimation work of its agents has risked invoking.  
Summary 
This chapter has argued that the discursive possibility of both non-participation 
and the subject identity of the non-participant were established as part of the 
discursive constitution of the Arts at the end of the eighteenth century. As such, 
the subject of the non-participant has always been a necessary part of the 
institutional discourses of the Arts, discourses that required adaptation when 
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the Arts sought a formal relationship with the state. At first, the subject of the 
non-participant provided the ideal boundary object around which the 
discourses of these two institutions could be woven together. The Arts was 
already discursively associated with a unique and transformative experience 
and existing dividing practices meant that there were those in society the state 
had deemed in need of transformation. The fact that those represented by the 
state as being in need of transformation were not currently participating with 
the Arts could in turn be pointed to as evidence that the transformative claims 
of the Arts were true and thus justification for their continued support. Now, not 
only was the possibility of non-participation fundamental to the institutional 
discourses of the Arts, but the subject of the non-participant also provided this 
institution with an object upon which it could claim to positively act in the 
interests of society, and thus legitimate its privileged relationship with the state 
and resultant public subsidy.  
However there is a difficulty that the Arts must continually negotiate in order to 
maintain the legitimacy of these claims. For despite all the activity that has been 
undertaken under the rationale of increasing participation, it remains the case 
that the majority of what receives public subsidy attracts the participation and 
interest of a minority of the population. As has been noted in Chapter 3, one of 
the largest pieces of cultural subsidy in Scotland goes on Scottish Opera, yet 
95% of the public do not attend the opera. While free entry to museums may 
have encouraged existing audiences to go more often, very few of those not 
previously going have altered their behaviour (Bailey and Falconer, 1998; 
Martin, 2002). This causes a paradox for the Arts. While the existence of the 
non-participant provides part of the raison-d’etre for its continued subsidy, the 
persistent non-participation of some individuals can simultaneously undermine 
the arguments on which this relationship has been built. For as Interviewee 38 
succinctly pointed out:  
…if you are making the case [for subsidy] based on the benefits of cultural 
participation then you have to demonstrate that an awful lot of people are 
participating to be able to justify the money […] If the arts are not for 
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everybody then why are we subsidising the arts to the extent that we are 
not subsidising other things?. 
For no matter which claims about the impact of the Arts are made, they almost 
all rely to a great extent on the active interaction between the Arts and 
individuals, they all rely on participation. “Art which no-one wants to use is not 
an addition to the nation’s wealth” (Pinnock, 2006, p.175, emphasis in original). 
This was something that even John Ruskin acknowledged, for despite 
advocating for the recognition of intrinsic value, he equally acknowledged that 
any intrinsic value is only transformed into what he described as effectual value 
through direct interaction between agent and object (Ruskin, 1871).  
 
The individual cannot be enlightened and enriched at a distance. Intangible 
societal wealth cannot be redistributed to those who are not there to collect it. 
The excluded cannot be included if they continue to be absent from what is 
deemed normative. While there are other arguments about the value of public 
subsidy for the Arts that on face value do not depend on use – legacy and 
bequest, prestige, option value (Ridge, et. al. 2007; Holden 2006; Holden 2004) 
– in actuality they remain dependent upon a presumption of use by somebody at 
some point. Something that provides benefits for some rather than all would 
struggle to legitimately lay claim to public subsidy in a liberal democracy. At a 
minimum it should be clear that while all might not be making use of it now, 
they value the option to be able to make use of it later. However as the results of 
the SHS - like the Taking Part survey in England – show, despite almost seventy 
years of state subsidy, it remains the case that patterns of participation with 
many of the manifestations of the Arts receiving the most significant levels of 
subsidy remain largely unchanged. So even if claims about the transformative 
powers of participation with the Arts are true, the majority of the public that are 
paying for them are not exposed to them. Thus, as Pinnock succinctly points out, 
if public subsidy for the Arts faces a crisis of legitimacy it is not because the 
claims made by the Arts Council and their subsidised organisations “are in any 
way objectionable” but rather that their “record of delivery simply contradicts 
them” (Pinnock, 2006, p.176). Explanations are thus required as to why 
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someone would intentionally opt not to do something that could a.) offer them 
an experience that they could not find elsewhere and b.) in having that 
experience contribute towards their own growth as an individual in a manner 
that would gain them societal status and advantage. Non-participation appears 
as a highly irrational thing to do and the discursive logics of the problem 
construction must account for this. The ‘ordinary’ habits of the ‘ordinary’ people 
with which the contemporary system of government is so keen that those 
receiving public subsidy consult (Clarke, 2013) must be represented in such a 
manner as to justify the continued existence of state subsidy for the Arts.  
 
Chapter 5 will now argue that to a great extent this is done through the way in 
which the subject identity of the non-participant has been constructed as an 
object within the discourse. The chapter will do this through a detailed analysis 
of how the non-participant is constructed as a less desirable model of agency 
than that associated with the cultural participant. It will show how the attitudes 
of non-participants are contrasted with those who are implicitly labelled as 
cultural participants and how these asserted differences problematises the 
agency of anyone labelled as a non-participant, representing them as being 
unable to make choices in their own best interest.   
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Chapter 5 – Fantasmic logic:  Defining desirable models of agency    
In Chapter 4 it was argued that the problem of cultural non-participation is 
more accurately understood as a problem of non-participation with the Arts, a 
discursive institution established towards the end of the eighteenth century and 
which now enjoys a privileged relationship with the state. The possibility of 
non-participation and the subject of the non-participant were both argued to be 
integral components of the discursive architecture of this institution. 
Furthermore, the subject of the non-participant proved valuable when that 
institution developed a formal relationship with the state as it provided a 
boundary object around which the discourses of the two institutions could be 
combined, through each affirming the dividing practices of the other. State 
subsidies for the Arts could be justified as part of providing access to 
opportunities for those who were socially deprived to develop their sensitivity 
for the aesthetic and in so doing transform themselves in the type of citizen who 
could make a more valuable contribution to society. As the data generated for 
this study shows, it is an argument that remains in use today, albeit adapted to 
the various discursive strands that have been created and revised as part of the 
discursive legitimation work undertaken to constantly affirm the legitimacy of 
the relationship between the Arts and the state.   
However it has been consistently apparent that those to whom this 
transformative experience was supposed to be of most value have continually 
failed to take up the opportunities that state subsidy was providing. This 
chapter now turns its attention to the fantasmic128 logic (Howarth, 2010) of the 
problem construction in order to consider how this apparent failure has been 
explained, and the risk to the institution negated, through managing the subject 
identity of the non-participant as an object within the discourse. The discussion 
will show how constructing and managing the identity of the non-participant 
simultaneously manages how the actions of those not participating with the 
Arts are understood, thus providing explanations as to why they continue to 
reject that which will supposedly enrich their lives. In so doing this Chapter is 
                                                          
128 While etymologically it would appear to make sense to talk of Phantasmic Logic, in the source 
text from which this term has been taken it has been spelt in the manner used here.  
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specifically concerned with research questions 5 - What subjects are 
constructed within the problem? And 6 - How are these subjects constructed? 
5.1 Constructing the non-participant  
The first section of this chapter will focus in greater detail on the manner in 
which the subject of the non-participant is constructed. Chapter 4 has already 
shown that this subject identity is understood to be in need of transformation, 
enrichment and is even culturally unhealthy; however the focus of this 
discussion will be on the identity based explanations – the fantasmic logics - 
that are offered in the discourse as to why non-participants fail to participate 
with that which would improve them.  
5.1.1 Non-participants are not always statistically non-participants 
In practice, cultural non-participants do not appear to be identified by their lack 
of cultural participation as measured by the SHS. The researcher could find no 
evidence from the responses of the interviewees that any attempts had been 
made to identify if those individuals that interviewees had worked with as part 
of cultural participation projects would be recorded as cultural non-participants 
in the SHS. Nor did there appear to be significant awareness of what other 
organisations may be doing to engage with the same group of supposed non-
participants - “You know we are doing this piece of work but I don’t know who else 
is doing these pieces of work” (Interviewee 4). 
In fact when asked, a number of interviewees explicitly stated that the 
individuals they worked with did participate in culture elsewhere and did 
already exhibit preferences for certain types of activities that would be accepted 
as legitimate sites of cultural participation within the discourse of abundant 
participation. This was particularly the case amongst those interviewees that 
were more likely to work directly with the public. They far more readily spoke 
about project participants as individuals, exhibiting a far greater degree of 
knowledge about the specifics of their lives. For example, when asked if the 
groups they were trying to engage with might simply be participating with 
culture elsewhere, Interviewee 2 appeared entirely certain that they were – 
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“yeah, yeah absolutely they are”. Likewise, in talking about an outreach project 
Interviewee 12 stated “the sixteen to nineteen program that we have got, those 
young people all have a general interest in the arts to start with”. Interviewee 41 
spoke about their project participants as having “seen commercial work, this is 
the feedback that I get from my participants. When you work with the type of 
people I work with they will say oh yeah we saw a Christmas show, or they have 
seen touring work at school, people will have been to a Mamma Mia or an Abba 
tribute or something like that”. Going to the cinema and live DJs were often felt to 
be likely pastimes of the people they were working with, both of which count as 
cultural participation according to the logics of the SHS.   
The interviewees’ responses suggest that at best the individuals taking part in 
the activities intended to increase cultural participation might be identified as 
someone who has not participated with that particular organisation or type of 
activity before. Although from the evidence provided by the interviewees even 
this was not always the case. This aligns with the findings of the audience data 
agency, Purple Seven, who found that the majority of those making use of 
discounted tickets intended to attract new audiences were actually those that 
were already audiences elsewhere (2014). Both the reported practice of the 
interviewees and the manner in which they spoke of non-participants would 
suggest that a cultural non-participant is labelled as such based on a range of 
other factors beyond what types of activities, organisations and individuals they 
interact with during a year. As such, there are no guarantees that the publicly 
subsidised activities intended to increase cultural participation would alter the 
Scottish Government’s national indicator, given that many of these individuals 
would already count as a cultural participant. This adds further credence to the 
claim that the identity of the non-participant is not primarily based on what 
they do or don’t do, but instead on the type of person that a non-participant is 
assumed to be.   
5.1.2 Non-participants are socially-deprived  
And so just as was the case at the turn of the twentieth century, those presented 
as being in most need of undergoing the enriching transformation afforded by 
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cultural participation are those who are the most materially deprived and/or 
have the lowest social status – their need for transformation offered as an 
explanation of their deprivation and low social position. Enriching the lives of 
the non-participant is therefore synonymous with enriching the individual so 
that they have the internal resources needed to transform themselves and their 
life in line with societal norms. This leads to the presumption that cultural non-
participants can quite confidently be identified through other demographic 
characteristics. As Interviewee 41 stated, they felt they did “make the 
assumption, if I am perfectly honest, that there are certain sections of society 
that feel they can’t access culture”. And Interviewee 14 made clear that they have 
never been funded to work specifically with non-participants, but instead was 
required to target certain types of people that were assumed likely to be non-
participants by virtue of some other demographic data marking them out as 
problematic for the state; evidence of the extent to which the dividing practices 
of these two institutions continue to be mutually affirming.  
 
It was evident amongst the interviewees that there was a clear common 
perception of what type of people would be appropriate in this regard. When 
asked whom their participation activity did focus on, most of those who did this 
type of work spoke about school children and those who they described as 
“socially excluded”, “socially deprived” or “high on the index of multiple 
deprivation”129. Interviewees spoke of aligning their work with various trends 
that had come and gone regarding particular demographic groups that the 
Scottish Government had shown an interest in targeting - “there is obviously 
trends though, that you can very easily pick up, like NEETS130, [laughs] they were a 
trend, and young men” (Interviewee 2); “There are sort of flavours of the month, 
trends and fashions [of who to engage with]. Young men… that is quite an 
interesting one, that has sort of bubbled up recently and prison is another very 
                                                          
129 The Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation identifies small area concentrations of multiple 
deprivation across all of Scotland in a consistent way. It ranks small areas from most deprived 
(ranked 1) to least deprived (ranked 6,505). People using the SIMD will often focus on the areas 
below a certain rank, for example, the 5%, 10%, 15% or 20% most deprived areas in Scotland 
130 Not in education, employment or training.   
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popular choice.” (Interviewee 38. See also Interviewees 1, 3, 4, 41). Currently, 
there appeared to be a number of organisations that were focusing on what 
Interviewee 1 described as “the elusive 16-24 year old thing that everyone keeps 
talking about”. This focus exists despite both the broader quantitative research 
and SHS indicating that those in this age bracket tend to be the most culturally 
active of any age group. However what all of these cases are indicative of is the 
search for a non-participant in the sense of searching for a suitable subject to 
whom the identity could be applied. 
 
Likewise, the transformational potential of cultural participation is almost only 
ever referenced in relation to that which awaits non-participants rather than 
those that are not labelled as such. The researcher could find no study that has 
explored the transformative power of the Arts on the university educated 
audiences for ballet and opera or the liberal intelligentsia that frequent 
contemporary arts venues. Presumably this is because they are understood as 
the type of people who do not need to be transformed, but rather the type of 
people who non-participants would ideally be transformed into. This was 
certainly the attitude that was explicitly expressed by some of the interviewees: 
 
[When asked why no one need challenge the interviewer or interviewee 
on their cultural participation] Well we can challenge ourselves, can’t we? 
I mean we are finished in that sense, no?  (Interviewee 24)  
 
[When it is pointed out that no one tries to influence the cultural choices 
of the interviewer as a white middle class educated white man] 
Interviewee 7: Yes, you are allowed to dabble in and out of whatever you 
like 
Interviewer: And to say I like that, and I don’t like that and the only reason 
I go is because I like it 
Interviewee 7: Yeah, you don’t need to be improved  
Interviewer: I don’t need to be improved? My mental health doesn’t need 
addressed? I don’t need enlightened or enriched? 
Interviewee 7: But maybe you are self-enriching? 
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And it would equally appear that there is no concern about the choices of those 
who would be recorded as a non-participant in the SHS but are neither socially 
deprived nor from a minority community. For example, when asked if they 
would consider doing outreach work with a group of bank workers who only 
ever watched television, played computer games and read comics (thus 
statistically a non-participant) interviewees always responded as though this 
had been said as a joke by the researcher. Thus, if a statistical non-participant 
changed nothing about their patterns of participation but moved to a different 
area and got a new job earning an average salary, then as far as the discursive 
logic of the problem construction is concerned they would cease to be a cultural 
non-participant.  
 
These same assumptions can be found in the written texts and practices of 
cultural policy. For example, the Scottish Government argues that cultural 
activities should be “targeted at people at risk [to] provide diversionary 
activities and make a positive impact on the incidence of crime and anti-social 
behaviour” (2008). This is a belief not dissimilar to Lord Goodman’s declaration 
in the late 1960’s that “a dose of culture could turn hooligans into citizens” 
(Goodman, cited in Mulgan, 1996). Likewise, in discussing their commitment to 
equalities and diversity, rather than identifying the cultural non-participant, 
Creative Scotland outlines that regularly funded organisations have a “specific 
equalities focus and clear remit to work in communities with socio-economic 
deprivation” (Creative Scotland, 2015h). The implicit assumption, reinforced by 
statistics like the SHS, is that it is in these communities that the cultural non-
participant is to be found, their socio-economic deprivation synonymous with 
their assumed cultural non-participation.  
5.1.3 Non-participants are hard to reach  
One of the core components of the subject identity of the non-participant is the 
suggestion that they are “hard-to reach”. It is an assertion that suggests those 
labelled as a non-participant are in some way more difficult to communicate 
with than other individuals:   
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The non-visitors are generally these people in the hard to reach brackets 
(Interviewee 1) 
…the hard to reach audience is a luxury that they might tackle if they get 
project funding. (Interviewee 5)   
… I mean, I believe myself that it is important to reach out to the harder 
to reach audience… that is also where the money is! [laughs] (Interviewee 
12)131  
 
The label of being hard to reach is not exclusive to the discourses of cultural 
policy132. A rudimentary search of existing research shows that every state 
institution appears to have a problem of communicating with a hard to reach 
audience. Health ( Flanagan and Hancock, 2010; Freimuth and Mettger, 1990), 
education (Day, 2013; Boag-Munroe and Evangelou, 2012), the police (Jones 
and Newburn, 2001),  government (Froonjian and Garnett, 2013) all appear to 
be struggling with what is often described as a complex issue in need of complex 
solutions (Boag-Munroe and Evangelou, 2012). Despite this supposed 
complexity it is generally framed as a question of communication so that 
appropriate solutions might include such interventions as:  
 utilizing knowledge about target audiences;  
 forming partnerships with agencies and individuals that interact with 
targeted populations;  
 utilizing children to reach parents and older relatives;  
 using ‘ethnic media’ that effectively reach immigrant and ethnic minority 
households, and; 
 simplifying communication and using feedback techniques (Froonjian 
and Garnett, 2013). 
                                                          
131 See Appendix 1.11 for further relevant examples from the data. 
132 Hard to reach is also used in more general methodology literature, but generally to refer to 
those that may be more difficult to gain access to as part of a sample e.g. those that are transient 
or under the guardianship of another. 
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Or alternatively it is seen as requiring an alternation in the language or terms of 
engagement (Day, 2013) that are employed when seeking to communicate with 
what has been understood as a hard to reach group.  
And so while representing the cultural non-participant as being hard to reach is 
not original, it is important. For it contributes significantly towards rendering 
the problem of cultural non-participation as technical – an inability to access, or 
communicate with certain people, which if only it can be overcome through 
specific interventions will then result in a normalization of their activities. 
There is an implied assumption that once non-participants are reached they 
would inevitably become a participant. In a technical sense it is about making 
contact or being present, as evident in the suggestion of Interviewee 20 that 
their organisation needed to physically visit geographic areas: “…we are just 
thinking that we need to reach all of these parts of the country that can’t 
physically get to us…”  
Yet this technical process of reaching the individuals they wish to participate is 
not really all that hard, something that has also been argued with regards to the 
hard to reach audiences of other institutions (Flanagan and Hancock, 2010; 
Cook, 2002). As the interviewees in a study about participation in policy 
consultation stated: “Who says we are hard to reach?” (Cook, 2002, emphasis in 
original)133. It is important to remember that the identity of the non-participant 
is applied to suitable proxies, and so reaching them simply requires identifying 
a group to label as such. While it may require an investment of resource, the fact 
that organisations were able to reach individuals that they were happy to 
classify as non-participants was clear from both the defined demographics that 
they targeted and the descriptions of work that was done with those groups. 
Interviewees were able to identify specific postcodes that they would work in 
and other community organisations that they could partner with in order to 
reach the supposedly hard to reach. So it appeared from the data generated that 
                                                          
133 The majority of research about hard to reach audiences in the cultural sector tends to be grey 
literature in which the hard to reach identity is taken for granted. One needs to look to other 
disciplines to find peer reviewed literature that problematises the notion that someone is hard 
to reach (Freimuth and Mettger, 1990; Cook, 2002; Day, 2013b). 
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the hard to reach were never so hard to reach that the organisations failed to do 
so.  
One study in relation to policing suggested that the hard to reach were not so 
much hard to reach in a physical sense as hard to engage with on a positive level 
(Jones and Newburn, 2001). However what was implicit in this description was 
that engaging on a positive level meant that those labelled as hard to reach both 
acted and interacted in the manner that the institution wanted them to. Indeed 
twenty five years ago a piece of health research suggested that the hard to reach 
was a label applied by institutional communicators to those who were both 
unlike themselves and whose behaviours their communication had failed to 
change (Freimuth and Mettger, 1990).  So what is perhaps a more accurate 
description of the hard to reach cultural non-participant is that they are those 
individuals who remain hard to persuade even after they are reached – either 
that they continue to show no interest in participating with what is being 
offered, or that after participating with what is offered, have no interest in doing 
so again.   
5.1.4 Non-participants think cultural participation is not for them  
As such, further explanation is required within the discourse as to why, when 
reached, the hard to reach remain non-participants. As was discussed in Chapter 
2, this is when the concept of barriers is employed, a word that evokes an 
obstruction to passage, a “brick wall” or “blockage” as interviewees 14 and 22 
respectively said. As has been addressed in Chapters 2 and 3, it is a keyword 
within the construction of the problem because it frames the non-participant as 
an excluded and hard to reach minority, keen to participate in the same way 
that a supposed majority does, but stopped by tangible barriers that the state, 
through its government sponsored intermediaries, is working to eradicate. This 
then contributes to those not participating with the Arts as being represented as 
individuals who have the desire to participate but are limited in their capacity to 
fulfil that desire. Deploying this keyword is yet another method of rendering the 
problem technical rather than political, an act that supports the pervasive 
attempts to present funding for the Arts as a depoliticized process (Gray, 2008).  
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In so doing, this keyword obscures the existence of an alternative identity for 
the non-participant: a non-participant that perceives no barriers to 
participation with the Arts and yet still chooses not to do so because they would 
rather spend their time doing something else.  
 
This is important because there is a distinction to be made between those who 
express an interest or desire to participate but who are hindered to some 
degree from doing so and those who have expressed no interest or desire and 
identify no absence in their life because of it. For being prevented from doing 
something you want to do because of tangible barriers such as lack of transport 
or finance is not the same as choosing not to do something in which you have no 
interest, place no value, would gain no unique utility; and may even have a 
detrimental effect through the loss of opportunity to spend that time otherwise. 
For a barrier arguably only occurs where a desire has been shown to exist and 
while there may well be some individuals that fit in to this category134, it 
remains the case that a large number of people simply express no interest or 
desire to participate with the Arts. National and international surveys regularly 
show that it is lack of interest that is the primary explanation given for not 
participating (European Commission, 2013b; Charlton et al., 2010; Scottish 
Government, 2009). Likewise the SHS found that 48% of those labelled as not 
currently engaged were not interested in participating with the listed activities, 
and 35% were not interested in attending those mentioned (SAC, 2008).  
 
Acknowledging the potential that this type of non-participant exists would 
undermine the discursive logic on which the legitimacy of state subsidies for the 
Arts relies. For while the dominant subject identity for the non-participant can 
be argued to value that which is receiving subsidy even though they are being 
prevented from attending, the alternative non-participant identity faces no 
                                                          
134 Individuals such as this doubtless exist and the Artlink Access programme is a good example 
of a scheme that works to support them. However this project leaves the decisions in the hands 
of the service user. They choose if it is a service they want to make use of and they select the 
events that they want to go to and how often. Artlink Access does not make any suggestion that 
people should use their service or curate what someone chooses to see. It is not for the team at 
Artlink to decide if someone goes to Spiderman or Kafka. 
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tangible practical or physical barriers and are consequently paying for the 
provision of activities about which they have no interest and do not value. The 
construction of the non-participant identity must therefore include an 
explanation that represents these individuals’ disinterestedness as something 
other than a legitimate position of disesteem for the state supported esoteric 
interest of a minority. And it is in response to this necessity that the mental or 
psychological barrier is then employed.  
 
In relation to the problem of non-participation, the phrase ‘not for me’ or even 
‘not for the likes of me’ is regularly pointed to as evidence that such a 
psychological barrier exists. It is thus often used as the description of this 
supposed mental state or attitude, such as when Fiona Hyslop stated that she 
didn’t want people to be constrained by a “sense that this isn’t for me” (2013). 
Indeed within the SHS Culture and Sport Module, question 7 asks respondents 
specifically about the extent to which they agree with the statement that 
“Culture and the arts are not for people like me” (Scottish Government, 2009). 
This phrase (or a variation thereof) was identified regularly in the data 
generated for this study as something that was represented as problematic, 
accompanied by the assumption that any evidence of this attitude should be 
challenged: 
 
…some people are very much at home in that, in that circle, … but not 
everyone is … not everyone thinks that it’s for them (Interviewee 1)  
 
It is important that people in Scotland feel confident about attending a 
theatre and that they feel it’s for them [… …] if you went along and stood 
outside a football ground and said to them, you know, they are going to 
say… probably their wives are going to say it is not for us, … yes there is a 
perception, and that is what we work so hard to break down, and we go out 
to communities, dress in our black hoodies and we, you know what I mean, 
we say, no this is for you actually [… …] it is about the ownership of us as a 
national company on all levels, and people feeling that we are for them, 
we are not just for middle class people (Interviewee 2) 
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I would say that once that person is engaged with a cultural activity and 
they have had it in the most appropriate location for them, whether it is 
here, whether it is in a community, whether it is in their own youth centre, 
and that they have had the right staff with them and they can say then it is 
not for them, then I will be amazed. (Interviewee 3) 
 
The logic underpinning this aspect of the subject identity of the non-participant 
suggests that complex societal factors have come to influence what someone 
does and does not perceive to be for them. As was discussed in Chapter 2, it 
draws heavily on Bourdieu (1986) and his notion of the habitus through which 
an individual learns the implicit structures of society and how they must behave 
in order to adhere to these structures and their assumed place within it. The job 
of state funded organisations and activities becomes about educating people 
that it is for them, in this sense it becomes about changing their values.  
5.1.5 Non-participants don’t know what they don’t know 
As mediated through the policy and professional discourses in the field of 
cultural policy, the tangible impact that social structuring (what Bourdieu, 1984, 
conceived of as habitus) is implied to have is that the non-participant has 
always presumed that the Arts are not for them. As such they have never 
participated or when they have it has been detrimentally affected by their 
preconditioned attitude towards the experience. Should this be addressed, then 
they will realise that the Arts is for them, and come to value it as the imagined 
majority are represented as doing. Once again, this argument has its roots in the 
nineteenth century, for when faced with the same difficulty in explaining the 
behaviour of the populace135, Mill proposed the same explanation. His 
justification for why some appeared to prefer the simple pleasures over those 
that were supposed to afford them greater benefit was, in the first instance, that 
they had not had the opportunity to experience the higher pleasures and were 
                                                          
135 In assessing which of two pleasures (and by association the experiences that afforded these 
pleasure) should be understood as the greater, Mill’s response was that it would be that to 
which the majority gave a decided preference. His assumption being that this preference would 
always be for that which was presumed to facilitate ones’ growth as a human being. However he 
appeared to face the same difficulty as today’s advocates for the Arts face in explaining why, if 
this was the case, the majority appeared not to make this value judgement and to opt to do 
something else. 
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therefore unable to make an informed judgement. Once one had experienced 
such pleasures he did not believe that anyone would ever consent to give them 
up, no matter how much of the simple pleasure they were offered as an 
alternative:  
 
Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower 
animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast's pleasures; no 
intelligent human being would consent to be a fool […] It is better to be a 
human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to 
be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are 
of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the 
question…(Mill, 2001 [1863], n.p.) 
 
There was certainly an assumption amongst the majority of interviewees that 
the non-participant was not having, and most likely had not had, the type of 
experience an interaction with the Arts could offer.  Although they 
acknowledged that this was a presumption and no evidence was given 
suggesting that any of the interviewees would attempt to find this out in 
identifying whom to work with in practice. Presenting the non-participant’s 
imagined history of cultural participation in this manner allows a common 
sense assertion to be made that it is inevitable they do not value the supposedly 
unique experience of engaging with the Arts if they have never had such a 
unique experience before. No one values that of which they have no knowledge 
or understanding, and interviewees stressed the logic of this argument through 
the use of the oft-repeated phrase “they don’t know what they don’t know”:   
 
….of course they don’t know that they don’t know, that is the irony of 
education, you don’t know what you don’t know until you have learnt 
that you did not know it.  (Interviewee 21)  
 
…it is that thing about thinking you know what you know, but actually 
there is still loads more for you to know… (Interviewee 21)  
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…..because we, because we are not in the business of giving people what 
they want are we, we are in the business of giving people things that they 
didn’t know that they wanted, so to say ok, you can get a ticket for a 
tenner to the Scottish Opera but you don’t want that, to give them the 
tenner to go and see Madonna would be closing their opportunities down 
rather than opening them up (Interviewee 4)  
 
I think it is about being challenged with stuff that you don’t know… 
(Interviewee 14)  
 
The implicit suggestion that this phrase contains is that it is only through 
participation with the Arts that someone could, in the words of Interviewee 14, 
“get it” and in getting it come to value it and thus continue to participate in the 
future. There is no option open to the non-participant to “get it” and still find no 
value in it. This also aligns with the rationale of market failure outlined in 
Chapter 3 and which is commonly drawn upon in attempting to explain the 
necessity for state intervention in the lives of its citizens. In particular it relates 
to the possibility of imperfect information, where a suboptimal level of activity 
with merit goods is explained by the assumed lack of education in, information 
about, and understanding of, the unique and valuable experience that they offer.  
 
The potential that the non-participant has participated, does “get it”, but doesn’t 
like it is a conundrum that Mill, too, had faced. Because for all that he (and the 
interviewees) might believe that anyone who has experienced the higher 
pleasures of the Arts would not willingly then forgo them, in practice this does 
not appear to be the case. Not all those who do not participate have never in 
their lives interacted with some manifestation of the Arts. Despite describing 
the opportunities they provided to non-participants as “an opportunity to make 
the value judgement” (Interviewee 13) or “a case of giving them the tools, 
language and experiences to critique if this is for them (Interviewee 41), the 
suggestion that someone might not value an experience with the Arts positively 
was one that that appeared to be difficult to countenance for many of the 
interviewees. Looking at Interviewee 14’s answer to the question of whether it 
is ever all right for someone to say something is not for them, it was clear that 
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they did not want to express the logical conclusion of someone having tried 
something and found it to be of no value. They quickly shift their narrative to 
focus on the potential for what they understand to be a positive outcome – “yes 
it is perfectly OK for folks to say that it is not for the likes of me… but then it is OK 
for us to go, well try it again, […] and maybe you go, wow I really enjoyed that”. 
Likewise, while Interviewee 41 acknowledged the possibility that someone 
might not value what was being offered, they stressed that this was not really 
the desired outcome: “if it is not right for them then absolutely don’t come, make 
their choices… but the hope is that when they encounter it they will ……”. 
 
Mill’s answer to this conundrum once again aligns exactly with that still being 
employed today. For he asserts that in order to make a legitimate judgement the 
individual must be “competently acquainted” (Mill, 2001  [1863]) suggesting 
that it is possible to have a sub-standard experience through a lack of competent 
acquaintance. Such a belief is indicative of the extent to which appreciation is a 
product of acculturation in which one learns what one should value and why. 
And this was an argument that the interviewees also adopted.  For when it was 
explicitly suggested that their dislike for an experience should be respected if 
people had encountered a specific type of activity in the past, or after they had 
been reached out to and still found no value in what was on offer, the common 
response was that this would only be the case if the previous interaction had 
been of the “right kind”: 
 
Justifying why current schools programs have not translated into larger 
audiences for opera] I always think, you know, for a start it is a terrible 
theatrical experience, in your gym […], I know that this is a heretic 
speaking here, but it is absolutely ludicrous to think they are going to sit 
through, you know, Marriage of Figaro [in a gym hall] (Interviewee 10) 
 
…the argument that says everybody has an equal right to this and 
therefore I am going to do some bastardised or compromised version of 
it just so that is possible for it to be in fifty miles of where everybody lives is 
nonsense because it’s patronizing, because you are not giving people the 
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true experience and there is no point in us pretending that you can do 
everything everywhere…  (Interviewee 19)  
 
…but given the right information before they go, regardless of who they 
are, then I think they would still enjoy it. (Interviewee 2)  
 
Once they have tried it, yeah, and that they have been given the right 
teacher and the right environment, […] I would say that once that person 
is engaged with a cultural activity and they have had it in the most 
appropriate location for them, whether it is here, whether it is in a 
community, whether it is in their own youth centre, and that they have had 
the right staff with them and they can say then it is not for them, then I 
will be amazed (Interviewee 2)136 
 
And so the logic of the problem construction is that once people gain the ‘right’ 
knowledge through having been helped to access the ‘right’ opportunities, 
provided by the ‘right’ people then they will inevitably “know enough to 
appreciate the wonderfulness of the arts that they currently disdain, mistrust or 
are bored by. They will come to like the right kind of art, and thus be able to 
enjoy the benefits such arts are presumed to bestow” (Jensen, 2002, p.153). As 
Interviewee 14 said: “I go there with the expectation that everybody is going to 
love this so much that they will connect with it in some way […] so I worry that it is 
not making sense to people, because once it makes sense then automatically 
you are going to want to do it”.  
 
However these beliefs are based upon a vicious cycle of discursive logic that 
means any rejection of that which is subsidised by the state is represented as a 
result of some structural flaw in the nature of the interaction, or a personal flaw 
in the knowledge and experience of the person participating, rather than a 
legitimate and informed expression of their personal taste. As Interviewee 22 
said, if you remove all the barriers and the non-participant still doesn’t develop 
an interest then it was important not to “drop it” and dismiss the individual as a 
“lost cause”. Leaving to one side for a moment the implication that someone who 
chooses not to do something is ‘lost’ and the associated implications of failing to 
                                                          
136 See Appendix 1.12 for further relevant examples from the data. 
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keep to the ‘right’ path with the accompanying risks this brings, what this 
highlights is the almost impossibility of non-participation to ever be accepted as 
non-problematic. It is impossible for anyone labelled as a non-participant to 
legitimately question the value of that which they are being offered. This is in 
stark opposition to the possible responses available to the subject of the cultural 
participant, for as shall shortly be discussed, they are granted the agency to 
decide that an experience was ‘right’ but it was not for them.  
5.2 Discourses of taste  
Before the chapter moves on to discuss in closer detail how the subject of the 
cultural participant is constructed in contrast to that of the non-participant, it is 
important to consider the role that taste plays within the discourses of cultural 
participation. In this regard, it should be remembered that outside of the 
discourse of inadequate participation the identities of the cultural participant 
and non-participant do not exist. Differing patterns of participation are 
explained with reference to the idea of personal taste and individual preference, 
and some of the research that supports these logics was discussed in Chapter 2. 
However when these differences are written upon as part of the problem of 
non-participation, taste becomes an attribute of the cultural participant alone, 
the non-participant’s lack of taste associated with their assumed lack of 
appreciation for the aesthetic. As shall be argued below, the cultural participant 
is allowed to express taste, because their discursive identity affords them the 
ability to have Taste.      
5.2.1 Why non-participation does not always make you a non-participant 
As has been discussed, non-participation is discursively explained through the 
characteristics of the non-participant subject identity. In particular it is 
represented as the result of psychological barriers that results in a ‘not for me’ 
attitude that needs to be changed through targeted intervention by the state. 
Such an attitude, and its associated psychological barrier, is often evidenced in 
research into this subject by pointing towards these sorts of statements: 
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[Discussing why they don’t go to the opera] Because I am thinking that I 
am going to be bored half way through because it is just not my thing.  
 
Opera and theatre are not really my bag  
 
I hate ballet and I hate opera with an absolute passion  
 
I am not a great fan of the ballet I am afraid, I like opera but not ballet, 
quite why that is I don’t know!  
 
I don’t really go to much classical music; I don’t really go to concerts much 
at all [Interviewer: Why?] I don’t like it [laughs] … I don’t like it, there you 
go, I don’t really understand it, so I don’t really like it  
 
I’ve never been big on live music for example, I’m not big on opera, I’m not 
big on cinema, possibly I am a bit of a…. actually I don’t know how 
engaged with culture I am, it’s a good question… not hugely I guess.  
 
[Talking about classical music] I barely glance at it [a festival 
programme] because it isn’t my thing 
 
[When asked if there is anything they don’t engage with] Yeah, opera 
[laughs] probably….opera and… most dance and more florid classical 
music. [When asked if they had been to an opera] Yes, many years ago, as 
a child, a childhood trauma [laughs]  
 
These quotes are not unusual for a study of this kind that focuses on cultural 
participation.  However what makes these quotes of particular interest is that 
they are not from individuals who would typically be labelled as non-
participants. Rather, these are the opinions of some of those that were 
interviewed for this study, individuals working in publically funded 
organisations, each with a degree of responsibility for trying to alter the choices 
that others make. Whether someone is classified as socially deprived, an 
outreach and engagement officer, or the director of a national cultural 
organisation it would appear that they may well share similar opinions about 
the opera or a night at the ballet. Despite indications that psychological barriers 
to altering pre-existing patterns of cultural participation are faced by the 
majority (Acacia Avenue, 2013; Keaney, 2008), in the discursive logics of the 
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problem they are almost solely associated with the subject of the non-
participant. In turn, it is only ever those that have already been categorised as 
non-participants who have their patterns of cultural participation questioned 
and are thus asked to provide explanations as to why they are different from 
others.  
 
For some of the interviewees this apparent irony was in no way problematic, 
and in fact one of the “funny things” about those who work in the sector. 
Interviewee 21 recalled a colleague that used to say “I work in the arts, I don’t go 
to the arts” while explaining that they felt those working in the Arts are 
primarily interested in their own field of activity and rarely go outside of it, a 
belief that is supported by the findings of Jancovich (2015b). Another said they 
didn’t worry that although their job was primarily about getting people to come 
to the theater, they “don’t even got to the theatre [themselves] as a choice” 
(Interviewee 14). In addition, one spoke of the fact that while they went “to a lot 
of stuff” it was only “because I get comp tickets, I don’t think I would go otherwise” 
(Interviewee 30). Indeed this was a factor that appeared to influence the 
participation patterns of a number of other interviewees137. If it is remembered 
that only 5% of the Scottish population attends the opera in any one year, and 
only 4% go to the ballet, then it is perhaps not surprising that so few of those 
working in roles that are funded to support cultural participation are not 
themselves participating with substantial swathes of that which receives 
subsidy. As Bennett et. al. have argued: “much of the middle class is not itself 
strongly attached to, conversant with, or engaged in the activities that mark 
legitimate culture” (2010, p.252). Perhaps even more surprisingly, the same 
might be said about many of those working in the Arts.  
 
                                                          
137 While Interviewee 30 was the only one to openly state that they would not go to certain 
activities if they were required to pay, it is interesting to note that a number of the interviewees 
did state that working in a cultural organisation and/or getting access to free or reduced tickets 
was an influencing factor on their own choices. For example Interviewee 38 stated that because 
they worked in theatre, they “see everything because I don’t have to pay” and that with regards to 
other art forms they were less likely to spend money to go and see them (see also Interviewees 
1, 8, 11, 12, 14, 17, 18, 20, 30, 38, 41). 
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There also appeared to be little consideration of the degree to which logically, 
the argument that you don’t know what you don’t know would not solely apply 
to the non-participant but to everyone: the researcher; interviewees; artists; 
policymakers; and all those that the SHS classifies as participating with culture. 
The argument of habitus works for ‘us’ as well as ‘them’, because the learnt 
behaviours of those labelled as cultural participants may equally be acting as a 
barrier to their participation with experiences that would significantly enrich 
their lives. Take for example Interviewee 26 who said of themselves elsewhere 
in the interview: “I think for music, definitely I am really bad at going to new 
things, it will be based on what I know…it is always based on what I know”. 
Likewise, Interviewee 41 said when challenged on their own narrow patterns of 
participation: “I am sure that like millions of people in this country, by the time I 
have done a full weeks work [… …] none of us want to spend money on stuff we 
are not sure about”. An opinion very similar to interviewee 38’s description of 
their own tendency to stick with what they knew:  “If someone was going to give 
me a free ticket I might go to a classical concert, but if I am going to make a choice 
about what to spend money on then I am going to stay with things that I am 
already comfortable with and for me theatre and dance is at the top of that list”. 
All of which is further evidence of the extent to which the negative 
characteristics associated with the non-participant identity can be identified in 
those individuals who, for other reasons, have not been identified as a societal 
problem requiring state sponsored alteration of their choices.  
5.2.2 Taste as personal preference  
When asked why it was OK for them to say that something was not for them, 
interviewees offered a variety of responses but common amongst these answers 
was the extent to which they stressed their own identity, their own agency and 
their own freedom to express that identity and agency through their taste:  
 
I’m perfectly able as an individual to be able to decide what, what I would 
and wouldn’t do and maybe I am reluctant to try stuff or whatever, but you 
know, ultimately I’m happy with that and it’s my decision, and you know 
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I’m grown up and ugly enough to decide what I want to engage with 
myself (Interviewee 3)  
 
[Talking about a genre of theatre that they dislike] I just mean that, you 
know, that taste has to come into it in the end you know. I like going to live 
performances, but not all live performances and that’s fair enough…. 
(Interviewee 19) 
 
[talking about opera] …if someone tried to…open that up to me…yeah I 
would probably be like, mmmmm, no thanks, I’m quite happy not going! 
[laughs] (Interviewee 18) 
 
[When asked why they chose doing one activity over another] Well I 
suppose that is personal taste (Interviewee 5) 
 
[Talking about why they dislike ballet and opera] I think it is because my 
preference is language… (Interviewee 26)  
 
[Talking about why they choose to do the things they do] I have to have a 
personal investment of some sort and recognise how that activity can 
satisfy that need or that desire (Interviewee 41)138 
 
As can be seen from these quotes, in supporting their own value judgments 
interviewees were quick to invoke their personal sovereignty as justification. 
They appeared to feel that not only was it appropriate but also that they were 
fully able to make choices that were reflective of an autonomous self. This 
ability to express agency through taste was not something that the interviewees 
entirely denied others, they recognised that their own tastes may not be the 
taste of others and that it would not always be apparent why someone had the 
taste that they did:  
 
… if you look at it from the point of view of those people who use the opera 
they might wonder whether I am able to get my fulfillment elsewhere 
[laughs] I guess from my part I don’t know why I don’t like it so… that’s 
why I don’t go, I wouldn’t get anything out of it, I don’t know what they are 
getting out of it… as much, I suppose as someone who doesn’t engage with 
the cinema doesn’t know what I am getting out of it… (Interviewee 3) 
                                                          
138 See Appendix 1.13 for further relevant examples from the data. 
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…and there are all sorts of personal tastes which are perfectly legitimate 
you know, some quite intelligent people I know don’t like opera, I find that 
mystifying but there you go! (Interviewee 19) 
 
It is absolutely fine in my book if you try it and you don’t want to go any 
further with it, I personally would find it disappointing but I can live with 
it. (Interviewee 38)  
 
If that is their choice, that’s fair enough, I choose not to go to the cinema, 
it’s not that I can’t access, I just begrudge paying the price and I am 
comfier on my sofa. I don’t know if that is too simplistic, but…. 
(Interviewee 41) 
 
Despite it being suggested that it was difficult to really understand the taste of 
others, there was no suggestion that having different taste was in any way 
indicative of some form of bad taste. Taste was only ever related to individual 
preference and no mention was made about the taste of any type of social 
group; as might be expected from the standard sociological theories of taste as 
refinement associated with writers such as Weber, Simmel and Bourdieu. 
Neither was there any evidence of the sort of discriminatory prejudices 
common in the eighteenth century that suggested some groups of people lacked 
the capacity or means to acquire and exhibit taste (Shiner, 2001). Nor was any 
explicit attempt made to construct a universal or transcendental taste based on 
the types of activities that someone preferred. Indeed a number of interviewees 
acknowledged that for a great number of people what went on at their 
organisation would be of no interest to them: 
 
I think that … I would hate to put a number on it but… you know you’re 
probably looking at eighty percent or something like that, of the 
population of Edinburgh that couldn’t give a shit about what we do 
and never would, because it is not for everybody (Interviewee 3)  
 
So actually there are only very specific groups that we can engage 
with seriously. If we were, if we did rap then I could engage with a much 
broader spectrum of young people, but we are not (Interviewee 21)  
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And I think there has to be some kind of discussion around that, the reason 
people don’t come to the theatre might be because they are just not 
interested (Interviewee 38) 
 
…But also, not everyone wants to go to see us, not everyone wants to 
come to a museum, we are completely surrounded by loads of different 
media, by loads of different things to do, and you know, everyone’s 
competing […]it’s quite deluded to think that every family is going to 
want to come to the museum, that every child is going to get something 
out of it, you would hope that, but not necessarily, there are lots of other 
things to do. (Interviewee 1)  
 
So based upon this apparent acceptance that not everything is for everyone, 
when the interviewees were asked directly if it was OK for people to say that 
something was not for them then the majority of interviewees initially felt that 
it was OK: 
 
I don’t like the idea that we are force feeding culture to anybody, so yes it 
is perfectly OK for folks to say that it is not for the likes of me 
(Interviewee 14)  
 
…Does it matter that 95% of people aren’t [participating]? No, not if they 
don’t want to, no… (Interviewee 4) 
 
…some people just might not ever want to explore, you know might try 
everything and go, you know, what I am interested in is football…and 
that’s OK (Interviewee 22)  
 
I think there are lots of people that are just not interested, and that is 
OK with me (Interviewee 21) 
 
I think by the same token it is fine that not everyone wants to access 
culture. There is stuff that I am not bothered about going to see 
(Interviewee 41)139  
 
However, when the researcher highlighted the apparent inconsistency of 
recognising their own right to decide what sort of activities were of value, 
                                                          
139 See Appendix 1.14 for further relevant examples from the data. 
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accepting that it was OK for others to find those same things to have no value for 
them, while professionally questioning and attempting to alter the tastes of 
others through constructing them as a problem, the response shifted to one in 
which they and the organisations they represented had a legitimate right to 
challenge the subjective choices of others:  
 
…Ok, so  yes, OK, it’s perfectly OK for folks to say it’s not for the likes of me 
but then it is OK for us [those working in the Arts] to go, well try it, or 
educate and challenge that expectation that it is not for the likes of 
you…. (Interviewee 14)  
 
Not only is this further evidence of the extent to which within the logic of the 
problem construction it is appropriate and indeed required for state sponsored 
intermediaries to attempt to alter the values of others, but also of the degree to 
which modernity has made “organized freedom compulsory” (Adorno, 1977, 
p.190) and in so doing allowed society, and in particular the representatives of 
the state, to make judgments about how one spends one’s ‘free time’.  Where 
diversity of any kind is acknowledged, it is only to the extent that it “can act in 
the service of uniformity” (Connor, 1992, p.4).    
5.2.3 Taste as an appreciation for the aesthetic  
Yet this renders the idea of taste highly problematic. If the interviewee wouldn’t 
go to the ballet or take part in some cosplay140 at ComicCon and that’s ok, if they 
recognise the potential for individual taste and the resultant diversity of 
preference that it engenders, how can they justify their professional practice in 
which they challenge someone else’s decision not to come to the gallery or 
theatre that they work in? The answer lies, somewhat obtusely, in a different 
discourse of Taste141. As had been the case when talking about cultural 
participation, it was evident that interviewees employed a different discourse 
the more that the discussion was explicitly related to their professional practice 
and the problem of non-participation. While talking in the discourse of 
                                                          
140 Dressing up as a favorite character, often from comics or science fiction programs/films.  
141 Capitalisation will be used to aid the reader in distinguishing which is being discussed.  
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abundant participation, the interviewees appeared able to accept the legitimacy 
of personal taste and subjective choice. However, once the discussion was 
situated within the discourse of inadequate participation then certain 
expressions of personal taste became an indicator of social inequality and in 
need of challenge and alteration. Once again there is a long historical 
precedence of recognising the legitimacy of someone’s subjective tastes for that 
which they found entertaining, recreational or distracting, while simultaneously 
acknowledging that not everyone’s subjective tastes included Taste for what is 
implicitly represented as a distinct and ultimately more valuable type of 
experience.  
 
To understand the apparent dual discourses of taste, one must once again look 
to the eighteenth century, at which point an alternative discourse of Taste 
emerged and which became part of the founding discourses of the Arts. As 
Shiner notes: “taste had always been an irremediably social concept, concerned 
as much with food, dress, and manners as with beauty or the meaning of nature” 
(2001, p.131). However as has been discussed in Chapter 4, in the eighteenth 
century an important split took place that divided the “satisfactions of utility 
and diversion from the special kind of pleasure that came to be called aesthetic” 
(Shiner, 2001, p.131). While taste in relation to the former continued to be seen 
as subjective, informed by the senses and related to individual experience – 
what Kant has been translated as calling the pleasant or agreeable - in relation 
to the latter, Taste was rather oxymoronically understood as subjectively 
universal. It was understood as adhering to standards that were absolute, 
located at the supersensible substrate of nature (Carey, 2005) and thus part of 
the sensus communis or common sensory and intellectual powers of humanity.  
 
What made this objective and universal Taste for the higher pleasures of the 
aesthetic experience subjective was that while in principle everyone is capable 
of possessing and exhibiting it, most will not because they are (for various 
reasons depending on the perspective of the writer) unable or prevented from 
doing so. Distanced from the sensory pleasures, this Taste manifested itself in 
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sensitivity for the beautiful, the aesthetic and ultimately, the Arts. Unlike 
subjective taste for the everyday pleasure of the agreeable that was seen as 
being motivated by an individual having a utilitarian stake in the object - be that 
practical, recreational or moral – an aesthetic Taste was marked by the 
disinterested manner that one exhibited towards the experience. It was as much 
if not more about what one valued the experience for as what one was having an 
experience with. In this regard it is evidence of the continued presence of the 
“absolute distinction between pleasure and value” (Connor, 1992, p.37) that has 
been integral to the idea of the unique aesthetic experience since its conception.   
5.3 Constructing the cultural participant  
While it was clear that within the discourse of abundant participation the 
legitimacy of individual taste could be recognised, within the discourse of 
inadequate participation someone must exhibit Taste if they are to be 
considered a cultural participant. Yet as Chapter 2, and in particular the logic of 
the cultural omnivore has made clear, exhibiting Taste is not simply a matter of 
participating in a clearly defined list of activities. Given that there were clear 
differences between what all of the interviewees stated they participated with 
and an open dismissal by some of that which would once have been understood 
as canonical cultural participation, any attempt to understand Taste in this 
manner quickly unravels. So how is it suggested within the discursive logic of 
the problem that this Taste for the enriching and transformative pleasures of 
the Arts manifests itself in contemporary society?  
 
The remainder of this chapter offers an answer to this question by returning to 
the observation that in defining the non-participant, interviewees did not solely 
focus on the non-participant’s actions (what they do or do not do in practice) 
but far more on their attitude towards leisure time activities. As shall be 
discussed below, in opposition to their own identity, interviewees represented 
the non-participants as closed minded, conservative and unwilling/unable to 
challenge themselves. In particular there were three things that were stressed 
as being different between themselves (as cultural participants whose taste 
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exhibited Taste) and the subject of the non-participant. Firstly, they suggest that 
their own patterns of cultural participation showed that they had a diversity of 
interests and openness towards trying new things. Secondly, interviewees felt 
that they were able to challenge themselves on what they did not know or had 
not done and thus implicitly had all of the knowledge required to do so. Finally, 
although they may have no interest in certain activities, the interviewees would 
never dismiss them outright – they stressed that they both valued their 
existence and the opportunity to potentially interact with them at some 
unspecified point in the future. This was why, no matter how similar their 
choices may be to those of the non-participant, they are to be understood as a 
subject whose attitude exhibits a desirable model of agency that need not be 
challenged. 
5.3.1 Cultural participants are open and omnivorous  
The extent to which the interviewees perceived diversity of interests and 
openness to new activities to be positive traits was stressed by the regularity 
with which they were highlighted directly after the dismissal of another activity. 
It appeared to be offered as evidence that interviewees were not narrow-
minded in their tastes in the manner that non-participants are, the interviewees’ 
expressed openness discursively negating their stated disinterest:  
 
I wouldn’t be that interested in doing things like that [boybands], but 
generally I would give everything a go, I have been to opera, theatre, 
you know, most things that are considered [… …]I’m very eclectic in things 
that I like”  (Interviewee 20) 
 
I don’t go to that many classical music concerts, but I am open minded 
and I have been to lots of different things  (Interviewee 12)  
 
“No, I probably am open to most things, I have a very small amount of 
time, and I don’t have a lot of cash, so it’s kind of… I will try most things… 
though loud rock music probably isn’t my, preferred cultural experience 
though (Interviewee 5)  
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[Opera and musical theatre] that is something I find really difficult to 
engage with […] Other than that I think most things I am interested in 
experimenting with, especially things I haven’t ever kind of had a great 
deal of experience with, new music, new theatre, new forms of dance for 
instance, things that I have never had much experience of in my life […] 
whether I would actively choose to book tickets though is perhaps a 
different thing (Interviewee 22)142 
 
This is indicative of the degree to which the ethos of omnivorousness 
(Friedman, 2012; Warde and Gayo-Cal, 2009; Warde et al., 2008; Sullivan and 
Katz-Gerro, 2007; Sintas and Álvarez, 2002; Peterson and Kern, 1996; Peterson, 
1992) carries a positive connotation both within the field of cultural policy and 
beyond.  It can be discursively employed as evidence of the Taste that results in 
the type of cultural participation that contributes towards ones’ growth as a 
valued citizen.  The interviewees can therefore un-problematically dismiss 
certain cultural activities out of hand given their simultaneous claim to an open 
and omnivorous identity sets their own attitude apart from the not for me 
attitude of the non-participant.  
 
Interviewee 8: I would prefer not to be going to certain styles of music 
concerts but it is selective within art forms, there is nothing that I am 
like, I don’t go to that 
Interviewer: What sort of styles of music? 
Interviewee 8: Jazz, World Music, most world Music. Yeah, there are 
certain…I mean I would really try to not go and see anything to do 
with contact improvisation dance or, you know, any of that kind of…the 
dance, movement psychotherapy end of performance  
 
I don’t know… I am quite up for anything really. I guess I like, pick and 
choose what bands and what shows I go to see and you are always making 
choices [… …] I probably wouldn’t choose certain kinds of films either. 
(Interviewee 26)  
 
I am open-minded and I have been to lots of different things, but I am 
sure you could give me an example now and I would say no, I wouldn’t be 
                                                          
142 See Appendix 1.15 for further relevant examples from the data. 
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interested in going to that. Musical Theatre, I wouldn’t go to that. 
(Interviewee 12)  
 
As noted in Chapter 4, interviewees often presented themselves and the work 
they did as assisting non-participants to “be more open” and “try new things out” 
so that they could “challenge themselves”. However it is interesting to note that 
with regards to their own participation, Interviewee 22 associates being 
stretched and challenged with doing the type of activity that they happened to 
prefer, rather than in doing new things. This is in contradiction to the argument 
they had made about the value of stretching oneself that they had previously 
used to explain that state subsidises for the Arts were important because they 
encouraged people to take part in new things that they would not do otherwise. 
Using the logic of this argument, if art-house cinema is something with which 
the interviewee is already comfortable, then continuing to interact with it will 
be less challenging for them and they should be seeking to stretch their 
repertoire of cultural participation in a different direction. However this was 
not how they represented it and implied that they were able to stretch 
themselves through participation with that which they preferred and were most 
familiar. Indeed when explicitly asked, many interviewees didn’t feel that they 
were challenged to change or expand their cultural participation in any way, but 
perhaps more importantly, that this even mattered:   
 
[When asked if they were challenged to change their cultural 
participation] No, that is interesting isn’t it, do I get challenged? Well I 
suppose, you get that thing when you buy a ticket for something it says you 
enjoyed this, why not try that and I tend to think why don’t you sod off, but 
yeah that is interesting… (Interviewee 4)  
 
[When asked if their cultural engagement was pushed and challenged] 
No, because I can shut my eyes to it and get on with my daily life… 
(Interviewee 5) 
 
No I have never been to see a ballet and I shouldn’t have to do that, this is 
the thing, no one is going to be on my case about it because I work in the 
arts, no one is worried about me. (Interviewee 41)  
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This was not a problem for them because they did not perceive themselves as 
being in need of assistance in this regard, as Interviewee 24 said: “I mean we are 
finished in that sense, no?”  Returning to the supposed transformative power of 
the Arts, it should be noted that when asked about their own cultural 
participation and why they participated, none of the interviewees indicated they 
did it because they felt they needed to be transformed – that was only ever 
presented as something that others were in need of. Ollivier (2008) has argued 
that this is because the same social discourses around the type of subjectivities 
and qualities that are desirable or undesirable in contemporary society also 
associate privilege with openness. This has the performative effect of making 
those with the greatest status and privilege in society open by default. The 
current research would add to this assertion in suggesting that there is also a 
cycle of discursive affirmation between openness, cultural participation with 
the Arts and privilege.  
 
Given the extent to which some interviewees had spoken about a seminal 
experience from the past, the implication is that they have already gained from 
the transformative benefits of the Arts, hence why they have a relative position 
of privilege in society and are thus able to claim openness to more participation 
with the Arts in future while simultaneously rejecting in the present much that 
the non-participant is judged for avoiding. The result is a variation of what Jones 
has described as liberal bigotry (2012) whereby the discursive identity of those 
with the greatest status allows them to make judgements about the subjective 
choices of others while still claiming to remain progressively minded and 
staunchly egalitarian. To be labelled as lacking such qualities is to be designated 
as having less value or worth to society (Oakley & O’Brien, 2015; Lamont, 2012) 
and for any inequalities to be explained as being a result of this.  
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5.3.2 Cultural participants can challenge their own cultural participation 
habits  
As such, while the cultural non-participant requires an external agent to 
challenge them, the interviewees (and anyone labelled as a cultural participant) 
are understood as being able to challenge themselves:  
 
I go places to be challenged, I go places to get challenged on what I 
perceive to be the blocks I have. (Interviewee 21) 
 
…but if I decide to consciously change that [lack of challenge] then I know 
where to look for information… (Interviewee 5) 
 
I can go and watch an hours’ worth of static and come out thinking that 
was interesting whereas most people would run screaming from the 
building, but I think that is just because I have got so used to that, so that 
is what stretches me, so it is kind of about personal maps… (Interviewee 
22)143 
 
The interviewees appear to be suggesting that they have somehow solved the 
problem most famously explicated by Donald Rumsfeld. Not only are they aware 
of the known unknowns, they are also aware of the unknown unknowns and 
thus are able to seek out and challenge themselves to do that about which they 
have no awareness or concept of. It can only be assumed that they know of 
everything that they don’t know given that they presented themselves as being 
self-stretching by dint of their knowledge about where they need to be 
stretched and how to do it, even if they have no plans to do it in the near future. 
This is indicative of the extent to which within the contemporary societal 
discourse of openness as a positive trait, what is most valued “is the capacity 
and willingness to learn and to choose as opposed to the inability or 
unwillingness to do so” (Ollivier 2008, p.124, emphasis added). By representing 
themselves as being critically reflective around their own cultural participation, 
the interviewees once again signify that their own patterns of cultural 
participation are not problematic no matter how particular or subjective they 
                                                          
143 See Appendix 1.16 for further relevant examples from the data. 
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may appear in practice. Whatever they opt to label as cultural participation is 
validated by their espousal of an omnivorous attitude, and it was therefore part 
of their identity as a “finished” cultural participant that they were allowed to set 
their own boundaries within which they could challenge themselves.   
5.3.3 Cultural participants are open to appreciating everything  
Finally, it is implied that when it comes to exhibiting Taste, ones’ attitude 
towards cultural participation is as important as the composition of one’s 
omnivorousness. As was discussed in Chapter 4, when asked why participation 
with culture should be encouraged, interviewees tended to speak of the 
potential for “life-changing experiences” (Interviewee 38) and “meaningful 
transformational engagement” (Interviewee 12). Almost none spoke of seeking 
enjoyment, entertainment, joy or fun, the type of words that John McGrath 
might associate with what he called a good night out (1981). This is indicative of 
the extent to which, within the discourse of inadequate participation, legitimate 
cultural participation is associated with valuing the activity in a manner that 
adheres to the institutional discourses of the Arts and thus requires one to 
stress the unique and transformative capacities of cultural participation. This is 
important because, as has already been discussed, the legitimation of public 
subsidy for the Arts is not based upon providing entertainment or enjoyment, 
but in offering an experience that transcended such simple pleasures for the 
greater good of society. While Peterson and Kern originally argued that the 
omnivore is not required to like everything indiscriminately, but to show 
openness to appreciating everything (1996), it is also important that their 
appreciation is based on something greater than its potential for entertainment. 
For what appears, for many of the interviewees, to be one of the specific 
distinguishing factors between their own identity and that of the non-
participant is the extent to which they express acceptance of the premise of 
‘cultural spinach’ (Jensen, 2003), knowing that even if you don’t enjoy much of 
that which receives state subsidy, it is something you should value for its unique 
capacities and show a willingness to try even if you never do. In Foucault’s 
terms, they have come to accept the technologies of the self (2003b [1982]) 
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through which one is expected to observe, analyse and interpret oneself144, and 
in so doing interiorise the authority of a governmental society and the values 
that it seeks to reproduce.  
 
And so espousing openness and support to all that receives state subsidy 
appeared to be as important, if not even more so, than enacting openness. The 
most effective way to perform openness appears to be affirming that you value 
the existing relationship between the state and the Arts. Because for all that 
adopting the discourse of omnivorousness provides a liberal and egalitarian 
veneer suggesting a denial of any hierarchy of value (Bennett et. al. 2009, 
p.255), distinctions do remain. Although diversity of activity was stressed as a 
positive thing by the interviewees it was not simply indiscriminate diversity 
that was being proposed. While it would appear that to claim the mantle of a 
legitimate omnivore your particular cultural soup could and indeed should 
include elements of what the recent class survey of the UK (Savage, 2014) has 
called emergent culture, it appears even more essential that it also include 
interactions with the state subsidised activities and organisations that are the 
manifestations of the Arts.   
 
As such, the interviewees’ responses suggest a discursive adherence to a 
compositional rather than volume based understanding of omnivorousness 
(Warde et. al. 2007) in which what you do does still continue to matter. This is 
because, as was discussed in Chapter 3, within the discourse of abundant 
participation the subject of the non-participant cannot exist as it is ostensibly 
impossible not to participate with culture. Indeed within this discourse the 
volume of cultural participation exhibited by someone labelled as a non-
participant in the discourse of inadequate participation could conceivably be the 
                                                          
144 For a number of the interviewees, the extent to which they had internalized these 
technologies was evident in the guilt they felt at not having had, or not enjoying certain state 
funded cultural experiences: “I think, I do feel that, I get festival fear when the brochure comes in, 
I think there is a perception that you should be doing things” (Interviewee 1. See also Interviewee 
5,8,14,25,32). 
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same or more than someone who was labelled as a cultural participant145. Yet in 
order for the Arts to have a societal problem that it can address it must be 
implied that the lives of non-participants are lacking in some degree and that 
this lack can only be addressed by patterns of participation that include some 
interaction with the state subsidised manifestations of the Arts. And so cultural 
participation policies continue to focus on the state maximising opportunities 
for lower status individuals to extend their knowledge and exposure to selected 
activities about which they may (or may not) currently know little. However 
they are always those activities to which those with greater status have 
discursively attached the higher pleasures of the aesthetic and which their own 
participation with, and knowledge of, in turn affirms the legitimacy of their 
higher status and their ability to assert what forms of cultural participation are 
of higher value.  
Summary 
This chapter has argued that cultural participants are assumed to be either 
sufficiently enriched, or if not, the combination of their knowledge, openness 
and inquisitive character means that they are adequately equipped to both 
enrich themselves and guide others in their own enrichment. It is is therefore 
the cultural participation patterns of those implicitly understood as cultural 
participants that are represented as being a manifestation of Taste and thus 
represented as normal, desirable and enriching. On the other hand, the cultural 
participation patterns of those labelled as non-participants, who are primarily 
those with less advantage and of lower social status, are relegated to being a 
symptom of their inequality and a partial explanation of their failure to succeed.   
 
This is accepted even if observation would suggest that the participation 
patterns of the most advantaged were as likely to be as calcified as anyone 
else’s. The difference in part is because the relative status of those accepted as 
cultural participants reduces the degree to which their activities will be 
                                                          
145 As Interviewee 5 stated when considering the exclusion of certain creative activities from the 
SHS: “on this basis my son is probably more culturally engaged than me because he plays computer 
games every day.” 
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watched, noticed or questioned. For within modern societies the lower one’s 
status the greater one’s activities are monitored and judged. This is a 
phenomenon that Foucault described as descending individualism whereby 
those that can employ the least power are increasingly individualized and 
problematised while the workings of power becomes more anonymous (1977, 
p.192). It is a process that is facilitated because of the extent to which those that 
can exert the greatest power over the field are able to control the conditions of 
their own critique and in so doing maintain their own privilege.   
 
This power also extends to being able to write the identities of those who can 
exert less power, and thus the non-participant is represented as equivalent to 
the type of person that Warde et.al. (2007) have described as the unassuming 
omnivore and whose choices are implicitly assumed to be overly narrow, closed 
minded and prone to a stubborn and unthinking dismissal of whole categories 
of cultural activity:  
 
It is much healthier, it is absolutely healthy when you talk about a 
particular range, or a particular art form and you say, I like this, but I don’t 
like that, but it is when people say I just don’t, I dismiss the whole area of 
cultural activity, I am not prepared to engage, participate, even vaguely 
think about it, and that is this sort of brick wall that somehow you want to 
take down, they may not want to go there, but you just want them to see it 
or whatever… (Interviewee 17) 
 
The lack of knowledge, experience, openness and/or willingness to learn that is 
represented as core components of the subject identity of the non-participant 
presents theirs as a flawed subjectivity, problematises their agency, and 
represents them as being in need of the input of expert mediation to guide their 
leisure time choices. As the rest of logics in the problem construction make 
clear, such state sponsored interventions would not only be for their own good, 
but also for the good of society. 
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Chapter 6 shall now go on to argue that representing the non-participant in this 
way has the effect of denying the capacity of certain people to legitimately make 
an equal contribution to the field of cultural policy. The manner in which those 
who can exert the greatest power within the field manage the subject identity of 
the non-participant allows them to co-opt their voice and silence their speech. 
Despite evidence that suggests the public are often far more open to risk taking 
than commonly suggested (Fennell et al., 2009) and when presented with 
various options will often take the “most unusual and radical solution” 
(Jancovich, 2015b, p.12), the constructed identity of the non-participant helps 
maintain the discourse of an ignorant and risk adverse individual whose 
parochial preferences would lead to the dumbing down of cultural provision, to 
the detriment of everyone. In so doing, cultural policy remains dominated by a 
group of cultural professionals whose position is constantly affirmed by those 
whose participation preferences enjoy significantly more direct state support 
than most. 
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Chapter 6 – Asymmetric relations of power  
In Chapter 5 it was argued that the subject identity of the non-participant is 
constructed in such a manner as to represent them as lacking in knowledge and 
thus closed to the unique benefits that they would gain from exhibiting the same 
patterns of cultural participation that those with the greatest status in society 
are assumed to do. This is valuable to the institution of the Arts because denying 
the agency of those labelled as non-participants neutralizes the potential that 
their choices will be recognised as a legitimate expression of disesteem and 
dissatisfaction for how state subsidies to support cultural participation are 
currently distributed.  An action that could be understood as political is 
rendered technical, and those ill served by the status quo are forever 
understood as potential participants and thus potential benefactors of that 
which the Arts are subsidised on the basis of providing.  
Affirming the existence of the non-participant and their difference to 
themselves is thus even more vital to those for whom the demise of the Arts as a 
unique realm of human activity would be accompanied by the loss of status that 
its institutional relationship with the state grants them. Because anyone 
employing and thus affirming the discursive logic of non-participation 
simultaneously constructs the subject of the non-participant in such a manner 
as to deny anyone labelled as such the right to speak in relation to cultural 
policy. In so doing any claim they may have to a more equitable distribution of 
state support is neutralised.  
This is important because for all that existing research can point towards the 
asymmetric power relationships in the field of cultural policy, far less has been 
considered in relation to how such an imbalance has been maintained in the 
face of increasing calls for public involvement in the decision making processes 
of public bodies.  There is a lack of focus on the specific acts of power that 
ensure that irrespective of how regularly cultural policy is criticised as elitist 
and unequal (Warwick Commission, 2015; Stark et al., 2013, 2014; Jensen, 
2002; Dodd, 1995) it remains dominated by a narrow group of decision makers 
that maintain the status quo. 
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This final chapter of analysis will argue that the affirmation and management of 
the non-participant identity is one such act of power that maintains such 
asymmetric power relations. It will be argued that it is an act of power 
conducted by those individuals whose access to the discursive identity of a 
cultural professional with concomitant claims to expert knowledge, allows them 
to make statements about the cultural participation patterns of others in such a 
manner as to affirm their own elevated and necessary position within the field. 
While the chapter continues with a discussion about the extent to which this 
means that cultural participation policies might best be understood as 
performative practice, it concludes by arguing that the effects of such discursive 
subjectification are not limited to the field in which it is constructed and 
maintained. In so doing, the chapter will specifically address research questions 
7 - How do the constructions of these subjects contribute to the resilience of the 
problem construction? And 8 - What effects does constructing non-participation 
as a problem have on social relations in the real? 
6.1 Cultural policy: a dominated field 
As was outlined in Chapter 2, research about inequalities in cultural 
participation tends to focus on questions of access, in particular, access to 
certain manifestations of the Arts. However, there is a second, although less 
expansive body of work that considers inequality with regards to access to the 
means of professional cultural production (see O’Brien & Oakley, 2015 for a 
summary). Furthermore, in his discussion on culture and class, Holden focuses 
on a different understanding of cultural participation altogether, one which is 
less concerned with the specific activities with which someone is participating 
and more with the capacity to participate in “helping to define what culture 
means” (2010, p.13). The importance of this extends beyond the immediate field 
of cultural policy because, as Oakley and O’Brien (2015) stress, culture plays a 
significant role in systems of social stratification that differentiate individuals 
on the basis of their societal value and worth. Oakley and O’Brien are therefore 
right to argue, “the question of who gets to make [professional] cultural 
products is a profoundly relevant one” (2015, p.3). But so is that of who makes 
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cultural policy decisions, for cultural policy making is an important site at which 
power relationships affect cultural production and practice both materially and 
discursively. It is to a discussion of how cultural policy remains a field 
dominated by a narrow network of cultural professionals that the first portion 
of this chapter now turns.  
6.1.1 The existence of a cultural elite 
Exploring why the published rates of cultural participation appear unchanged 
despite the significant policy focus it has received it recent years, Jancovich 
(2011, 2015b, 2015a) has undertaken work that considers the inequality of 
influence faced by some with regards to cultural policy making146. She argues 
that the invitation to participate rarely extends as far as involvement in the 
decision making process around the organisations and activities that receive 
public subsidy. Likewise, Anberree, et. al. (2015) have argued that participatory 
projects do little to change the core operations of subsidised organisations, 
finding public participation to be “marginal and fragmentary, characterised by a 
specific and ad-hoc structure” (2015, p.40). While acknowledging the potential 
for cultural policy to tend towards a path-dependency model, Jancovich makes 
use of Lukes (2005) argument that elites will always dominate policy decisions, 
to propose that an elite continue to wield the greatest influence over cultural 
policy despite some isolated attempts to widen the range of voices involved in 
decision making. Her conclusion is that resistance to change from parts of the 
arts sector, combined with decision making processes that ignore the 
inequalities of power inherent to them are the “greatest barriers to increasing 
participation” (2015b, p.13). However her analysis does not offer a significant 
discussion about what these inequalities of power are and how they might 
work. Such under theorisation makes disrupting such power relations far more 
difficult as it risks any attempt to do so simply maintaining the logic of the 
existing relationships, albeit with alternative faces adopting the various existing 
discursive subject positions available.   
                                                          
146 Specifically her work has focused on the operation of cultural organisations and distribution 
of public funds. 
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6.1.2 Great men of culture, snobs and neo-mandarins   
In order to consider how elites have managed to maintain such control over the 
field of cultural policy, one must first consider who these elite are. Although 
research can often focus on the fact that the cultural sector is disproportionately 
composed of a social and economic elite (O’Brien and Oakley, 2015, Oakley  and 
O'Brien, 2015; Warwick Commission, 2015; Hesmondhalgh and Saha, 2013; 
Jones, 2012), this overlooks the fact that irrespective of their demographic 
background, the very nature of the Arts requires the existence of a cultural elite. 
As has been discussed in Chapter 4, the constitution of the Arts created a 
specific sphere of practice in which the individual was divorced from their 
experiences, thereby creating a market in which reunification could only occur 
through the action of an intermediary. And so the presumption of management 
by some elite has, since its inception, been endemic to the institution of the Arts. 
At its core is the acceptance of an “unequal, asymmetrical social relation - the 
split between acting and bearing the impact of action, between the managers 
and the managed, the knowing and the ignorant, the refined and the crude” 
(Bauman, 2004, p.65). As such, in addition to creating the subject positions of 
the cultural participant and non-participant, the discursive constitution of the 
Arts also established the possibility for these cultural elite to exist.  
These elite were individuals who were represented as enjoying a distinctly 
greater knowledge, understanding and sensibility for the aesthetic experience 
and thus best placed to manage the development of society’s culture. The 
existence of such cultural elites became even more important as the Arts and 
the state came together, for the legitimacy of this relationship relied to a great 
extent upon the spoken testimony of those who were understood as the 
twentieth century equivalent of Matthew Arnold’s ‘great men of culture’ (2009 
[1869]). Men (and they were mostly men) who were represented as being 
passionately motivated to share the best that had been said and done with those 
who lived outside of the clique of the cultivated and learned and in so doing to 
improve their place in life (Hewison, 2013; Sinclair, 1995).  
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The existence within the discourse of such a subject identity, along with their 
taken for granted role in decision making, aligned easily with what Gray (2000) 
has described as democratic elitism: the dominant model of policy making in the 
UK for much of the twentieth century. This model gains its own discursive 
legitimacy from two of the core assumptions of the modern episteme, namely 
the notion that truth can be identified in a disinterested way by those with the 
right knowledge and that as such, knowledge exists independently of power 
(Foucault, 1977). And so, from the outset of state subsidies for the Arts, the 
relationship between the two institutions has been predicated upon the 
labelling of some individuals as experts who were able to ensure the “‘fair’ 
disbursement of grants to arts organisations according to observable criteria of 
judgement, thus being, in principle, accountable to ‘the public’” (McGuigan, 
2004, p.39). As Hewison has noted, this belief is enshrined in the principle of 
arms-length governance that “consigns the management of cultural policy to a 
group of experts who know transcendence when they see it” (2013, p.57) 
because they are represented as knowing better than most about how best to 
maximise opportunities for aesthetic experiences. They are the few who Keynes 
described as capable of passionate perception (Pinnock, 2006) and that (in the 
French context) Bourdieu would come to label as cultural intermediaries (1984) 
whose role was to increase the cultural catchment of the objects and activities 
most valued by those with most status in society.  
 
Not only are these cultural experts a product of the institutional discourses of 
the Arts, their dominance of the cultural policy field is sustained because their 
expertise and right to speak is legitimated by the acknowledgement of their 
position by other experts to whom they reciprocate their support using the 
same discursive logic that produces both of them as subjects. They thus 
“operate in the role of self-advocates rather than self-critics, creating what has 
been defined as an ‘interminable circuit of inter-legitimation’ (Bourdieu 1984, p. 
53)” (Jancovich, 2015b, p.9). It is for this reason that cultural policy remains 
primarily orientated towards the protection of the Arts to the detriment of some 
individuals and their ability to participate in a range of activities of their 
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choosing. Cultural policy at all levels is almost entirely shaped by the decisions 
of a narrow group of individuals who have been granted status and authority on 
the basis of the institutional discourses that their decisions and practices 
reproduce.  
 
While their own affirmation had previously been adequate to validate such 
decisions and the logics upon which they were based, the adoption by 
government of the principles of New Public Management (Chappell and Knell, 
2012; Moore, 2005; Moore, 1995) engendered a need for more supposedly 
objective decision making. As such, the cultural policy field saw a deluge of 
evidence and evidence making 147 as policymakers, practitioners, politicians and 
academics all sought ways in which to capture, measure, and articulate the 
impact of state subsidy for the Arts. Indeed the measurement of impact appears 
to have become a creative industry in its own right with many of these new 
discursive texts being produced by new agents in what has been described as 
the rise of calculative cultural expertise (Prince 2013, see also Power, 1997 for 
similair discussions). However, Prince has argued that these supposedly 
independent figures and the allegedly objective evidence that they produce 
simply obscure what ultimately remains the subjective decisions of an elite few 
behind the performed objectivity that could be provided by statistics and 
consultants reports148 providing  ‘killer facts’ (Stevens, 2011) for making 
persuasive policy stories. 
6.1.3 The challenge of a cultural democracy  
However the dominant model of managing the relationship between the Arts 
and the state is persistently challenged by an alternative one that presents it as 
thoroughly elitist, concerned only with supporting the esoteric interests of the 
most privileged and those that wished to mimic them. The discourse of 
democratising culture that has been so central to the justification of state 
subsidy for the Arts was particularly critiqued on the basis that it ignored all 
                                                          
147 Reports, literature reviews, project evaluations, public consultations etc. A selection of such 
material has also been summarized in Chapter 2.   
148 It was at this time (2005) that the Taking Part survey was introduced in England. 
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cultural activity outside of a narrowly defined canon and contained little focus 
on access to the means of cultural production and distribution (EDUCULT, 2015; 
Garnham, 2005; Evrard, 1997; DiMaggio and Useem, 1978). The accusation was 
that in practice, cultural policy focused only on providing access to those 
activities and objects that had historically been seen as the preserve of the social 
elite, be that the aristocracy or the ruling bourgeoisie (Stevenson et al., 2015; 
Landry and Matarasso, 1999). This also raised the question of regressive 
taxation given that, from the outset of state subsidies for the Arts, the taxation of 
those on the lowest incomes was supporting activities primarily undertaken by 
those that could arguably afford to pay more for them.  
 
This was not an argument restricted to the UK, and UNESCO was explicitly 
calling for governments across the world to understand what the cultural needs 
of individuals were, rather than presuming they simply wanted access to that 
which had previously been denied to them: 
 
In working out a cultural policy it is necessary to evaluate needs and to 
know what exists to meet them. In most countries very little is known 
concerning either of these aspects: people do not even know what 
methods can be used to discover the facts of cultural activity and what 
are the needs of the public (UNESCO, 1969) 
 
Those arguing against the status quo suggested that the majority of what was 
supposedly being redistributed through state support appeared to be irrelevant 
to the majority. This is a point made forcefully by Su Braden in her book Artists 
and People (1978) in which she denounced the Arts Council’s ideological 
support for ‘bourgeois culture’149. In the UK, movements focused on community 
arts and the centres in which it was often created were indicative of the 
emergence of a new discourse of cultural democracy (EDUCULT, 2015; 
                                                          
149 This was in line with the position being adopted by UNESCO at the time where there was a 
call for government policies in this area to acknowledge a diversity of culture by virtue of no 
longer only promoting wider access to ‘high-class culture’, but rather to promote creative 
activity and the expression of individual personality amongst the populace (Toleda Silva, 2015). 
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Garnham, 2005; Evrard, 1997; DiMaggio and Useem, 1978) that challenged the 
status quo through suggesting a far broader range of activities should be 
supported and promoted by the state. Demands for greater support for the local, 
amateur and popular culture that was produced and arguably preferred by 
those represented as the ordinary public (Bianchini et. al. 1988; Mulgan and 
Warpole, 1986) meant that by the 1970’s the canon of state subsidised activities 
had expanded slightly to include film and jazz (Black, 2006). However the 
majority of subsidies remained orientated to those organisations whose 
activities best reflected the original manifestations of the Arts150 and as such 
criticism only intensified. By the 1980s Norman Tebbit151 was forcefully arguing 
that the Arts Council was not only elitist but also politically biased and unable to 
provide what the people wanted (Dodd, 1995). Increasingly, part of the 
discursive legitimation work required by the agents of the Arts was to explain 
how the system was not simply an elite “defending their own tastes and status 
in the name of the masses” (Jensen, 2002, p.197 citing Charles Paul Freund).  
 
There are doubtless those who would contend that the Arts are no longer elitist. 
Indeed many of the interviewees did and as evidence of this, they pointed to the 
ways in which they sought to break down barriers in order to diversify their 
audiences. However it was evident that they primarily understood the idea of 
elitism in social or economic terms and overlooked the extent to which, by its 
very nature, the Arts must retain a cultural elite if it is to mean anything at all. 
And so while it may be the case that since the middle of the twentieth century 
there has been an increasing shift towards participation between the artist, the 
art, and the audience (Walmsley, 2013b; Brown et al., 2011a; van Wel et al., 
                                                          
150 In 1969, one third of the Art Council’s spending still went on four institutions: The National 
Theatre, Royal Opera House, Royal Shakespeare Company and Sadler’s Wells (Black, 2006). In 
1978 this disparity remained given that thirty travelling theatre companies shared less the 
£1million while the Royal Shakespeare Company and National shared £4million (Itzin 1980, 
cited in McGuigan 2004). 
151 Tebbit called for cultural provision to be met by an effective and unregulated market where 
people would be free to partake of what they chose, be it pornography on page three or 
classicism in the gallery (Dodd, 1995). Government was represented as having taken an 
unnecessary interest in the private lives of its citizens, and in doing so presided over the 
transference of wealth from those with the least to support the minority interests of those with 
the most.   
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2006; McCarthy and Kimberly, 2001), changing the format of the participation 
with an elite does not in and of itself eradicate that elite. Bishop talks of the 
extent to which artists have striven to “collapse the distinction between 
performer and audience, professional and amateur, production and reception” 
(2006, p. 10) but these distinctions can only be collapsed within the 
institutional discourses of the Arts. They can never be eradicated because to do 
so would be to stop affirming the existence of the Arts as a distinct realm of 
human activity. The relationship between the components might change, the 
names with which they are labelled may be reimagined, but the components all 
remain and the imagined outcome remains the same: the Arts, the unique 
experience that it offers participants, and the need for a cultural elite to mediate 
the relationship between the two – this is a core part of the institutional 
discourse that proves impossible for cultural policy to think outside of. 
6.1.4 Cultural professionals  
Gartman (1991) has argued that critical theory research can too often invoke 
the existence of elites without being specific about which individuals they are 
referring to or offering enough detail about how their dominance over culture 
works. In an attempt to avoid such a shortcoming, it is important to clarify who 
have been understood as the cultural elite within the present study. Lesley 
Riddoch identifies the cultural elite as being located within the network of 
bureaucratic governance152 through which modern government functions:   
… the power wielded by funders, civil servants, and arts administrators 
over what to show and what to store, what to expose to a Scotland-wide 
audience, what to confine to ‘experimental spaces’ and what to simply 
ignore. (2014, p.273)  
 
However Jancovich (2015) understands this elite to be a far broader network, 
and includes those well-funded organisations that have been understood as 
wielding the most power and influence in cultural policy making (see also 
                                                          
152 See, Taylor (1997) for a discussion of network governance in relation to cultural policy in the 
UK. 
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Griffiths et al., 2008). It is often argued that within such organisations there 
emerge a limited number of voices that claim greatest authority (Lukes, 2005). 
This leads Jancovich (2015b) to suggest that it is the senior representatives of 
the best funded cultural organisations that have the greatest power, far more 
than those working within the organisations that fund them. She argues that 
fundamental change with regards to how cultural policy decisions are made are 
blocked by these “powerful organisations [and their leaders] that have a strong 
stake at the table” (2015b, p.10) and seek to use it in order to retain their own 
status and dominance. 
 
While this researcher agrees that the most senior and prominent individuals 
from major funded organisations are amongst those with the greatest status in 
the field, they would not limit the label of the cultural elite to these individuals 
alone. To do so would focus on what Foucault might understand as sovereign 
power to the detriment of any consideration of disciplinary power (1977. See, in 
particular, pp.170-177). Disciplinary power is far less visible because of the 
extent to which it is de-centralised and manifest in what Foucault describes as 
the micro-physics of power (1977). Disciplinary power is not a thing that can be 
acquired, reserved or possessed, rather it is a relation that is constantly 
operating at the most micro levels of social relations and is exercised both 
strategically and tactically to maintain advantage in any given field through 
ensuring control over its discourses and discursive practice. In so doing, such 
acts of power are responsible for the production and preservation of belief and 
values (Maguire and Mathews, 2010; Connor, 1992; Bourdieu, 1984; Foucault, 
1980).  While the state may draft laws and policies that determine who is 
normal and who is abnormal, “these policies and laws are based on knowledge 
produced by disciplines and institutions” (Danaher et al., 2000) and thus affirm 
the truth of these disciplines and the inequalities inherent in their institutions. 
Those who claim to have most knowledge about the field that the institution 
dominates then sustain such truths through their ubiquity of use and 
unchallenged repetition.  
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And so this thesis argues that the cultural elite includes all those agents whose 
representation within the field as some type of cultural professional marks 
them out as legitimate to make statements about what is of cultural value, and 
in doing so make or affirm choices about how to spend public money on 
supporting cultural participation – a kind of aesthetic technocrat. This therefore 
includes artists, critics, cultural commentators, academics, policy-makers, and 
the staff of cultural organisations153. Indeed it would include all of those whose 
cultural preferences are afforded greater privilege by the state, who can employ 
power more easily within the field of cultural policy, and who can use this to 
benefit their own status both within the field and beyond. While there may be 
disagreements about which particular type of cultural professional should be 
able to employ the greatest power154, they all share a commitment to the 
discursive logic that allows their subjective judgments to gain the status of 
objective truths based on their “ability to distinguish and valorise different 
cultural experiences in a way that resonates with others claiming the same 
expertise” (Prince, 2013, p.747). The more status an individual gains within the 
field, the more power they can employ to affirm their own status and the status 
of others but the more vigorously they must also defend the discursive logic 
upon which their status relies.  
From this perspective all of those interviewed for this study can be understood 
as part of this network of cultural professionals whose access to this subject 
identity within the field grants them a more elevated status than they would 
have by virtue of simply participating with the Arts. It is the same distinction 
that Clive Bell endorsed when he distinguished between the ‘civilisers’ and the 
‘simply civilised’ (1928), or between those who can have Taste and those who 
can legitimately seek to shape Taste (Nixon & du Gay, 2002).  Through their 
statements and their actions these civilisers assert their identity as cultural 
                                                          
153 This perspective places this thesis at odds with Adorno (1978b) who drew a distinction 
between those that he understood as administrators and those who had expertise in art.  
154 This is because institutions are not without internal friction - they contain multiple self-
serving interest groups who seek to gain access, influence and control over the resources and 
power that the institution can employ within a given field. For an example such a dispute see 
Stevenson (2014) for an analysis of a discursive event centered on the governance of Creative 
Scotland.  
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professionals who should be seen to be legitimately able to talk knowingly 
about the cultural participation of others. Interviewees access to the identity of 
cultural professional was regularly evident throughout the interviews as they 
altered their discursive position (Wodak, 2007) from one in which their opinion 
was being sought “as a person” to one in which it was being sought as “a 
professional” (a distinction that Interviewees 4, 5, 6, 14, 16 and 17 all explicitly 
made). Such movement between discursive positions is not unusual, for as 
Foucault notes, any position: 
 
can be filled by virtually any individual when he formulates the 
statement; and in so far as one and the same individual may occupy, in 
turn, the same series of statements, different positions, and assume the 
role of different subjects (1972, p.94).  
 
And so the more explicit the questions became about cultural participation 
policies, the more the interviewees adopted an explicitly professional identity 
and the related discursive position. This distinction was evident, for example, in 
Interviewee 5 speaking of putting on their “professional hat” before answering 
certain questions, Interviewee 17 clarifying if they were being asked as an 
individual or as a representative of their organisation, and Interviewee 11 
stating that this was them “speaking as a human being, not an employee”.  
6.1.5 Claiming expertise, not elitism  
An awareness of the elevated status that this professional identity granted them 
was evident in many of the interviewees’ responses; however care was also 
taken with regards to how this was represented. On one hand it was common 
for interviewees to explicitly distance themselves and their institutions from 
any accusations of elitism: 
 
I think the more, I am not trying to sound elitist, the more an audience 
knows or can be receptive to things the more I think the institutions should 
reach out to them and provide them with what they want. (Interviewee 
17)  
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I think if you don’t reach out and engage more widely, it just becomes 
very elitist and your audience are all … all… middle class people who are 
already engaged in culture (Interviewee 12) 
 
There is also an elitism, let’s be completely honest, there is an elitism, 
ballet, opera, less so theatre but still to a certain extent […] there is a thing 
of it not being… of it being elite (interviewee 41)  
 
…that is where you get into questions of who defines quality and 
accusations of elitism and all of that. (Interviewee 25)  
 
Such a rejection is to be expected given the threat that the idea of elitism poses 
to the institutional relationship between the Arts and the state, which has been 
discussed previously in this thesis. However interviewees simultaneously all 
appeared to draw a line with regards to how far their stated desire for 
participation with the public would go and in so doing affirmed the necessity of 
some kind of elite decision maker of which their own role was one particular 
example. There was a point at which the opinions of the cultural non-participant 
(and indeed cultural participant) were no longer seen to be legitimate or 
wanted, in particular with regards to any decisions about the nature of what it 
was that state subsidies to support cultural participation would provide. As 
interviewee 17 said  "it is a question of them not really knowing what they want, 
or not knowing much about the field […] we have to take the leading role in 
that exchange”. Through employing the discursive identity of the non-
participant that has been outlined in Chapter 5, Interviewees were able justify 
this relationship on the basis that the non-participant lacked some degree of 
knowledge that made their input inappropriate at certain points:  
 
 …would you ask your plumber to do an operation on your brain, you 
wouldn’t really, and yet we constantly think that audiences can tell us what 
to do […] but there is a point at which the audience can’t do it, because 
they don’t have the knowledge, they are not in the daily infrastructure 
of it and the kind of…knowing the industry [… …] you just have to trust 
the neurosurgeon! (Interviewee 21)  
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…you know the program here is run by me, and is it just my taste, do I get 
to decide how £666,000 of public money is spent every year just down to 
my personal taste? And we defend that quite a lot by saying, no, no, because 
obviously, it is a question of somebody that is trained, and somebody 
who … is fully engaged (Interviewee 4) 
 
…in terms of participation, it is still led by people who have expertise, 
you know they say you can curate a show from the Tate collection, what 
art work do you want, this one or this one, you know, it is still, there 
absolutely is a role for expertise… (Interviewee 12)  
 
[Despite previously stating that “It’s not about people coming to us and us 
giving them expertise”] I am all for and I fully believe in cultural 
engagement within communities, but there is also that thing, when I am 
directing or facilitating, that is my job, my training, I have to be the 
expert because I am letting people down if I am not [… …] It is like if I saw 
someone who was distressed, I would not go and deal with that on my own, 
I would speak to a professional. […] It is kind of like, you know, we do 
know what we are doing, that’s not to take anything away from you.  
(Interviewee 41)  
 
…of course we are providing them with what they should want, because, 
because we flatter ourselves that we know what we are curating, and that 
we appreciate and know some of the complexities of it so we are trying 
to, in the nicest possible way, educate people about that… (Interviewee 17)  
 
The discomfort evident in some of the interviewees as they rejected any 
suggestion of elitism while simultaneously affirming their own elite status is not 
unusual, for in their desire to gain access to status within the field of cultural 
policy even those individuals who may hold dissonant perspectives and employ 
conflicting discourses from alternative discursive positions are required to 
suppress or adapt them. They must do so in order to legitimately employ the 
subject identity of the cultural professional and in order to defend that ability 
once they have attained it. This is necessary because in gaining access at any 
level to any dominant faction within a discursive field all fundamentally 
different understandings of reality must be “repressed and forgotten so that the 
dominant group can continue to justify the ‘inevitability’ of their own rise to 
power” (Danaher et al., 2000, p.24). While individuals might adopt different 
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logics when speaking from outside of the field, when speaking from their 
position within it they must repeatedly ensure they affirm the discourses upon 
which their status relies (Danaher et al., 2000, p.26) and is indicative of the 
extent to which, for any individual, their life is “made easier through 
capitulation to the collective[s] with which they identify” (Adorno, 1978, p.202). 
As such, truth becomes what is good for us to believe in any given circumstance 
(James, 1995 [1907]). 
 
This is why, whenever the interview moved from a discussion about culture in 
the abstract to a specific discussion about cultural participation policies, the 
interviewees would adopt a professional identity, employ the discourse of 
inadequate participation, and affirm the existence of a cultural non-participant, 
even if they had dismissed cultural non-participation as impossible elsewhere in 
the interview. As Interviewee 14 stated, while they personally would never 
make the assumption that anyone was a cultural non-participant, they knew 
that it was common in their profession to do just that. This was a sentiment that 
was shared by Interviewee 41 who felt that “there is that assumption that we 
make, quite often that we make, that certain groups haven’t got a cultural life”. 
The ‘we’ in this sentence is presumably those with whom they share their 
professional identity, individuals that Interviewee 21 described as: 
 
…the people who run the arts that love the arts […who] are therefore 
completely committed to it, and for whom it is therefore a lifelong ambition 
and mission to bring everybody into it (Interviewee 21).  
 
Institutions such as the Arts are established through the actualisation of value 
judgements and “they are always likely to become fixated by the desire to 
conserve and reproduce those values” (Connor, 1992, p.4). For as Adorno 
(1978b) notes, the external affectivity of an institution is a function of its inner 
homogeneity, and while there may well be competition within the institution for 
access to greater status and an increased share of resources (Taylor & Van 
Every, 1993), such competition is restrained by a transcendent interest in 
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maintaining the integrity of the whole. So while there may be those agents 
within the institution that would like to instigate change, they face significant 
discursive sanctions should they attempt to do so in a manner that puts the 
institution at risk. 
 
As such, to be committed to the Arts demands a commitment to its discourses 
and the values and beliefs that they reproduce. For those who gain societal 
status from a discursive identity constructed from the discourses of the Arts 
cannot deny the existence of the cultural non-participant when talking from 
their professional position within the field of cultural policy. To do so would be 
to risk undermining the discursive credibility of the institution of which they are 
a part. This is not an option as it is the acceptance of these discursive logics that 
give meaning to the texts that cultural professionals produce (funding 
applications, evaluation reports etc.), the practices they employ (outreach 
activities, free access, discounted tickets etc.) and ultimately upon which the 
continued relationship between the Arts and the state relies. Cultural 
professionals cannot claim legitimate expertise unless they have a structure of 
meaning upon which to base such claims and the resultant status that they gain. 
The necessity to maintain the discourses upon which this structure of meaning 
relies results in a discursive path dependency155 that means what can be 
thought and said, and by whom, remains fundamentally constrained within the 
field of cultural policy. This limits the extent to which anyone with any influence 
in the field can change it, even if they wanted to, because cultural professionals 
must always affirm the distinction between “those who do the valuing and those 
whose actions are subjected to evaluation” (Connor, 1992, p.248). 
6.1.6 The logics of decision making  
In 1945 Keynes made clear that with the establishment of the Arts Council, 
there was no intention to “socialise this side of social endeavour” (1945, p.21) 
and so it appears to remain the case today. For while there may be tension 
                                                          
155 This is not discursive path dependence as understood in linguistics whereby in discussion 
between agents over multiple connected propositions, the orders in which claims are made are 
seen to affect the conclusion reached. 
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between them, and one might debate their relative influence, it remains the case 
that cultural policy decisions are made between a network of cultural 
professionals consisting of artists, arts managers, bureaucrats, academics, 
critics, and politicians. Participation by the full spectrum of the public in 
decisions regarding the production and supply of subsidised culture is not 
desired (Jancovich, 2015b; Fennell et al., 2009) or even understood as sensible. 
As the self-proclaimed representatives of the ‘artistic community’ in Scotland 
stated during the 2013 stooshie156 (see Stevenson, 2014 for a discussion of this 
discursive event), they believed that “existing resources are best managed in an 
atmosphere of trust between those who make art and those who fund it” (Greig 
et. al. 2012 emphasis added). In their response to this demand, despite 
reaffirming their commitment to “increasing public engagement and 
participation” (Creative Scotland, 2012c), Creative Scotland’s board appears to 
agree with this assumption. Although committing to the establishment of 
forums that will feed into any future policy development, the wider public were 
only incidentally informed of them. As such, these forums were essentially 
limited to “artists, creative practitioners and staff” (Creative Scotland, 2012d) 
and did not include representatives of all the interest groups that state subsidies 
for culture are presumably intended to support.  
The degree to which, within the field of cultural policy, members of the public 
are constructed as passive objects rather than as active subjects was evidenced 
in the current data when interviewees were directly asked who else should be 
spoken to about the subject of cultural non-participation. Interviewee’s 
suggestions included funders, administrators, academics, artists, managers, and 
civil servants but never the public and never the non-participant, whom this 
study is ostensibly about. In practice, the discursive passivity of the public is 
manifest in the extent to which it is apparently unproblematic for them to be 
wholly excluded from Creative Scotland’s decision-making process. In offering a 
summary of how they decided upon those organisations that would share £300 
                                                          
156 A Scottish term broadly meaning uproar, commotion or row, often used in relation to some 
form of protest. 
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million pounds of public money over three years by becoming regularly funded 
organisations, Creative Scotland extensively stress the presence of art-form 
expertise, while those that are meant to participate with what is funded are 
noticeable by their absence:  
In stage one; all applications were assessed individually against published 
criteria by staff with the appropriate art-form or specialism 
knowledge, by finance staff and in detail by art-form teams. In stage 
two; those applications recommended from stage one were then discussed 
in detail by the senior team at Creative Scotland, including art-form 
leads, with the aim of building as balanced a portfolio as possible for 
Regularly Funded Organisations across different art-forms, geography, 
organisational scale, range and diversity. The recommended portfolio was 
then presented to the Creative Scotland Board for final approval on 16 
October. Each application was considered by 30 different people across the 
decision making process. They included our Specialist Officers, Finance 
Team, Directors, Art form Portfolio Managers and Board. (Creative 
Scotland, 2015h) 
However for all that those representing themselves during the stooshie as the 
spokespeople for the ‘artistic community’ (and thus culture) rejected the 
purportedly “obfuscating language of management” (Greig et.al., 2012), the 
same might equally be said about the esoteric and opaque nature of the 
language of “art form expertise” that was represented as the legitimate manner 
in which to discuss and defend spending decisions on cultural subsidies157. 
Because irrespective of which language is employed, they all seek to manage the 
practice of individuals and serve to deny the public the ability to speak (Davis, 
2010) within the field of cultural policy.  
Pinnock (2006) describes such decision making logic as Keynesian, and points 
out that it has remained the dominant approach to cultural policy at the same 
time as it has increasingly been abandoned in other areas of government. The 
apparent extent to which a network of cultural professionals have maintained 
their dominance of cultural policy is especially surprising given the political 
                                                          
157 It is a position that this particular group share with John Tusa (2007) and Brian McMaster 
(2008) who are particularly vocal advocates for the need for a special type of expertise in 
making cultural policy decisions.  
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economy of advanced liberalism, the discourses of which represent the public as 
autonomous, rational agents who will respond to external stimuli and incentives 
in a self-maximising manner. It was these discourses that supported the 
development of New Public Management into New Public Governance.  
New Public Governance draws even more extensively on Mark Moore’s theory 
of Public Value (1995) in which legitimacy and democratic authorisation arises 
from the delivery of policy objectives developed collaboratively with individuals 
in their role as citizens. For Moore, it is fundamental that any publicly funded 
organisation has a clear understanding of what its raison d’être is in the eyes of 
citizens, and only by measuring success against these refined public preferences 
can they gain the approval of what Moore describes as the “external authorising 
environment” (1995, p.34)158. This shift resulted in all areas of government in 
the UK159 adopting a stated enthusiasm for encouraging and evidencing the 
participation of ‘ordinary people’ in all areas of public life (Clarke, 2013). 
‘Ordinary people’ had become the mythical figure that must be obeyed and 
satisfied, supposedly at all costs (McGuigan, 2004). This enthusiasm manifested 
itself across the public sector in the form of increased public consultations 
(Bunting, 2007), the measurement of public satisfaction (Lee et al., 2011) and a 
challenge for state supported organisations to reflect and reform the way in 
which they engage with the interests of the public (Keaney, 2006)160. Cultural 
policy was no exception and Chris Smith, the UK Culture Secretary at the time, 
spearheaded a new wave of audience-led initiatives intended to bring 
“democracy to culture […] through a process generated from the bottom rather 
than the top” (1998, p.17).   
However institutions whose relationship with the state has thus far been 
predicated on the knowledge and authority of professional expertise face a 
                                                          
158 For a discussion about public value in relation to cultural policy see Lee et al., 2011 and Gray, 
2008. 
159 First promoted through the Number 10 strategy unit and their publication Creating Public 
Value (Kelly et al., 2002). 
160 The BBC became the most high profile public organisation to embrace the idea of public 
value, conducting their own public value study in advance of their charter review in 2007 ( 
Coyle and Woollard, 2009; Collins, 2007) 
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significant difficulty when they are made to ask rather than tell the public what 
value their institution has and how the public should respond as a result of this 
supposed value. It is a difficulty that is summarised effectively by Clarke:  
…the process of discovering, summoning and enrolling ordinary people 
is a difficult process. It demands considerable political and governmental 
labour and its results are unpredictable. These subjects do not 
necessarily come when summoned, nor do they necessarily behave 
according to the plan if they do arrive. (2013, p.222) 
Or, to paraphrase, what if the public don’t share the values and beliefs of the 
institution, have different priorities and demand significant change to what is 
currently supported? What if they simply don’t feel that they need that 
institution in their life and do not want to participate with it? What if they 
simply do not value what it is that is being subsidised and express that through 
the choices that they make? For as Pinnock argues, “the value that people attach 
to art can reasonably be inferred from the use(s) they are seen to make of it” 
(Pinnock, 2006, p.175). 
The answer, in part, is to problematise their values through offering an 
explanation of why they do not align with those of the institution and in so 
doing retain control over the dominant understanding of the institution. And so 
for the cultural professional it is not good enough to only manage meanings 
about the cultural content of any particular object or action (as De Propris and 
Mwaura, 2013 suggest), or even to simply affirm the possibility of non-
participation. To maintain control of the field, cultural professionals must also 
manage the way in which the non-participant subject is understood, in the 
manner that has been shown in Chapter 5. Because expertise and the additional 
status one may claim because of it is not an innate individual trait but is 
constituted between a network of human and non-human agents, “an 
individual’s expert status depends on their position in assemblages of human 
and nonhuman materials and technologies” (Prince, 2013, p.750). The 
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maintenance of these assemblages therefore becomes paramount to the expert 
and a task to which power will necessarily be applied.  
And so where public consultations have been employed they remain the result 
of top-down directives (Peck, 2009; Hay, 2007) resulting in superficial attempts 
to ask the public what they thought the Arts can do for them161, facilitated by 
cultural professionals who are best served by the maintenance of the status quo. 
These are interactions that are far closer to Arnstein’s concept of ‘inform and 
consult’ on her ‘Ladder of Citizen Participation’ (1969) than the type of 
collaborations that she associated with a fully participatory democratic process 
in which all parties would play an active part.  
6.1.7 Co-opting their voice 
So, just as McConnell (2009) found in her study162, cultural policy is made by 
those that claim the ability to speak on behalf of culture. This ability is granted 
to them by their subject identity within the institutional discourses of the Arts. 
It is however important that cultural professionals are seen to be attempting to 
involve others in their decision making, for although the public has no speech 
within the field of cultural policy, it does have a voice, a voice that is controlled 
by the cultural professionals who are able to cop-opt it to their service (see 
Davis, 2010 and Hallward, 2005 for a dsicussion of how some groups can co-opt 
the voices of others). For example, in explaining why the government takes an 
interest in cultural participation, Interviewee 19 employed the voice of the 
interviewer as a representative of a broader society with homogenized desires:   
part of our lives as society, is to encourage cultural participation [… ] just 
as you want efficient health services and you want to know they are being 
run efficiently, and that’s a reasonable request, you know, you also want 
to know that cultural provision is being run efficiently but you’re doing it 
for another reason, you’re doing it because you believe it’s a fundamental 
part of a civilised society 
                                                          
161 ACE’s Arts Debate is a prime example of this, as outlined previously.  
162 It should be noted that McConnell did not see this as a necessarily bad thing but associated it 
with a subject identity that she describes as ‘the cultural hero’ who is a passionate advocate and 
defendant of the arts.  
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Here, the voice of a silent public is invoked to justify the subjective decisions of 
the network of professionals that maintains the most significant influence over 
cultural policy. As one of the interviewees with an influence over what received 
funding stated: (note the pronouns)  
[When asked about funds supporting activities for which there appeared 
to be small audiences]…we are still happy to fund things where we think 
there is good work, so for me that suggests we see it as market failure, the 
analogy would be funding a bus link in Wester Ross because nobody in the 
market would supply that product. But if we think there is a need for 
people to see, we think there is a need for experimental film to be pushed 
forward as a medium continually then we would continue to fund that. So 
there are certainly some decisions taken as an organisation around 
what is of value to Scotland  
As the final sentence makes clear, it is unproblematic to suggest that cultural 
professionals have a legitimate right to decide which activities are discursively 
understood as having the greatest value to all the people of Scotland and which 
are presumably seen as mere pleasures of contentment and distraction163. This 
is indicative of the extent to which management (in the sense of controlling and 
manipulating the probability and understanding of social actions) is embedded 
within the discursive practice of the cultural professional. Not only in terms of 
making statements about what is of value, but also in regards whose value 
statements are seen as legitimate and in which circumstances. For managing is 
to restrict the freedom of the managed through limiting their capacity to be 
heard, and thus their ability to challenge the status quo. This is one of the core 
principles of Rancière’s broad ranging critique of society and democracy in 
which his most basic assumption is very simple: “everyone thinks, everyone 
speaks [and yet] the prevailing division of labour and configuration of society 
ensures that only certain classes of people are authorized to think” (2005, p.26) 
and thus capable of speech. Labeling some individuals with the subject identity 
of a cultural non-participant allows the cultural professionals to do just this and 
                                                          
163 Likewise, for all that Creative Scotland’s Open Call for funding requires all applicants whose 
funded activities will not involve the public “to describe how [their] project will enable [them] 
to engage with people in the future”(2015b), the public have no opportunity to judge the value 
they will supposedly gain, that is agreed between the applicant and the assessor. 
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to keep control of the field upon which their status relies.  
As such, it is the assertion of this thesis that the discursive problem of non-
participation also functions as an articulatory practice (Laclau and Mouffe, 
1985, p.96)  that constitutes and organizes social relations. Not only in the sense 
that it constructs the subject identity of the non-participant and in doing so 
“produce the phenomena that it regulates and constrains” (Butler, 1993, p.2) 
but also in that it represent the subjective choices of cultural professionals as 
part of the solution rather than part of the discursive structures that make the 
existence of a non-participant both possible and plausible.  Although the outputs 
of these decisions will inevitably support the cultural participation of some, that 
is a secondary outcome of decisions that are taken first and foremost to support 
the existing manifestations of the Arts and the interests of the cultural 
professionals who run, value and make use of them.   
6.2 The effect of asymmetric power relationships within the field  
Creative Scotland (2014a) found that when asked, most people felt supporting 
cultural participation was something  public money should be spent on. While 
this was echoed in ACE’s 2006 Arts Debate it also indicated that “the real issue is 
not whether or why – it is how” (Bunting, 2007, p.20). In this study, the majority 
of those that did not represent themselves as part of the artistic community 
were concerned that decisions were made by “a small, closed group of experts 
who are not in touch with the needs and priorities of the wider population” 
(2007, p.23). In contrast, the majority of artists and those working in arts 
organisations felt that wider involvement of the public would lead to safe 
decisions and the ‘dumbing down’ of subsidised art (see also Jancovich, 2015 for 
a discussion of this fear).  In turn, the extent to which only certain subjects are 
seen as legitimately able to speak within the field of cultural policy has an effect 
on how the practice of supporting cultural participation is understood and 
evaluated as successful. The next section of this chapter considers such effects 
in more detail.    
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6.2.1 The calcification of public subsidy  
As Pinnock (2006) points out, the logic of evidence-based policy making would 
suggest that the process of public subsidy for the arts should proceed as follows: 
Make subsidised art available, publicise its availability, and see who 
responds. If not enough people respond or if most of those who do could 
afford the art without the subsidy, then fund something different 
(Pinnock, 2006, p.178) 
Yet in practice this is not what occurs. Public subsidy continues to support that 
which the majority have little interest in and which the majority of participants 
with could arguably afford to pay for themselves. Despite decades of work to 
improve access and increase participation, as the recent Warwick Commission 
(2015) has highlighted, it is the wealthiest, better educated and least ethnically 
diverse 8% of the UK population164 that makes most use of publically subsidised 
organisations and events (and thus enjoy a significantly higher public spend per 
head on their cultural interests). Taking into account the extent to which Lottery 
Funding is being employed to mitigate reductions to grant-in-aid, this wealth 
transference is arguably becoming even worse. Considering National Lottery 
Expenditure in England, Stark, et. al. found that: 
The Arts Lottery has disproportionately benefited the most prosperous 
and ‘arts engaged’ communities in England, which are often also those 
contributing least to the Lottery. Some of the least arts-engaged and 
poorest communities, meanwhile, who are contributing most heavily to 
the ‘arts good cause’, receive the least return (2014, Executive 
Summary)165 
Fiona Hyslop suggested that in terms of cultural policy in Scotland “How we do 
things is just as important as what things we do” (2013, emphasis added). This 
research would not disagree, for the manner in which decisions are made and 
                                                          
164 And this figure represented an improvement on that which had been recorded historically.  
165 While these studies did not look at Scotland, given the degree to which the majority of state 
subsidy supports a network of cultural organisations not dissimilar to those in England, it can be 
assumed that a similar situation exists there also. 
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the resultant calcification of that which is subsidised speaks volumes in this 
regard.  For all that McConnell (2009) suggested cultural policymaking was an 
unexpected and non-liner process, such an unpredictable process appears to 
consistently deliver startlingly similar outputs.  
For example, despite Creative Scotland’s 2014 overhaul of its funding streams, 
resulting in an expanded group of organisations receiving 3 year funding, 83% 
of them had been those organisations that had always received some form of 
regular funding. Of the 20 supposedly new organisations, they bore a startling 
resemblance to the type of organisations already receiving support and many 
had received some sort of project funding previously (see Creative Scotland, 
2015i for a list of those receiving subsidy and on which these claims are made). 
Eleven of Scotland’s 32 councils have no regular funded organisation located in 
them166; this is equivalent to a quarter of the population having no regular 
investment of central government subsidy to support cultural participation in 
their local area. One can only imagine that if Edinburgh had no subsidy there 
would be an outcry, and yet the population of Edinburgh is only one third of this 
number. However Interviewee 19 was not alone in seeing this type of inequality 
as unproblematic, stating that: “if I was living in the Highlands167, I would know 
living in the Highlands that I wasn’t going to get access to large scale whatever, 
that’s a choice, that’s a personal choice”. This is further evidence that any 
question of equal access is equal access to that which the network of cultural 
professionals choose to fund and support, not equal access to cultural subsidy 
irrespective of where one lives. In practice, this means that cultural policy tends 
towards what might best be understood as cultural protectionism, because as 
Craik has noted in relation to cultural policy in Australia but that might be 
equally applied to the UK: 
In addition to the four models described above168, we should add the 
                                                          
166 Clackmannanshire, East Ayrshire, East Renfrewshire, Falkirk, Midlothian, Moray, North 
Ayrshire, Renfrewshire, Scottish Borders Council, South Lanarkshire and West Dunbartonshire. 
167 As it happens the Highlands does have some regularly funded organisations. 
168The patron model; the architect model; the engineer model; and the facilitator model (Craik, 
2007, p.1). 
264 
 
elite nurturer model (Craik 1996). In this model, governments select a 
small number of elite cultural organisations to receive a one-line budget 
and/or other generous subsidies, thus placing them in a coveted position 
by guaranteeing recurrent funding that insulates them from having to 
compete with ‘outsider’ cultural organisations. (2007, p.2) 
The results of such protectionism and the resultant cultural disenfranchisement 
(Holden, 2010) enacted by this network of cultural professionals and their 
interminable circuit of inter-legitimation (Bourdieu 1984) has been well 
documented over the past fifty years (Stark et al., 2013; Jancovich, 2011). In 
2004 85% of Arts Council England’s funding was going to the same 
organisations it had the decade before (Frayling, 2005).  In 2008, despite 
promising a change in patterns of funding, 67% of those previously receiving 
funding from Arts Council England received an increase while other smaller 
organisations were having to close through lack of support (Jancovich, 2015b). 
The ROCC report (Stark et al., 2013) highlighted the continued dominance of 
major London organisations in securing support from ACE, while in Scotland 
almost 70% of those receiving regular funding are based in Glasgow or 
Edinburgh169.  
Despite the regularity with which this inequity is highlighted, little of any 
significance is ever done about it. The 65% of Scotland’s central government 
spend on culture that is consumed by the Scottish National Collections and 
National Performing Companies has, to all intents and purposes, been taken out 
of the equation by being granted a direct funding relationship with the Scottish 
Government. It is highly unlikely that come 2018, Creative Scotland will hand 
out their next round of funding to a portfolio of organisations vastly different 
from that which exists today, especially given the increasingly insistent 
demands for stability and security from those organisations receiving subsidy, 
which make moving funding elsewhere highly difficult.  In turn, as these 
privileged organisations, their staff and the network of preferred artists whose 
                                                          
169 Creative Scotland stresses that many of these organisations take their work out into other 
regions of Scotland.  
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work they support, consume the majority of the cultural budget, “there is little 
opportunity to fund new or experimental cultural forms, thus risking 
conservatism, or stasis, of cultural development” (Craik, 2007, p.2). As one of 
the participants in Jancovich’s study noted, the “lack of diversity of perspectives 
within arts policy ‘tends to produce organisations that have certain sorts of 
people in certain sorts of roles, which can be … stultifying’” (2015, p.7). 
As this researcher has highlighted elsewhere, in 2014 the annual budget for 
Creative Scotland’s Artist’s Bursaries program, where artists could determine 
their own projects, was £1.45m, while The National Events budget, where 
artists got to ‘commemorate’ or ‘celebrate’ other’s projects through partnering 
with national or regularly funded organisations, was £8m (Stevenson 2014 
citing Johnny Gailey). Likewise, amateur and community cultural participation 
has been recognised as being woefully under resourced (Dodd et al., 2008) 
despite the amount of people that are involved in it. Voluntary Arts Scotland (a 
body working across Scotland to support amateur activity) received £100,000 a 
year subsidy, almost a third of that received by the Collective Gallery - a 
contemporary Art gallery located at the top of a relatively inaccessible hill in the 
centre of the capital (Creative Scotland, 2015i). This gallery then sought further 
public funding in order to support outreach and engagement activities170 to help 
diversify their audience – possibly seeking to attract the very individuals that 
Voluntary Arts Scotland may be struggling to help, given the relatively small size 
of their own subsidy. Perhaps most telling of all, in 2011 Creative Scotland 
dedicated only 2.3 million pounds or 3% of their total income to specific “access 
and audience development work” (CS, 2011), work that inherently has a greater 
flexibility to be more responsive to the interests of those not participating with 
the type of opportunities provided by the sort of organisations detailed above.  
                                                          
170 For example, the Collective Gallery received a grant as part of the 2014 Commonwealth 
Games cultural fund to undertake a project entitled ‘All-Sided Games’. Private discussion with 
one of the artists involved indicated that one of the events as part of this (a race with 100 people 
on the top of Calton Hill) failed to attract 100 people. Collective is also being supported with 
around £600,000 of local authority money and £900,000 of Lottery Funding to support the 
redevelopment of the site that it occupies in order to make it a more attractive destination.   
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The relatively inconsequential nature of this amount was acknowledged by an 
interviewee who worked within Creative Scotland and who described this 
particular fund as “peanuts” and unable to impact wider cultural participation. 
Indeed from 2015 onwards there was no longer even a dedicated fund for this 
type of activity. Anyone proposing work specifically intended to “develop and 
reach new audiences (including those hard to reach) and encourage more people 
to get involved in artistic and creative activity” (Creative Scotland, 2015e) was 
required to apply for general “Open Project” funding and to compete against all 
those seeking subsidy for work that was not specifically intended to be of 
interest to those currently uninterested in what the state typically supports 
financially.  With the vast bulk of Scotland’s cultural spend already accounted 
for, the majority of activity to deliver increased cultural participation is 
therefore limited to a product-led approach (Kawashima, 2006) that seeks to 
find ways to increase the interaction between those labelled as non-participants 
and a limited selection of activities and organisations. The form of which those 
whose cultural participation is supposedly being supported have little to no 
significant influence over. 
6.2.2 Performative participation policies  
All of the above leads to an assertion that despite the stated aim of the Scottish 
Government to increase cultural participation, cultural participation policies are 
simply a performative practice that legitimises the continued privilege enjoyed 
by an existing network of organisations and the network of cultural 
professionals that both support and benefit from them. Certainly the majority of 
interviewees were not even aware that increasing cultural participation in 
Scotland was a policy objective of the Scottish Government, just that their 
funding agreements required them to be as inclusive as possible and that on 
occasion they had been asked to target specific groups of people171. In this 
regard it is worth remembering that the SHS was not specifically designed to 
monitor the Scottish Government’s National Indicator on Cultural Engagement. 
                                                          
171 Although interviewees stated that this was increasingly less after the establishment of 
Creative Scotland. 
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Questions on cultural participation already existed in the SHS before the 
indicator was established and they were adopted because of the “amount of 
boxes” that the survey was seen to tick and because it was a “regular and robust 
piece of research” (Interviewee 11, 30). As Interviewee 25 stated, “In terms of the 
national indicator, I do think it is in there because it is something that can be 
measured and because the Scottish Government already owned the Scottish 
Household survey”. Interviewee 5 simply summed it up as a crude tool that was 
the outcome of “successful lobbying” and remembered the lack of clarity that 
surrounded its establishment: 
…[talking of a consultation meeting about the establishment of an 
indicator on cultural engagement] …there was an interesting group of 
people in the room at the time, you know [staff from Glasgow Life] were 
there, I was there, [staff from Creative Scotland] were there, there were 
people from Museums Galleries Scotland, and people from the 
government…and nobody had an answer to that question, there is a 
measurement to indicate how we are doing, but not why we are doing 
it and whether that is OK or not. (Interviewee 5)  
However interviewees didn’t feel that the measurement’s crudeness and lack of 
clarity mattered, because what they felt was most significant was that there was 
a measure at all. As interviewee 11 said “from a professional perspective I think 
that is incredibly significant that it is there” while Interviewee 38 felt that the 
existence of the national indicator “means the Arts is high up the agenda which is 
fantastic”. This perspective was one that others concurred with once the nature 
of the indicator was outlined to them (in particular see interviewees 11, 7, 14, 
23 and 39). This is indicative of the extent to which cultural professionals see 
the existence of the SHS questions and the creation of the national indicator on 
cultural engagement more in terms of a symbolic acknowledgement of the value 
of the Arts to the state rather than a genuine desire to gain knowledge about 
how best to support cultural participation for everyone. It appeared to be of 
little to no concern as to what useful information it could offer policymakers 
about patterns of participation, how such patterns might suggest what support 
should implemented, or that the data that was available appeared to suggest 
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current approaches to increasing cultural participation were making no 
significant change. It is also worth noting that while some interviewees 
acknowledged that activities to encourage participation were something they 
needed to do, they were not convinced that those asking them to do it were all 
that clear about what form that should take or why:  
…we are beginning to realize that the people in Creative Scotland know 
less than we do, and…like I say…I was about to say don't quote me on this 
but maybe you should, maybe you should, we all need to talk about this. I 
worry that it [participation activities] is just something that we 
do…that it is a general…a knee jerk throw money at it because it 
sounds good. (Interviewee 4) 
 
As one respondent stated when asked about what the expectations were on her 
organisation with regards to increasing cultural participation: “the answer is 
nothing [laughs] what we are expected to do is pretty much what you have 
mentioned earlier, to use culture as a tool to reach other objectives” (Interviewee 
13). Likewise, Interviewee 41 said that they didn’t see themselves as 
attempting, or even really able, to increase participation with culture. All they 
felt they could do was to engage people with their theatre and its work. Indeed 
those that worked in larger organisations receiving regular funding from either 
Creative Scotland or the Scottish Government generally felt that they were not 
working to address specific government targets on cultural participation - “I am 
not necessarily looking to do things that are aiming to fulfill that strategy, you 
know” (Interviewee 14); If it happens to hit an outcome, which inherently it does, 
then awesome (Interviewee 41). Indeed Interviewee 21 spoke of how they made 
the art and it was the job of the CEO and Marketing Director to talk about that 
work in the manner that their funders required. Or as Interviewee 13 stated: 
“we are not responding to policy, we are responding to art”. 
6.2.3 The discursive practice of ‘reaching out’  
The fact that existing participation policies appear to have little impact on the 
national indicator is unsurprising given that, as discussed in Chapter 5, none of 
the interviewees expressed any sense that they had to specifically work with 
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individuals who would classify as non-participants within the SHS. Instead, 
what the majority appeared to understand was that there was an expectation on 
them as an organisation receiving public subsidy to be seen to undertake some 
sort of work targeted at any sort of individuals outside of their primary 
audience demographic, what Interviewee 16 described as “the vague term 
audience engagement” and the majority described as “reaching out”: 
 
…you try and ensure that you are reaching out all the time… (Interviewee 
19) 
 
…well I am sure we will come to this, the need to reach out more… 
(Interviewee 17)  
 
…we are doing as best we can with the resources that we have got to reach 
out to as many people as we can… (Interviewee 16)  
 
…I would just like to be able to reach out and get them in… (Interviewee 
12)  
 
That’s what we do, it’s for arts organisation to be aware of who those key 
people are in those communities to try and reach out to those people that 
are just entirely disengaged [with society] (Interviewee 38)  
 
In the past, the drive to ‘reach out’ led to situations such as that described by 
Interviewee 3 where they found themselves conducting outreach activities with 
people that told them “we’re not fucking interested in what you do, we want to go 
and eat popcorn and watch Spiderman, that’s exactly what we need, that’s our 
culture”. However the perception amongst the majority of interviewees was that 
for the most part the ultimate decision about whom they would reach out to 
remained with the organisation and in most cases a small number of people 
within that organisation172: 
 
                                                          
172 This aligns with the idea of street level bureaucrats, as proposed by Lipsky (2010 [1980]). 
See McCall (2009) for an application of this theory in relation to regional museums in Scotland.  
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 …obviously we are funded by Creative Scotland so it is important that we 
have a program, but what we do with it is actually up to me and my 
colleague. (Interviewee 12) 
 
…older people is a big thing just now. It is a huge area which I, to be quite 
honest, I don’t have much personal interest or passion or expertise in 
setting up a project for at the moment [… …] I focus on young people and 
specifically teenagers because that is my comfort zone and expertise. 
(Interviewee 12)  
 
But in a way the choices of what goes on [in relation to participation 
projects] in this building probably come down to me. (Interviewee 7)  
 
We don’t engage with that because I am not particularly interested in 
that […] Who decides? [who to reach out to] it is ultimately down to me.  
 (Interviewee 38)  
 
…we always want to work with young men and that is not a Government 
imposed priority, that is a priority we put on ourselves. (Interviewee 2) 
 
As a metaphor, ‘reaching out’ aligns with the discursive keyword of barriers that 
was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. It represents the organisations as making a 
special and concerted effort to communicate with someone in circumstances 
that make that communication more difficult and thus more notable, with the 
related implication that this contact will be of some sort of benefit to those that 
are reached. However whether the non-participant choses to then participate 
appears of less importance than those receiving subsidy being able to say that 
they were reaching out and being able to point to actions that evidenced this, 
even if that action made no permanent difference to the cultural participation 
patterns of the individuals they reached out to. The existence of the specific 
practice, not that the subsidised organisations were successfully serving the 
needs of a full diversity of people, appeared to be what interviewees believed 
was required. As Interviewee 12 stated: “I mean obviously we are funded by 
Creative Scotland, so it is important that we have an outreach program”, not 
that the program makes any noticeable difference to the national patterns of 
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cultural participation. Or as Interviewee 13 stated, “We are not given any 
percentages that we need to hit in order to get our funding.  
 
As such, ‘reaching out’ is best understood as a performative discursive practice 
that is central to the representation of subsidised Arts organisations and 
activities as being inclusive and inviting. However it was making the offer, 
rather than the actual acceptance of it that was of most importance: 
 
…but no its not, it’s not a massive problem if they don’t come, it’s a 
bonus if they do… and like I say I just want everyone to feel that they can 
(Interviewee 1) 
 
 [… …] We have to make sure that we are seen as being open and 
accessible to everyone […] We can’t drag them kicking and screaming but 
we can make sure that they know about it (Interviewee 38)  
 
…there are invitations to be offered, that’s what’s important…the most 
you can do is offer invitations… (Interviewee 5) 
 
If people feel that have access to the country’s cultural offer but just 
choose to continue their engagement within their community, within their 
home, as opposed to feeling they can’t access it, that’s OK. (Interviewee 
41) 
 
All of which is indicative of the extent to which the practice performs equality 
without quantitatively or qualitatively delivering it. It is the type of “pseudo-
activity” that “overplays itself and fires itself up for the sake of its own publicity 
without admitting to what degree it serves as a substitute for satisfaction, thus 
elevating itself to an end in itself” (Adorno, 1978, p.200).  
6.2.4 Supporting the status quo  
This was not to say that there was no evidence of measurement around 
participation happening at an organisational level, only that the nature of this 
measurement was a little haphazard. The knowledge of it amongst the 
interviewees was at times vague, and the importance they placed on its content 
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appeared minimal as it was seen as primarily bureaucratic. As such, they were 
generally dismissive of it as the tone and metaphors employed indicate: 
 
Interviewer: Are you obliged to report anything back to government in 
terms of cultural engagement figures? 
Interviewee 10:  I don’t know. We publish a lot of stuff online so I don’t 
think we are obliged to … but no, as far as I know I don’t think we have to 
report any figures 
 
The last time I looked at one of these forms there were things in there 
about, you know, how many people of Asian descent or whatever 
(Interviewee 3)  
 
[Talking about a funding application]…the last set of hoops we jumped 
through for Creative Scotland… (Interviewee 4) 
 
I know that working for an organisation that’s still got core funding from 
the government we have to report back on key performance indicators [… 
…] but it often seems there are mixed messages coming through [… …] it 
seems that because we are still tied into the government you know we have 
to jump on certain band wagons, or make sure that we are seen to be 
taking part in these initiatives and things like that as well … so… I’m not 
sure exactly who they are benefiting all the time… (Interviewee 1) 
 
Furthermore, while it was clear that anyone receiving public subsidy was 
required to report back on its use, none of the interviewees that spoke about 
submitting such a report had ever found they received any feedback or 
sanctions in cases where they had not attracted the diversity of audience they 
had committed to reaching out to at the outset. One interviewee described 
audience diversity as something that went in the annual report but never gets 
asked about again: “I have never had a conversation about it, no one has ever 
come back and said ‘oh you’ve only got two’ [referring to Asian audience 
members]” (Interviewee 4). Another interviewee with ten years’ experience in 
the same organisation felt that, “If we weren’t hitting such targets - and I do think 
there are such targets, and I don’t think we hit them - nobody would beat us up 
about it” (Interviewee 3). Two others acknowledged (with the proviso that they 
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were not identified) that they often doctored the figures they returned to their 
funders so as to ensure their projects reported a high degree of impact on 
community wellbeing. Likewise, Interviewee 21 presumed that funders must 
“take for granted that there is a fuzzy glow going on and that is why you only see 
smiley faces on education leaflets, you don’t see the miserable ones in the corner 
that didn’t want to participate”. None of these interviewees appeared concerned 
about any apparent deceit. They felt that these reports were never followed up 
so long as the funder was told that their aims were being met and that their 
actions were understood as evidencing inclusivity.  
 
The perception that the reported figures were not considered in detail appeared 
to be founded, given that those spoken to at Creative Scotland indicated they 
were not looking specifically at who each funded organisation was participating 
with or how relatively successful they were at this compared to other 
organisations. Instead what they stated was that funded organisations needed 
to be seen to be broadly supporting the aim of supporting access and 
participation and “exhibiting a willingness” to diversify their audience:  
 …we don’t have the level of resource to look at the individual 
participants of each project…the way we are pulling back information 
from the organisation…I mean, again, we don’t have the ability to kind 
of…analyse that fully either. We are looking for kind of broad strokes. 
Can they say that they hit this or that aim” (Creative Scotland Staff 
Member)  
And indeed there appears to be little sanctions if these outreach programs 
achieve very little with regards to changing the cultural participation 
preferences of those they work with. For all that subsidised organisations face 
consistent calls for greater accountability - most recently in the Warwick 
Commission (2015) - there is never any clarity or even discussion about what 
sanctions they should face if they fail to deliver what is required. The status of 
these acculturation intermediaries (Maguire & Matthews, 2010) appears not to 
be affected by how little they manage to increase the cultural catchment of the 
practices they are meant to be promoting. This thesis argues that this is because, 
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with regards to cultural participation, how the actions of those receiving 
funding are understood within the discursive field of cultural policy appears of 
more importance than any changes they have made, or failed to make, in 
practice to the patterns of participation amongst the populace.  
Furthermore, even where people did participate, there was a suggestion that 
their participation was as much value to the organisation they participated with 
as it was to the individual who was participating. For example, Interviewee 41 
talked about how they would reward their participants “to say thank you for 
supporting us, because that is what it is too”. They described outreach 
activities as “an absolute double-edged sword” in that the organisation needed 
them as much as they believed the participants needed the organisation, and 
that without them, when it came to applying for funding “they would be fucked”. 
Likewise, in the quote below, the interviewee starts to talk about what the 
participant would gain, but concludes the thought with what the organisation 
would gain: additional ambassadors and thus legitimacy for the value of their 
state supported organisation:  
I suppose if you think what would you gain from having ten men who go to 
the football every weekend, having them come to the ballet, what would 
they gain from that, for me, they would be saying to their sons, if they went 
to the ballet and they had a really positive experience, they are then 
positive ambassadors for us. (Interviewee 2) 
And so anyone that wants or needs their cultural participation to be supported 
by the state must be prepared to align their preferred type of cultural 
participation with that which is on offer and delegate some of their agency to 
the state sponsored cultural professionals in making these decisions for 
them173. Indeed the more structural limitations someone does face in pursuing 
their interests, the more they are expected to cede their own agency and to rely 
on the curated choices of others to meet these needs.  For all that they are to be 
provided with opportunities to participate, these do not extend as far as having 
the opportunity to participate in the decision making process about the type of 
                                                          
173 This is the same relationship that Schrum has described as a status bargain (1996). 
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opportunities for cultural participation that public subsidy provides. Instead 
they are invited to “subscribe to, rather than shape, the culture that is on offer” 
(Holden, 2010, p.37), to regulate their conduct and values to align with those 
deemed as desirable for society through the guidance of acculturation 
intermediaries (Maguire and Matthews, 2010). And so for all that supporting 
non-participants and their cultural participation must be discursively espoused 
and practiced, it is not so that they can provide a legitimizing environment as 
proposed by Moore (1995), but instead that their discursive invocation 
legitimises the environment that they are being provided with by those who 
retain the greatest influence over the field.  
6.3 The effect beyond the field 
The effects of the discursive logics with which the problem of non-participation 
is constructed do not only affect the practice that takes place within the field of 
cultural policy. Rather it becomes part of the wider system of dividing practices 
that affirms the inequality that it professes to address. The final section of this 
chapter will consider in more detail the assertion that rather than removing 
inequality, the construction of cultural non-participation as a problem and its 
associated practices contribute towards the acceptance of inequality as 
inevitable.  
6.3.1 Choice is a political act  
At an event attended by the researcher at which they presented their work in 
progress, a member of the audience challenged them on the argument that they 
were making. They suggested that even if cultural participation policies were 
focused on a limited range of organisations and activities, selected by cultural 
professionals and about which the majority of the public were not interested, 
was this really such a bad thing in itself?  They described the current system as 
being “at worst benign”. This researcher argues that this is not the case. It is not 
the case because culture is arguably all about choice, whether that is at the level 
of the individual or the state. The question of state subsidies is therefore no 
different. Even if funding was tripled there would still be organisations, 
individuals, activities and objects that would receive no support. Likewise there 
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would be those individuals who were left to overcome the genuine barriers they 
face to participating with that which they wanted to participate but found 
themselves unable to access in an unregulated market. As Lesley Riddoch 
reminds us: 
 
There are too many artefacts, too many traditions and too many distinct 
cultures to fit into the pint pots of funding streams, exhibitions spaces, 
official events or time in the school curriculum. There is no way to 
avoid choice and choice is a political act … the dilemma remains. 
Which artists to choose? Which performance to fund? And who should 
decide? (2014, pp.273–274, emphasis added)    
 
The need to discriminate is not in question but what is an issue is the 
concentration of power within the process of discrimination (Pinnock, 2006). 
For Riddoch’s assertion could be further refined to acknowledge that choice is 
an individual act that becomes political when one person’s choices, one person’s 
values are granted greater status by the state than another’s, and that in turn 
this then affirms the status of that individual. As Connor notes, “culture is in a 
sense synonymous with value”  (1992, p.234) and any question of culture is a 
question about power, freedom and equality (Holden, 2010; Adorno, in 
Bernstein 2001). The problem construction of cultural non-participation is such 
that it serves to problematise certain values and in doing so denies rather than 
affirms the equality of those it claims to assist. For just as Holden notes, it is not 
only the case that “people can be economically deprived and unequal [they can 
also be] culturally deprived and unequal” (2010, p.31). Not simply in terms of 
what they can access but also in terms of the recognition that their culture 
receives by the state and the rights they have to make value claims about the 
practices they undertake.  
6.3.2 Constraining the possibility of experience 
For in their need to problematise the agency of those who do not subscribe to 
the values of the Arts, cultural professionals are discursively denying those 
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labelled as non-participants the ability to locate and legitimate a social practice 
as comparable in value to that which the cultural professionals claim for an 
interaction with a manifestation of the Arts.  As such, the dominant discourses 
of cultural participation within the field of cultural policy are, to paraphrase 
Sacks, placing constraints for some on the very possibility of having an 
experience:  
 
The occasions of entitlement to have them are carefully regulated, and 
the experiences you are entitled to have on an occasion that you are 
entitled to have one is further carefully regulated (1971, p.428)  
 
Because while the majority of advocates for the Arts have been promoting a 
discourse in which equality is understood as primarily being about future access 
to that which is funded, they have been complicit in a simultaneous discourse 
that insidiously devalues the experiences that happen outside of this system. In 
doing so they question to the point of denial the capacity of those labelled as 
non-participants to both think and feel for themselves about what forms of 
practice they value. The discursive practice of cultural policy is not orientated 
towards recognising and supporting the diversity of activity that takes place in 
society. It remains couched in the discursive logics of the Arts’ transformative 
capacities in which the right dose of exposure will help someone to adapt their 
practice to the benefit of their position in society. Through internalising the 
technologies of the self (Foucault, 2003b [1982]), and in so doing abandoning 
their deleterious preferences, subjectivities, and values, the non-participant can 
embrace a more preferable pattern of cultural participation - a more enriching 
pattern of cultural participation - one that it is promised will transform them 
and their less than optimal life through making the material inequality that they 
may face evaporate in a cloud of aesthetic transcendence. 
 
With regards to this necessity for non-participants to alter their values, it is 
interesting to note that Creative Scotland sees one of its primary objectives over 
the next decade as being about doing just that: 
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We want Scotland to be a place where the arts, screen and creative 
industries are valued and recognised… (Creative Scotland, 2014c, p.6) 
 
Arts and creativity will be valued… (Creative Scotland, 2014c, p.6) 
 
We want a Scotland where everyone actively values and celebrates arts 
and creativity… (Creative Scotland, 2014c, p.13) 
 
Foster an environment where participants, audiences and consumers 
value and can confidently engage with the arts, screen and creative 
industries (Creative Scotland, 2014c, p.18) 
 
We believe these are essential to the thriving, engaged and valued arts, 
screen and creative industries in Scotland. (Creative Scotland, 2014c, 
p.24) 
 
The choice of verbs and use of the future tense in these extracts indicate that not 
everyone in Scotland is understood to currently value the arts, screen and 
creative industries, even despite Fiona Hyslop’s assertion that “[Scotland] is a 
nation that truly values its creative talents and heritage” (2013). It can perhaps 
be assumed that this is because too many people are perceived as failing to 
value them in the right way, because they fail to do so from within the 
discursive logics of the Arts.  Arguably, the threat that the Arts must negate is 
not that people don’t value the Arts, but that the institution is failing to 
effectively manage the manner in which people do.   
6.3.3 Affirming dividing practices  
The impact of the discursive subjectification of some individuals as non-
participants and the inequality that this subjectification affirms is not limited to 
the field of cultural policy alone. As has been discussed in Chapter 4, the 
institutional discourses of the Arts and the state are bound together, in part 
through affirming the dividing practices of the other. As such, the existence of 
the problem of cultural non-participation supports the logics of social mobility 
and the assumed justice of a meritocracy that have been the dominant 
discourses of equality employed by the state since the Thatcher governments of 
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the nineteen eighties. They are discourses that allow those with the most social, 
economic and cultural advantage to talk about “equality of opportunities rather 
than equality of conditions” (Jones, 2012, p.97). The logic of these discourses 
locate the blame for inequality at the feet of those who have the least (Levitas, 
2004, 2005). Their failure to guarantee and secure their own equality is 
represented as the result of a flawed subjectivity and concomitant inability to 
adopt the values and habits of those that they should seek to emulate. Where 
structural factors are considered they are represented, just as it is in the current 
case, as barriers to those opportunities, organisations and activities that would 
help to adjust these flawed subjectivities and thus allow these individuals to 
tackle their own social, political and economic deprivation. The discursive 
construction of cultural non-participation as a problem is thus another example 
of the extent to which “issues once considered ‘social’ have come increasingly to 
be thought of as ‘cultural’” whereby concerns about identity, empowerment, 
belonging and inclusion have “superseded questions of material entitlements” 
(McGuigan, 2004, p.34). The poor are no longer poor but are instead culturally 
excluded non-participants, and if they behaved more like those with the 
greatest privilege then they would not find themselves so deprived. 
While Jones (2012) has used the somewhat more inflammatory term of 
‘demonization’, his broad assertion is one that this thesis agrees with, albeit that 
it would alter it so as to suggest that it is the construction of certain 
subjectivities as problematic that is the backbone of an unequal society.  For the 
notion of social progress and equality being delivered through addressing 
inequality of knowledge and experience at the level of the problematic 
individual is what makes contemporary inequality “appear utterly apparent and 
obvious – or ‘sensible’, to use Rancière’s term” (Pelletier, 2009, p.114). It is 
firstly reliant upon a truth that is identified as such by those able to employ the 
most power within specific fields, and secondly upon equality being understood 
as something that can be granted through gradually educating others in this 
truth and encouraging their behaviour to align with it. As some of the 
interviewees stated: 
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..but we know that what we do is good for people and I want people to 
actually have that benefit [… …] all of those things that we know are true 
of engagement and cultural participation. (Interviewee 19) 
 
…of course we are providing them with what they should want, because, 
because we flatter ourselves that we know what we are curating, and that 
we appreciate and know some of the complexities of it so we are 
trying to, in the nicest possible way, educate people about that… 
(Interviewee 17)  
 
It is a logic that is indicative of the extent to which Bourdieu (1986) and his 
conception of cultural capital has been adopted, adapted and embedded in the 
discourses of cultural policy in defence of the status quo. Cultural capital is 
represented as something tangible that can be granted to others through 
appropriate social interactions and through these interactions the non-
participant would come to value that which is valued by those with the greatest 
social status. Many of those that invoke the work of Bourdieu tend towards 
teaching and sharing what they believe they know to be true to those 
“constituted as unable to overcome an incapacity, because they are captured by 
the logic of bodily practice” (Pelletier, 2009, p.113). Bourdieu’s analysis of the 
division of knowledge and experience between social groups is thus employed 
as an explanation of inequality. As a consequence of their habitus the cultural 
non-participant cannot effectively engage because they cannot successfully 
employ and negotiate the dominant discourses of culture within the society of 
which they are a part. Because they cannot engage in these discourses they are 
thus excluded from advantageous social interaction that might alleviate their 
material deprivation. However, as was discussed in Chapter 2, while Bourdieu’s 
concept was offered as an application of how the materially privileged create a 
barrier between themselves and everyone else, it is employed in the discourses 
of policy in relation to the materially deprived and their inability to integrate 
into mainstream society (Barry 2002 cited in Levitas, 2004). The solution is 
represented as a need for the state to provide a type of remedial habitus 
through providing the ‘right sort’ of opportunities. As such, the taken for 
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granted assumption is that the supposed non-participant should need or want 
to participate with that which cultural professionals tell them they should so as 
to gain greater equality with the most materially advantaged in society. If they 
refuse through not acting as required and failing to take up the opportunities 
offered to them then they legitimate their own deprivation.  
6.3.4 The presumption of inequality  
A counter argument to this can be made by drawing on the thinking of Rancière 
(Rancière, 2005; Hallward, 2005; Rancière, 2004). From this perspective the 
non-participant can be understood as politically disenfranchised because the 
discourses of cultural policy are built upon the discourses of the Arts and thus 
the non-participants’ own discourses of cultural participation are not treated or 
heard as equal by those who dominate the field. This is similar to what Pelletier 
has argued is the case in education, for the suggestion that there is a problem of 
cultural non-participation is primarily “the idea of those who give themselves 
the authority of reducing the inequality of others with respect to themselves” 
(2009, p.123). In so doing they legitimise and enhance the social and cultural 
inequalities that do exist outside of the field in question. Such an approach does 
not sufficiently consider why one manifestation of cultural capital is accepted as 
more optimal than another. It assumes that the advantage one might gain from 
discursively practicing a particular form of cultural capital is warranted and that 
as such the objective of the state should be focused on equalising access to and 
participation with the sites at which it can be fostered. As Pelletier notes but 
that also has relevance for the current argument:  
 
In Bourdieu’s work, the education system’s democratic claims conceal 
the reality of inequality. In Rancière’s work, the visibility of such claims, 
their proclamation and celebration, is the naturalization of inequality. In 
other words, equality is not an illusion that conceals inequality; rather, 
equality (in the future) is precisely that which legitimises the 
presupposition of inequality (in the present). (2009,p.125) 
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From this perspective the Arts is not part of the solution to social inequality, it is 
part of the cause, for its institutional discourses are part of the dominant 
distribution of the sensible (Rancière, 2004). Just as Jones (2012) has argued 
that the discourse of ‘chav-hate’174 does, constructing the cultural participation 
patterns of some as a problem becomes yet one more way in which the unequal 
status of some in society can be explained and therefore accepted as sensible 
and even inevitable. In validating the supremacy of one type of cultural capital 
and therefore “being culturally exclusive, [the Arts] have helped to 
institutionalise the socially excluded in a pernicious way” (Kawashima, 2006, 
p.67). Just as the degree to which possessing the cultural capital of the dominant 
faction affects status, so too “does the way that [the dominant] culture represent 
the poor and disadvantaged by reinforcing their position in society and 
confirming their low status and exclusion” (Holden, 2010, p.23). This is an act 
that is achieved “through defining desirable and undesirable models of agency, 
that is, implicitly and widely shared conceptions of how [someone should] feel, 
think and act in the world” (Snibbe and Markus 2005 cited in Ollivier, 2008, 
p.124).  
It is on this basis that this thesis understands the problem construction of 
cultural non-participation, along with its associated discourses and practices. It 
is an example of the technologies of behavioural management that are employed 
by the state in their attempt to manage and regulate the practice of individuals.  
The insidious suggestion is that if only those individuals labelled as non-
participants were to participate with the Arts, then they would no longer be 
materially disadvantaged. Yet the Arts did not cause poverty and inequality, and 
neither can it solve it. However the discursive logic of the problem construction 
does act to maintain it. For although the cultural capital gained from 
participating with the Arts may offer some help to escape poverty, it only does 
so because it offers the opportunity for those that allow the technologies to 
modify their behaviour to legitimately leave behind those that do not.  
                                                          
174 Jones does not refer to it as a discourse but given how he describes this phenomenon it is 
how this researcher has understood it.  
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6.3.5 The presumption of equality  
From Rancière’s perspective equality is not the end game, it is not something 
that is to be granted or provided via the successful delivery of certain actions or 
interventions by those who already have it. Instead he offers a different starting 
point, one in which equality is not conceived of quantitatively because to do so 
would be pointless. Instead, equality it is to be presumed in all things. It is a 
relational conception of equality and emancipation and is about its societal 
acknowledgment, affirmation and verification. In this regard, Rancière is 
broadly aligned with the perspective of Richard Rorty, who believed that in 
adopting a pragmatist perspective one should dispense with the project of 
emancipation because “there has never been anything to emancipate and that 
human nature has never been in chains” (Rorty, 1985, cited in Connor, 1992, p. 
237). Once equality is presumed, there is a moral imperative for any polity 
claiming to be a liberal democracy to ensure that everyone has the literacy and 
leisure to “listen to lots of different people, think about what they say” (Rorty, 
1989 p.84) and form their own opinions. However no vehicle for achieving this 
should be valorized over any other and what should be welcomed is an ever-
increasing multiplicity of ways in which this might occur.   
From this viewpoint the cultural value one person gains from watching the 
latest blockbuster movie, going to their local pub to take part in karaoke or 
constructing a new world in MineCraft should not be seen as any more real or 
valuable than that which someone may gain from going to the ballet or taking 
part in life drawing. Neither should cultural intermediaries and their capacity to 
cultivate the cultural content of any practice (De Propris and Mwaura, 2013) be 
required in order to explain the value of the that practice in relation to the 
discursive logics of the Arts in order for it to be acknowledged as culturally 
valuable. If the discourses of cultural policy were to start from a presumption of 
equality then what becomes problematic is not that one person does not 
apportion the same value to the ballet that another does, but that the cultural 
values of one individual are given greater privilege by the state than the cultural 
values of another. That for some, the activities, organisations and objects that 
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they value participation with could, for various reasons, be increasingly 
inaccessible to them, but that this is not understood as a problem to which the 
resources of the state can, or should, be applied.  
And so, with regards to cultural policy, presuming equality at the level of the 
individual demands striving for equity in practice. Cultural equity is not about 
being granted access to that which others value but that the individual does not, 
it is the ability to express oneself freely and in a manner that the individual 
perceives to be valuable based on what they feel and think. To be able to do so is 
an indicator of freedom and an expression of power. If cultural policy is to help 
address social injustice and affirm equality rather than reinforce inequality it 
must be concerned with recognising and supporting the cultural values of 
everyone, not focused on affirming the value of the institution that has 
discursively dominated the field of cultural policy since its inception. Cultural 
equity can only be achieved if governments “shift the focus of cultural policy 
away from institutional fiefdoms and cultural forms, and focus instead on 
people” (Holden, 2010, p.59).  
Because progressive cultural policy should not be about cultivating adherents to 
the dominant culture – which in the present case is a culture in which the Arts 
exists as a unique field of human activity - but should instead cultivate a  
“confidence that results in an individual being able to contribute to the 
development of culture[s], rather than merely appreciating [or valuing] what 
already exists” (Holden, 2010, p.23). It is a perspective that arguably requires 
the adoption of what Jensen describes as an expressive logic of culture (2002, 
2003) and which she bases on the work of John Dewey (1934).  This position 
should not be understood as cultural relativism for such a “collapse into unity is 
only the inverse product of the absolute fixation on value that is the 
characteristic of the [existing] model” (Connor, 1992, p.251). As such, a cultural 
equity perspective does not require that distinctions are denied, abolished or 
collapsed, rather that: 
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 …distinctions are important because they are important to the 
participants. Lines of demarcation between good and bad culture are 
endlessly being constructed, sustained, repaired and transformed. These 
distinctions matter, but they matter because they are part of an 
evaluative ritual – the ceremony of making and protecting worthiness” 
(Jensen, 2002, p.198) 
Acknowledging that no value judgement is any better than another in the sense 
of being an objectively truer statement in no way disallows the possibility of 
making meaningful value judgements. “It is just that the value of those value 
judgements must be understood, evaluated and compared otherwise, that is, as 
something other than ‘truth-value’ or ‘validity’ in the objectivist, essential sense” 
(Smith, 1988, p.98). The aim of policy should be to make possible “the collective 
transaction of cultural value” (Connor, 1992, p.251), through establishing 
conditions that “precede and surpass the hardening of the value of art and 
culture into the forms of fetish” (1992, p.251). While the pragmatics of policy 
would require what Hall (1993) has described as the temporary closure of 
meaning, subsequent policy interventions should seek to disrupt those 
meanings, demanding the constant substitution of one form of expression for 
another, allowing different and diverse identity projects to prosper. All attempts 
to fix the play of value should be resisted and in so doing value would be 
constantly deferred in favour of the imperative to value. It is the belief of this 
researcher that adopting such a perspective at the level of policy making would 
severely disrupt the process by which the value judgements of some become 
accepted as universal values for all. Values that in turn are employed to 
discursively legitimate systems of societal Distinction (Bourdieu, 1986) in 
which inequality is represented as both inevitable and sensible (Rancière, 
2004).   
Summary 
This chapter has argued that alongside the discursive construction of the non-
participant, the potential for a network of cultural professionals was also 
established whose claim to expertise has allowed them to exert greater 
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influence on the field of cultural policy through their attempts to manage the 
dominant discourses by which it functions. The status granted by the discourses 
of the Arts to these cultural professionals has always been fundamental to the 
work of discursively legitimising the relationship between the Arts and the 
state, however competing societal discourses about the structure of society and 
the nature of government have increasingly required that they employ 
additional discursive practices in order to enforce their own legitimacy and the 
legitimacy of the claims they make. In turn this has resulted in an increasing 
need for the type of discursive legitimation work evident within the data 
generated for this study as those with the greatest status seek to perform 
equality through their practice. For what cannot be abandoned is the 
assumption that there is such a thing as the Arts, the unique artistic experience 
that interactions with manifestations of the Arts are seen to offer, and those 
who for whatever reason are not having them. These logics cannot be 
abandoned because they are central to the institutional discourse upon which 
the Arts is based, and around which its relationship with the state has been 
established. As such, affirming the existence of the non-participant becomes 
ever more discursively important for cultural professionals, for although it is 
increasingly the case that the Arts cannot be defined in absolute terms, the 
possibility of the non-participant is enough to affirm that not everything can 
afford the unique experience that the Arts lays claims to. As such, the mediation 
of experts remains necessary and the continuation of state support on the 
grounds of provision remains plausible.   
In affirming the identity of the non-participant, those who employ this subject 
identity to talk about others – such as the interviewees in the present research - 
are engaged in an act of micro power that suppresses the capacity of some to 
speak within the field of cultural policy. Instead, their voices are co-opted by 
those cultural professionals in order to affirm the status quo and manage 
cultural policy towards their own advantage. The result being that despite the 
policy rhetoric around supporting the cultural participation of all, in actuality 
this is a performative practice that is about affirming the value of the Arts and 
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the legitimacy of its existing relationship with the state. And so for all that 
tackling the problem of cultural non-participation appears highly altruistic, the 
opportunities that are provided by those paid to reach out remain controlled by 
cultural professionals who claim to know what it is people should want to do in 
order to have the sort of experience that will provide them with the enrichment 
their life supposedly lacks.  
This discourse manifests itself in the decision making practices of cultural policy 
that are primarily conducted as a closed discussion between policymakers and 
those cultural professionals seen to possess the most expertise (Jancovich, 
2015b). For although co-creation (Walmsley, 2013) may be welcome when 
customizing the offer, when decisions are made about what offers will be 
supported with public subsidy the public lose their right to speech, as the 
cultural professionals co-opt their voice. As such, the opportunity to participate 
is perhaps better understood as an offer to “subscribe to, rather than shape the 
culture that is on offer” (Holden, 2010, p.37). The manner in which the problem 
of cultural non-participation is constructed affirms an assumption that in order 
to gain cultural equality one must be prepared to embrace certain cultural 
values and accept the status and legitimacy of the cultural professionals whose 
ability to execute power in decision-making ensures that one culture remains 
valorized over all others.  
‘In the real’ (Schwartz-Shea & Yanow 2012) there is no one who is a cultural 
non-participant, but the discursive existence of the non-participant subject 
obscures the extent to which there are what Holden (2010) has described as the 
culturally and creatively disenfranchised: those individuals whose choices and 
opinions are not valued to the same degree as others. And so this thesis argues 
that this means cultural policy is dominated by professionals who cannot accept 
anyone not sharing their particular cultural values, beliefs, and the discursive 
logics they are based on, for to do so would be to put their own elevated status 
in question. The result is that cultural policy remains elitist. Not always socially 
or economically elite, but culturally elite. Through encouraging the 
abandonment of the cultural non-participant as an object within the discourse, 
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this thesis offers a perspective on how such cultural domination might finally be 
disrupted.  
  
289 
 
Conclusion 
Increased public participation in decision making has been argued to be part of 
a reflexive modernity that brought with it a greater demand by individuals to 
understand why they were being encouraged to do something, borne out of a 
diminished reverence for the elite classes (Prieur and Savage, 2011). Yet 
cultural policy has managed to avoid such demands and is still primarily the 
product of cultural elites (Jancovich 2015; Schlesinger 2009a; see also Fennell et 
al. 2009) who exert significant control over how culture should be shaped and 
do so in such a manner that it affirms their own societal status. One of the key 
contributions made by this thesis is in moving beyond simply highlighting these 
asymmetric power relationships to offer an argument as to how they have 
managed to be sustained in the face of such consistent pressure for change. For 
only by understanding how asymmetric relations of power are maintained 
might one start to disrupt them. The thesis has done this through offering a 
detailed discussion about how the discursive construction of non-participation 
as a problem, and in particular the non-participant as a problematic subject, 
helps to legitimise the dominance of cultural professionals while simultaneously 
limiting the capacity of those with different perspectives to speak in relation to 
what sort of cultural participation is of value, and how the state might best 
support their participation with that which they value. Such construction of 
subjects as objects in a discourse, combined with managing the sensible 
relationships between them, obscures the use of power within the social 
relations to which they are applied.  
This concluding chapter will now summarise the arguments that have been 
made and offer some reflections about what they might mean for cultural policy, 
and how, if at all, an alternative approach to supporting cultural participation 
might be taken.    
i. Non-participation: A discursive problematisation  
This research set out to answer the question: Why is there a problem of cultural 
non-participation? However the argument of this thesis is that no exogenous 
problem of cultural participation exists ‘in the real’ (Bacchi, 2009). This is not to 
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argue that differences do not exist in the degree to which individuals interact 
with various types of organisations and activities, or that different people make 
different choices about how to spend their time. Neither is it suggested that 
there are no structural limitations that stop individuals from both interacting 
with organisations and activities for the first time and continuing to interact in 
the manner they wish with those that they value. Instead this thesis questions 
why such variations in patterns of participation should be represented as a 
problem and specifically one requiring state intervention to address. In answer 
to this question, the thesis has argued that the problem of cultural non-
participation exists because it is an essential component of both the discursive 
construction of the Arts as an institution and that the subject of the non-
participant is a fundamental boundary object upon which the legitimacy of the 
Arts’ relationship with the state is based. It is a problem construction that is 
maintained by the statements and practice of cultural professionals who benefit 
significantly from its continuation. For sustaining the existence of the problem 
affirms the dividing practices that the discourses of the Arts produce, and in so 
doing sustains the right of cultural professionals to exercise the most power 
within the field of cultural policy. Ultimately, this leads to cultural protectionism 
and cultural participation policies that perform equality, access and inclusion, in 
order to maintain the dominance of an institution based on inequality, division 
and exclusion. The rhetoric of the Arts may be progressive, inclusive and 
egalitarian but in practice it adopts the divisionary logic of that against which it 
supposedly seeks to act.  
Holden speaks of a culture war175 in which battles are raging on two fronts, “the 
first concerns who has access to what has traditionally been defined as ‘culture’ 
and the second is about who gets to decide what ‘culture’ is in the first place” 
(2010, p.9). But it is the argument of this thesis that the first of these is a 
performative practice that keeps the majority of those seeking greater equality 
engaged in a comparatively inconsequential and potentially endless skirmish 
about how the state subsidised Arts can best reach out to a discursively 
                                                          
175 As does Jensen, 2002. 
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constructed non-participant while the war is lost on the other front. Because it 
is there that the network of cultural professionals manages the subject identity 
of the non-participant. As has been argued, it is a discursive identity applied to 
those who have no interest in the opportunities for cultural participation that 
the state subsidises. The construction of which allows these individuals to be 
brought into a dialectical relationship with the Arts in such a manner as to 
negate the legitimacy of their agency while affirming the unique value of the 
artistic experience, the cultural professionals who recognise it, and the 
privileged relationship of the Arts with the state. 
And so it continues to be the case that those that seek to manage cultural 
participation represent it as something that transcends the political, obscuring 
the fact that legitimacy about cultural policy decisions “spring not from 
democracy, but from elite authority” (Street, 2011, p.382). It is an authority that 
is based on claims to knowledge and a cultivated sensibility that others are 
represented as lacking. It is this lack that is then used to explain the failure of 
some to act in the same manner that others do, suggest that these individuals 
have an inability to enrich their own lives, and legitimate the necessity for 
others to speak on their behalf in the field of cultural policy. Despite the talk of 
participation, public value, co-creation, and a cultural policy that is “of us all” 
(Hyslop, 2013) the underlying logic of the dominant discourses of cultural 
policy are little changed. They continue to adhere to the discourses of the Arts 
and thus focus on a liberal humanist aspiration to increase exposure to those 
activities and organisations that have been identified by a network of cultural 
professionals as being of greatest value, by virtue of their potential to offer a 
unique and enriching experience. Little consideration is given with regards to 
ensuring “popular control over the means of cultural production, redefining 
what counts as ‘culture’, and participation [in decision making] for groups 
hitherto excluded by the established structures of patronage” (McGuigan, 2004, 
p.40).  
For all that the problem is represented as a lack of opportunities, it is a lack of 
opportunities for which the solution is represented as being supported access to 
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a market of activities curated by those that claim to know what is of greatest 
value and thus what should and should not receive subsidy. Decisions about 
what these activities should be are seen to be legitimate if taken by a narrow 
group of individuals, represented as experts in culture and whose expertise 
allows them to make value judgements about what is best for others. What this 
suppresses is any consideration that it is not the subsidised organisations’ 
audience that needs to be diversified but rather that a greater diversity of 
organisations and activities needs to be publicly subsidised on the basis of 
decisions made by a greater diversity of people, in a greater diversity of ways. 
Neither is it considered that there may be a need for a societal redistribution of 
time and money to allow everyone to make fully autonomous decisions about 
the activities they want to participate with in the open market where the 
majority of contemporary cultural participation takes place.  
That is because the extent to which some are denied the right to speak means 
that as it stands, cultural policy ignores how cultural participation is in favour of 
an idea of how cultural professionals believe that cultural participation should 
be. This matters, because as Jensen reminds us, “if we live by stories, and seek 
the best stories by which to live, then we must first figure out what stories we 
are already telling ourselves, so that we can decide if we like where they are 
taking us” (2002, p.117). The persistence of a story about cultural non-
participants – the potential for which were established with the constitution of 
the Arts over two hundred years ago - means that as Garnham pointed out in 
1983, “one cannot understand the culture of our time or the challenges and 
opportunities which that dominant culture offers to public policy-makers” 
(cited in McGuigan, 2004, chap.42). The asymmetric power relationship upon 
which the Arts was established means that for all that the rhetoric of cultural 
policy is saturated with liberal, egalitarian and even revolutionary ideas, they 
will all inevitably flounder in “the gap between the “juridical people and the 
empirical people […] the ideal and the real, the utopian and the present” (Miller 
and Yudice, 2002, p.25). Its focus will remain permanently orientated towards 
the operation of sedimented values while failing to adequately acknowledge the 
293 
 
imperative to value that is a fundamental aspect of life (Connor, 1992) and 
integral to an individual’s freedom.    
ii. Upsetting the institutionalised inequity  
Creative Scotland has made much use of the undefined phrase ‘cultural ecology’ 
(CS, 2011) that evokes imagery of an ecosystem that must be nurtured so as to 
maintain its natural balance and facilitate growth. Yet as with nature, a balance 
cannot be found by focusing solely on selected aspects of a biome. However 
both Creative Scotland and the majority of organisations and artists that they 
support176 exhibit a continued preference for focusing on a narrow portion of 
the supply side of the equation. They take the established approach of 
strengthening the Arts so as “to meet the twin objectives of artistic excellence 
and extending public reach and participation” (Knell & Taylor, 2011, p.21). In 
apparently excluding certain people from any dialogue about how cultural 
provision in Scotland should be developed, cultural professionals continue to 
supress the agency of those whose cultural participation the Scottish 
Government claims that they want to support. At best, the location at which 
greater participation can be sensibly supported is represented as being the 
point of delivery and not the point at which the decisions about what will be 
supported are made. Similarly to Holden (2006) and (Jancovich, 2011, 2015b) 
this thesis argues that in order to establish what Moore (1995) has described as 
an authorizing environment, closed conversations between any form of cultural 
elite must be rejected in favour of a more multi-dimensional dialogue that takes 
into account a far greater range of perspectives about what cultural policy is for 
and how cultural participation can best be supported.  
 
As Lee et al. have noted, Moore conceived of public value as a process 
demanding deliberation and dialogue, not a technocratic process of aggregating 
the stated satisfaction of individuals (2011)177. As such, this is not an argument 
                                                          
176 It should be noted that there is no evidence as to the extent that the opinions of the artists in 
question represent the majority of those working in the sector that receive no public subsidy.  
177 It should be noted that Lee et.al. do question if public value could ever be usefully employed 
to shape policy, an assertion that Gray (2008) concurs with.  
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for what may be dismissed as a populist approach to cultural provision. It 
accepts that many other arguments may be made about values and benefits that 
are equally important and may not correspond to the type of cultural 
opportunities that some wish to participate with. Neither is it suggesting that 
the state should not be involved in supporting cultural participation. The 
argument is that if the state truly wishes to address the inequity that exists 
between the ability of different individuals to participate with the sort of 
organisations and activities they choose, then the discourses of the Arts and the 
cultural professionals whose status it supports should not continue to dominate 
the field of cultural policy.   
 
In order to finally upset this institutionalised inequity a shift would be required 
in how cultural policy decisions are made away from a model in which certain 
people are shut out on the basis of their ignorance about how best to lead an 
enriching life. Instead it would require organisations like Creative Scotland to 
act as facilitators of a dialogue between policymakers, professionals and the 
public, none of whom should be labelled as non-participants for this alters the 
manner in which the values they express are understood. Everyone should be 
seen as a cultural participant in order to place the focus on the differential 
conditions that people face in pursuing his or her participation. It would also 
require recognition that cultural policy cannot be side-lined as the 
responsibility of a single government department or delivered solely through 
the distribution of limited funds, for cultural participation is a label applied to 
social activity that crosses the public, private and third sectors; albeit that 
governments have significant influence over how patterns of cultural 
participation develop though the framework of all of their policies, from town 
planning to taxation, curriculum content to commercial regulation (Holden, 
2010).  
The Scottish Government circulated a memorandum to all local authorities and 
government departments explaining that “culture delivers” (2008) and as 
Chapter 2 of this thesis showed, countless research has attempted to make 
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claims about the absolute value of culture and in particular the value of 
participation with it. However this thesis proposes that such a focus be inverted 
so that research and policy makers begin to ask how all levels of government 
can ensure that everyone can include more of the cultural participation they 
value in their lives. The Arts will inevitably be a part of that patchwork of 
participation, but they are not - and should not - be all of it. However having 
these sort of approaches adopted is one thing, the difficulty in ensuring that 
they offer a real potential for change, rather than a performative process that 
simply affirms pre-set agendas and taken for granted power relationships is 
well discussed (Ostrom, 1996). Returning once again to the thoughts of 
Raymond Williams:  
The question that has to be faced, if we may put it for a moment in one of 
Tawney’s analogies, is whether the known gold will be more widely 
spread, or whether, in fact, there will be a change of currency. If the 
social and economic changes which Tawney recommends are in fact 
effected, it is the latter, the change of currency, which can reasonably be 
expected (1971 [1958], p.222-223) 
 
While at first reading this quote might seem to capture the sentiment that this 
research seeks to advance, the metaphor employed falls short of the true extent 
of the change that advancing cultural equity would require. For all that one 
might change the currency, if the new currency is simply adopted into the old 
system of exchange then little has altered other than the physical qualities of the 
assets that are accepted as valuable. And it is exactly this that has allowed Arts 
policy to be rebranded as cultural policy with little change to the asymmetric 
power relationships by which it functions.  
 
As it stands, it is arguably impossible for cultural policy to be thought of outside 
of the institutional discourses of the Arts, a difficulty that is also evident in the 
extent to which, in the main, even scholars that critique the romantic basis of 
the Arts and its transcendent value do so by attempting to refashion rather than 
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abandon it. One of the outcomes of the Cultural Studies discipline associated in 
the UK with the work of individuals like Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams, 
Paul Willis, Angela McRobbie and Stuart Hall178 was arguably to have that which 
was labelled as popular culture valued to the same degree and against the same 
criteria that the high culture of the Arts was. As Barker states, Cultural Studies 
opened up popular culture for study “by bringing the tools and concepts of art 
and literature to bear on it” (2005, p.59). The problem was represented as a 
failure of those with power to recognise the true value of the cultural 
preferences of the majority. While it could be suggested that this was an 
emancipatory endeavor, it can also be argued that it merely seeks to rearrange 
the classificatory system rather than challenging the need for such practice to be 
classified.   
 
From this perspective, such endeavors can be seen as supporting the consensual 
status quo by adhering to the institutional discourses of the Arts and the 
necessity of their experts and professionals to validate that that is to be 
accepted as valuable. For to be valued, popular culture had to be seen to offer an 
experience equivalent to that which was supposedly afforded by the dominant 
manifestations of the Arts. In turn this meant that legitimate cultural 
participation could not exist anywhere until it has been observed and validated 
by someone other than the individual that has experienced it, specifically those 
whose discursive identity legitimates them to know. Elites and their expertise 
were still required to explain what was represented as the true value that 
someone might gain from listening to popular music, as much as they were 
required to explain the value of listening to opera. Informed by their Marxist 
pedigree, such perspectives mean that the majority of the public is represented 
as always being in need of some sort of cultural intermediary to explain to them 
why the forms of cultural participation that they most enjoy are of value. There 
                                                          
178 The discipline of Cultural Studies has a geographic and intellectual base far bigger than that 
which is mentioned here, however given the UK focus of the present study the Birmingham 
Centre for Cultural Studies is the most pertinent. For wider discussion about the development of 
Cultural Studies as a discipline see Barker (2005). 
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is always assumed to be a truth that they have failed to understand, and which 
their experience alone is not sufficient to give them knowledge of.  
 
Egalitarian as some may believe this sounds it is an impossible desire if one 
accepts that no truth can be taught because the knowledge of both the teacher 
and the taught is equally constructed by and filtered through the discourses, 
institutions and identities that constitute and divide society into that which can 
be known (Danaher et al., 2000). And so even those cultural professionals 
whose participatory intents are genuinely emancipatory are so wedded to the 
core discursive logics of the Arts - the same logics that grant them their own 
elevated status - that such change may be as good as impossible for them to 
facilitate. For all relations, be them oppression, exploitation cooperation or 
solidarity, are “irredeemably contaminated by mastery and the social weight of 
domination” (Hallward, 2005, p.42). True equality requires - and indeed must 
remain - fully independent of any social mediation. Therefore any attempts at 
facilitating the interaction of those labelled as cultural non-participants with 
those cultural professionals that can currently exert the greatest power and 
influence in the field can never be anything more than a discursive practice that 
at best results in a renegotiation by the dominated of the terms of their 
domination.  
Indeed was a society of cultural equals to be possible, it should not even require 
such expert mediation, for as Rancière notes: 
Such a society would repudiate the division between those who know 
and those who don’t, between those who possess or don’t possess the 
property of intelligence. It would only know minds in action: people who 
do, who speak about what they are doing, and who thus transform all 
their works into ways of demonstrating the humanity that is in them as 
in everyone (1991, p.71) 
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Considering the nature of this assertion and returning to Williams’ quote cited 
above, one is presented with the real challenge faced by those who claim to 
value both the Arts and equality:   
…there is an unresolved contradiction, which phrases about broadening 
and enriching merely blur, between the recognition that a culture must 
grow and the hope that ‘existing standards of excellence’ may be 
preserved intact. (Williams, 1971 [1958], p.222-223, emphasis added) 
While ‘standards of excellence’ might be understood in the more material sense 
as those canonical cultural artefacts and systems of practice that are pointed to 
as the models of an agreed system of value, it can also be understood as the 
system of value itself. A structure of rules established and maintained through 
an institutional authority by which value can be apportioned, but that depends 
on embedded inequality so as to grant legitimacy to the appointed 
representatives of that institution. From this perspective, changing what is 
understood as being a manifestation of the Arts is simply part of the game of 
truths inherent to its institutional discourses and upon which inequality is 
accepted as inevitable. To return to Williams’ financial analogy, it is the system 
of exchange and the value structures on which it is based that must be replaced 
if a new order is to take hold. It must begin from the assumption of equality with 
regards to everyone’s status as a cultural participant, both in terms of what he 
or she does and why he or she does it. The constraints on the possibility of 
experience must be abandoned and the ability to feel, think, value and speak in 
the field of cultural policy acknowledged for every person. As Rancière has 
argued: 
…every [person] who has a soul was born with a soul. In universal 
teaching we believe that [everyone] feels pleasure and pain, and that it is 
only up to [them] to know when, how, and by what set of circumstances 
[they] felt this pleasure or pain (1991, p.67)179 
                                                          
179 This quote has been altered to remove the somewhat ironic gender bias that the original 
translation includes. 
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Based on this argument, this thesis argues that if there is to be any possibility of 
disrupting the institutional discursive path dependency that dominates the field 
of cultural policy then creating the discursive conditions in which this would be 
possible is essential. For while Jancovich is right to note that despite nearly two 
decades of public consultations in the cultural sector, the “public’s chosen forms 
of cultural expression and engagement” are still not seen as valid (2011, p.273), 
it is because neither these individuals nor their capacity to speak about what 
they value are seen as valid either. Therefore, as it stands, any dialogue would 
not be a dialogue between equals because of the manner in which the discursive 
identity of the cultural non-participant has been constructed. Anyone that might 
have different cultural values is represented as not credible to contribute to any 
discussion on cultural policy other than from their subjugated voice as a non-
participant in need of inclusion through the mediation of cultural professionals. 
This is important because it should not be presumed that the purpose of such 
dialogue is to result in an ever-greater number of activities being valued as 
cultural participation, because as it stands being valued as cultural participation 
means being valued within the discursive logics of the Arts. And it is this that 
needs to be disrupted if an emancipatory cultural policy is ever to be achieved. 
For equality cannot be attained if, in order to have one’s practice valued, it must 
be mediated through the cultural values of another. As Holden has argued, “no 
one should be excluded from any sort of cultural activity, but more importantly, 
as a matter of social justice, nor should they be excluded from helping to define 
what culture means [to them]” (Holden, 2010, p.13). However, such an 
aspiration can only be realised if everyone is given a legitimate right to speak 
about the practice that they value and the manner in which they value it.   
iii. Valuing the imperative to value 
Creative Scotland’s stated desire for the Arts to be valued uses it as a verb that 
means to apportion a high worth to something. But of course value also has 
another meaning as a verb: the action of judging value, of apportioning what one 
perceives the worth of something to be, of evaluation. In this sense it is 
impossible not to value the Arts or any other object, organisation, person or 
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concept with which one comes into contact. Every time someone has an 
experience, they value it. It is impossible to avoid, it is intrinsic to the 
experience. As Connor notes, “the process of evaluation can never be avoided” 
(1992, p.8). Everyone will value different things, to different degrees, for 
different reasons. To believe otherwise is to ignore the reality of our own lived 
experience. Someone may just as easily reach a negative value about an 
experience as a positive one, but they will have valued it in relation to the 
particular and unique interaction that they have had with it. In valuing the 
things that they choose to do because of the extent to which it meets their 
immediate need for simple pleasure, entertainment or whatever else they judge 
to be legitimate, those labelled as non-participants are not failing to participate 
with culture or to value the Arts. Rather they are engaging in a political action 
that expresses their values and in doing so challenges the existence of a 
normative assumption: that to participate with culture in a manner that is 
valuable requires some degree of participation with that which cultural 
professionals have legitimated as manifestations of the Arts.  
 
State subsidies (or the lack of them) for certain activities are undoubtedly an 
influencing factor on patterns of cultural participation. However it is inequitable 
that some are having their preferred cultural participation provided at a 
personal cost vastly preferential to that faced by those whose needs are wholly 
met by the market. If the state is to recognise on one hand the increasingly rich 
and diverse cultures of contemporary society at the same time that it is faced 
with a diminishing pot of money with which to support this, then surely the 
time has come to think differently about how best the cultural participation 
choices of everyone might be supported. If the problem for government was 
understood as a need to support cultural equity rather than proving equality of 
access to the Arts, then those - such as Creative Scotland - who implement 
policy, would be free to focus less on maximising access to those organisations 
and activities that, for potentially other valid reasons, the Government funds but 
the majority of the public are not interested in participating with. Instead they 
would be able to think creatively about how to ensure everyone can equitably 
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pursue the ‘rich cultural life’ that they desire. This would necessitate a new 
cultural policy paradigm in which a full spectrum of possibilities are actively 
encouraged and valued, and in which success is judged through the satisfaction 
of the public with regards to the opportunities for participation available to 
them, irrespective of whom provides them, or of what form they take.  
Furthermore, if state supported encouragement of cultural participation should 
also remain about challenging individuals with regards to that which they don’t 
know because it is accepted that exposure to other types of cultural activity is a 
good thing, then this should surely not be limited to those currently labelled as 
non-participants. For whose cultural participation is not limited to some degree 
by that with which they are most familiar and a concomitant fear of the 
unknown? The dedicated opera attendee should be encouraged to attend live DJ 
events; the fan of ballet should be nudged towards the world of graphic novels; 
and local quilting groups should be reaching out to lovers of contemporary 
conceptual art. Neither should this be about requiring these individuals to 
acknowledge these other practices as Art in a process whereby they explain the 
value of what they interact with on existing institutional terms and using the 
value framework with which they are most familiar.  It is not especially 
challenging to bring in representatives of the types of practice with which the 
advocates for the Arts are not familiar so as to offer sanitised or mediated 
performances within the physical spaces and institutional structures that they 
are most familiar with. Instead, these individuals should be encouraged to go to 
the spaces and communities in which these types of practice are based and in 
which the supposed cultural participant may feel as uncomfortable as the 
supposed non-participant is always assumed to be when faced with the 
unfamiliar buildings, specific social rituals, or esoteric language of the Arts. 
These individuals should have the value of the activity explained to them in the 
same manner that they have explained the value of the Arts to those they seek 
to persuade and in the process should find their own values, including their 
adherence to the uniqueness of the experience offered by the Arts challenged.  
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iv. Thinking outside the Arts  
Holden suggests that while “the elision of culture as anthropology and culture as 
‘the arts’ is regrettable, it is unavoidable” (2010, p.20), but to accept it as such is 
to accept the discursive power that this grants the Arts and its agents. Culture is 
not the Arts, and the field of cultural policy should not be constrained by the 
dominant discourses of a single institution no matter how pervasive. In 1978 Su 
Braden suggested that the “great artistic deception of the twentieth century has 
been to insist to all people that this [high arts] was their culture” (p.153).  The 
present research might seek to refine this assertion to suggest that the greatest 
social deception of the twenty-first century has been to insist to all people that 
their cultural participation must be with the Arts and that valuing the Arts must 
be part of their culture if they wish to be valued. For culture is “a dynamic 
renegotiation and reinterpretation of what we are heirs to, plus the constant 
creation of new work and new meanings” (Holden, 2010, p.63), the Arts and its 
institutional discourses are but one part of this. The culturally disenfranchised 
will not gain social justice and cultural equity through increasing access to that 
which cultural professionals think that they should. As Holden (2010) has 
argued, the culture of an open and democratic nation must be open to 
contestation, adaptation and recreation, for cultural equity also demands that 
“every value is itself subject to the force of evaluation” (Connor, 1992, p.3). The 
Arts is not, as those that advocate for it tend to suggest, the ultimate tool by 
which this can be undertaken. Rather it is an aspect of the culture and values of 
certain individuals in certain nations, and as such the privileged position and 
normative status enjoyed by the Arts should not be exempt from any potential 
rupture and critique. Failing to do so is to limit the potential for any progressive 
cultural policy making to the horizon of the thinkable (O’Reagan, 1992a; 1992b) 
at which equality is performed in relation to value judgements that are assumed 
universal.   
 
Researchers have spent a significant amount of time and resource attempting to 
explain why some people choose not to interact with the activities and 
organisations that receive government subsidy. On the basis of this study, it is 
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the belief of this researcher that the time has come to move on from this narrow 
endeavour. The challenge that the findings of this thesis presents to those 
conducting future research in this area is to consider how the dominance of the 
discursive logics of the Arts can be disrupted in the field of cultural policy, and 
in particular how the subject identity of the cultural non-participant can be 
eradicated. This requires a re-orientation of the debate away from questions 
about equal access to cultural consumption and towards the challenge of 
ensuring equitable influence over the means of cultural production. Cultural 
policy and government subsidies are a part of this, and as such there is a need to 
find new ways in which anyone who wants to can find that they are able to 
speak and be heard in the field without having their voices captured by the elite 
network of cultural professionals. For research to do so requires a far greater 
focus on the process of policymaking. Initially, there is a need to understand in 
specific detail how cultural policy decisions are currently made. Such rich 
insight can only be gained through embedded observational and ethnographic 
studies of a type that are, at present, rarely employed to understand the process 
of cultural policy making. Such studies would identify the potential points at 
which disruptive, action orientated research interventions could then be 
conducted that would challenge dominant discursive practices through 
establishing multi-dimensional dialogues that transgress the horizon of the 
thinkable (O’Reagan, 1992a; 1992b) about what cultural policy is and how it 
should be practiced.   
 
However such a reorientation is not straightforward. For in the UK, valuing the 
Arts along with affirming the need for everyone to participate with its 
manifestations has become, like creativity (Osborne, 2003), some sort of moral 
imperative where one finds oneself hard-pressed to take any type of position in 
opposition to it. This poses a difficulty, because progressive cultural 
policymaking and the research needed to engender it requires thinking outside 
of the Arts. Yet it is this that too few researchers seem willing or able to do. 
Perhaps it is because, as Osborne (2003 citing Gell, 1992) notes when 
considering the difficulties faced by anyone researching in this discipline: “of all 
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things, we are unwilling to make a break with the myth of aestheticism, but just 
as one cannot be a sociologist of religion without being a methodological atheist, 
so one cannot be a sociologist of art and literature without being something of a 
methodological philistine” (2003, p.514). Osborne is not suggesting that one 
should be ignorant about methodology, but that for the integrity of a critical 
methodology one should adopt the discursive identity of the philistine. However 
the identity of the philistine or Neanderthal is one that is consistently derided 
by those that seek to defend the Arts (for example, see Barnett et. al., 2015; 
Tusa, 2007) and it is an identity that few researchers seem keen to assume. Yet 
why would they given that statistics suggest their level of education places them 
amongst the culturally privileged whose cultural participation needs are well 
met by the status quo? Furthermore, if a researcher begins to question the Arts, 
it is hard for them to avoid questioning the legitimacy of the institution upon 
which their own status depends, given that the genealogy of its own 
institutional discourses is not that far removed from those that brought the Arts 
into being.  
 
Connor argues that once established “only an institution can dissolve itself” 
(1992, p.3) and this is the paradox at the heart of supposedly liberal institutions 
orientated towards equality. To truly achieve their objective they would be 
required to “enable the anti-institutional diversification of value” (Connor, 1992, 
p.4) that would undermine their own elevated status and privilege. For all that 
some elite may claim progressive intentions, as Gartman notes, in practice they 
“have no interest in eliminating cultural authority per se, but merely in securing 
a greater share of it for themselves” (1991, p.439). As such, they opt to continue 
to conserve and reproduce the values on which their existence relies through 
their management of the discourses that give their practice meaning. And so the 
capacity to engender the change that is required in order to advance a more 
culturally equitable society is perhaps forever limited because of the extent to 
which it is impossible to think outside the discourses of the Arts and the 
discursive logics upon which its relationship with the state is based. For one 
cannot truly question the Arts from within its discursive logic and should one 
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attempt to disavow the Arts then the resultant subjectification as a non-
participant, or philistine, quickly absorbs the would-be insurgent back into a 
dialectical relationship with the institution that they seek to deny. Everyone is 
written upon by the discourses of the Arts irrespective of what choices they 
make, and just as Adorno (1944) argued with regards to what he described as 
the ‘Culture Industry’, any practice that “might emerge as a point of resistance to 
the all-embracing unity of the system is immediately integrated and repressed” 
(Bernstein, 1991, p.9).  
 
For the existence of the discursive identity of the non-participant ensures that 
while some may not participate with any of the physical manifestations of the 
Arts, they have no choice but to participate in the discourses of the institution 
and the logics that they reproduce. For such individuals are unknowingly taken 
into the dispositive and are written upon by its discourses. Having become 
objects in the discourse, they both legitimate the continued financial support of 
the state for the institution that has co-opted culture for itself, and affirm the 
privileged position of the cultural professionals whose social status this 
institution supports.  
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Appendices  
Appendix 1.01 - The discourse of abundant participation  
 
Culture is a completely different thing now […] because we have so much 
access to so many different things. (Interviewee 14)  
 
I see this all the time as I travel the country. There is just a whole lot of 
stuff going on […] from a policy and political point of view it is sometimes 
very difficult to keep track of what you have got […] that is not because 
they haven’t bothered to look, it is because it is complex and it is deep and 
it is rich and, you know, to get a real sense handle on what that ecology is, 
you know, it is quite a big job. (Interviewee 11)  
 
There is an awful lot of engagement, and that is a really good news story 
[…] Here we are in this fabulous city with all of these cultural riches and 
all of this opportunity and whatever people choose to do that is fine. 
(Interviewee 38) 
 
Scotland, it is so rich with so many choices. (Interviewee 11) 
 
…there is an awful lot going on here at the moment [… …] I mean there 
are those that can be a bit overwhelmed sometimes I would have thought. 
(Interviewee 21) 
 
… I think you need to celebrate the fact that we have a culturally rich life, 
and that there are many opportunities for people and that they will be 
participating in those in their own sweet way… (Interviewee 5)  
 
There is lots of cultural participation going on in communities but for 
some reason it is not seen as valid (Interviewee 41)  
 
There is culture happening everywhere. From our farms and orchards to 
hospitals, theatres and our own front rooms”. (Speaker at Public Event 1)  
 
Appendix 1.02 - Cultural participation as artefact  
 
I think out with my art form, which is theatre, I enjoy galleries, exhibitions, 
heritage that sort of thing. (Interviewee 41) 
 
What do engage with personally? Well I will say a little about what that 
means for me, is film, photography, bits of visual arts and a lot of music, but 
it is interesting because I wouldn’t see myself as a participant in any of 
those things. (Interviewee 25)  
 
… I am very much engaged with art, and I absolutely love design; I trained 
as a silversmith. I also write fiction in my spare time so I am very engaged 
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with book festivals, literary events, all those sort of things, and I love live 
music. (Interviewee 20)  
 
…I would talk about fine art galleries, and films and music and possible 
even television. (Interviewee 7)  
 
Appendix 1.03 – Questioning the logics  of the Scottish Household Survey  
 
Yes exactly, sure if you look at gigs, underground culture, sharing music 
through the internet that is predominantly … I am making this up 
obviously, but I think it is quite a male thing, and again I am back to 
football again aren’t I? So yes I think, the way you are talking about 
measurement, I am thinking what is it measuring? Is it of any use to 
anyone? (Interviewee 7)  
 
I think it is quite limiting by…I am very surprised by this and I have heard it 
before but couldn’t believe it… that they don’t include radios and television 
as culture… (Interviewee 20)  
 
…we are wealthy and we do have access to culture in our living rooms, 
through our TV [… …] the perception that people are not going to opera of 
theatre of whatever, no it doesn’t matter because actually it is alright 
compared to other places … (Interviewee 14)  
 
It is interesting that going to comedy isn’t [included in the SHS] 
(Interviewee 12) 
 
It’s interesting how they define culture. Within a city you may have lots of 
people who are not accessing cultural buildings, events etc. but within their 
communities….if they play in a band in the pub then that is culture, there is 
a lot of community stuff that happens that is still culture. That question of 
how we measure it is something we are always working with (Interviewee 
41)  
 
[Talking about the likelihood that the people they worked with had been 
to commercial theatre]. They are still accessing theatre, let’s not take 
anything away from that, let’s not have any kind of snobbery here. 
(Interviewee 41)  
 
[Talking about theatre and gaming] neither of these things should be 
superior over the other and I think that is where we get in to that whole 
thing about the arts being something separate and different but they are 
just things that people do. (Interviewee 38) 
 
Certainly it is possible to be non-engaged in the culture that is listed in the 
SHS or the Taking Part survey in England [… …] People do things in their 
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leisure time but just don’t see those things as cultural in the way we are 
asking about it. (Interviewee 25) 
 
Appendix 1.04 - The impossibility of non-participation  
 
Interviewer: Do you think it is possible for people not to engage with 
culture? 
Interviewee 12: No, probably not actually, I don’t know….. 
Interviewer: OK, but could you perhaps imagine someone who is not 
culturally engaged? 
Interviewee 12: No, I really can’t, actually, because everyone listens to 
music don’t they? Or they go to gigs, watch films 
 
Interviewer: So the national indicator suggests 89% are engaged with 
culture, meaning that 11% don’t 
Interviewee 20: So what are they doing, you would have to wonder 
wouldn’t you! [laughs] 
Interviewer: So you don’t think it is possible? 
Interviewee 20: No, I don’t think it is, because, it really depends, you know, 
you would have to live in a cave … maybe prisoners? But then again they do 
have access to culture in prisons, they have televisions don’t they? Surely 
that is culture? It is culture. We know it is. So I don’t think it is possible, 
unless someone was living in a cave as a hermit  
 
Interviewer: So is it possible to be a cultural non-participant? 
Interviewee 6: No, because everyone is involved in some sort of culture, but 
what we are       talking about here is a much more formal culture in terms 
of some established museums, plays, theatres etc. but I think that anybody 
is going to be involved in something whether it is listening to their CD’s 
playing their video games or…there will be some connection with culture 
for everyone.  
 
I don’t think that the nine percent [referring to the 91% cultural 
engagement statistic180] are people who are able to access culture and 
don’t, I think they are probably people who can’t for some reason as I can’t 
imagine anyone who could access culture not doing something, at least 
once a year. I think that for me is beyond the realms of possibility” 
(Interviewee 13)  
 
So if a non-attender is somebody who you have never reached in anyway, 
who has never darkened the door of a theatre ever, or a concert hall, or a 
cinema or whatever, if you actually think about it in that way then it is 
highly unlikely that there is anybody in the population who has never done 
                                                          
180 There are two figures referenced in the interviews as the national indicator was updated 
from 89% to 91% engagement in 2013  
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any of those things, and in that case everybody is an attender (Interviewee 
19) 
 
Presumably there are people that are non-engaged with culture, in that 
they don’t do cooking or gardening, or…but…but actually they probably 
still watch television. They will still have some interest in the wider culture. 
(Interviewee 25) 
 
Appendix 1.05 - Knowledge of the national indicator  
 
Ok, well I assume there is one, I don’t actually know what it is but I am 
thinking it will be participation in numbers of…. (Interviewee 7) 
 
No, I could probably have a stab at some ideas and things that I might have 
heard, but not as an actual policy. I mean I presume it is something along 
the lines of Scotland is a cultural engaged nation; you know, participate 
and celebrate cultural heritage or something [laughs] (Interviewee 8)  
 
Not necessarily precisely, I mean key performance indicators is what we 
deal with at our level, but in broader terms of what [the indicator] is, I 
don’t think I could repeat back to you exactly what that is (Interviewee 
20) 
 
Appendix 1.06 – Barriers 
 
….and then all of the old conventional barriers of time and money and 
information [PRACTICAL BARRIER] will come (Interviewee 5) 
 
…when people say I just don’t, I dismiss the whole area of cultural activity, I 
am not prepared to engage, participate, even vaguely think about it 
[MENTAL BARRIER], and that is this sort of brick wall [BARRIER] that 
somehow you want to take down (Interviewee 14)  
 
…have they had the opportunity for it to engender excitement in them, or 
speak to them, and if they haven’t then that is something to address, and if 
they have then what is stopping them [BARRIER], it is more physical 
[PHYSICAL BARRIER], it is money [PRACTICAL BARRIER], it is I am 
scared of that building, it all seems for rich people [MENTAL BARRIERS], 
all those things you know all too well. (Interviewee 9) 
 
Those who wish to access culture there shouldn’t be financial barriers 
[PRACTICAL BARRIER] there shouldn’t be social barriers 
[PRACTICAL/PSYCHOLOGICAL BARRIERS], there shouldn’t be 
psychological barriers, there shouldn’t be a sense of elitism, there 
shouldn’t be a cultural landscape within a city whereby culture is for the 
haves form a certain postcode and not for the have nots. (Interviewee 41) 
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Appendix 1.07 - The resilience of distinctions 
 
The question we need to be asking is how do we move the young from 
digital engagement to real engagement? (Attendee at public event 1)   
 
I think what we are trying to address is to look at people with the very 
small maps, who haven’t had a chance to kind of like, haven’t had that 
many opportunities to experience interesting culture and creativity… 
(Interviewee 22)  
 
You can’t just come in and say that we are a brass band and we are going 
to do popular show tunes and everybody in Scotland is going to see it 
because we are going to tour it round…that quality needs to be there 
first (Interviewee 25) 
 
I think if you were picking up a newspaper then you are participating in 
culture, well depends on what newspaper you are reading [laughs] 
(Interviewee 14)  
 
Well no, not the singing kettle, no I have a quality threshold [laughs] 
(Interviewee 5)  
 
Do you mean that maybe going to the opera is better than going to see the 
James Bond film [laughs] (Interviewee 12)  
 
[After recognising the theatre, cinema, shopping as all being valuable in 
some way] …wouldn’t it be an unusual society if people were just inside 
online, or watching movies or online shopping [laughs] but maybe that is 
what is coming our way  (Interviewee 38) 
 
Appendix 1.08 – The centrality of the arts 
 
…we are not responding to policy, we are responding to art…(Interviewee 
14)   
 
…there is an altruism there that they get a general introduction to what 
the arts might be, I am not sure about culture, I would be more inclined to 
use the word, the arts. (Interviewee 21)  
 
Does it include video games and television? Because if it includes culture in 
the widest, creative industries umbrella, then it is probably pretty high, but 
if it is actually talking about the arts and culture as related to the arts 
then it is probably a lot lower (Interviewee 38) 
 
… are we talking purely about the arts here? (Interviewee 3) 
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I think there is a lot of emphasis at the moment on health and well-being 
and, em, how the arts can help various problems. (Interviewee 1)  
 
…that is the fallacy of policy; the money sits in engagement and 
participation not simply in funding the arts” (Interviewee 21)  
 
[talking about who non-participation was a problem for] predominantly 
it’s the organisations problem, and the arts (Interviewee 18) 
 
…the assumption with art is that it holds entertainment anyway, I 
think…but that is art, I am talking about the arts I have realised, which is a 
part of culture… (Interviewee 14)  
 
It is true that when you start to be touched by the arts your life changes, 
you can engage with more complex ideas, you can be a bit more self-aware, 
there are all sorts of really good soft targets that come from people 
engaging with the arts and what is wonderful is that those arguments 
have been absolutely won. But let me say it is not without constant 
missioning, a constant reaffirmation that … you can’t ever be complacent 
that a government will think the arts is good for its population, so we are 
all very good advocates for the arts, but it is a little bit, well just about the 
arts, there are a lot of other things that are fairly transformative on this 
planet, not just the arts (Interviewee 21) 
 
Young people should be accessing the arts for arts sake (Interviewee 41)  
 
Appendix 1.09 - The impacts of cultural participation  
 
I think that art is about enlightenment and so, therefore the, it is vitally 
important that everybody has access to that enlightenment [… …] What we 
are offering is the light bulb moment, the moments of enlightenment […] 
so the education bit is vitally important, which to me is culture, and then 
there is aspiration and that is where enlightenment comes in. 
(Interviewee 14) 
 
…then there is the ambition or will to achieve, to change, and that is about 
empowerment, so that is where culture sits as well, to be able to 
empower people to realise it through whatever means. (Interviewee 14)  
 
…engaging with dance, I personally feel, gives them a voice 
[empowerment], and for many people who don’t feel that they are 
particularly academic, in different ways, or, dance can help in so many 
ways to build bridges for people who feel that they don’t slot in in normal 
ways (Interviewee 2) 
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…. It acts as a sort of societal glue em, in, in makes society function 
more efficiently and more productively and makes children better 
learners (Interviewee 19) 
 
As I understand it, a piece of work has been done that links health 
outcomes and participation in culture and all things being equal you are 
told that people have better health outcomes, regardless of class, 
location anything like that, if they are culturally engaged and intuitively I 
do believe that, and I believe communities work better when there is a 
cultural offer and people are culturally engaged. (Interviewee 25)  
  
Our culture and our heritage root us in a place but don’t fix us in a place – 
they help to empower, enrich and shape our communities (Hyslop, 2013) 
Appendix 1.10 - The arts and…. 
 
We want a Scotland where everyone actively values and celebrates arts 
and creativity as the heartbeat for our lives (Creative Scotland, 2014c, 
p.13) 
 
Arts and creativity offer meaning to people’s lives in many different ways. 
(Creative Scotland, 2014c, p.48) 
 
[SHS question] I would now like to ask about your views on culture, 
heritage and the arts  
Appendix 1.11 - Hard to reach  
 
[all our work] is aimed at excluded young people, or hard to reach young 
people… (Interviewee 4)  
…we’ve been developing a project which is about how to reach hard to 
reach young people between 16 and 18. (Interviewee 19) 
…and in Scotland it is that hard to reach communities that are too 
distant…(Interviewee 20 
 
Appendix 1.12 – The right kind of experience  
 
After a cultural experience people usually feel better, as long as the 
experience is well handled (Interviewee38)  
 
Somebody going that they would rather be at home listening to the radio 
because they think theatre is a bit shit, now that is hard because have they 
had the experience of good theatre (Interviewee 41)  
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Appendix 1.13 - Personal taste 
 
I am not surprised, because that is what human beings are like, we live in 
a skin, and it is very difficult for us to think beyond that (Interviewee 21) 
 
[Discussing Jazz, Folk and World Music] I just don’t identify with them 
in anyway, I see people who are performing and engaged and interested in 
the subject and I just, it finds no connection with me at all and so I look 
upon it as an alien, and not even an alien that thinks I don’t really 
understand it but it is kind of beautiful [laughs] I am more likely to think 
why are you bothering, just stop! (Interviewee 8) 
 
…in my head I am thinking computers and gaming and internet and all the 
culture that is on there is completely alien to me, completely alien, I mean 
certainly the gaming culture, it has absolutely no interest to me […] the 
thing is I could if I spent the hours on it that others do but I don’t because 
it doesn’t interest me. (Interviewee 38) 
 
People would just say to me that it is because I don’t know how to enjoy 
opera so it is about learning a language and learning about the history of 
the art form to open all that up to you, but I think it is important not to 
have to do all of that….I mean if I don’t like it now, I just don’t like 
listening to music in that sort of way (Interviewee 25)  
 
Interviewer: Is it ever ok for someone to say actually that is not for me  
Interviewee 20: Absolutely 
Interviewer: So why do we have such an issue, do we think that everything 
is for everyone, is that realistic to believe?      
Interviewee 20: I don’t think it is a real aspiration because I don’t like 
boxing and nobody is going to persuade me to go and see it, you know … it 
is personal taste and personal choice 
Appendix 1.14 - It’s OK not to say it is not for me 
 
I think I’ve always felt that there aren’t that many sort of people out there 
that … who, who don’t use us but just don’t know that it really is for them, if 
you see what I mean. So I think that is a very small group and it’s a little bit 
superior for, for, you know, people to imagine that the only reason this isn’t 
being used is because, you know, these people, that we know better than 
these people themselves (Interviewee 3)  
 
With the non-attender I would be worried if they have never been given 
that opportunity, but if they have chosen, if they have done it and gone that 
it really wasn’t for me, I kind of think that is OK   (Interviewee 38)  
 
..there are all sorts of personal tastes which are perfectly legitimate… 
(Interviewee 19) 
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…it is a bit of a stupid idea to think that everybody should be interested in 
art and culture … it would be a strange world if everybody was actually… 
(Interviewee 12)  
 
…some people’s cultural participation might be going to the cinema and 
listening to music and they might not care or ever be interested in anything 
else and that is fine! (Interviewee 12)  
 
…it is fine, its fine by me, I don’t have a problem with that, I mean I am not 
encouraging people to come, at most I would be asking them to buy a ticket 
and to make up their own mind, that is all really (Interviewee 21)  
 
Appendix 1.15 - Openness to participation  
 
I would probably give everything a go, particularly if somebody else was 
paying [laughs] (Interviewee 7)  
 
…but no, I am pretty eclectic really... (Interviewee 11)  
 
[directly after they have said they are quite happy not to be going to 
opera] But I am lucky enough to be engaged in, or involved in or 
participate in a lot…a range of culture… (Interviewee 19) 
 
I wouldn’t want to go and see the ballet and that is my choice, but I’m not 
taking anything away from those art forms and I would go if I had to. 
(Interviewee 41)  
 
[After stating that they would not choose to go themselves] If someone 
was going to give me a free ticket I might go to a classical concert 
(Interviewee 38) 
 
Appendix 1.16 - I can stretch myself  
 
….books it is generally, really basically… I would see what I bought on 
Amazon and then see what they recommend for you based on what you 
have bought, and Eventbrite is very good, sending you through emails 
asking if you would like to go to this too [… …] that is good because I learn 
about things that I absolutely wouldn’t have known about. Facebook is a 
really good one for that as well. (Interviewee 26)  
 
Interviewer: So the presumption is that you have made an informed choice 
not to go, even the things that you have never been to before? 
Interviewee 41: Yeah…  
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They know and I know that if I wanted to and if I could afford it I could get 
myself a ticket and off I go (Interviewee 41) 
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Appendix 2.01 – Oral consent form 
 
 
 
My name is David Stevenson and I am a PhD research candidate from the School 
of Arts, Social Science and Management at Queen Margaret University in 
Edinburgh.  I am currently undertaking a research project provisionally entitled: 
Everyone’s invited, but do they want to come? This study is investigating the 
Scottish Government’s policy to encourage greater participation in culture, and 
in particular why, despite many years of focus, cultural participation patterns 
remain broadly unchanged. This study has been granted ethical approval by 
Queen Margaret University.  
 
I am currently looking for volunteers to participate in the project. Anyone 
volunteering to participate should be over 16 years of age and fit into one of two 
broad categories: 
 
1. Be involved in the creation of cultural policy at a strategic level, or work 
within an organisation that does. 
2. Be involved in the creation or delivery of activity intended to increase 
cultural participation within a cultural organisation that receives some 
form of public money.  
 
If you agree to participate in the study, you will be asked to take part in a 
recorded interview, either one-to-one with the interviewer or alongside others 
that you know. The whole procedure should take approximately one hour. You 
will be free to withdraw from the study at any stage and you would not have to 
give a reason, you do not have to answer any questions you do not want to. You 
are also free to request that the interview is not recorded.  
 
All data will be anonymised as much as possible, but you may be identifiable 
from tape recordings of your voice that will only be heard by the researcher and 
their supervisors. While your name and organisation will be listed as a 
participant in the research, any direct quotations will not be attributable to you. 
If you wish, your name will be replaced with a pseudonym in any written 
documentation, and any aspects of your interview that reveal you identity can 
be redacted. The results of this study may be published in a journal, monograph 
or presented at a conference. The recordings and any transcripts that are made 
will be kept secure in password-protected files and only seen by the researcher 
and their supervisors. 
 
If you would like to contact an independent person, who knows about this 
project but is not involved in it, you are welcome to contact Dr Mark Gillham.  
His contact details are given overleaf. If you have read and understood this 
information sheet, any questions you had have been answered, and you would 
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like to be a participant in the study, then I will take your participation in the 
interview as consent to contribute to this study. 
 
Thank you for your interest in this research  
 
 
 
 
David Stevenson MA, AFHEA 
 
Contact details of the researcher 
Name of researcher: David Stevenson 
Address:  PhD Candidate 
   School of Arts, Social Science and Management 
Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh 
   Queen Margaret University Drive 
Musselburgh 
East Lothian  EH21 6UU 
Email / Telephone: dstevenson@qmu.ac.uk / 0131 474 0000 
 
Contact details of the independent adviser  
Name of adviser: Dr Mark Gillham 
Address:  Head of Division  
Queen Margaret University, Edinburgh 
   Queen Margaret University Drive 
Musselburgh 
East Lothian  EH21 6UU 
Email / Telephone: mgillham@qmu.ac.uk/ 0131 474 0000 
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